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S The British Empire "gives an impression of unsystematic 
genius in the Englishman, who has no senseiof structural 
beauty or orderly creation. To him nothing isjwrong, 
however illogical, so long as the machine works. " 
(Berliner Tageblatt, 20th August 1938. ) 
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-Abstract 
This 'thesis studies the modes of collaboration between the members 
of the British Commonwealth in foreign affairs, with particular emphasis 
on the United Kingdom's methods of keeping the other members informed 
and ascertaining their views. It is not an attempt at a comprehensive 
survey of the foreign relations of the U. K. or the individual Dominions, 
but is designed as a study of the attitudes towards collaboration over 
the span of nearly a decade, using specific examples of successful or 
deficient collaboration to illustrate the policy of the U. K. and its 
response to the attitudes of its partners. 
The first chapter takes the'form of a survey of; Commonwealth relations 
in the late 1930s. The second chapter considers Commonwealth collaboration 
during the first five years of the war, with special attention to two 
aspects; the transmission of information to the Dominions and their 
participation in the higher direction of the war. The next chapter 
, concentrates on the U. K. 's plans for the post-war period, specifically 
the representation of the association internationally and the F. O. 's 
consideration of methods by which the U. K. could increase contacts between 
the member countries. In the fourth chapter attention is given to 
the policies of the Dominion Governments and their plans for the 
Commonwealth after the war, both in terms of the international position 
of the Commonwealth and their individual association with it. Chapter 
five studies the only war-time Prime Ministers' Meeting, in 1944, at 
which the member states discussed the establishment of the proposed 
9 
world organisation and the Commonwealth's association with it, and 
measures to improve collaborafton within the Commonwealth. 
Chapter six considers the degree of harmony in the policies of the 
member countries on some important aspects of international policy, such 
as the, Great Power veto or the position of 'middle' ranking states 
II 
within the U. N. The dual role of the'U. K. as a member of the 
Commonwealth and of the Great Power elite is also studied with a view 
to assessing the compatibility of these two. The next chapter considers 
the U. K. 's attempts to promote close collaboration at the various 
international conferences between 1944 and 1946 and the efforts made 
to produce a bonsensus on policy. The 1945 San Francisco Conference 
is looked at in particular detail to demonstrate the contact which took 
place between Commonwealth Ministers and officials. In chapter eight 
three examples of collaboration on aspects of U. K. policy - the-1946 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the re-negotiation of the treaties with France 
and the U. S. S. R. in the same year - are studied as examples of problems 
which remained in Commonwealth collaboration in the, post=war. The 
latter two illustrate the importance of the U. K. 's attitude with regard 
to transmitting information in advance of policy decisions, and the 
difficulties entailed by the divergence in Dominion attitudes. Consideration 
is also given to the role of the Dominion High Commissioners in London, 
in terms of the information provided for them and their status within 
the diplomatic community. Finally, chapter nine looks ahead to the 
expansion of the Commonwealth and the key position of India. This 
does not involve a study of Anglo-Indian relations, or the U. K. 's policy 
in granting , India independence. It considers three issues raised 
by 
the independence of India and the question of its future association 
with the Commonwealth: first, the effect on the U. K. 's policy of 
transmitting information to fellow members; secondly, the stimulus 
which India's new status provided for the r. 0. to reconsider its position 
in relation to Commonwealth liaison; thirdly, the discussions which 
were prompted about the fundamental basis of the Commonwealth relationshfp 
and the feasibility of permitting a republican state to be a member. 
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Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations refer to material in the Public Record 
Office, London: 
DO Dominions Office Records 
, FO Foreign Office Records- 
CAB Cabinet Office Records 
Prem Prime-Minister's Office Records 
CP Cabinet Paper 
WP liar Cabinet Paper 
CM Cabinet Minutes ý'' 
WM° War Cabinet üinutes º 
The following abbreviation refers to material in the Public Archives, 
Ottawa: 
MG26, J1 & J4 - King Papers 
Various Printed Sources have been abbreviated in the footnotes, although 
the references are contained in full in the Bibliography. Thus the 
Selections from the Smuts Papery edited by J. Van der, Poel, are referred 
to as the Smuts Papers, with appropriate volume and number assigned. 
The printed edition of King's diary, edited by J. W. Pickersgill in the 
Mackenzie King Record, is referred to by title, volume and page number. 
Where the original manuscript has been used, the date of the entry has 
been given. The printed Documents on Canadian External Relations are 
footnoted as Canadian Documents; similarly the published Documents 
on Australian Foreign Policy are footnoted as Australian Documents and 
the Documents Relating to New Zealand's participation in the'Second`World,, 
War are noted as N. Z. Documents. Elsewhere, secondary sources are noted' 
in full the first time they are drawn upon in each chapter. 
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Introduction 
The machinery created to further Commonwealth collaböration in 
foreign affairs was not constructed all at once from a blue-print. 
Rather, it grew gradually over a span of years in response to'the* 
constitutional advance of the Dominions and their increasing interest 
in world affairs. The first half of the twentieth-century saw 
periodic additions to the system employed by the members to keep in 
contact with each other, rather than any major revisions of that system, 
and not all channels of communication used were adopted by every member. 
' 
Generally new methods of collaboration were added without abandoning 
previous ones. One of the earliest practices of direct Prime' 
Ministerial contact - was permanently retained, although some Dominions 
wanted to use their High Commissioners as the principal means of 
communication, as foreign states used their ambassadors. The U. K. 
2 
was particularly keen to keep 
, 
this direct link between the leaders, 
especially when the Dominions became more independently minded. 
The establishment of the D. O. in 1925 had marked an explicit 
recognition of the difference between the Dominions and the colonies. 
The office had a fairly modest early history as a junior Whitehall 
department and the facts that its first Secretary of State, Mr. Leo 
Amery, (who had played a major role in the establishment of the D. O. ) 
was also Colonial Secretary, and that the D. O. was housed in the same 
building as the C. O. sharing many administrative facilities, made it 
difficult for the D. O. to be regarded as wholly independent of the 
1. For example Australia appointed a Political Liaison officer to the. -,, 
Cabinet Offices of the U. K. in 1925, but New. Zealand was the only 
Dominion to follow this example and it did so only in 1937. 
2. See chapter 9, p. 436. 
VI 
C. 0.3 After the 1926 Imperial Conference and the clarification of 
the Dominions' autonomous status in the Balfour Report, plans were 
begun to establish a network of U. K. representatives in the Dominions, 
charged to represent Eritish'interests. The traditional link between 
the Governors-General in the Dominions and the U. K. was inappropriate 
because the Governor-General. was"the personal representative of the 
King, not of the U. K. Government. The first High Commissioner to be 
appointed was to the senior Dominion, Canada, and Sir William Clark 
took up office there in April 1928. Thereafter appointments were made 
during the next decade to the other Dominions. 
4 
On Amery's insistence, the High Commissioners wgre not narrow 
diplomatic representatives and the title of 'Minister' ort 'Ambassador' 
was rejected to preserve a distinction between the close 'family' 
relationship within the Commonwealth. The High commissioners represented 
the full spectrum of British interests in the Dominions, but the D. O. 
secured its authority to act as the office responsible for these 
representatives and the sole channel of communication with them. 
Accordingly, Prime Ministerial correspondence passed through D. O. channels. 
The first High Commissioners chosen were men with varied Whitehall 
experience, although none was from the Foreign Service. Gradually the 
D. O. furnished the High Commissions with more men from its own ranks, 
as it built up a body of experienced officials, and by 1936 this extended 
to the senior post of High Commissioner, with Sir Geoffrey Whiskard's 
3. For further details on the establishment of the D. O. see: P. G. 
Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian 
Relations 1917-1926 (C. U. P. 1977) pp. 256-257; G. N. Hillmer, 
An lo-Canadian Relations 1926-1937: A study of Canada's role in the 
shaping of commonwealth policies (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1974) pp. 3-4; Rt. Hon Lord Garner, The 
Commonwealth office, 1925-1968 (London 1978) pp. 10-32. 
4. For further details on the appointment of High commissioners see 
Garner, op. cit., pp. 33-47; Hillmer, op. cit., chapter 2; L. H. 
Wilmot, The Functions and Activities of the British High Commissioner 
from 1928-39, with particular emphasis on the British High Commission 
at Ottawa (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Birkbeck College, London, 1977). 
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appointment to Australia s However, there was in practice a, balance 
between the appointment of D. O. and non-D. O. officials as High 
Commissioners and later some politicians were also appointed. The 
fact, that. the D. 0, became an"overseas service, was of considerable 
advantage to it. Officials were able to consider Commonwealth 
relations in o'light of. their own experience of one ormore""Dominions 
and the personal contacts they, had established with rominion Ministers 
and officials. When. these officials, were posted in the overseas 
Commonwealth, they were-able to begin with the benefit of-a knowledge 
and understanding of Commonwealth relations. Perhapslthe full- 
advantage of this did not-come-to fruition until the 1950s. and 1960s, 
as the., senior officials of. the D. O., before that-time, -Sir Edward Harding, 
Sir Eric., Machtig,, and Sir"John Stephenson, had not served abroad. 
Later when men such as Sir-Alexander Clutterbuck, Ben Cockram, Lord 
Garner, Sir Walter Hankinson, Stephen, -Holmes and Sir Percivale Lieschingý 
had reached the top posts, the full. benefits of this dual,, experience., 
could be called upon. However, by the 1940s the D. O. did contain many 
men with wide experience and understanding of. service in London and 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. 
6 
Commonwealth relations have always been characterised-by two 
seemingly irreconcilable trends. On the one hand stand the close 
historical and racial ties, stimulating association; on the other, 
the attraction of independent action. To a large-extent the study 
of the Commonwealth in any period reflects these twin forces, but 
perhaps none especially so than the period 1939-1947. The Dominions' 
participation in the war and their increased international status at 
its conclusion strengthened both trends, but particularly the inclination, 
to act independently in international affairs. By 1945 the Dominions 
5. See chapter 2, p. 112. 
6. For details of the careers of these men, see Appendix I. 
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had three courses open to them: ' to act as individual` states with no 
close alignment with any other-'Power; to', be part of'a close-knit 
Commonwealth group, pursý; ng a common policy; or to'combine their 
independent identities 
The U. K. had meanwhile 
this plus the full par 
international affairs, 
with co-operative action within the Coiuonwealth. 
been weakened by its massive war effort and 
ticipation. of the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. in 
relegated the U. K. in the hierarchy of states. 
This prompted a greater awareness by the U. K. of the value of its 
Commonwealth partners as a support to its power and influence, and 
resulted in attempts to promote greater collaboration with the Dominions. 
The reconciliation of this desire with the Dominions' tendencies to 
'act independently posed a problem which required sensit. ve handling 
and an even greater degree of'flexibilityin the treatment of the 
individual Dominions than before. There had always been variations in 
the pattern of U. K. -Dominions relations, but the post-war period demanded 
an even clearer acceptance ofýthe principle that Commonwealth relations 
had to combine a system of bi-lateral collaboration, with group 
collaboration. ' There'could be no question of forcing a minority of 
members to join a co-operative scheme when they did not wish to. 
There were many disagreements about 
policy 
and the methods of 
collaboration in the 1940s, but perhaps the most important aspect of 
Commonwealth relations in this decade lay in the continued efforts made 
to find a mutually acceptable basis for collaboration which would permit 
the twin forces of association and independence to co-exist and not 
force members to choose between subservience to a rigid common policy, 
or opt for secession from theaCommonwealti. The period 1939-1947 was, 
chosen for this study in order to contrast the modes of collaboration 
existing before the war with those of thellate 1940s, and to show 
how attitudes had changed. 
Ix 
The decision to study this period has meant restrictions-on the 
kl. 
areas of Commonwealth collaboration which it has; been possible to study. 
;' One aspect omitted, despite its close affinity with foreign-affairs 
is defence or military collaboration. Apart from the limits of time 
and space, this aspect has been left out because it had already been 
covered fairly thoroughly in published documents and books. In the 
Australian official histories, of the war there are volumes covering 
the actions of all three Australian' Services and the published Australian 
Documents also contain some valuable material. The New Zealand Documents 
are primarily concerned with the military aspect of New Zealand's war 
effort and these are well supplemented by F. L. Wood's book The New 
I 
Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs. For Canada, 
there are official histories on the Canadian Navy and Army during the 
war, while Colonel C. P. Stacey's'Arms, Men and Governments: The War 
Policies of Canada gives an excellent coverage of Canada's military 
policies and defence co-operation with the U. K. There are also several 
official'volumes'on South'Africa's military contribution to the war. 
In addition there are a number of secondary sources which give accounts 
of the actual collaboration of the Commonwealth"in terms of the military 
comaiitment'of'each to the fighting'and'the co-ordination of those 
defence policies. 'While making some reference to defence policies, 
this thesis therefore offers no extended treatment of that aspect of 
collaboration. " .r 
F' 
The Pacific war and relations with the U. S. A. were of special concern 
to Australia and-New Zealand and I have, tried-to indicate these two, 
Dominions' preoccupation with the Pacific and the . 
impact of closer 
relations with the U. S. A. on their relations with. the-Commonwealth. 
ýýý 
However, there is a considerable body of literature which specifically 
studies the'policies of the U. S. A., the U. K. and the two antipodean 
" '° X 
Dominions and in many-instances-I have made references to these for 
further consideration. Some of the best sources are by Roger J. Bell, 
Unequal Allies: Australia-American Relations and the, Pacific War; -Paul 
. 
Raggie, Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against 
Japan, 1931-1941; W. R. Louis, ýImperialism-at Bay, -1941-1945; The`United 
States and th"t decolonisation of the British Empire; Trevor-Reese, 
Australia , 'New Zealand and. the United States; A"surle of International 
Relations, 1941-1968; - Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind:. United 
States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941-1945, and Ian Hamill, 
The'Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the defence of. 
Australia and New Zealand,, 1919-42. 
The other Dominion to have particularly close relations with the 
U. S. A. was Canada, due to, its close geographical proximity. American- 
Canadian. relations have ,a longer history and a larger store of literature 
than Australia or New, Zealand's relations with the U. S., and this'is 
really a subject in its own right. I have attempted, to. inform the 
reader of the occasions when-American policy had, a particular bearing 
on Canadian policies, but-it-is important to keep Canada's preoccupation 
with the U. S. A. constantly-in mind when considering almost any aspect 
of Canadian attitudes towards the Commonwealth, or-international affairs 
in general. , 
Widening-the horizon, Canada was also-concerned-during 
this period with the Pan American Union, although itýnever joined the 
body. This facet has been omitted from the thesis as also requiring 
consideration in its own right,. but again the-reader would be wise to 
remember that in-as-much as South Africa was concerned with-the events 
in the rest-of its continent, and the-Antipodean Dominions with the 
a 
actions in the Pacific area, Canada was constantly keeping a watch on 
the policies and actions throughout the American continent. - This 
area was one of the first to which it sent accredited representatives. 
7 
7. See especially R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, Ties That Bind: 
Canadian American Relations in Wartime From the Great War to the 
Cold War (Toronto, 1977). 
XI 
The thesis studies the Commonwealth members who fought in the 
Second World War, and deliberately excludes any detailed consideration 1 
of Eire. Eire remained"a member of the Commonwealth until 1948, but 
in many respects as a non-participating member. As anon-belligerent 
it could not join in discussion of war strategy and although it retained 
diplomatic ralations with the other members, it was a Dominion with 
special status and cannot easily be considered on a 
par 
with the others. 
For studies on Eire, see D. W. Harkness, The Restless Dominion: The 
Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (London 
1969); J. T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years, 1939145 (Newton Abbot 
1975); and P. N. S. Mansergh, The Preclude to'Partition: Concepts and 
Aims in Ireland and India (C. U. P. 1978). 
The issues chosen in. this study to illustrate the attitudes towards 
collaboration, and the machinery implemented to further it, have been 
selected to demonstrate the attitudes of all members and the reaction 
of the U. K. to each. The concentration on the policies of Canada and 
Australia stems from three factors. First, they were the most active 
Dominions internationally; secondly, they often held divergent views 
about collaboration, representing either end of the spectrum of 
Commonwealth opinion; and thirdly, because the foreign policies of 
Canada and Australia are better documented than those of the other two 
Dominions. I have also tried to balance Commonwealth collaboration 
within an international context with collaboration on narrower, inter- 
Commonwealth or specifically U. K. issues. Thus the thesis considers 
the association within the context of the U. N., the reaction of the 
Dominions to the U. K. 's consultation procedures during the re-negotiation 
"w 
of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1946, the status of High Commissioners 
jt` 
in London and the actions of the F. O. in promoting communications with 
Commonwealth officials. The network of Commonwealth collaboration 
XII 
extended from the Prime Ministers down to junior officials; and I 
have tried to indicate this range. 
I 
The principal sources used in this study were the records, of the 
Dominions Office, (later the, Commonwealth Relations Office) the Foreign 
Office and the Cabinet Office. From the papers of the"Dominions Office 
I have chiefly used two sets of files; the General Correspondence, 
D. 0.35, and the Private ÖEfice Files, D. 0.121. " The General Correspondence 
files which, contain the principal despatches to and from the Dominions, 
plus the internal office minuting, are only available-up until the year 
1946. (Production of the C. R. O. 's papers in this category has, been 
delayed by some problems over the arrangement of the papers-. ) However, 
I 
many of the Private Office papers are open for theýyearsjup to 1950. 
As a result of this situation for the latter part, of the thesis, 
especially the chapter on India's entry, I have had to rely upon some 
Private Office papers, supplemented by those from the Foreign Office -- 
and the Cabinet Office. 
Two officials of the Dominions Office who reached senior positions 
have written some account of their time at the office. Sir Charles 
Dixon, Assistant Under-Secretary and later constitutional adviser wrote 
his memoirs in 1969. These were hot published, but a copy was given 
to the Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society and I was-kindly given 
access to them. Lord Garner, who was a Principal in the Dominions 
Office in 1945, and later\reached the position of Permanent Under-Secretary 
of the Commonwealth Relations Office, has published a book entitled 
The Commonwealth Office, 1925-1968 which contains many interesting 
insights into the working of the Dominions Office, especially"about 
a 
many of the individuals involved in Commonwealth Relations. 
The Foreign Office was increasingly involved in the U. K. 's relations 
with the Dominions from the late 1930s and some valuable information 
XIII 
can be gained from, this Office's. papers. In addition I have also used 
these papers to give some indication of occasions in which the attitudes 
of the Foreign Office, or certain individuals within it, did not 
correspond with the view of the Dominions Office. In the main I have 
drawn upon the files of the Dominions Intelligence Department (later 
called the Cdtmonwealth Liaison Department), which was the department 
in the Foreign Office established to provide. information on foreign 
affairs to-the Dominion Governments, via the Dominions Office. Later 
this department also actively promoted more direct . consultations with 
Dominion officials and by the late 1940s the U. K. had'to re-consider 
its apportioning of responsibility for foreign affairs. collaboration 
i between the Foreign Office and the Dominions Office. ' 
In addition to the minutes and memoranda of the U. K. Cabinet, 
various Cabinet Office files contain minutes and memoranda of Cabinet 
committees. established to discuss some aspects. of Commonwealth Relations. 
There are also full records of the major Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
meetings in Cabinet papers, as well as in those of the Dominions Office. 
Some material from Premier Files,. containing minutes by the Prime 
Minister of the day, have been used, especially those, by. Churchill 
during the war. , 
However, Premier'8, which contains Attlee's, Minutes, 
I found to, b, e of very, limited value for. this particular subject. 
Another body of primary source upon. which I. was able to draw was 
that of the Canadian Public Archives;, -I have the Canadian Government 
and the University of Leeds to thank; for helping to finance the visit. 
The opportunities for travelling abroad were limited by considerations 
of time and expense and I decided that because the Canadian, External 
Affairs. Department was the most fully developed of all the Dominions rýý' 
for this period, a visit to Canada would be the most productive. As 
a result, I have been able to include some material from Canadian 
i 
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? "`' sources' to supplement the main U. K. documents. 
In'addition to these archival sources I have used the published 
documents of the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian Governments. 
These do-riot yet provide a full--coverage for` these, Dominions, as 
the Australian and Canadian documents are not yet published for the 
whole period; while the New. Zealand documents, produced much earlier, ' 
are primarily-concerned with the'military/political 
policy 
of the 
New Zealand Government vis-a-vis the deployment'of New Zealand troops. 
There is some information about the Government's views on collaboration, 
particularly on. the subject of New Zealändxepresentation in the high 
direction of the war, but whether the lackýof information on New 
Zealand's policies towards-collaboration is'due to the absence of 
documents or due to its nascent Department'of External Affairs, or 
merely the choice of the editor, is uncertain',, ' There are`'no published 
documents covering the policies of the South African Government. 
Two of the four Dominion'Prime Ministers have left semi'-documentary 
sources. ' Smuts" personal corresponden'ce', 'a""selection of which has been 
published by Jean Van der P$ 1, contains some valuable material on Smuts' 
views and the internal situation in South Africa. 'The{ Canadian Prime 
Minister, W. 'L. M. King, kept a full diary for most of his political 
life published in an abridged form in The'Mackenzie'King Record. Since 
I also had'access to the original manuscript of this Diary, the reader 
will find references to both the unpublished-and the published Diary. 
The other diary which I'was able to study was that of the Canadian High 
Commissioner to the U. K. from 1935-1946, Mr. Vincent Massey. This is 
held in Massey College, Üniversity of Toronto. My thanks are extended r f-"ý 
.s' 
to Mr. Claude Bissell for-facilitating access'to Massey's diary. 
The copious files in the U. K. "archives, and the plentiful minutes 
contained therein, have enabled me to`form an'impression'of the opinions 
xv 
of individuals and departments on many of the crucial issues and acquire 
some sense) of the framework in which Ministers and officials approached 
questions of Commonwealth collaboration. Sir Charles Dixon's 
Memoirs and Lord Garner's book have assisted this process and I was able 
to have one conversation with the late Malcolm MacDonald. One other 
figure involved in this period of Commonwealth relations, to whom I posed 
a number of questions, was-Professor John W. Holmes, 
\lately 
of the Canadian 
External Affairs Department. Professor Holmes had just finished reviewing 
the archival sources for the purpose of writing a two-volume work on 
Canadian foreign policy and was thus well re-acquainted with the events 
of the 1940s, and made many interesting comments. I have supplemented 
i 
these materials by references to a variety of secondary 
sources, books 
and articles, the most useful of which I have listed in the bibliography. 
As well as studying the policies of the various Governments towards 
Commonwealth collaboration, I have tried to shed light on the actions, 
opinions and abilities of some of the people at the centre of events. 
For this purpose I have had to rely on the comments of other people 
involved as well as upon the conclusions drawn from reading the letters 
and minutes in the archives. Where there exist differing opinions 
and judgments I have tried to include them and it has not been my 
intention to make definitive judgments about the careers of these men. 
However, I do feel that knowledge of the personal side of Commonwealth 
relations, the attitudes of individuals to each other, assists an 
understanding of* the way in which the several Governments collaborated 
together. Because of the unique historical roots of the Commonwealth, 
it was, at least until 1949, an extremely close 'family' group and 
r 
within it, the interaction of individuals was possibly more relevant 
f". 
L 
to the success or failure of co-operation than would be the case in the 
relations between two foreign countries. Finally, due to the large 
XVI 
number of people involved in some capacity in Commonwealth collaboration, 
I have included in the appendices short bibliographical sketches of 
the principal characters to aid the reader in the problem of identification 
and listed the holders of the"main offices. 
~' 
u f) 
t Fl/ 
1 
Chapter One 
k rr.. 
Commonwealth Relations before the Second World War 
i".. }sr . 
During the 1930s the British Commonwealth was in the process of 
adapting its relations to the constitutional framework defined the 
/. h Qretý,, cý ýjjýe 
ý/ý4ý71ýý% 1 1926 and endorsed 
A 
the 1931 
The Commonwealth was not an Alliance established for specific purpses; 
rather it was an association of like-minded, 'indepen ent countries, equal 
with one another and committed to collaboration in matters of mutual 
interest. It was an evolving' association which had emerged from 
earlier Eritish'expansion overseas. Its ties were a mixture of 
practicality and sentiment. On the one hand stood the iinportant'linksr' 
of race, culture, religion and similar institutions, which were for 
many so importantly symbolised by the British monarchy, to which all 
paid allegiance. On the other hand, political, economic and defence 
agreements bound the members together. Commonwealth collaboration 
embraced almost all spheres of human activity, governmental-and non- 
governmental; politics, trade, culture, sport and family relationships. 
The Commonwealth was frequently referred to as a 'family of nations' 
and the members tried to retain their mutual links because of feelings 
of race and friendship and, not least, self-interest, however ill-defined. 
In the sphere of foreign affairs the latter was particularly strong 
as the Dominions viewed.. a world without a powerful U. K. as likely to 
be a more dangerous place for them, and the U. K. valued the prestige 
and potential strength which its leadership of the Commonwealth was 
felt to provide. During the'-1930s the Commonwealth countries tried 
to develop ways of harmonisinEr their foreign policies without prejudices 
to the new basis of their relationship. 1 
1. P. N. S. Mansergh,. Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth 
Affairs, 1931-1952 (London 1953), Vol. 1, pp. 1-3. 
2 
The Commonwealth countries had fought together in the First World 
War, participated as independent powers in the Peace Conference and 
became founding members of the League of Nations. The U. K. assumed 
after the First World War that the Dominions wished to participate 
in its foreign policy, but the Chanak crisis of 1922 showed Canada's 
11 desire to coßtrol its own foreign policy and not to be committed to the 
U. K. 's, or participate in a common Commonwealth poliy. The lessons 
to be drawn from this were evident in the 1925 Locarno Treaty which 
provided for Dominion accession, but did not require it. 
2. The Balfour 
Declaration of 1926 and the 1931 Statute of Westminster firmly 
established the right of all members to form their own foreign policies 
and in the 1930s the association began to put the twin concepts of 
independence and co-operation into practice. As the decade progressed 
the Dominions increased their activity in foreign affairs in terms of 
their actions at Geneva, their interest in the deteriorating international 
situation, and increasing the'number of people appointed to formulate 
and carry out their foreign policies. The greatest stiuulus for this 
development was undoubtedly the crisis in European and Far Eastern 
relations, but the most striking feature of the Commonwealth's approach 
to foreign affairs in the 1930s va's the different attitude of each 
towards the international situation and towards the issue of inter- 
Commonwealth collaboration. The pre-requisite for a common Commonwealth 
foreign policy was a substantial identity of views on both these issues; 
the Commonwealth of the 1930s did not possess it. 
2. For detailed studies of the Commonwealth in the 1920s and 1930s 
see P. N. S. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London 1969); 
P. N. S. Mansergh, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of _ 
External Policy 1931-1939 (O. U. P. 1952); G. Carter, The British 
Commonwealth and. International Securit : The Role of the Dominions 
1919-1939 (Toronto 1947); R. Ovendale, Appeasement and the English- 
Speaking eaki World: Britain the United States the Dominions and the 
policy of appeasement 1937-1939 (Cardiff 1975 ; R. F. Holland, 
Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939 (Macmillan, London 
1981T. 
3 
The senior Dominion, Canada', 'which had welcomed the recognition 
of the Dominions' independence from the U. K., solidly took the position 
that'Canada could not be expected to make any prior commitments-to the 
U. K.; it was an independent, country,, responsible for its own policies 
and would decide upon its actions in light of the situation. Its 
Prime Ministc from 1935, W. L. M. King, 'believed very strongly that 
to frame common policies in an association of free and equal countries 
would weaken, not strengthen, the unity of the association and eventually 
divide it. He stood by the thesis 'that they were like-minded countries 
and would tend to stand together in a crisis because their attitudes 
atd"interests were similax, 'not'because they. were committed to do-. so. 
This opinion was certainly reinforced by Canada's domestic situation, 
especially the substantial French Canadian population and its close 
proximity to"the U. S. A. Canadian Governments picked-a careful way, 
between their powerful neighbour and their, trans-Atlantic partner, while. 
at the same time anticipating accusations from French Canadians that 
they were"the puppets of the'U. K. ''Government. y. This was especially.: 
relevant for a Liberal, 'g'overnment', such as King's, which tended to 
rely on a large French-Canadian vote. 
3 
King welcomed the information' sent from London about foreign 
affairs, but, not requests for formal consultation or expressions, of 
opinion on, or support for, U. K. policy. " By so'doing he hoped to avoid 
charges that his Government was' automatically supporting U. K. policy, 
while being able to harmonise Canada's policy with the U. K. 's.,. rThere 
was a considerable difference between King's public and private 
statements. In February 1938, at the time of Mr. Anthony Eden's 
resignation as Foreign Secretary, the U. K. High Commissioner in Ottawa, Fs, 
Sir Francis Floud, 'reported that when questioned in Parliament about 
3. L. B. Pearson, 'Forty Years on: Reflections on our Foreign Policy',, 
International J ournül, 1967, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 357-363. 
4 
the U. K. 's determination to reach an agreement with Italy and Eden's 
resignation, King had replied that he had not been consulted, nor 
expressed any opinion about U. K. policy. At the same time King had 
privately informed Floud that he was in full agreement with the U. K. 's 
policy and thought that the necessary agreement with Italy could not 
be achieved while Eden remained at the F. 0.4 
King strongly objected to the Canadian High Commissioner's 
attending the meetings held in London between the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs and the Dominion High Commissioners. He-.. -. forbade 
Mr. Vincent Massey to attend, these'until the'Czechoslovakian crisis 
and thereafter stressed that such meetings did not constitute 'consultations' 
between-the two governments and that Massey was not-, entitled to express 
the views of the Canadian Government. 
5 In 1939 King also had some 
worries about the channel'. of communication between Canada and the U. K. 
In July he complained to a member of the U. K. High Commission that too 
many messages were being sent to him via that office, rather than directly 
between the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary and himself. He assumed 
this to be an innovation by the Secretary'of State for Dominion Affairs, 
Sir T. Inskip, and remarked that he had managed to explain to Mr. 
MacDonald, the previous Secretary öf State, Canada's standpoint in 
inter-Commonwealth relations, whereas Inskip did not seem to comprehend 
it. Mr: Stephen Holmes, 4. n official inlthe U. K. High Commission, 
reported that King'was<clearly associatingthe U. K. 'stuse'of the High 
Commission to transmit messages to him with; his own objectionsýto 
Massey's attending meetings at the D. 0.6 The new High Commissioner, 
4. Floud to D. O. 27th February 1938, D0151552 . F43/63; 
Floud to D. O 
28th February 1938, D035/552 F43/64- 
5. V. Massey, What's Past is Prologue (oronto 1963), pp. 240-242; 
Campbell to D. 0.. 21st March 1939, D035/576, F706/10; Campbell to D. O. 
24th March 1939, D0114/98, F706/117, INo. 10. 
6. Holmes to Harding, l5th. July 1939 and 21st July 1939, D035/541, C97/42. 
5 
Mr. G. Campbell, saw King the following month, armed with a letter 
from the D. O. commenting on King's statements to Holmes. During 
the conversation it became apparent to the High Commissioner that 
King felt a violent antipathy towards Massey, as he informed him 
that 
he was nbt going to have him strutting about like a foreign 
diplomat and committing Canada to all sorts of things which 
he would be only too likely to do if he were constantly 
visiting Secretaries of State. 
The Canadian Prime Minister said he did-not like discussions with the 
U. K. High Commissioner on important issues as he felt,, he had 
no control'over the-use to which what he or I say may be 
put and that, at a later date, he may be accused of 
committing Canada to do this or that with nothing in 
writing to show that this is actually groundless. 
Campbell informed King that Inskip had not changed the U. K. 's policy 
on communications with Canada and that if more questions were being 
transmitted through the High Commission, this reflected the-delicate 
and swift developments in world affairs. Yet it seemed that it was 
precisely because issues were so important that King wanted more direct 
communication with U. K. Ministers. lie specifically said that he 
would like more correspondence with Lord Halifax on foreign affairs, 
before definite decisions were made, and that 
the Dominions must ... have a louder voice in affairs 
which concerned their welfare 
if the Commonwealth were to continue.? This was a remarkable statement 
for King to make (if this ' discussion was'reported correctly) but it 
seems to reflect the desperate international situation and possibly 
7. Harding to Campbell 3rd August, 1939 and Campbell to Harding 25th .' August 1939, D035/541, C96/46. There was no direct communication..,, 
between the U. K. Foreign Secretary and the Dominion Governments - 
all correspondence was sent via the D. O. This issue became a 
controversial one in the late 1940s when the F. O. asserted its claim 
to deal directly with Dominion Governments. (For a study of the . 
British High Commission in Ottawa before the war, see Lloyd H. Wilmot, 
The Functions and Activities of the British High Commissions from 
1928-1939, with particular em hasis on the British High Commission 
at Ottawa. (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Birkbeck College, London, 1977). 
6 
King's concern at the U. K. 's guarantee to Poland and other Eastern 
European countries which it-was unable to aid'-directly. - War broke out 1 
within weeks of this conversation. . Communication with all the 
Dominions 
was changed as'a consequence and by 1941 many new men were posted to 
the. Dominions. The choice of MacDonald for the Ottawa post (in 
March 1941) was particularly pleasing for King. 
Canada supported the main aspects of U. K. foreiin policy in the 
1930s'but'made very few foreign. policy statements itself; those that 
King did make were vague and characterised by his assertion that Canada 
would-wait and see. 
8 
During 1938 he began to speak rather more 
positively of the U. K. 's efforts to keep-the peace, but-still refused 
to-be-drawn-into a discussionýof hypothetical possibilities. He-fully, 
supported the Munich agreement, not least because he was worried that 
a serious split would-have arisen in Canada if war had-broken out then. 
9 
By December 1938 King was more confident that he would have a large--, 
majority in Parliament in favour. of fighting with the U. K. 
10 The Canadian 
Government responded to Chamberlain's statement in March 1939 that 
he would consult with the other democracies, after Germany's seizure 
of Czechoslovakia, with the pledge that it was ready for consultations 
with the U. K)' King was not happyabout the guarantees to East 
European and. Ealkan"states, and told theU. K. High Commissioner that 
the, Canadian people did not'want to fight a war involving'a Balkan or 
African dispute. 12' Nevertheless, in March and April King and other 
senior Ministers made significant statements on Canada's foreign policy. 
In particular, Mr. Lapointe, the Justice Minister and senior French 
1 
8. Floud to D. O. 17th May 1938, D0114/85, D155/46, No. 90. (For King'". s, 
actions at the 1937 Imperial Conference, see'G. -N. Milliner, 'The 
Pursuit of Peace; Mackenzie King and the 1937 Imperial Conference' 
in J. English and J. 0. Stubbs, eds., Mackenzie King: Widening the 
Debate (Toronto 1978). 
9. Acting High Commissioner to D. O. 18th September 1938,, D0114/94, F82/206, 
App. II, No. 10 and 24th September, 1938, D0114/94, F82/195,. App. II, No. 
1 
10. Campbell to Harding 8th December_1938, D035/540, C87/31. 
11. Report from The Time, -, 21st March 1939, D035/540, F706/106. 
12. Campbell to D. O. 24th March 1939, D0114/98, F706/108, No. 11. 
7 
Canadian in the Cabinet, was referring to the impossibility of Canada's 
remaining neutral; this marked a clear effort by King to win over 
French Canadian opinion by not making the speech himself. By August 
1939 the High Commissioner was reporting "a remarkable desire to co- 
operate" on the part of Canada. 
13 
The U. K: ' High Commissioner in 1938, Sir F. Floud, criticised King 
in February of that year for not educating his country politically and 
for avoiding foreign policy statements. However, the main concern 
14 
of King was to preserve Canada's unity, not to risk divisions 
prematurely by making categorical statements on future policy. He 
was content to bide his time and stick to his pledge to place the 
question before Parliament. King was anxious to ensure chat if and when 
war occurred the unity he had tried to build up would be sufficient, 
not merely to secure a positive vote in Parliament, but to achieve this 
without dividing British and French Canadian opinion. 
15 
The Governor- 
General, Lord Tweedsmuir, understood King's position better. He told 
his wife in May 1938 t 
The people who clamour for a bolder statement do not realise 
the delicacy of the ground here. Canada, as a sovereign 
nation, must leave any question of participation in war to 
her Parliament when the crisis arises. She is very jealous 
about avoiding prior commitments. 
He noted that some people in the U. K. did not seem to understand the 
"real delicacy" of the position of the Dominions, especially Canada 
"who is so much out of the possible war area". The latter point is 
pertinent, for Europe was and seemed a long way from Canada, shielded 
as Canada was by the U. S. A. Even the prospect of war in the Pacific 
was not as worrying to Canadians as it was to Australians or New 
"1 
13. Campbell to Stephenson 2nd April 1939, D0114/98, F706/123, No. 15; 
19th April 1939 D035/540, C87/44; and 25th August 1939, D0114/98, 
F706/263, No. 52. 
14. Floud to Harding, 28th February 1938, D035/5522, F43/64. 
15. Acting High Commissioner to D. O. 28th September 1938, D0114/94, 
F82/228, App. II, No. 17; Campbell to D. O. 27th April 1939, D0114/98, 
F706/155, No. 21. 
8 
Zealanders. 
16 
On 25th August 1939 King informed the U. K. High 
Commissioner confidentially that his Cabinet was unanimous in its 
determination to fight, but that this could not be put into effect 
until Parliament had agreed to it. He stressed that this decision 
should be kept secret as Canada had to be allowed to make its choice 
as a nation. 
17 
Some similarities existed between the attitudes of South Africa 
and Canada but they were by no means identical. Like Canada, South 
Africa had a substantial non-British population but of Dutch extraction, 
and approximately equal in, number to the British South Africans and 
in general more positively hostile to maintaining the British connection 
through the Commonwealth. As with Canada, South Africa therefore faced 
problems of national unity. Unlike King, the South African Prime 
Minister, J. B. Hertzog, was prepared to make foreign policy statements 
both publicly and in correspondence with the U. K. 
Hertzog shared King's attitude to inter-Commonwealth collaboration, 
."ýý: yr: 
disliking any U. K. announcements that the Dominions had been 'consulted', 
but being, generally satisfied with the information transmitted by the 
D. O. In June 1938 the South African High Commissioner, Mr. 'e water, 
told the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the "information 
system" was just about complete. South Africa had been one of the 
18 
strongest proponents of the Dominions' independence and"the-basis, 
for Commonwealth relations. enunciated, by the Balfour Declaration, and 
it consistently defended-its, -'right to formulate its own policies. 
This was especially stressed. by-Hertzog who had an ambivalent attitude 
towards South Africa's membership'of the Commonwealth. In March 1939, 
19 
16. Lord Tweedsmuir to Lady-Tweedsmuir, 25th August-1938, -Buchan Papers, 
Queens University, Kingston, Ontario. 
17. Campbell to D. O. 25th August 1939, D0114/98, F706/277, No. 50. 
18. Minute by Harding 24th June 1938,. D035/576, F706/106., 
19. C. M. Van Der Heever, General J. B. M. Hertzog (Johannesburg, 1946), 
p. 184. 
9 
in answer to 'a: geiestion in Parliament on U. K. policy,, Hertzog , said 
that while his Government had been fully informed of the U. K. 's actions, 
it had not been consulted or asked for its-approval. -M'7. The Permanent, 
Under-Secretary at the D. O. -,, Sir Edward Harding, commented. to the 
Secretary of State that'Hertzog was probably very pleased to have 
been 'able t6 "give that reply. 
20 
., 
In, the following month the U. K., High 
Commissioner in Pretoria; Sir W. Clark,, noted that il\recent. months 
the U. K: 'had not been asking-'for-Dominion views at. all, ýsimply informing 
them Of--its actions, He°addedýthat-in South Africa's case he thought. 
this was a. wise course and-a "relief" to Hertzog. 
21 1 
`'Hertzog, was not silent about, his°views, on. the international situation, 
I 
and'held'very firm positions son the-; problems. and-their remedies. - AHe 
was critical of the 1919 peace'settlement, -, especially in-Easternt'" 
Europe, opposed to whatýhe saw as, France! s attempts-to gain hegemony, 
over'-Europe at'Germany's expense., ýIn'a letter". to-Smuts' from. the . 
1937 
Imperial-Conference he criticised the U. K: 's attitude=towards Germany; 
hostility, which was not based upon any evidence that Germany was to 
blame for causing. the deterioration' of the world situation. He. 
ascribed the U. K. 's attitude 
to"men, in government circles'- like Chamberlain in`my opinion -. 
who see nothing else in Germany than an enemy of Eritain. 22 
In March 1938 he was urging the U. K. to continue on its course of appeasing 
Germany and ensuring that there was no encirclement which would lead 
to war, not because the latter wanted it, but because it w uld inevitably 
interpret such actions as a declaration of hostilities differing little 
. -. 
1Y-vY5 
from a formal declaration of war. Hertzog also gave frequent warnings 
that South Africa would not patticipate in a war which arose from East -,, 
20. Minute by Harding, 21st March 1939, D035/576, F706/106. 
21. Clark to Harding, 4th. April 1939, D035/576, F706/49. 
22. Hertzog to Smuts, 24th May 1937. Smuts Papers, Vol. VI, No. 416; 
Van Der Heever, op. cit., pp 266-267. e- f 
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European issues. 23 In'late March'1938 Hertzog pressed'Chamberlain-'`4, 
to continue to try and reach-an understanding with Germany'I'although 
1 
he appreciated that the Anschluss had stopped'approaches for a time. 
24 
On 27th September 1938, during the -talks"on the Sudetenland, ' Hertzogu-"' ', 
reiterated that hisagovernment could not be'expected'to take part"ins - 
a war over Czechoslovakia, particularly as he*considered the issue 
outstanding to be of no material' substance, merely oýe of-"procedure; 
2 
it had been agreed'that'Germany was entitled toýthe area; 
5 
The South African Government was not only urging the U. K. to stay 
out of war, and threatening to do', likewise, 1but was drawing up definite 
plans for its neutrality. Before, th-e'Münich agreement an inner circle 
I 
of Ministers, including Smuts, had-met-and, -agreed thatcitk would not 
intervene if war broke out. This decision was confirmed`by a full 
meeting of the Cabinet on 28th`September. 
26 r'The'neutrality proposed 
by Hertzog contained one important qualification, that the Simonstown 
agreement, allowing the'U. K. the use of that-'naval port, would be 
honoured. Otherwise the Union would not sever diplomatic relations" 
with any belligerent state and would continue to conduct its relations, 
as if no war were occurring, while prohibiting any hostile'action"on 
its territory. 
27 
In November 19M a U. K. newspaper, The Daily Mail, 
announced tha't South Africa had decided'during'the Munich crisis to 
stay neutral, but this was officially denied by the South . `African'High 
Commission in London, 
28 
'possibly indicating that it did'not want to make 
unnecessary difficulties for the U. K. ' 
The right of a Dominion to remain neutral was an uncharted aspect 
of Commonwealth constitutional relations.. The U. K. had always considered-,, 
.. r 
23. Aide memoire by Hertzog, 23rd August 1938, D035/576, F706/113; 
memorandum by MacDonald to Halifax, 23rd March 1938, D0114/94, F82/11, 
App. I, No. 1. 
24. Clark to MacDonald, March 1938, D035/551, F33/59. 
25. Aide memoire by Hertzog, 27th September 1938, D035/540, C87/21. 
26. W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 1919-1950 (Cambridge 
1968), 
Vol. II, p. 285. 
27. Van Der Heever, op. cit., p. 275. 
28. The Daily Mail, 4th November 1938, See D035/540, C87/21. 
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it an impossibility, basing this belief on the indivisibility of the 
Crown; whereas South Africa had already, declared its belief in. the 
divisibility' of, the Crown. In 1936, after the abdication of Edward 
VIII, the South African Government had passed the Act of, the Union, 
recognising the succession of George VI from the date of-. the abdication 
and him-specifically as King of South Africa.,, Hertzog's biographer 
notes that for Hertzog, this provided the final affirmation of the 
divisibility of the Crown, and his proposals in 1938 indicate that 
he did not see Commonwealth membership as precluding the policy of 
neutrality. 
29 
. ý;., 
By the Spring. of 1939 there were indications, that South Africa's 
attitude might be. changing. In March: the=Prime. Minister told Parliament 
that when. the actions of a European nation, threatened. the safety and 
interests of South Africa, then would be the time for the Union to be 
involved in Europe's affairs. He added that the time-had not yet 
arrived ! '. however much it might, sometimes . appear to knock, at the door. 1,30 
In Apri1,, 1939 Hertzog was asked by the, ardentNationalist, Dr. Malan, 
to 
. 
declare` neutrality for any war. . 
He refused,, saying that he was 
the last, person to do anything to break: the friendship with the U. K. 
31 
In February 1939 the U. K. High Commicioner had spoken to Smuts who 
was very gloomy about-the prospects for a general war but told Clark 
that he thought the South African Parliament would join with the U. K., 
especiall if there were likely to be. hostilities in North Africa. 
32 
Yet in September, when the crisis came he was much less optimistic. 
In the Spring of 1939 Clark was telling the D. O. that Hertzog seemed 
to have no intention of educating'South African opinion about the dangers 
29. Van Der Heever, op. cit., pp. 265-266. 
30. Clark to D. O. received 24th March 1939, D0114/98, F706/115,, No. 8. 
31. Clark to D. O., received 13th April 1939, D0114/98, F706/137, No. 16. 
32. Clark to D. O. 13th September 1939, D035/530, C6/49.,. 
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with which it was'threatened. -33. Hevas'not doing so because'he hid 
not approved of the policy of pressurising Germany'in 1939 and did 
not think that the European war which 'seemed imminent was of, any 
direct concernof South Africa. -, "What he did fear for was his country's 
unity. Nor was he'alone in fearirigAomestic repercussions, -'Smuts 
anticipating ý'in May -1939 some kind 'of =, rising in South Africa in -the 
event of its joining a 'British' war: 
34 
When the crisis occurred in August'and September 1939s' Hertzog' 
decide&to advise'Parliament to adopt a position of neutrality under 
the terms prepared `the previous} year., -, When he' met with 'Smuts on 2nd 
September, the two failed to agree. ',, Smuts determined that South 
Africa ought to declare war alongside the U. K. 'Two'motions were put 
to the South African Parliament on 4th September. -Hertzog emphasised 
South Africa's independence from the'U. K. and suggested that if'it 
agreed to fight this-war it was accepting the'thesis that it had to 
fight whenever the U. K. did. According to the High Commissioner's 
report, he denied Germany's ambitions for world domination and vigorously 
defended Germany's policies. He stated that the U. K. had declared'war 
on account of Poland, and it must realise that it was a war'in which 
South Africa's interests were not involved, and predicted that,, if- 
it were dragged in, 
it would be 11 end of our membership of the British 
Commonwealth. 
By contrast Smuts advocated the severance of relations with Germany, 
co-operation with the rest of the Commonwealth and its allies, and steps 
33. Clark to D. O. 20th February 1939, D035/5431, D28/23; Clark to D. O.. -., 
5th September 1939, D035/5431, D28/32. 
34. Van Der Heever op. cit., p. 275; Clark to Harding, 5th September 
1939, D035/5431, D28/32. 
35. Clark to D. O. 13th September 1939, D035/530, C6/49. (Mr. G. Heaton 
Nicholls, 'South African M. P. and later High -Commissioner to the U. K., wrote in his memoirs that he was very surprised at Hertzog's 
. 
proposal for neutrality. G. H. Nicholls, South Africa in My Time 
(London, 1961), pp. 337-344. ) 
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to secure South, Africa's defence, adding the proviso that forces would 
not be sent overseas. He refuted Hertzog's view that Germany was 
not°seeking world domination and maintained that-it was in South Africa's 
interests to oppose the use of force as an instrument. of. national 
policy. At the end of the debate, Smuts won by 13 votes. The 
Governor-Generlrl refused Hertzog's, request for a dissolution of Parliament, 
and invited Smuts to form a. government. 
36 
Thus Sout Africa entered 
the Second World War - with a different leader and a, population divided 
on its policy, as the close vote in Parliament indicated. 
The. Australian Government took a very different attitude. towards 
Commonwealth consultations in. the 1930s from that of. Canada or South 
Africa. It wished to maximise its contacts and the, \instances of 
consultation with the U. K.,. and favoured a common policy for the 
Commonwealth, provided it was one which was agreed by all the independent 
members of the Commonwealth. In 1935 the Australian High commissioner, 
Mr. Bruce, complained to Eden that although the Dominions were supposed 
to be consulted on all major foreign policy issues, "that rule was 
more often broken than observed. "37 A comment of some verisimilitude. 
The Dominions were almost always informed of 'policy but not always 
consulted. In preparation for the l937 Imperial Conference a memorandum 
on foreign affairs was prepared which defined as a prime objective 
of Australian foreign policy close co-operation with the U. K. and other 
Commonwealth members. 
38 At the conference Lyons, the Prime Minister, 
stressed the need to stand solidly behind the U. K., saying 
it would enormously strengthen Britain if it was made clear 
beyond misunderstanding that there was no division of any 
sort within the Empire ranks. 39 
r 
36. Clark to D. O. 13th September 1939, D035/530, C6/49; Hancock, op. cit., 
pp. 321-323; Smuts Papers Vol. VI, Nos 476 and 487. 
37. C. Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds (London, 1965), 
pp. 232-233. 
38. External Affairs Department memorandum 'The Foreign Situation', March 
1937, Australian Documents Vol. 1, No. 17. 
39. Australian minutes of 10th meeting of principal delegates at the 1937 
Imperial Conference, Ist June 1937, Australian Documents Vol. 1, 
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. ;... 
The Australian Government was not immune to accusations of being too 
ready to acquiesce to the U. K. 's lead in foreign policy. ' In August, 
1938 Lyons told-the U. K. 's Secretary at the High Commission, Mr. P. ''' 
Liesching, that his Cabinet was due to discuss the Czech' situation' 
and agreed on policy suggestions to send to the U. K. in order to avoid 
such attacks and be able to give "the, U. K. "its- considered views. 
40 
: _. 
In October 1938 Australia expressed its agreement with the policy of 
implementing the Anglo-Italian, agreement--and was willing to synchronise 
its announcement with, thei:; U. K. ! s'. 
41 
By, 1939, the new Prime Ministerft"' 
Mr. Menzies, was giving a more definite commitment to the U. K., 
stating in April that Britain's peace meant Australia's peace: 
If she is at war, we are at war, even though that war finds 
us not in European battlefields, but defending our own shores. 
This was a reference to the Japanese threat in the Pacific. He added 
that Australia's defence and trade depended on British sea power, which 
meant it could not refuse the U. K. in its hour of danger; "the British 
countries of the world must stand or fall together. "42 
Australia was also keen to build up its staff of men experienced 
in foreign affairs, and at the same time increase its contacts with 
other countries. The U. S. A. was seen as the most important and in 
January 1937 Australia's first representation there was approved, not 
for a separate mission to be established, but for a Counsellor to join 
the staff of the U. K. Embassy. This arrangement seems to have worked 
well, but by August 1938 separate representation was proposed because 
as it increased its international contacts Australia thought it"imperative 
to have direct representation in countries of first-rate importance to 
V, 
40. Liesching to D. O. 31st August 1938, D0114/94, F82/95, App. II, 
No. 3 and Australian Documents Vol. I, No. 242. 
41. Lyons to MacDonald, 26th October 1938, and Lyons to Chamberlain, 
28th October, 1938, Australian Documents Vol. 1, Nos. 307 & 309. 
42. Speech by Menzies, 26th April 1939, Australian Documents Vol. II, 
No. 73. 
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it. This was approved in August 1939.43 A representative to Japan 
was also suggested, although Menzies had reservations about this, 
44 
The U. K. was also uneasy, fearing that Japan would use the appointment 
to weaken Commonwealth unity, but` the proposal was agreed in principle 
by the Australian Government in August 1939.45 One of Australia's 
existing representatives, Mr. Keith Officer, wanted to strengthen links 
with Canada and establish a strong Department of External Affairs in 
Canberra which could pursue a positive foreign policy with missions 
advising on action required, as well as passing on, information. ' He 
criticised Canada's External Affairs Department, which was much larger 
with more foreign missions, 
they get very little if any more information in spite of 
their Missions than we get depending as we do on the Foreign 
Office, and ... they have no policy on any subject except 
to do nothing or ay nothing for fear that they may do or. say 
the wrong thing. 4° 
The Canadian External Affairs department had been established longer 
and did'include men of, the highest calibre, although at this time they 
were in very junior positions. Officer's statement does reflect the 
tight jreinwhich King, doubling as Minister for External Affairs, kept 
on foreign I policy and his reluctance for Canada to make foreign policy 
statements, a feature he seems to have transmitted to his officials. 
One aspect of the Dominions' development of individual foreign 
/' 
43. For documents on Australian representation in Washington, see 
Australian Documents Vol. I, Nos. 10,328 & 333 and Vol. II, Nos. 
11,63,76,105 & 148. 
44. Menzies to Lyons, 5th January-1939, Australian Documents Vol. II0 
No. 2. w. 
45. Australian Documents Vol. II, Nos. 63,76,84 & 148. 
46. Officer to Casey, 25th January 1939, Australian Documents Vol. II, 
No. 11; see also Nos. 196,197 & 204. Canada and Australia exchanged 
High Commissioners in September 1939. (For descriptions of Australia's 
External Affairs Department see, A. Watt, Australian Diplomat (London, 
1972) pp. 18-22; R. G. Casey, Friends and Neighbours: Australia 
and the World (Melbourne, 1954) pp. 29-33; H. Wolfson, 'The Evolution 
of Australia in World Affairs', Australian Outlook March 1953, pp. 5-21. 
For an impression King's handling of foreign affairs and the Canadian 
External Affairs Department by one of his officials, see J. A. Gibson, 
'Mr. Mackenzie King and Canadian Autonomy, 1921-1946', Canadian 
Historical Association Annual Report 1951, pp. 20-21. ) 
. 
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policies was the establishment of missions abroad, frequently before 
ones in member countries. By the late 1930s Canada was represented 
in the U. S. A;, France and Japan, and after 1939 established many more 
foreign missions. South Africa had representatives in Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, The Netherlands, the U. S., France, Portugal and Belgium, 
and Australia was about to extend its representation after war broke 
out. New Zealand was the only Domit on yet to start this process, 
apart from its representatives in London. An important result of 
this limited contact with other countries was the reliance of the 
Dominions on British information and the inevitably prejudiced versions 
they received from the U. K. It is perhaps not coincidental that the 
Dominion most favourable in its attitude to Germany was the only"one 
to have a representative there. 
The Australian Government supported the U. K. 's policy for most 
of the 1930s, frequently expressing its views and occasionally' taking 
issue with the U. K. February 1938 was one such occasion when the 
Australian Government assumed that Eden's resignation ushered in a new 
foreign policy, which led it to complain that it had not been consulted 
about any change to the policy laid down at the 1937 conference. 
47 
During the Czechoslovakian crisis Australia showed the first signs 
of an unwillingness to fight. In March 1938 Lyons said that Australia 
did not want any commitments to be given to Czechoslovakia, and on 
31st August he warned the Acting High Commissioner of the lack of 
support for the Czech cause. -Lyons did not thin(c it was a question 
which justified involving the Commonwealth in war and urged caution 
on the U. K. 
48 
On 2nd September he was expressing his alarm at Benes' 
47. Whiskard to D. O. 2nd March 1938 pt. 2, D035/562; F355/3; 2nd March 
1938, D035/552 , F43/71 and 17th March 1938, D035/576, 
F706/49; 
Australian Government to D. O. 6th March 1938, Australian Documents 
Vol. I, No. 129. 
48. Lyons to Chamberlain, 23rd March 1938, Australian Documents Vol. I, 
No. 151; Acting High Commissioner (Canberra to D. O. 31st August. 
1938, pts. 1&2, D0114/94, F82/95 & F82/96, Nos. 3&4. 
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hesitancy in making concessions and urged. a solution to, the problem, - 
while two weeks later Lyons and Menzies were , saying that 
almost any alternative is preferable -to -involvement'in 
war with Germany in the evegt f the latter forcibly 
intervening in Czechoslovakia. 
ý*9 
1, -t _f - j: - 
Australia's final plea for the U. K. to avoid war"came on 26th, September. 
r, 
Lyons told Chamberlain that as the cession of the Sudentenlandahad been 
agreed in principle, the method of its transfer, was not worth ýa, war. 
He added that the plebiscite ought to be settled before Germany occuped 
the area and 'said public opinion would require°adequate assurances about 
the future of -Czechoslovakia. Liesching was appalled at the,, dictatorial 
tone of the telegram, commenting that "he could hardly believe it". 
He admitted that the first point did represent Australian opinion,: but 
said that the rest would be thought "an insulting under-estimate of 
50 
their appreciation of immediate and ultimateissuea involved". 
However; it is clear that, like Canada and South Africa, -Australia did 
not support a policy of armed resistance to'Germany in. September, 1938, 
although it is'certain that Australia, unlike the other two, would have 
joined with the U. R. had war been declared. -- 
I 
The Pacific was a constant pre-occupation of the Australian Government, 
due to-the threat of Japanese aggression. -Throughout the decade it 
sought details of the U. K. 's: Faz Eastern policy, especially its plans 
for--sending the fleet-to Singapore and reinforcing the: _base 
there, 
In March 937 it'considered it "impossible to conceive of asituation" 
in, which the U. K. would not be"abl'e to despatch alarge proportion of 
49. Liesching to Lord Stanley, 14th September 1938, Australian Documents 
Vol. I, No. 253. 
50. Lyons to Chamberlain, 26th. September, 1938, "and Liesching to Lord 
Stanley, 27th September-1938, Australian Documents Vol. I, Nos. 278 
&'280. (For a discussion of the Australian Government's support of 
Britain's appeasement policy, see B. M. Andrews, The Australian 
Government and Appeasement', Australian Journal of Politics 1967, 
'Vol. 13, No. 1. Andrews emphasises that Menzies was the strongest 
supporter of appeasement, not believing until September 1939 that 
the time'had come to resist Germany. ) 
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its fleet to Eastern waters. 
51 
During 1938 there were many enquiries 
to, and reassurances from the U. K. about the security of the Pacific 
and the U. K. 's plans. 
52 
In March 1939 the Australians discovered 
that the U. K. was no longer confident about being able to send an 
"adequate" force East when a C. I. D. document, was wrongly sent to its 
Liaison Officer, due to "complete misunderstanding and gross stupidity". 
53 
After this, the Australian Government pressed harder,, for-firm assurances 
about, Pacific strategy. 
54 
Despite, its, worries about the Pacific theatre,, the Australian 
Government continued to support the U. K. in. 1939. In May it urged 
the U. K. to secure the maximum co-operation from the U. S. S. R. and the 
Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Hughes, made a speech in that month 
supporting, the U. K. 's policy of seeking co-operation from other, 
democracies and, stressing that Germany had revealed that it. was no longer 
just. interested in its own minorities. He pledged Australia's;.. 
willingness to consult and co-operate. 
55, Although, in July 1939 Menzies 
was-suggesting that Danzig was an instance for. negotiation, by 27th 
Augusthe advised Chamberlain that Hitler's latest proposals should 
be regarded with suspicion and while not excluding a negotiated. 
settlement, thought the Commonwealth should not connive at one which 
left Poland in a position resembling that of Czechoslovakia a year 
before. Four days later he told Chamberlain that although Australia 
did not consider Danzig intrinsically worth a war, "Poland 
had to be 
protected, ' adding that Australia had confidence. in the U. K. and supported 
51. Memorandum in preparation for the 1937 Imperial Conference, March 1937, 
Australian Documents Vol. I, No. 12. 
52. Australian Documents Vol. I, Nos. 134,196 & 315; Menzies to Chamberlain 
24th June. 1939, Prem'I/309. 
53. Australian Documents Vol. II, No. 42; I. Hamill, Strategic illusion: 
the Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 
1919-1942 (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1975) p. 469ff, 
and J. M. McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence, 1921-1942', 
Australian Outlook, 1971, *Vol. 25, *pp. 165-180. 
54. Australian Documents, Vol. II, Nos. 60,70,74,112,113 & 118. 
55. Menzies to Bruce, 19th May 1939, Australian Documents Vol. II, No. 90; 
U. K. High Commission Canberra to D. O. 10th May 1939, D035/576, F706/162. 
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it fully. 
56 
On 3rd September Menzies broadcast' to' the Australian 
people,. informing them that as a result of Germany's action 4n Poland 
the U. K. had declared war and that- "as, a result; Australia is also 
at, war. "57 This decision was approved byýParliament, but unlike 
Canada and South Africa, ' Australia considered--itself committed by 
the U. K. 's actions. P 4: r' s 
New Zealand 'possessed more similarities with Australia than with 
the other two Dominions, although it did not take an identical, view 
to Australia's and it was not an obedient satellite ofýthe'U. K. as 
many have-assumed. It was the Dominion least enthusiastic aboutx , iý 
declarations of independent status and did 'notý adopt the Statute of 
Westminster until 1947. (Australia was also late-in 'adopting the 
Statute, in its case in 1942, but Australian relations with`the U. K. 
in the-later 1930s were constitutionally more approximate to those of 
Canada and South Africa, despite'its more positive attitude towards 
co-operation'. ) The New Zealand Government favoured close consultation 
and co-operation with the U. K. In 1935 the then Prime'Minister, Mr. 
Forbes, declared that, if the U. K. was at war so would'New Zealand 
A "catastrophe" which affected the-U. K. ' would also affect New Zealand. 
But his "conclusion that this meant there was no need to consult with 
the U. K. on foreign and defence matters, because of the automatic 
commitment, caused an outcry in New Zealand. His successor, the 
Labour leader, Mr., Savage, took a slightly different attitude. ' He 
affirmed his intention to-strengthening the'ties with the Commonwealth, 
but stressed that this had to be done by discussions, 'with the New 
,C 
Zealand Parliament°possessing the determining voice of New Zealand policy. 
SB 
56. Menzies to Chamberlain, 27th August 1939 and 1st September 1939, 
Australian Documents Vol. II, Nos. 156 & 174. 
57. Broadcast message by Menzies, 3rd September 1939, Australian Documents:, 
Vol. II, No. 189. 
58. F. L. Wood, The New Zealand People at War: political and External 
Affairs (New Zealand, 1971), pp. 32-34. For a general study of N. Z. 
in the inter-war years, see Angus Ross,. 'Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful 
Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the inter-war years', 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 1972, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 28-44. 
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New Zealand's communications with the U. K. differed from those of 
the other Dominions. It had the Governor-General as the main channel 
and no U. K. 'High Commissioner was appointed until 1939. The Dominions 
had had representatives in London for a considerable time, but it was 
only between 1928 and 1931 that U. K. High Commissioners supplanted 
the Governors-General as the main link between the Governments in the 
other three. When the proposal was under consideration in 1926, the 
U. K. Government questioned all the Governors-General about it. Sir 
Charles Fergusson in New Zealand opposed such a move, maintaining that 
it would weaken the position of the Crown and the unity of the Empire. 
The U. K., once it had accepted the principle of appointing U. ` K. High 
Commissioners, responded to the wishes of the individual Dominions. 
New Zealand was content with the prevailing position, although it did 
ask for a Liaison Officer who was appointed to Wellington in the late 
1920s, but the post was not continued. The official channel between 
the U. K. and New Zealand remained the Governor-General-until 1941, although 
with the appointment of Sir H. Batterbee in 1939, with his own staff and 
separate cipher, an extra dimension was added. In London New Zealand 
had sent its own LiäiWon Officer in 1937 in addition to the High 
Commission staff, to liaise on foreign affairs, following'Australia's 
example of 1926.59 
At the 19$7 Imperial conference Savage supported Australia'. s call 
for a resolution proclaiming the Commonwealth's support for U. K. policy 
and its determination to stand together, but only.. on the conditions that 
such a declaration dealt with realities; the problems and their remedies; 
was not full of empty sentiments, and that each returned home to implement 
the policies. 
60 (Such advocacy of a common policy was rejected by 
59. Rt. Hon. Lord Garner, The Commonwealth Office, -1925-1968 
(London, 1978), 
pp. 33-43; Wood, op. cit., p. 53. Appointment of N. Z. liaison officer 
see S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets Vol. 3, p. 276. 
60. Australian minutes of 10th meeting of principal delegates at the 1937 
Imperial Conference, 1st June 1937, Australian Documents Vol. I, No. 34. 
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King, who could not agree to such a commitment. ) At the conference 
Savage called for a common Commonwealth policy based on the principles 
of "kindliness", "decency" and "economic welfare". He was critical 
of some inconsistencies in U. K. policy and called for more genuine 
consultation. In some respects New Zealand's foreign policy was 
more adventurous than the U. K. 's, and in many, more naive, reflecting 
its lack of international experience. However, it continued its basic 
support for the U. K. even while disagreeing with some aspects of the 
policy, and was never shaken from its thesis that, the countries shared 
a common fate and that New Zealand would stand by the U. K. in a crisis. 
61 
In March 1938 Savage offered to send a message of support to the U. K. 
in order to assist it during the Ai 
0 
rumours that the Dominions had not 
The major differences between 
their respective attitudes to the 
zschluss crisis and also to refute 
1 1. 
been adequately consulted. 
62 
the U. K. and New Zealand lay in 
League of Nations and collective 
security. New Zealand had always been a staunch supporter of the 
League and the theory of collective security, it had urged strong action 
towards the. aggressors, and when the League had been discredited it 
still supported the organisation and pressed for its rejuvination as 
the only way to secure peace. This attitude sometimes placed it in 
opposition to U. K. policy, but i't was not afraid to state its view, 
and on occasions oppose U. K. policy openly. From 1936 New Zealand 
held a temporary seat on the League-Council and over Spain and Abyssinia 
voiced its differences with the U. K. It deplored the one-sided 
intervention in Spain and urged the League to take steps-to aid the 
misery of the Spanish people and the legitimate Government, opposing 
the Fascist states. 
63 
With regard to Abyssinia, it refused 'to sanction 
61. Wood, op. cit., p. 50 & pp. 54-55. 62. Galway to MacDonald, 14th March 1938, D035/576, F705/26. 
63. Wood, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
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Italy's invasion, pressed for greater League action and opposed 
the recognition of Italy's occupation. 
64 In April 1938 it told 
the U. K. Government that it thought the recognition of Italy's conquest 
of Abyssinia mould encourage other Powers who preferred might to right. 
Although it did compromise in-as-much as it promised not to vote against 
the U. K. 's policy of recognition and its implementation of the Anglo- 
Italian Agreement, but to abstain if the issue came to a vote. 
65 
As with Australia, the Pacific was of particular concern to New 
Zealand and in the later 1930s it was increasingly. worried about Japanese 
policy and the capacity of the U. K. to defend the Far East. At the 
1937 conference Savage had proposed a conference of Pacific Powers to 
discuss the situation and then to reach some kind of non-aggression pact. 
In December 1938 New Zealand was still pressing for a conference and 
telling the Australian Government, which also was in favour, that it 
wanted to discuss the whole strategic situation. The Australian 
Government raised difficulties about the timing, but Savage urged the 
need for a conference as soon as possible. New Zealand also wanted 
66 
reassurances from the U. K. on its policy of reinforcing Singapore, and 
the official New Zealand historian, Mr. Wood, notes that the New Zealand 
Government was sceptical that the base could hold indefinitely. New 
Zealand anxieties cannot have been aided by the news that the U. K. was 
questioning its capacity to send an "adequate" force East, for the 
New Zealand High Commissioner was informed by his Australian colleague 
64. Australian minutes of 1st meeting of principal delegates at the 
1937 Imperial Conference, 19th May-1937, Australian Documents Vol. 
I, No. 26; Garner, op. cit., p. 85. 
65. New Zealand Government to D. O., 5th'Apri1 1938, D035/5521, F48/25; 
Galway to MacDonald, 14th March 1938, D035/576, F705/27.. 
66. Savage to Lyons, 22nd December 1938,17th February 1939 and 
31st March 1939, Australian Documents, Vol. I, No. 335, and Vol. 
II, Nos. 26 & 65. 
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of the, secret C. I. D. Paper. 
67 
With Chamberlain's announcement in March 1939 that the U. K. intended 
to consult with others and take steps to try and halt German aggression, 
r 
New Zealand responded by reaffirming its conviction that an international 
conference with a wide membership should be held to redress the 
legitimate grievances of countries and thought there was a chance of 
including the U. S. A., which would be so vital. Meanwhile it declared 
its full support for the U. K. and its efforts to prevent a further 
deterioration of the situation. 
68 At the end of-April the New Zealand 
Government was telling the U. K. that it still favoured an international 
conference, but that whatever happened, it would back the U. K. if it 
came to war. 
69 
By the end of August New Zealand was facing the future 
united in its determination to support the U. K., with the Opposition 
pledging its support for the Government's policy. Meanwhile the Acting 
Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, continued to try and urge the co-operation 
of the U. S. A. 
7° 
The New Zealand Government sent a telegram to London 
backing its attempts to secure co-operation from the U. S. S. R. and it 
approved the U. K. 's reaffirmation of the guarantee to Poland after 
the Russo-German pact. On 1st September the New Zealand Government 
took measures to place the country on ä war footing, and it declared 
war with the U. K. on 3rd September, upholding its attitude that the 
fate of New Zealand was inextricably tied to the U. K. Thus, when 
the U. K. \was at war, so was New Zealand. As in the case of Australia, 
Parliament was only consulted, and approved, after the' declaration had 
67. Wood, op. cit., pp. 73-77; Ismay to Chatfield, 18th March 1939, 
Australian Documents Vol. II, No. 42. (At the 1937 Conference N. Z. 
had pressed the U. K. on theýpo: icy of"sending a fleet to Singapore'. 
See J. M. McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence', Australian 
Outlook 1971, V. ol. 25, p. 178. ) 1 
68. New Zealand Government to D. O., '21st March 1939, D0114/98, F706/106, 
No. 2. 
69. Batterbee to D. O., 29th April 1939, D0114/98, F706/158, No. 23. 
70. Batterbee to D. O., 23rd August 1939, D035/576,. F706/220. 
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been made. 
71 
The 'rogue' Dominion of the inter-war years was Ireland (variously 
referred to as the Irish Free State and Eire). Ireland tended to 
combine the more extreme attitudes at times demonstrated by Canada 
and South Africa and with these two pressed for constitutional reform 
and the recognition of the Dominions' independence from the U. K. But 
its opposition to the Commonwealth connection, especially joint allegiance 
to the Crown, went deeper than in either of the other two. MacDonald's 
tenure at the D. O. saw an improvement of Anglo-Irish relations, and 
provided the stimulus for the U. K. to reconsider its attitude to 
Ireland and attempt to retain it within the Commonwealth. In 1936, 
with the need for legislation to recognise the abdication' of Edward 
VIII and the succession of George VI, Ireland decided to enact the 
External Relations Act, which de Valera had been considering for some 
time. This effectively rejected the sovereignty of the Crown in all 
Irish affairs except external relations. The U. K. accepted this new 
1ý 1 
arrangement and Ireland was still considered to be a member of the 
Commonwealth, but de Valera did not attend the 1937 conference and 
relations were more distant. Ireland rejected the idea that a U. K. 
war would also be an Irish war and"'made it very clear that Ireland was 
not prepared-to fight, but would maintain a friendly neutrality. 
In 1938 the U. K. concluded an agreement with Ireland in which the U. K. 
gave up its rights to the Irish bases. Many criticised this agreement 
for depriving the U. K. of vital bases it would need if war broke out, 
and Churchill harked back to it during the war, MacDonald and 
Chamberlain,. who were its principal architects, defended it by arguing. 
that not to have agreed to handing the bases back-would have left the '"'ý 
U. K. in a position of trying to operate them against the wishes of a 
71. Wood, o . cýit., pp. 96-100; Sir Robert Menzies, 'Afternoon Light (London, 1967), pp. 15-16. 
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hostile population with the likelihood of the enemy landing in Ireland. 
Their hope was that if the bases were voluntarily returned, Irish 
friendship might be won and the ports might be offered to the U. K. 
in time of war. 
72 
From 1937 onwards the D. O. expected Ireland to declare 
its neutrality. (There was very little hope that it would fight with 
the rest of the Commonwealth. )73 Nor was there any real attempt to 
tackle the consequences of Ireland's (or South Africa's) neutrality 
for the Commonwealth relationship. Batterbee raised the issue in 
December 1937, and questioned whether a way could be found not to insist 
that neutrality necessitated, a state's departure from the Commonwealth, 
without reducing the substance of membership too much. 
74 But the 
question was never faced squarely and no decision was taken about 
continued membership. This was possibly because the position was 
uncertain until the last minute,, and even if a Dominion-did not immediately 
declare war, it might do so at a , later stage, possibly as the result 
of the enemy's actions. Moreover, as Garner points out, to have 
pressurised Ireland would probably only have resulted in a hostile, not 
benevolent, 1neutrality. 75 With South Africa's own neutrality proposals 
and Canada's acceptance of the divisible Crown (in-as-much as it 
considered the King to be King of each country and capable of being 
separately represented abroad), it is unlikely that these Dominions 
would have welcomed any action by the U. K. to expel Ireland from the 
Commonwealth. Irish-Commonwealth rcations lay in abeyance during 
72. Garner, op. cit., pp. 95-96 & 111-120; Mansergh, Commonwealth Experience 
(Cambridge, 1969), pp. 321-322. (After the outbreak of war Churchill 
said the U. K. should have seized the Irish Ports. Eden told Oliver 
Harvey that he thought this would drive Eire out of the Commonwealth; 
that de Valera was doing all he could and it would be madness to 
take such action because it would drive de Valera and start up all 
the trouble again, not least with the U. S. A., The Diplomatic Diaries 
of Oliver Harvey, 1937-1940, ed. J. Harvey (London, 1970), 30th October 19 
p. 326. 
73. Memorandum by Dixon, 'Probable attitudes and preparedness of the 
Dominions in event of war', 14th December 1937, D035/5432, D28/5. 
74. Minute of Batterbee, 'Position of the Dominions in the event of war', 
December 1937, ibid. 
75. Garner, op. cit., p. 98. 
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the war and contact was reduced as it could not be told of many developments 
on security grounds. Its future as a member of the Commonwealth was 
only clarified after the war. 
In the 1930s the U. K. was faced with Commonwealth partners in 
different stages of constitutional development, possessing varying 
attitudes toiF`ards Commonwealth collaboration and, on`some issues, 
holding different foreign policies. ' The'problem`fo the U. K. 'was how 
to cope with these divergencies-while keeping the members in the 
association. It was not a matter of accommodating the='Döminion 
viewpoint'. That term was, and is, frequently misused to represent 
a stereotype attitude common to all the 'junior' members of-the"- 
Commonwealth, whereas this rarely existed. There were the views of 
the four Dominions which were often not identical, and the diversity 
was not likely to diminish. As the Dominions increased their knowledge 
of, and experience in, foreign affairs, relied less on information 
from the U. K., and became more aware of their geo-political positions 
in the world, "the diversity of viewpoint was if anything likely to 
increase. The community of interest, and the essential like-mindedness 
of all the members to the basic principles of international affairs, 
had to be reconciled with these other differences. 
At a meeting between F. O. and D. O. Ministers and officials to 
prepare for the 1937 Imperial Conference, the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, MacDonald, outlined his approach to inter-Commonwealth 
co-operation in foreign affairs. 
The object, he felt, must be to get 'harmony' on foreign 
policy and - in effect, therefore, - a common foreign policy, 
but not to attempt to get a common foreign policy in name. 
He thought it would be possible to go'this far, though it 
must be realised that the Dominions could not be expected 
to accept any definite commitments as regards assistance 
to this country in the event of war. , 
What was necessary 
was to state the foreign policy of the United Kingdom, to 
ask the Dominions Delegates to indicate the foreign policies 
of their Governments and then to hope that these policies 
might so harmonize that, in effect, they would be one. 76 
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76. Minutes of meeting at the F. O., 19th March 1937, D035/537, 
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In a Cabinet memorandum two weeks later, MacDonald recalled the 
constitutional changes of the previous decade and the emphasis which 
had been placed on equality and independence of the component parts 
"M 
of the association. He expressed the belief that the Commonwealth 
could not survive if it continued to place such emphasis on 
individual sovereignty, that the balance of community needed, to be 
re-asserted. He proposed that the U. K. should try to do this at 
the conference while making it clear'to the Dominions that the U. K. 
recognised their equality and freedom to decide their own policies, 
and that the U. K. had no desire to "put the clock back and limit their 
freedom" 
Our conception is of a partnership between nations who 
freely, naturally and prudently-co-operate on account of 
their association under the Crown and their,, common 
traditions, beliefs and interests'. 77 
MacDonald was confident that the' individual policies of each members-:,. 
would possess sufficient similarity 'to make co-operation and virtual 
unanimity possible. He thought that all the Dominions, respected the - 
U. K., 
fparticularly . 
in its judgment of foreignvaffairs ,,, and would, 
be 
.. 
greatly influenced by it provided "they'are permitted: to agree with 
us in their own way and their own, time". 
MacDonald understood better than most U. K. Ministers,; and some 
Dominions Secretaries, the attitudes of the Dominions andý. the best, i 
methods o: gaining their co-operation. -Despite the"fact, »that the D. O. 
was his f rst Cabinet post and at-thirty-three-the was the youngest, 
member'of the Cabinet; MacDonald was not overawed or'hesitant about. 
putting forth his views. In May, 1936 he presented-to the Cabinet a 
memorandum on Ireland which was long, detailed and-extremely-forthright,: 
and has been"described as a "monster mouthful" to swallow "from so 
young and new a Cabinet member". 
78 - He managed, to convince King that 
77. Cabinet memorandum by Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 2nd 
April 1937, D035/537, C41/105. 
78. Garner, op. cit., p. 19 & pp. 116-117. 
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he understood Canada's attitude to inter-Commonwealth collaboration, 
` which was not an easy task, and later as High Commissioner in Ottawa 
became a close confidant of King, who had welcomed the-appointment. 
79 
r 
MacDonald's youthfulness was a positive asset to his position; for he 
seemed less imbued with old attitudes towards the-Empire-and more in 
tune with the aspirations of the Dominions. The D. O. -under his 
authority certainly seemed to function more successfully, reflecting 
his ability to bring the best out of his staff and set the right tone 
in communication with the Dominions, 
80 
-1 
MacDonald's statements quoted, above epitomised the D. O. 's attitude 
towards U. K. collaboration in the late 1930s. In practical terms this 
tended to amount to finding the lowest-common denominator acceptable to 
all members, supplemented by individual treatment on subjects ýor attitudes 
beyond--'. the-scope of other members. For instance the. Secretary of State 
was willing to accommodate W. L., M. King's opposition. to the. -Canadian 
High Commissioner's attending meetings held between the-Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs and-the other High' Commissioners, by, seeing 
Massey separately to repeat'the information he had imparted to the 
i 
others. 
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On another occasion, -in order to ease-the position of 
Canada and South Africa, the D. O.; -asked the Australian Government 
1 
not to use the phrase "foreign, policy of the Empire" in public speeches, 
or refer to the meetings between the Secretary of State and the High 
Commissioners as 'consultations', or suggest. that the Dominions were 
82 
merely consultants to a principal'(i. e. the u. K. )ti. in foreign affairs. 
Despite instances when some Dominions complained-that the U. K. 
had wrongly stated that they had been consulted or had approved of 
U. K. policy, the D. O. 'tried to stop any statements for the U. K. which 
79. - S. Holmes to Harding, 15th. July 1939,. D035/541, C97/42; Mackenzie 
King Record Vol. I, p. 178. 
80. Garner, op. cit., p. 19. 
81. V. Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto, 1963), pp. 240-242; 
Garner, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
82. Harding to Whiskard, 2nd March 1938, Dä35/562, F355/3; D. O. to 
Whiskard, May 1939, D0114/98, No. 27. 
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inferred that the Commonwealth was pursuing a common policy, or that 
the Dominions were acquiescing to all U. K. initiatives. As the D. O. 's 
own introduction to a Confidential Print containing documents on 
Commonwealth relations prior to the outbreak of war explained, 
The Dominions were not expressly consulted as to the policy 
which should be adopted in the sense of being asked formally 
to signify their approval of it or associate themselves with 
it; in some cases indeed such formal consultations would, on 
political grounds, have been distasteful to the Dominions. - 
Instead they were kept informed of the U. K. 's actions and, in the absence 
of adverse comment, the U. K. felt entitled to assume that there were no 
objections to its policies., 
83 
To ensure that this was U: K. `policy, 
as opposed to just the D. O. 's, that'Office reminded other Government 
departments of the need to use the correct terminology when it was - 
speaking about the Commonwealth. In-a'note to the. F. O., which was 
copied to the Treasury and the Prime' Minister; the D. O. reminded that 
office of the touchiness of one-or two Dominions over references to 
their relationship to U. K. foreign policy. ' To avoid=trouble, the'U. K. 
had to confine such referenceswithin°'-narrow limits.. The D. O. referred 
to King's consistent denial that 'consultations' took place and-it- 
said it had to be left to the individual Dominion to interpret the 
U. K. 's 'communications as merely-informative,. or: -as seeking-their own 1 
views. It also noted that the U. K. ha&no authority to give public 
expression to Dominion policies, unlessýexpressly, asked to'by-a. Dominion, 
and how 'all would protest if unauthorised statements were made. 
$G 
In 
I4 
March 1939 a. further'note was sent to the F. O., reminding it, of King's 
dislike of the term 'consultation', unless-the opinion of aýmember 
had been sought before any action was decided upon. 
85 
1 The D. O.: did 
seem, then, to appreciate the attitudes of the Dominions and also the 
83. Introduction to Confidential Print on 'The International Situation 
leading to the outbreak of war', D0114/98, Intro. No. 1. 
84. D. O. notes on the position of the Dominions regarding the present 
international situation sent to F. O., -23rd March 1938, D035/576, 
F706/48. 
85. Hankinson to Harvey 28th March 1939, D035/576, D706/118. 
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reasons for them. The first note said that Canada's domestic situation 
required King to maintain this rigid distinction between information 
and consultation, and the U. K. High Commission in Canada kept the 
D. O. alive to the political situation which determined Canada's 
position. 
86 
U. K. commitments towards Europe, in the form of the Locarno Agreement, 
the Munich Agreement, and the guarantees to Poland and other Eastern 
European countries, were not shared by the Dominions. The Locarno 
Agreement in 1925 marked the first British acceptance of unilateral 
commitments when an : issue could mean involvement in war and this 
practice continued in the 1930s. The main reason for this was the un- 
willingness of the Dominions to have agreed 'to share in these obligations, 
and the embarrassment which negative replies'would have caused to the 
U. K. The U. K. also thought that in light öf the political positions 
of the Dominion Governments, to refrain from asking them to undertake 
such commitments seemed to be the most likely way of facilitating their 
co-operation at a later stage, if it'should be needed. 
87 
This 
demonstrateda good appreciation of the positions of South Africa and 
Canada. 
Closest collaboration between Commonwealth countries characterised 
i 
the abdication crisis of 1936., ' Late in November Baldwin warned the 
King that he doubted whether the U. K. Parliament would agree to a 
morganatic marriage and that he would have to consult with the Dominions. 
The King agreed to Baldwin's'consulting the several governments, rather 
than consulting His Ministers personally through the Governors-General, 
and the D. O. under MacDonald was responsible for drafting the messages. 
86. Acting High Commissioner, Ottawa, to D. O., 28th) September 1938, 
D0114/94, F82/206, App. II, 'No. 10; Campbell to D. O., 27th April 
1939, D0114/98, F706/115, No. 21. 
87. Harding to Clark, 19th April 1939, D035/576, F706/149. 
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Communication was conducted secretly, through the U. K. High Commissioners 
and to the relief of everyone, the Commonwealth governemnts were 
unanimous in-their counsels to the King. Massey notes that the 
High Commissioners in London were also kept fully informed of developments. 
88 
During the major crisis in the late 1930s, there was often little 
time available to give the Dominions warning of events or the opportunity 
to comment upon them, especially during the Czech, crisis. The 
Dominions were kept closely informed by telegram and MacDonald, who had 
revived the practice of meeting with the High, Commissioners in London, 
saw. them almost daily during this period. MacDonald stressed to 
Chamberlain on 18th September the neCi to inform the Dominions before 
committing the-U. K., but accepted the latter's insistence that there, 
could be. delay. 
89 
It was left to, the_Secretary of State to apologise., 
to. the Dominion High Commissioners for the U. K. 's-action of giving 
a guarantee without prior warning to them or any chance to express. 
their views. He explained the situation. and the necessity for swift,, 
action. 
90 
The bürden of Commonwealth defence lay heavily on the U. K., especially 
on the Royal Navy. Attempts at the end of. the First World War to 
establist a single-Imperial Navy failed, and the Dominions' assertion 
of their independence and their, pursuit of, their own foreign policies 
limited defence collaboration. By. 1932 there was in effect a 
permanent alliance between the Commonwealth countries' armed forces 
which , were. 
fairly- well, integrated. ' There, was standardisation of 
arms. and organisation, to facilitate joint action, and a common centre 
of advice. However, no Dominion'-felt compelled to follow the U. K. 's 
advice and Dominion defence forces remained sparse, with a low level 
88. Garner, op. cit., pp. 67-71; Massey, op. cit., p. 249. 
89. Conversation between MacDonald and Chamberlain, 18th September 
1938, D035/554, F82/165. 
90. Report of meetings between Dominions Secretary and Dominion High 
Commissioners, 17th and 19th September 1938, D0121/4. 
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r 
of defence expenditure. The geographical spread of the Commonwealth 
meant that it was to a great extent 'a strategic liability to the U. K. 
as long as the Dominions contributed so little to Imperial defence, 
and the requirements of Commonwealth defence dissipated the U. K. 's 
strength elsewhere. At the 1937 Imperial Conference`the'U. K. -asked, 
the Dominions to increase their defence contributions, warning them 
of the difficulty it would face in opposing'Germany, Italy and"Japan 
simultaneously. Despite some improvement, by the outbreak of war 
there was no concerted strategic plan of Imperial defence and no" 
agreement in advance as to flow and where Dominion forces would be- 
employed, 
91 
During 1938 the U. K. Government was frequently, asked in Parliament 
about the machinery for Commonwealth" collaboration and whether' Dominion 
approval had been gained, with M. P. 's on-occasions showing-w'-high'- 
degree of ignorance about Commonwealth relations, or an inclination 
to embarrass the Government. The Government was' generally"careful'ýto 
give cautious, neutral replies to these enqiries. In April 1938 
Mr. Dalton spoke of an apparent difference in policy between, New Zealand 
and the U. K. (Savage had made a slightly critical statement after 
seeing an incomplete report of a U. K. policy statement. ) He was told 
that it was a major feature of Commonwealth relations that each member 
was responsible to its own Parliament and people and entitled to form 
it own foreign policy. There was not, and need not be, identity of 
view on every detail of foreign policy, the important thing was to 
ensure that on fundamental aims and principles there was no difference 
in outlook. M. P. s were cautioned not to seek out every real or imaginary 
91. See D. C. Watt, 'Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy 
1911-1939: The Substance and the Shadow', Personalities and 
Politics (London 1965); G. Peden, British Rearmament and the' 
Treasury, 1932-1939 (Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1979); 
I. Hamill, Strategic Illusion, op. cit.; M. Howard, The Continental' 
Commitment (London, 1972); G. N. Hillmer, 'Defence and Ideology: 
The Anglo-Canadian military 'alliance' in the 1930s', International 
Journal 1977-78, Vol. 33, pp. 588-596. ' 
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difference between members and parade it before the eyes of the world. 
In June 1938 the Government indicated its satisfaction with the 
machinery for collaboration, while adding that it was willing to 
consider suggestions to improve it. 
92 
After a telegram in February 1939 from the U. K. High Commissioner 
in New Zealand reporting that Mr. Jordan, the New Zealand High 
Commissioner in the U. K., was sending back optimistic reports about 
the prospects for peace, the F. O., which prepared'the material on 
foreign affairs sent to the Dominions, considered showing the Dominion 
High Commissioners the secret documents on which it based its foreign 
policy appreciations. It was thought that this might make the 
Dominions more aware of the seriousness of the situation. However, 
Sir A. Cadogan, the Permanent Under=Secretary, and Lord Halifax,, the 
Foreign Secretary, decided that because of-the secrecy-of the material 
and because their appreciations were 'yawn from such a wide selection, 
this would be impossible. Lord Halifax told Inskip that consequently 
the Dominions would have to 
trust, 'us to draw a just conclusion from reports which we 
receive. 93 
The F. O. did ask the D. O. if any aspect of F. O. procedure had given cause 
for offence recently, which led the D. O. to remind it not to make 
94 
references to consultations with the Dominions, in deference to King. 
The D. O. kept a very close eye not merely on individual Dominion 
attitudes towards specific issues,, when these could be determined; but 
also on the overall position of each in relation to their readiness 
92. Parliamentary question by Dalton, April 1938, D035/576, F706/26; 
Parliamentary question by Henderson, 27th March 1938, D025/576, 
F706/14; See also questions by Mr. Hannah, 21st March 1938, Mr. ' 
Mander, 21st June 1938 and Mr. Day, 1st November 1938, Hansard 
House of Commons Debates, Vols. 333, Col. 841; Vol. 337, Col. 
805-6; Vol. -340, Col. 4. 
93. Minutes by R. Hadow, 9th February 1939, Cadogan, 11th February 1939 
. and Halifax, 2nd March 1939, Halifax to Inskip, 
2nd March 1939, 
F0372/3315, T2299/436/384. ' 
94. Hankinson to Harvey, 28th March 1939, D035/576, F706/118. 
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and capacity to fight a war. A detailed memorandum was. periodically 
updated to show the prevailing attitudes of Canada, South Africa 
and Ireland (the attitudes of Australia and New. Zealand were never 
considered to be in any doubt. ) In December 1937. Canada's attitude 
was thought to be in some doubt, the main determining, factors were, 
expected to be the attitude of the French Canadian population and the 
position of the U. S. A. It recognised that South Africa considered. 
. 
it legitimate to adopt a position of neutrality and. that the, Government 
there was sympathetic to Germany and hostile to France.. It thought 
the critical factor would be the effect of a war on Africa. If a. _ 
strong militant foreign power were to threaten, the Union. it wouldF,,,, d 
probably co-operate with the U. K. within the confines of Africa; 
otherwise its position was very doubtful. Ireland was expected to. 
declare its neutrality (although the-U. K. still. expected then to, ber, 
able to use the Irish ports. ) 
95 
By. February, 1939-the prognosis., was 
more optimistic. Canada was. expected to declare war after a delay 
in which Parliament would be summoned, and South Africa was also 
thought willing to participate eventually, after a longer delay in 
which its Parliament would also have to be consulted.,.. The D. O. did 
not think that it would hurry to reach a decision. 
96 
The change in 
Canada's position is consistent 'with Canadian statements, especially 
King's personal comments to the U. K. High Commissioner. -and U. K. 
Ministers. 
The chang in the expected attitude-of South Africa is perhaps less. 
easy to understand. Smuts had told the U. K. High Commissioner that 
95. Memorandum by Dixon, 'Probable attitudes and preparedness of the 
Dominions in the event of war"', 14th December 1937, D035/5432, D28/5. 
(Some uncertainty about Canada's attitude can be seen in a letter 
from Hankey to Harding, 9th May 1937. Hankey wrote "it would be 
disastrous if we laid our plans on the assumption that we could 
count upon Canada, and then when the day came we found that we had 
been building on false premises", CAB21/670. J. Granatstein, 
Canada's War: the Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 
(Toronto, 1975), p. 3. ) 
96. Memorandum by Dixon, 'Probable attitudes and preparedness of the 
Dominions in the event of war', February 1939, D035/5432, D28/21, 
or D035/540, C87/31. 
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month that he thäught the Union Parliament would decide to participäte, 
but Hertzog's statements had not yet shown much sign of any change 
of policy and the U. K. had been fully aware of the neutrality 
proposals of September 1938. The final memorandum, which was 
submitted to the U. K. Cabinet, of May 1939,97 was substantially the 
same as the one in February, with perhaps slightly more justification 
for its optimism. Nevertheless, until war was declared the U. K. were 
not sure how many of its partners would join with'it, and whether large 
majorities would be in favour of belligerency. For, as King had 
often stressed, the latter Roint was significant if the Dominions were 
to be of any real value to the U. K.; a divided country was of dubious 
advantage as an ally. 
An important question is whether the attitudes of the Dominions 
had any effect on U. K. foreign policy. If it is difficult to cite an 
example which had an exclusive influence on the U. K., this does not 
mean that the Dominions made no impact upon U. K. policy. It is perhaps 
not insignificant that before Munich'the D. O. was doubtful about the 
participation of three of the five Dominions, or that all five urged 
Chamberlain to reach an agreement with Germany in September 1938, and 
not to declare war over Czechoslovakia. In his memoirs Sir Charles 
Dixon, Assistant Under-Secretary at the D. O., says during the Czech 
crisis "it was most striking" how all the Dominions, except perhaps 
New Zeala d, were opposed to war with Germany "which they felt would 
have a disastrous effect on relations between theLMembers of the 
Commonwealth, and might even result in its break-up. "98 When Sir 
Eric Machtig, the Permanent Under=Secretary, was asked for documents 
1 
97. D. O. memorandum for submission to Cabinet, 'Probable attitudes of 
the Dominions in the event of war', D035/5432, D28/32. 
98. Dixon, Memoirs (Unpublished, 1969), p. 51. 
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for the official historian which showed the influence of the Dominions 
on U. K. policy, he commented 
casual conversations and personal discussions with visiting 
Dominion Ministers or officijils are probably not fully 
recorded, but it seems likely that it is largely through 
this kind of channel that such Dominion influence as has 
been exercised has taken its effect. 
99 
Without minimising the importance of such conversations referred to by 
Machtig, he probably exaggerated the lack of such documentary evidence 
as the telegrams from Dominion governments and records of discussions 
with the High Commissioners. 'Indeed Dixon recalls that when Mr. Patrick 
Gordon Walker was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
at the D. O. in 1947 he commented to Dixon that 
until he had seen the office records, he had not realised the 
strength of the Dominion*s'feeling against the war, and that in 
fairness to Mr. Chamberlain, this ought to be brought to the 
notice of the public. 100 
Dixon minuted that he thought the Dominions' influence was not to be 
found so much in formal expressions of opinion on particular issues 
as they arose, but 
in the general trend of opinion in the Dominions which was a 
factor necessarily present, and very prominently, in the minds of Un. ted Kingdom Ministers when formulating their conclusions 
on individual questions 
He noted,, that their opposition to involvement in another European war 
was well known and that this "had to be taken into account'. He thought 
the Dominions had not 
dissuaded the United Kingdom Government from taking any action 
on which they themselves were bent or induced the U. K. Government 
to take action which they would not have taken of their own 
volition, but it may well have swayed opinion decisively in cases 
where U. K. views on some particular matter were divided. 
101 
99. Machtig to Bridges, 30th July 1944, D035/1482, WC72/6. 
100. Dixon, op. cit., p. 51. 
101. Minute by Dixon, 30th January 1945, ibid. (At the height of the 
Munich crisis Cadogan recalls being sent for by Chamberlain and 
writes that P. M. and a small group of ministers were "frightened 
out of their wits by, amongst other things, MacDonald and Bruce 
"on subject of Dominions". The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
ed. D. Dilks (London, 1971), p. 107, entry for 27th September 1938. 
For study of Dominion's influence over U. K. policy see Reinhard 
Meyers, 'Britain, Europe and the Dominions in the 1930s: Some 
Aspects of British, European and Commonwealth policies', Australian 
Journal of History and Politics 1976, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 36-50 and 
R. Ovendale, op. cit. ) 
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There is a strong case to be made for the decisiveness of the Dominions' 
influence on U. K. policy in September 1938-with-regard to the Munich. 
Agreement. Surveying this question after his retirement,. Dixon 
suggested that the Dominions helped to strengthen Chamberlain's 
102 
resolution. 
"' 
r rz - 
On the whole the U. K. did not try to solve the contradictions 
posed by the varying attitudes of the Dominions, but attempted to 
minimise them and promote a sense of unity despite them. The gravity 
of the international situation was clearly one reason not to force 
difficult issues and British governments no doubt felt that time was 
needed after the constitutional declarations of 1926 and 1931 to settle 
matters. They were prepared to wait and see how things would develop 
and whether, having achieved the recognition of their independence, 
the Dominions would begin to stress the values of the association, 
as MacDonald had hoped before the 1937 Conference. The essentially 
evolutionary character of the Commonwealth and its remarkable flexibility 
constituted a strength and also a weakness. This continually changing 
association'. held room for ambiguities and uncertainties. The Dominions 
were not always sure precisely where they stood in relation to their 
Commonwealth commitments, and whether the twin principles of independence 
and allegiance were really compatible. For example, in 1938 King, 
while praising U. K. foreign policy, refused to commit Canada to 
supporting it and said the Canadian-Parliament would have to decide 
when the time came. He added that this was not ,a wholly satisfactory 
position but was the result of the existing stage of the Commonwealth 
relationship: 
102. Dixon, op. cit., p. 51. 
UNIVERSITY 
lIE3RARY 
LEERS 
38 
Z r1 
It is inherent in the contradiction between the recognised 
independent responsibility of the several members of the 
Commonwealth ... and the possibility that war proclaimed by the King as regards part of his dominions may involve 
other parts in conflict. In other words, we have worked 
out a satisfactory and enduring solution of the relations 
between the several membersoof the British Commonwealth in 
peace time; we have not yet worked 'gut a completely logical 
solution of the position in. wartime. l° 
Two unquestioned aspects of the Commonwealth relationship in the 1920s 
and 1930s - the impossibility of a. Dominion's remaining neutral. in 
war and the common allegiance to the Crown - had been placed , 
in. doubt 
by the actions of Ireland in 1936 and 1939 and, by"the hesitations of 
South Africa in 1938 and 1939. The U. K. was naturally, triumphant at 
the support it received from its partners in 1939 and felt justified. 
It is quite likely that all the Dominions could have survived, the war 
unscathed, interns of not being in vaded,; had they not joined in. 
Their, entry into war sprang not from , the immediate. danger in. which 
they were placed, but from their various ties with, and reliance upon, 
the U. K. 
104 
Their participation was probably inevitable in any 
general, defensive war in which the U. K. was involved, but as King 
had noted, %this was not a completely logical or satisfactory. position 
for these 'independent' countries to occupy. The. war produced a 
great effect on, the Dominions, not least in catapulting them through 
stages of development in foreign affairs which might otherwise have 
taken decades to achieve. However, the fact that the Commonwealth 
countries entered the war, despite the differences in their attitudes, 
did not guarantee a placid partnership during the, hostilities or 
afterwards. 
103. 'Statement by King to Canadian Parliament, 25th May 1938, U . K. - High 
Commission Ottawa to D. O., 26th May 1938, D035/576, F705/33. 
104. G. N. Hillmer concludes that there wasan 'Anglo-Dominion alliance' 
in the inter-war period; one which was based on "the same 
allegiances, the 'same values, traditions and institutions and 
the same enlightened self-interest", G. N. Hillmer, 'The Anglo- 
Dominion Alliance, 1919-1939' (Unpublished). 
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Chapter Two 
The Commonwealth at War: U. K. policy towards war-time 
collaboration with-the Dominions 
Before the war broke out'the U. K. had begun to consider alterations 
which might be needed to the system of Commonwealth collaboration-if ti 
hostilities occurred, and shortly after war was declared some changes 
, 
were made. As in peace-time, there were two main aspects of inter- 
Commonwealth collaboration; the transmission of information, ' and 
consultation on policy. Throughout the war both affects were subject 
to re-examination and alteration as inadequacies' were perceived; some 
of these resulted from a change in the Dominions' association with the 
war. The most contentious issue concerned the establishment of a 
supreme Commonwealth war council to ensure a sufficient voice for the. 
Dominions in the direction of the war. Opinions on'this subject 
differed; it was not a case of the Dominions' desiring one system 
and the U. K. another. In general, the war saw an extension of inter- 
Commonwealth representation and an increase in the amount of information 
sent to each member. Despite pressure from some Dominions to participate 
directly in the high direction of the war, the exigencies of waging 
war and the close co-operation which developed between the U. K. and 
the U. S. A. tended to exclude the Dominions from the inner councils. 
In November 1938 the Permanent Under-Secretary at the D. O., Sir 
Edward Harding, wrote to the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Edward Bridges, 
about war-time machinery for Commonwealth collaboration. He thought 
that whatever machinery was established, it had to be based on two 
principles; the clear and full recognition of the complete responsibility 
of each country's government to its own Parliament and people, and the 
need for the closest co-operation to secure prompt discussions. and 
remove. the possibilities of misunderstanding and disagreement and to 
40 
make the most economical use of the material available. Among other 
"z 
ideas he suggested the creation of an inter-Commonwealth council 
containing Ministers of all members, but' added that it would have 
to be a purely advisory body unless governments were prepared to 
delegate full authority. Harding thought there might also be a joint 
secretariat for such a council. 
l 
Bridges assumed that there would 
be a small U. K. War Cabinet of about six, and thought it would be 
impossible to add one representative of each Dominion to this, because 
it would become too large and unwieldy. He considered the idea of 
co-opting a single Dominion representative, but doubted if there was 
anyone of Smuts' calibre to repeat the 1917-1918 precedent, and 
questioned whether the Dominions would want a representative from only 
one country, 
Monthly meetings between Dominion and U. K. Ministers might provide 
an alternative, but the exact powers to be given such Ministers would 
be a problem and if meetings were to be held with such frequency the 
Dominion representatives would have to reside in London; which would 
mean they would have to be High Commissioners rather than Ministers. 
To consult with senior Ministers would, Bridges thought, mean, having 
meetings only very rarely. He told Harding that the dominant factor 
in war would be the pace of events, which would inevitably place the 
power of decision with "those at the centre". Consequently, it was 
important to ensure that 
Dominion representatives'in London are kept very fully 
informed of developments, and are' brought' into discussions 
at periodic intervals with one or two members of the War 
Cabinet. 
This. would be the priority in the early stages. and if- the' Dominions wanted 
more direct participation, : later on other plans` would 
have tö be'considered, 
but Bridges was doubtful about the effectiveness of a-supreme'wär council 
1. Harding to Bridges, 2nd November 1938, CAB21/488. 
41 
of U. K. and Dominion representatives. 
2 
Harding agreed with the notion that one or two members of the War 
Cabinet should keep in touch with the Dominion High Commissioners', but 
noted that he wanted to examine in advance of an' emergency other 
proposals which would enable the Dominions-'to 
exercise their proper share in controlling the use of the 
contributions made by them. 
He agreed that four additions to the U. K. War Cabinet would be impossible, 
but did not dismiss the possibility of an intermediate body between the 
High Commissioners, (who only acted as a channel of information) and 
rare meetings between senior Ministers. 
3 
Bridges informed the Minister 
for Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, of his correspondence with 
Harding. He advised that nothing should be done for the time being about 
associating the Dominion with the higher directiön of the war as it was 
difficult to produce a scheme which would recognise their independence 
and be a satisfactory instrument for reaching decisions. It would be 
better to rely on the good sense of the Dominions to recognise when 
the time came that "supreme control can only be exercised by those at 
the centre? '. Chatfield concurred with this, but added that the Dominions 
Secretary should be co-opted when necessary to, the War Cabinet with a 
"watching brief", so as to be able to convey information to and from 
the High Commissioners. 
4 
That influential figure, Sir Maurice Hankey, 
had also been considering the position of the Dominions. In August 
1939 after having discussions with. Chamberlain about a War Cabinet he 
ti 
noted that he had forgotten to mention to the Prime Minister the 
importance of keeping the Dominions fully informed, which "seemed to 
point to the S. of S. for Dominion Affairs being in the Cabinet". 
5"%, 
Some consideration had been given to war-time collaboration in the 
2. Bridges to Harding, 6th February 1939, ibid. 
3. Harding to Bridges, 16th February 1939, ibid. 
4. Bridges to Chatfield, 1st March 1939; Chatfield to Bridges, 3rd 
March, 1939, ibid. 
5. S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol. 3, (London, 1974), p. 414. 
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months before war and at the first meeting of the, U. K. War Cabinet the 
importance of-keeping the Dominion High Commissioners fully informed was 
noted. Chamberlain proposed that the new Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, Eden, should receive the agenda for all Cabinet 
meetings and attend for discussion of matters about which he needed 
to be informed. He added that this information could be supplemented 
with more technical material on occasions. 
6 Apart from this procedure, 
a Ministerial committee was established to study inter-Commonwealth 
co-operation and suggest any improvements to the machinery. - This 
reported to the War Cabinet on 16th September.. Its report noted the 
Dominions Secretary's access to the War Cabinet and the arrangements, 
which had been made for special daily telegrams, based on the Chiefs 
of Staff daily situation report, to be-sent to the Dominion Governments 
and shown to the High Commissioners. The establishment in 1917 of 
an Imperial War Cabinet was recalled, but the committee suggested that 
an early repetition of this would be difficult as all the Dominion 
leaders were facing pressing problems in their countries, because of 
the heavy pressure upon U. K. Ministers, and in view of the danger that i 
the U. K. might be directly attacked. The committee recommended that 
the Dominion High Commissioners be given an opportunity of having 1 
talks with Ministers, that Dominion liaison arrangements with Service 
and civilian departments should be gradually extended, and that a 
meeting o Prime Ministers could be-convened within the foreseeable 
future. 
Measures had been taken to establish a Supreme War Council of U. K. 
6. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 3rd September 1939, CAB65/1, WM(39)1:. 
7. Report by Ministerial Committee on'Dominion collaboration', 14th 
September 1939, CAB67/1, WP(G)(39)10. (The Committee consisted of 
Chatfield (Minister for co-ordination of Defence), Eden and Hankey 
(Minister without Portfolio) and was assisted by Ismay (Secretary to 
the Chiefs of Staff) and Bridges. For meeting of the committee see 
CAB21/874. ) 
N 
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and French representatives, (with other allied representatives to 
join as appropriate) and Sir John Stephenson, Assistant Under Secretary, 
at the D. O., -had suggested that the principle should be accepted whereby 
as soon as Dominion forces were serving in the-field, Dominion Governments 
should be represented on the Supreme Council. He said it*would be 
advantageous if they could be told that their status would be equal 
to the U. K. 's on this body. 
8 
The Cabinet Committee rejected the 
notion of associating the Dominions with the Supreme War Council at 
that time. The committee's most urgent proposal as for senior Dominion 
Ministers to visit the U. K. so they could appreciate the gravity of the 
situation and report in full to their governments. 
9 
The War Cabinet 
accepted the committee's proposals, but the conclusions noted that 
In view of heavy pressure on members of the War Cabinet 
the hope was also expressed that meetings between the High 
Commissioners and members of the War Cabinet would not 
take-place very frequently. 10 ' 
Thus; the arrangements first established to collaboration with the 
Dominions placed a heavy emphasis on information and much less on joint 
collaboration, with an inauspicious reservation-being expressed by the 
War Cabinet that it hoped not to be bothered-too often by°the-High.! 
Commissioners.. The two main aspects of communication'- telegrams-to 
DominionýGovernments and meetings. with. High. Commissioners -, did, not 
differ much from those arrangements-in operation"inýthe last years of ' 
peace. Nevertheless the Dominions were to be"sent specially prepared 
. telegrams., supplemented by other information-from the "F.?  O. (and elsewhere, 
. the High Commissioners-were to see the Dominions Secretary daily, and 
-. his association with a smaller War, Cabinet seemed to be safeguarded; 
, The meeting of Dominion Ministers which took place in November-1939 
8. Minute by Stephenson, 9th September 1939, D035/998, WC1/iA. 
9. Report by Ministerial Committee on 'Dominion Collaboration' 14th, '' 
September 1939, op. cit. 
10. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 16th September 1939, CAB65/1°, "WM(39)17. 
(Telegrams were sent to the Dominion Governments informing them of 
the arrangements agreed to by the Cabinet, and'inviting them to send 
Ministers to visit, 21st September 1939; CAB21/874. ) 
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was again primarily for the purpose of informing those Ministers of the 
situation and what assistance the U. K. could best use. This is not 
to say that the U. K. had, no intention of consulting the Dominions on 
specific areas of joint action, but, as far as the overall direction 
of the war was concerned, it had no immediate plans in 1939 to ensure 
the direct pd'tticipation of the Dominions. Bridges had pointed to 
the difficulty of devising an effective scheme. Commenting on a 
suggestion by Harding that while preparing for an inter-allied council 
they should remember the need to accommodate the Dominions, Bridges 
told Ismay that he felt strongly that if inter-allied control were 
complicated by the Dominions "we shall get something unworkable". 
However, how long it would be possible for the stress toiremain on 
informing, rather than consulting, the Dominions, depended on the success 
of these arrangements and the degree to which individual Dominion 
Governments desired to play a more positive role in the formulation of 
policy. 
On 8th September 1939 Eden told the first war-time meeting of 
Dominion High Commissioners of the decision to send daily telegrams to 
their governments; on account of their special secrecy these telegrams 
would not be distributed in London'but would be available to them at 
the meetings, with the Dominions Secretary where they would be supplemented 
by information on special points, or the general background. 
12 These 
meetings tended to informality. The D. O. kept only a note of the 
l3 
subjects... discussed and important views expressed for their,, 'own records. 
Garner, who then held the rank of Principal in the D. O., has described 
them as "small and intimate gatherings"-specifically for-High Commissioners, 
a fpýý 
11. Bridges to Ismay, 11th May 1939, CAB21/488. 
12. Note of first war-time meeting between Dominions Secretary and Dominion 
High Commissioners, 8th September 1939, D0121/6.4 
13. Minute by Mr. W. A. W. Clark (Principal at the D. O. ) in response to an 
enquiry from Mr. Strang (F. O. ) for the minutes of a. meeting, 6th October 
1'943, D035/1525, W223/1. (Massey records that the High Commissioners 
expressly asked for no minutes to be taken. Massey, What's Past is 
Prologue (Toronto, 1963), pp. 297-298. ) 
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with'no substituting deputies allowed. 
14 
The Dominion High Commissioners were representatives of their 
governments, appointed to facilitate co-operation and communication. 
The value of these men during the war as interpreters and communicators 
of their governments' policies depended mainly on two factors; the 
individual and-his position and contacts in London, and his government's 
regard for him. The five High Commissioners posted in-London during 
the war were men of different personal status who varied in their 
effectiveness. Mr. Stanley Bruce, the Austrälian'High Commissioner, 
was an, ex-Prime Minister with correspondingly wide experience of 
Commonwealth affairs and foreign policy, and a high personal status. 
He-had been stationed in London since 1932, first as Resident Minister 
and from 1933 as High Commissioner. Bruce was probably the best informed 
oUall; Dominion. =High Commissioners because of his personal, contacts 
with-senior Ministers and -officials, and also his Government's posting 
of a`Political Liaison Officer with rooms in the Cabinet Offices to 
liaise with the F. O. Bruce told his Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Menzies, 
11 
"A' that he would try to supplement the information he received from his 
personal and private contacts, but-reminded him of the necessity for 
secrecy as -., i ir- 
much of 'what I learn is no't known to ordinary members of 
the Cabinet. 
His subse uent telegram to Menzies indicates that Sir Maurice Hankey and 
15 
Lord Chatfield were among those from whom he gleaned information.. It 
was Bruce's own opinion that Australia was better informed during his 
High Commissionership than all the rest of the Commonwealth combined, 
14. Rt. Hon. Lord Garner, The Commonwealth office, 1925-1968 (London, 1978), 
p. 198. 
15. Two cables from Bruce to Menzies, both dated 7th September 1939, 
Australian Documents Vol. II, Nos. 211 & 212. (Both Hankey and 
Chatfield had been members of the committee studying Commonwealth 
collaboration, and Hankey in particular had considerable knowledge of 
the Dominions and was well acquP-*, nted with many Dominion Ministers and 
officials. In 1936 he had told Richard Casey (then Treasurer in the 
Australian Government) that Bruce was "! very hgihly thought of (in the, 
U. K. ) and very popular", Roskill, op. cit., p. 239. ) 
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and had a greater influence on policy. 
16 Bruce undoubtedly had a 
close relationship with Menzies and they corresponded frequently, 
trusting each other's judgment and using one another as sounding boards 
for ideas. Menzies has since described Bruce, as being "unsurpassed" 
as High Commissioner. 
17 
This mutual confidence meant that Bruce was 
very much a part of Australia's whole process of collaboration with 
the U. K. and used often for expressing Australia's viewpoint. Bruce's 
relations with Mr. -J. Curtin, P. M. -from October 1941, were-fairly good, 
but not as close as with Menzies. However, there were serious tensions 
between Bruce and Mr. Evatt,, the Labour External Affairs Minister which 
was due as much to a clash of personalities as differences in policy. 
18 
The regard with which Bruce was held inýthe U. K. is shown by Chamberlain's 
reaction to Menzies' suggestion that Bruce should be sent to the U. S. A. 
Chamberlain told Bruce that he ought to remain'in London because he had 
built up an unrivalled range of contact, and later told-Menzies that 
he did not want Bruce to leave, even-for, a few months, as he was needed 
in London. 
19 
Mr. Vincent Massey, -the Canadian High Commissioner', was also a 
senior figure with experience of Washington, (where he was posted from 
1926) who had been in London since 1935. He was originally not i 
enthusiastic about the establishment of the A. O., anticipating that 
it would be an obstacle, not a facility towards informing the Dominions 
on foreign affairs, but the war seemed to alter his opinion. 
20 
The 
difficulty for Massey lay not'in his position in. Iondon, but his' 
relationship with his own Prime Minister and the Canadian Department 
of External Affairs, which the Prime Minister, Mr. W. L. M. King also 
headed. In the 1930s'King had objected to Massey's attending meetings 
16. C. Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds (London, 1965), p. 87. 
17. Sir R. Menzies, Afternoon Light (London, 1967), pp.. 116-117., 
18. Edwards, op. cit.,. pp. 337-347; Minutes by Greenway, 1st July 1943 and 
Newton, 2nd July-1943, F0371/36604, W9595/3523/68. 
19. Bruce-to Menzies, 19th September 1939,, Chamberlain to Menzies, 10th 
November 1939, Australian Documents Vol. II, Nos. 233 & 344; Garner, 
op. cit., p. 199. 
20. Massey, op. cit., p. 236. 
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at the D. O. with the other High Commissioners, and was never happy 
about the arrangement. 
21 King's attitude towards Massey was rather 
ambivalent; -at times he addressed hia or referred toýhim in praising, 
friendly tones, but on Others he was highly critical. It does'seem 
that King lacked confidence in his High Commissioner personally, and 
as Minister for External Affairs, often kept' him badly. informed. ` King's 
view seems to have been shared by Mr. Skelton, (Under-Secretary of 
External Affairs until his, death in 1941) but Massey says that the 
situation improved after Mr. Norman Robertson took'over that office. 
22 
No doubt Massey contributed to this uneasy relationship by his-general 
attitude and behaviour. - He was, an intellectual, stylish and aristocratic 
in bearing, and considered the High Commissioners, especially Bruce 
and himself, as "not quite Ministers but more than diplomats". ' He 
23 
referred to the gatherings at the, D. O. as the "junior War Cabinet". 
Miss Violet Markham told Lord Tweedsmuir, ' Governor-General to Canada, 
that Massey had been bitten by an "ambassadorial bug", and that this 
was the real cause of the friction between'King and Massey. 
24 
Massey 
clearly favoured the meetings between the Secretary of State and the 
I 
High Commissioners and later described them as ones in which it was 
possible', to "think as you spoke",. in which he and his colleagues were 
encouraged to give their personal opinions, even if they could not 
commit their governments. ý This applied particularly to Massey because 
of the difficult relationship between him and King, and because King 
did not envisage any Canadian High Commissioner, p paying an innovating 
role. 
21. See chapter 1 p. -4 and Massey, op. c°it., pp. 238-243. 
22. Massey, op. cit., pp. 294-296. 
23. Massey's Diary, entry for 10th November 1939, Massey College Toronto; 
Massey, op. cit., pp. 303-309. (For Lord Garners impression of Massey, 
see Rt. Hon Lord Garner, 'Britain and Canada in the 1940s and 1950s', 
in P. Lyon, ed. Britain and Canada: Survey of a changing Relationship 
(London, 1976), p. 92. ) 
24. Miss V. Markham to Tweedsmuir, 23rd October 1939, Buchan Papers. 
(Commenting on the Masseys, Miss Markham wrote: "they don't realise 
that all this talk of serving Canada boils'down to a good deal of 
personal ambition mixed up with social aspirations which loom so large 
in Alice's mind. ) 
48 tr 
Mr. Waterson, South African High Commissioner from 1939 to 1943, 
replaced Mr. ±e Water when the latter resigned after South Africa 
declared war. On hearing Hertzog's decision to propose a neutrality 
motion, to Water` told Eden that he agreed with this, commenting that 
Hertzog understood the South African people better than Smuts did. 
25 
Garner describes Waterson as 'a "light-weight", and Mr. Bödenstein, 
Head 'of the South 'African External Affairs Department, confirmed the 
view' of Harding' thät Wa'terson was no: as good asthis predecessor 
because he''was-wholly sympathetic' to the English side and incapable 
of re resentin the Afrikaaner 
26 
pg pointýof view. Waterson seemed to 
take 'seriously the suggestion made by the High-Commissioners at their 
first`war-time meeting that ; they should not '. communicate' supplementary 
information to their governments as they had in the past, (according 
to the D. O. 's note of the meeting. ) Bruce recalls that at a later 
meeting Waterson'äsked'Eden'whether`he should'communicate'a piece of 
information to Smuts`. "'Bruce"notes that he did not intend to follow 
Waterson's practice'of "br'inging up matters which I propose to communicate 
to'thg Prime Minister". 
27' 
Waterson was replaced in 1943, possibly 
because he was not felt to be the ideal representative, and his successor 
Colonel Reitz, a man with an illustrious military reputation in the 
Boer War, is described by"rner as agreeable but making no impact. 
Reitz died suddenly 'in Inte. 194k and Mr. 'G. Heaton Nicholls, previously 
an M. P., replaced him with instru'ctiöns from Smuts to back up the U. K. 
Ministersein their task of keeping the Commonweal h. together. Smuts 
25. The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London,,, 1965), p. 68. ;,. >. 26. Harding to Sir Cosmo Parkinson (K. U. S. of the D. O. Feb. -May 1940), 
6th March 1940, D035/540,087/62 .; Garner, op. cit., p. 
199. 
27. Notes of first meeting between the Dominions Secretary and the 
_ 
Dominion High Commissioners, 8th September 1939, D0121/6; "Note by 
Bruce, 30th January 1940, Australian Documents Vol. III, , 
No. 36. 
, 28., Garner, op. cit., p. 199. 
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stressed to him that South Africa's future depended on a strong and 
united Commonwealth. 
29 
The distinctive aspect about the position 
of any South African High Commissioner sprang from the close relations 
between Smuts and most senior U. it. Ministers, especially Churchill, 
as a result the High Commissioner might often be by-passed. 
Although the New Zealand High Commissioner, Mr. Jordan, had been 
in London since 1934 and was well-enough liked by most people, he did 
not possess the outstanding personal characteristics which marked out 
Bruce. The D. O. referred to him in a telegram to their own High 
Commissioner, in New Zealand, Sir H. Batterbee, as "neither interested- 
in, nor qualified to handle, diplomatic and strategic issues". 
30 After 
a meeting of High Commissioners in 1943, Massey recorded in his diary 
Jordan waited to see in which direction the feeling of 
the meeting went and, then made a revivalist speech in 
favour of the majority view, ýF 
and Nicholls also recalls that Jordan was "not particularly interested 
in foreign affairs', but more concerned with matters of trade. 
31 
One slight cloud over Jordan's reputation came to light in 1943 
when an official from the F. O. 's Northern Department said he had been 
withholding information on the U. S. S. R. from the Dominion High 
Commissioners because he had heard that Jordan was indiscreet. Sir 
Basil Newton, the F. O. 's Liaison, Officer to the Dominion High Commissioners, 
admitted that there was some doubt about Jordan who, although generally 
uninterested in foreign affairs, was passionately in favour of the 
Soviet regime and resented any criticisms of it. Newton wrote 
There can be no question of his whole-hearted loyalty & his 
desire to co-operate, but I have myself thought it conceivable 
through inexperience & lack of acumen in foreign affairs'(in 
many ways he is very shrewd and full of mother wit) he might on 
occasions be indiscreet in conversation with Soviet friends. I 
think the D. O. share my feelings, thigh I have never heard of 
any actual instance of indiscretion. I 
29. G. H. Nicholls, South Africa In My Time (London, *1961), p. 380. 
30. D. O. to Batterbee, February 1942, Prem 4,43A/14. 
31. Hassey's Diary, entry for 3rd February 1943, Massey College, Toronto; 
Nicholls, op. cit., p. 383. 
32. Minutes by (C. T. A. W. ?? ) 1st June 1943, Newton, 4th June 1943 & 15th 
June 1943, and Greenway (Head of the Döminions Intelligence Department 
of the F. O. ) 11th June 1943, F0371/36605, w8107/4184/68. 
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It was arranged, with the approval of Cadogan, that Newton would not 
discuss sensitive material with the High Commissioners when Jordan was 
present, a task made easier by the latter's frequent absence from the 
D. O. meetings. The F. O. was to speak with the D. O. about this 
arrangement and there seems. to be no record of any dissent on the 
D. O. 's part. The reason for Jordan's absence is unclear unless 
4, 
he felt simply that his Government was receiving sufficient information 
on foreign and military questions from the D. O. 's telegrams. 
The U. K. was generally satisfied with its meetings with the High 
Commissioners. Lord Cranborne, who was Dominions Secretary for the 
longest time during the war, described them as being of "the greatest 
value", assisting him to form balanced conclusions, and providing the 
High Commissioners with a valuable background to policies and events. 
He added one qualification - that the High Commissioners could seldom 
speak on behalf of their governments and had to give personal opinions. 
33 
This was a consequence of their representative status and their government's 
use of each of them. Nicholls, who arrived during Cranborne's second 
term at the D. O., had described the meetings as "very pleasant affairs 
though occupied with serious matters". The effect was to make the 
High Commissioners feel significant parts of the war machine, and he 
thought the Dominion Governments had no reason to feel uninformed 
34 
providing the High Commissioner was doing his job properly. More 
serious criticism came from Bruce and Massey. The former complained 
that the Dominions Secretary was not fully informed of the situation, 
or not in sufficient time for the Dominions to be consulted, and the 
latter noted that so much depended on the willingness and ability of 
the Dominions Secretary to provide them with information and Churchill's 
33. Cranborne to Mr. McGuire, 23rd August 1945, D035/1205, WC75/47. 
34. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 382. - 
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readiness. to keep them informed. 
35.44 
t" During the first phases, of, the war,, commonly known as the 'phoney 
war', the situation was,,. fairly acceptable, to, everyone; later, 
difficulties arose.: The first., war-time, Secretary.. of, State for Dominion 
Affairs was, Eden, who had been brought.. back into the Government on the 
outbreak. of hostilities. Eden was not whollylsympathetic to; the- i, 
reconstituted Government and found his-anomalous association, with, the 
War Cabinet humiliating. There were those, who were glad, that he had 
been brought back to Office, but . not made., a central member of 
the War 
Cabinet, thus ensuring that he . would not 
be discredited. by its. 
_ 
performance. 
36 
Eden recalls that he enjoyed his,; work with the Dominions 
and. was; very interested in Commonwealth affairs,, but he. was eager for 
L 
an executive department, particularly; the War Office. Garner, who 
37 
served under Eden,. recalls a restlessness, on his part, -and, an absence 
of: any "profound interest" in Commonwealth problems, but. says he 
excelled in his handling of the High, Commissioners' meetings. 
38 
Massey 
recorded that Eden was-"admirable" and, that. all the High, Commissioners 
were disappointed, to. see him leave. 
39 
._ 
Bruce's opinion was rather more , '` 
ic 
ambiguous. In May 1940 he told Menzies that he was disappointed with 
Eden's successor, Lord Caldecote,, but-said that despite this he thought 
he would be "as effective" asEden.. 
-,, 
Considering Bruce's criticisms 
of Caldecote,, this. was not-a very complimentary remark, but it might 
merely haue referred to the fact . that. neither men was a member of 
the 
35. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 322-324; Massey, op., p. 296. 
36.., Oliver Harvey, who was Eden's private secretary at the F. O. 1936-38 
& 1941-3, recorded his delight that Eden was not in the War`Cabinet, 
but was, to have access to it,, and also Eden's feeling that he was 
"insufficiently occupied" at the D. O., 'Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver 
Harvey, 1937-1940, ed. J. Harvey, -., 
(London, 1970) see entries for 3rd 
September 1939,26th March 1940 and 27th March 1940. 
37. The Eden Memoirs, op. cit., pp; -63, --84 & 91. -- His biographer also refers 
to Eden's discomfort between September 1939 and May 1940. See D. 
Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Biography (Allen Lane, London, 1981), pp. 153 
& 157-8. 
38. Garner, op. cit., p. 161. 
39. Massey, op. cit., p. 299. 
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War Cabinet. 
40 
Finally, it is interesting to note Menzies' opinion 
of Eden after the latter had returned to the F. O. Returning from a 
visit to the U. K. in the Spring of 1941, Menzies reported on the 
situation in the U. K. and on various Ministers, commenting that although 
Eden had considerable experience and great industry he was a "light-weight" 
who had not developed in recent years. 
41 
With the end of the 'phoney 
war' and the increasing seriousness of the war situation, Dominion calls 
for more information and consultations grew and the U. K. were forced 
to reconsider the arrangements it had made. 
The Australian Prime Minister, Menzies, combined an attitude of 
solid support for the U. K. and its war effort, with fairly frequent 
requests for information and consultations and occasional criticisms 
of British actions. In January 1940 Menzies cabled Chamberlain about 
the proposed action to interfere with Swedish supplies-of iron ore to 
Germany and requested that no decision be taken until the Dominion 
Governments had been sent fuller information and had time to express 
their views. He added that he was concerned at the effect of such 
action on other neutral countries. Bruce reported that his message 
had arrived just in time and that the, War Cabinet had decided to drop 
the contemplated action. 
42 
In May 1940 the safety of Australian 
and New Zealand convoys concerned Menzies because of the uncertainty 
surrounding Italy's possible entry into the war, and he requested a 
full appreciation from the Chiefs of Staff of the prospective situation. 
Commenting on the appreciation, Menzies said that-4t should have been 
sent earlier, and that he had found it disappointing, compared with 
special reports he had received from the Committee of Imperial Defence 
/ 
(C. I. D. ). 
40. Bruce to Menzies, 15th May 1940, Australian Documents Vol. III, No. 244. 
41. Minute to the Australian Advisory War Council, 28th May 1941, 
Australian Documents Vol. IV, No. 472. (After the war Menzies 
radically revised his opinion of Eden. ) . 42. Menzies to Chamberlain, 12th January 1940, Bruce to Menzies, 12th 
January 1940, Australian Documents Vol.. III, No. 13 & 14. 
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The possibility -with which'we are confronted in, the 
Mediterranean has, we understand, been the subject of 
examination in recent'years'and we feel-that there. 'should'-` 
be available to Dominion Governments a comprehensive 
appreciation along the 'generally accepted lines of: this 
class of document. 
Menzies said that if there was concern about the safeguarding of such 
information it would be sent to him, as Minister for Defence Co- 
ordination, and he would ensure its security, but he asked to be 
given information on the disposition of allied forces in the various 
theatres. Menzies added that he made these "observations" in the 
I. -. ,'r-' tl^' 
"spirit of a helpful suggestion" so Australia could judge how it could 
best use its own forces. 
43 -These messages reflected Menzies' opinion 
that the Dominion Governments should be kept very closely"in touch 
with all political and military strategy and whenever possible, 
consult'ed' about actiön. ` ,;;, a .-,. c, 
As-eärly'as September 1939 Menzies had'told the U. K. High`Commissioner 
of the need for the Dominions to have an effective voice'in U. K. policy 
and how they had not done so before the'war, citing the U. K. Is-guarantee 
to Poland as an example. He also suggested that the Dominions should 
be give 
44 
n atseat on the U. K. War Cabinet. However in May 1940? 
Menzies, did not seem too dissatisfied with' the position, 'and'to1d 
the U. K. ýHigh Commissioner, Mr. G. Whiskard, that apart from the points 
he had made to Eden on 8th May, "he'had'no compliint whatsoever as 
to information and opportunities for consultation afforded by the United 
Kingdom Government". 45 In September 1940 Menzies and Brüce both. felt 
the situation had badly deteriorated when they were given no information 
about the withdrawal' from Dakar in advance'of'press'notices'. The 
._ 
Secretary of State for. Dominion Affairs, Lord Caldecote, explained . to 
43. Menzies to Eden, 1st May 1940 & 8th May 1940, `Aüstralian Docüiaents"ý 
Vol. III, Nos. 191 & 215. -- 44. Whiskärd to D. O,, 20th September 193,9, CAB21/874. 45`. Whiskard to Eden, '10th May 1940, Australian Documents' Vol., III, 
No. 225. 
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Menzies that the U. K. had to release information to the press immediately 
in, order to counter false accounts of the operation they expected the 
German and Vichy agencies to broadcast, and this was why the Dominions 
had not. been informed first. 
46 Meanwhile Bruce-was-telling Menzies 
that he; had protested strongly about the lack of communication and! had 
discovered that time had been, available, although no information had 
been given to him either. He blamed the position: on-Churchill's'lack- 
of appreciation of - the Dominions, and the "feebleness" of the Secretary 
of State. a Menzies sent a message to Churchill criticising'the military 
action taken and telling him 
It is absolutely wrong that the Australian Government'-, 
should know practically nothing of details of engagement 
and nothing at all of decision to abandon it until after 
newspaper publication. 
He added that this was-not the first occasion when the absence; of official 
information had proved humiliating'to his government. 
47 
There ensued 
a series of cables between Churchill and Menzies, the former expressing 
his disappointment at Menzies' criticisms and saying he had hoped for 
"a broad and generous measure of indulgence" because of:.. the U. K. 's 
exertions on Australia's behalf. . Bruce reported that 'Churchill was 
resentful of Menzies'-cable, because he was sensitive about Dakar and 
knew that Menzies' criticisms were right. Menzies responded by 
assuring Churchill that "whatever interrogative or even critical" . 
messages he sent 
Australia knows courage when it sees it and will follow you 
to a 'finish, as to the best of my abilities I certainly 
shall. 48 
From May 1940, when the Churchill government assumed office, -three 
46. Caldecote to Whiskard, (enclosing message for Menzies) 26th September 
1940, Australian Documents Vol. IV, No. 140. 
47. Bruce to Menzies, 26th September 1940; Menzies to Bruce, (enclosing 
message for Churchill) 4th October 1940, Australian Documents Vol. IV, 
Nos. 141 & 144. 
48. Churchill to Menzies, 2nd October 1940; Bruce to Menzies, 2nd October 
1940; Menzies to Churchill, 4th October 1940, Australian Documents 
Vol. IV, Nos. 152,154'& 158. 
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factors affected the collaboration with the Dominions: first, the 
low opinion in which the High Commissioners held the new Secretary of 
State,. Caldecote; second, Churchill's own attitude towards Commonwealth 
collaboration; third, the deteriorating war situation and the increased 
speed at which events were moving. Lord Caldecote was no stranger 
to the D. O.,. he had been Secretary of State from January to September 
1939° (as Sir T. Inskip) but his appointment in May 1940 was not welcomed 
with much enthusiasm. Massey recalls that the High Commissioners 
proteste&to Churchill at the appointment, and that although he personally 
liked-Caldecote, the D. O. 
was not the kind of Office to be given as a consolation 
prize to a retiring politician 
adding that as he suspected, he was never near enough the centre of the 
stage to cater adequately for them. Bruce, who referred later to 
49 
Caldecote's "feebleness' told his Prime Minister that it was an 
unsatisfactory appointment, and that Caldecote lacked the necessary 
drive and personality to put over the Dominions' view to the War Cabinet, 
or a receptive or constructive mind. Echoing Massey, he said the 
appointment of a discarded Lord Chancellor was "not complimentary" to 
the Dominions. 
50 
Whatever Caldecote's capacity for the post, it 
seems ass if the High Commissioners made up their minds that he was 
a bad appointment and gave him little chance. Garner records that, 
led by Bruce, they showed "scant respect" for Caldecote, showing their 
irritation if he kept them waiting and that consequently the High. 
Commissioners' meetings with him were at best "tepid". Although 
lacking Eden's flair or brilliance, Garner describes Caldecote as 
"high-minded" and "conscientious", with integrity and the capacity to 
make the best use of his staff. Perhaps more surprisingly, in view 
of the Dominion High Commissioners' comments, he also says that-he 
49. Massey, op. cit., p. 299. 
50. Bruce to Menzies, 15th May 1940, Australian Documents Vol. III, 
No. 244. 
56 
refused to be overborne by Churchill, 's whims. 
51 
Caldecote clearly tried to fulfil his duties and serve the 
Dominions as-well as he could. The records of the War Cabinet show 
his interventions on their behalf;., as on 13th June-1940-when he urged- 
the need to keep them fully informed and consulted, emphasising the 
need to treat them as full partners. 
52 However, his exclusion from 
the War Cabinet, proper undoubtedly;, produced difficulties and although 
he tried to ensure that he, was fully, informed, on. occasions he had 
to tell the High, Commissioners that he. was unable-to provide them with 
information of_Cabinet discussions as he had not been present at-the 
time. 
53. 
Over the Dakar incident, which caused such friction with 
Australia, Caldecote senta draft-, telegram to Churchill, explaining 
that he was anxious to give. the Dominions the fullest information---V: 
(especially after hearing the views of the High Commissioners) but it 
was difficult to do this as he had not been-at the Cabinet's: discussions. 
He suggested that Churchill should amplify the draft. 
5`4 
2In 
response, to Menzies! request-in may 1940 for., fuller information 
about the war, Caldecote prepared a. memorandum for ., the 
War Cabinet about 
Commonwealth collaboration. He informed them t hat; a. military officer 
had been, appointed to the D. O.. to, act as liaison with the War Cabinet. 
Secretary and the Service Departments (the first appointee was: Colonel.,, -. 
W. A. W. Bishop 
55) 
to assist. in preparing telegrams., The memorandum 
stressed the commitment of the Dominions to the war and the importance 
of providing. them. with the fullest information.: ,ý°;: " 
51. Garner, op. cit., pp. 161 & 199. (Caldecote combined the position of 
Dominions Secretary with Leader'of the House of Lords. )., 
52. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 13th June 1940,, CAB65/7, WM(40)165.: 
53. Notes of meetings with High Commissioners, 28th & 29th June 1940, 
D0121/8. 
54. Minute Caldecote to Churchill, 26th September 1940,. Prem4,43B/1; 
55. Colonel, W. A. W. Bishop, later, Sir Alexander Bishop the'U. K. 's High 
Commissioner to Cyprus, is described by Dixon as having been very 
valuable in the early part of the war. (Later, he took up a military 
appointment overseas. )., Dixon MCoirs (Unpublished, 1969), p. 55. 
/ 
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If the U. K. was to be able to secure the maximum co-operation from the 
Dominions it had to show that it was ready 
to take-them completely into our confidence. At present 
there is some sign of a feeling that we are not telling them 
all that we should. 
Advance warning of events would facilitate their co-operation and allow 
them to prepare domestic opinion and lessen shocks which otherwise 
would take communities, far from the scene of action, by suprise. He 
asked the Cabinet to approve the general principle that the Dominions 
should be continually given the fullest possible information, and that 
it be left to the Dominions Secretary to judge which Cabinet material 
should be passed on to them. 
56 
The War Cabinet considered , -this paper 
on 5th June and agreed to the proposals, subject to the Service 
Department's approving all important texts sent to the Dominions. 
57 
The military liaison officer also attended some of the meetings with 
the High Commissioners. 
v II 
It seems that in the wake of Menzies' request and the War Cabinet's 
authorisation for all possible information to be sent, the tempo did 
increase. The Dakar incident was essentially a question of timing, 
not a case when the Dominions were not forwarned of action. Perhaps 
this increase in information led Churchill to start complaining about 
the material which was transmitted. In November 1940 Churchill asked 
General Ismay and Bridges who was responsible for drawing up a telegram 
to the U. C. High Commissioners about troop movements involved in 
supporting Greece, commenting. 
No one is entitled to be informed of impending movements of 
British ships ... It is intolerable that. all these secret 
matters connected with operations should be scattered round 
the world. It may sometimes be necessary where Dominions 
forces are involved to give specific details, but more usually 
general statements should suffice. I had no idea that such 
information was being circularised. Not onlý the lives of 
troops and sailors, but the success of operations, are involved. 
58 
/ý 
56. Memorandum by Caldecote, 'Supply of Military Appreciations for Dominion 
Prime Ministers', 3rd June 1940, CAB66/8. WP(40)192. 
57. Minutes of War Cabinet. Meeting, 5th, June 1940,. CAB65/7. WM(40)155. 
58. Minute Churchill to Ismay and Br-idges, "9th November 1940, Prem4,43B/1. 
, 
58 
Ismay tried to reassure Churchill that the heading, 'Circular'., on ý} 
telegrams to the U. K. High Commissioners was misleading; _ 
the only to .ý 
people abroad who saw them were, the High Commissioners, and_in London, 
himself, the War Cabinet Office, `the F. O. and. the. Chiefs of Staff. He 
1 . 1" 44 
explained that special action was taken at, the, High Commissions to, 
, ensure secrecy, and 
that the telegram, in question was drafted, by, the 
military liaison officer at the D. O. after the, War Cabinet's. decision 
to communicate theeinformation at the meeting on 4th November. 1940.59 
Churchill instructed Ismay to send nothing relating to future, 
operations without his permission in each case. 
60 
This placed further 
restrictions on the Dominions Secretary and undermined his authority 
to judge'what information should be sent. ' In October'1940'Churchill 
made a change at the D. O., bringing in Lord Cranborne in place of 
Caldecote, when the latter was appointed Lord Chief Justice., Bruce, 
onFhearing. of Caldecote's departure, went to see Churchill, 
to stress the importance of Caldecote's successor being an 
absolutely first class man and that he should attend all 
Cabinet Meetings.. 
Churchill did not take kindly to this advice and complained to Bruce, 
that the War Cabinet could not have private meetings without the Dominions 
being represented. To Menzies, Bruce said his first reaction to 
1' 
Cranborne's appointment was one of disappointment, as he did not seem 
to carry enough political weight, and because Churchill had shown ay 
total lack of appreciation of the "importance and, position" of the 
Dominions. 
I 
But he told his. Prime Minister that he had been told tr 
Cranborne possessed "ability and guts" and only needed time to prove 
himself, so Bruce said he would suspend judgment.., Two months later`, 
59. Minute Ismay to., Churchill, 13th November 1940, ibid. '', 
60. Minute by Churchill, 13th November 1940, 'i_. 
61. Note by Bruce of 'a conversation with Churchill, 2nd October 1940; 
Bruce to Menzies, 3rd October 1940, Australian Documents Vol. IV, 
Nos. 232 & 472. 
59 
Churchill asked Bruce how he thought Cranborne was getting'on? Bruce 
replied "quite well", but reiterated his view that the Dominions a- 
Secretary ought to be the second man in the Cabinet to the Prime 
Minister. Menzies' summing up of Cranborne after his visit to London 
was terse, but not uncomplimentary; "an able Minister". 
62 
Others 
have been much more flattering about Cranborne. Massey told King 
that he possessed all the qualities for the post and that his 
"understanding and imagination and keenness" were of great help in 
dealing with inter-Commonwealth problems. 
63 
Smut's wrote to Cranborne 
on his appointment saying 
After your sacrifice in the appeasement days you have also 
come proudly into your own, and will, I am surg, be a great 
source of strength to Eden and the Government. 
One of South Africa's High Commissioners, Nicholls, recounts that 
Cranborne "continually impressed me as a man of outstanding ability 
and knowledge of affairs" and judged that "no other man in England was 
more fitted for the post than he". 
65 
Two officials who served under 
him have also praised Cranborne. Sir Charles Dixon, an Assistant Under- 
Secretary at the D. O., said he found him "most pleasant to deal with", 
quick to grasp a point, and prepared to discuss things fully with 
his advisors, whether he agreed with them or not. 
66 
Garner, who 
was Cranborne's Private Secretary for part of his period of office, 
seems to have regarded Cranborne as the most successful of the war-time 
Secretaries of State. He notes his range of abilities, his courtesy, 
his humanity and his capacity 'to develop good rel4tions with both the 
62. Note by Bruce of a conversation with Churchill, 19th December 1940; 
Minute to Advisory War Council, 28th May 1941, Australian Documents: 
Vol. IV, Nos. 232 & 472. 
63. Massey'to King, 1st November 1943, M 26, JI Vol. 347, Massey 
Correspondence Sept. -Dec. 1943, p. 298954. (This was sent after 
Cranborne had begun his second term at the D. O. ) 
64. Smuts to Cranborne, 11th February 1941, Avon Papers F095414, Dom4l/l. 
(Cranborne had resigned as Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the F. O. 
in February 1938 at the same time as Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary 
65. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 384. 
66. Dixon, Memoirs, p. 55. 
60 
High Commissioners and his own staff. 
67 
One is left with the 
impression, -from. his letters and minutes, that Cranborne was extremely 
successful as Dominions Secretary, possessing the ability to serve, 
t,.. y rather than dominate, Dominion Ministers and officials which was 
necessary in that difficult office. Mr. John Curtin, Menzies' 
successor, endured two years of stormy relations with the U. K. when 
he came to power, but he told the U. K. High Commissioner, Sir R. Cross, 
just before his first visit to London that while he was rather in awe 
of the "formidable" Churchill, he had a-. -very good impression of 
Cranborne. 68 
Cranborne, despite his age and comparatively junior status within 
the Government, was not afraid to stand up to Churchill. He defended 
his own staff when they came under criticism, 
69 
and also the Dominions' 
right to information at a time when Churchill was very reluctant to 
send very much material. In December 1940 Cranborne asked his Prime 
Minister whether he intended to support the policy agreed to by the 
War Cabinet of providing the Dominions with . the 
fullest amount of 
information possible, telling him that he and his predecessors had 
found that sharing information with the Dominion Prime Ministers 
greatly contributes to gaining their confidence and 
ensuring practical co-operation with'-us 
He said he wanted to be able to'continue to send information to them, 
and'that-; e had already had complaints from the Australian Government 
as well as, the High Commissioners. 
67. Garner, op. cit., p.. 163. , xr 68. f Cross to Cranborne, 13th April 1943, Prem4,50/15. 
69., 
--Minutes-by Churchill. and. Cranborne September, 1941, _Prem4 
44/1. 
(For example, Lord Harlech, the U. K. High Commissioner to South 
Africa, 'sent a telegram giving his personal impressions of the 
situation there which was circulated to the War Cabire t.. '"Churchill 
took exception to it, accusing the High Commissioner of making 
supercilious and superficial judgments, but Cranborne defended 
Harlech and modified the terms of Churchill's reply. ) See also 
Cranborne's defence of Sir. G. Campbell in October 1940 against Beaverbrook and Churchill - Garner, op. cit., pp. 176-79. ) 
61 
Demands of this kind are embarrassing, -,, as they are often 
framed in an inconvenient form. The provision of a steady 
and continuous supply of information, Is, I feel, the best 
method of checking such a tendency. 7° 
Churchill replied that although there was to be no change in principle, 
he did not want military information to be transmitted where no Dominion 
troops were involved, telling Cranborne an effort ought'to be made one 
to "scatter so much deadly and secret information" around, and that 
there was a danger of the D. O. staff getting into the habit of running 
a "kind of newspaper full of deadly secrets" which was circularised 
to the four Dominions. He said he was generally trying to restrict 
the distribution of secret information and so while the principle 
71 
remained intact, "there should be considerable soft-pedalling in practice". 
The following month Cranborne asked if he could increase the 
categories of information shown to the Dominion High Commissioners 
because summaries had been altered and now contained less secret 
information. He said he recognised that the Cabinet had decided to 
curtail information to foreign powers, but suggested that this should 
not apply t, o the High Commissioners. They considered they should 
receive more, and he thought this should be complied with. 
72 
Churchill 
refused, telling Cranborne that the c-erational summaries he wanted 
to show them were too secret, and insisting that they operated on 
a 'need to know' basis, although this did not "imply any want of 
confidence" in the High Commissioners. 
73 
The Spring of 1941 saw 
Menzies visiting the U. K. to discuss strategy with Churchill and to 
find out more information. There was also an increase in the number 
of telegrams from the New Zealand, Government asking for information 
70. 
71. 
Cranborne 
Churchill 
to Churchill, 
to Cranborne, 
23rd December 
25th December 
1940, 
1940, 
Prem4',.. 43B/1. 
ibid. (Also printed 
in W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vo l. 2, App. A. (London, 
1951. ) 
72. Cranborne to Churchill, 17th January 1941, Prem4,7/5. 
73. Churchill to Cranborne, 27th January 1941, ibid. f+ 
62 
about replacements and the defence of the Far East. 
74 
Cranborne 
continued to try and obtain Churchill7s authorisation for a variety 
of information to be communicated to the Dominions. By the autumn 
Cranborne clearly felt in an impossible position because he felt he was not 
invited to attend enough War Cabinet meetings, and because of the 
information which Churchill refused to allow him to pass on. He 
said that the result of these strictures was to encourage the High 
Commissioners to seek out other sources, "which apparently talk more 
freely" which made the position of Dominions Secretary "a farce". He 
did not ask to attend War Cabinet meetings to which he was not entitled, 
But :, I do feel very strongly that I should be given full 
discretion to tell and show the High'Commissioners anything 
_. 
I 
,, 
think right, with the well understood exception of 
operational matters. You may, I think, trust me not to 
pass on what they should not have. But I do want a free 
hand, without which it is quite impossible to carry on the 75 
work of Dominions Secretary which is of the first importance. 
Churchill's solution to this, and similar pressure exerted upon him 
by the Australian High Commissioner and Sir Earle Page, (formerly 
Australian Prime Minister, 1939, and Australia's special representative 
in the U. K, `, 1941-1942) was to make a further, although only temporary. % 
change at the D. O. In February 1942 Churchill wrote to Lord Moyne 
informing him that events and opinions had forced him to make changes' 
in the Government, and made it necessary to give Attlee the D. O. "which 
many have pressed should be held by a member of the War Cabinet"; 
consequently he said he wanted Cranborne to go to the C. O., where 
Moyne was, Secretary. of State. 
76 
74. Telegrams of March/April 1942, Prem4,43B/2., 
75. Cranborne to Churchill, 18th'November 1941, D0121/10A. 
76. Churchill to Moyne, 19th February 1942, W. S. Churchill, The Second 
World War, Vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1953) p. 78. As well' 
as Bruce and Page advising Churchill of the need for the Dominions 
Secretary to be in the War Cabinet, (see p. 14)The Times. was also 
advocating this from August 1941. See The Times, 25th August 1941, 
p. 5b&c. (There do seem to have been some basic disagreements 
between Churchill and Cranborne. ' In April 1944 when Cabinet changes 
were being discussed in Whitehall, it was mooted that Cranborne would go 
to the F. O., but Harvey noted that this was unlikely because both men 
suspected that there would be too many clashes over policy. The War 
Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945, (London, 1978) entries for 7th 
April 1944 and 17th April 1944. ) 
63 
Churchill's attitude towards the Commonwealth seems to have 
an important bearing on the U. K. 's relations with the Dominions. 
He appears not to have recognised them as mature, fully independent 
partners, and either failed to see the importance of keeping them 
informed, or in a rather paternalistic manner, did not want-to: bother 
them with information, especially if it was likely to worry them. He 
refused to allow a telegram outlining the dangers of an invasion of, '- 
the U. K., in March 1941, because he did not want them "worried with 
all this questionable stuff", and in September 1941. was not keen to 
send an` appreciation of the war situation which would "hustle and 
worry" the Dominions. 
77 
Menzies told the Advisory War Council in 
Australia that Churchill had no "conception of the British Dominions 
as separate entities" and that the more distant a problem was from the 
heart of the Empire (i. e. the U. K. ) the less he thought-about it. This 
demonstrates Menzies' concern that the-, U. K.. did not pay, sufficient 
78 
attention to the problems 'Of the Far East. Massey comments on 
Churchill's neglect in utilising the knowledge and experience of the 
D. O. and criticised him for treating it_just. as, a Post office. : This 
was precisely how Churchill described the D. O., himself, in a conversation 
with Bruce in. December, as a counter to Bruce's, insistence that the 
Dominions Secretary should be a member of , 
the War,, Cabinet. 
79 
Lord-. 
Moran, Churchill's doctor and close friend, recounts that Smuts was 
one of thq very few people for whom`Churchill, had anyrespect and, to 
whom he listened. However, the correspondence agd`. conversations 
between Smuts and Churchill show that they. tended. to, discuss the grand 
issues of the day, as old friends and colleagues, and did-not-often 
77. Minute by Churchill, March 1941; minute Churchill'to Ismay 13th 
September 1941, Prem4,43B/2.. 
78. Minute to Advisory War Council, 28th May 1941, Australian Documents 
Vol. IV, No. 472. 
79. Massey, op. cit., 'p. 297; Note by Bruce of conversation with 
Churchill, 19th December 1940, Australian Documents Vol. IV, No. 232. 
discuss Commonwealth issues. Moran also noted Churchill's coolness 
to King, commenting that while the two men were quite friendly, 
Churchill was "not really interested in Mackenzie King. He takes 
him for granted. "80 Churchill had numerous contacts in the Dominions 
and it might have been expected that these, plus his long friendship 
with Smuts, would have facilitated an enlightened attitude towards 
them. Yet, he had also been Colonial Secretary earlier in his career 
and according to Garner, held "quaint notions" about the Commonwealth. 
His attitude was a romantic one and his mind harkened 
back to the, Empire at its apogee as he knew itr. in early 
manhood; he took pride in the continuing Commonwealth 81 
but sometimes treated ißt with more rhetoric than realism. 
Churchill also tended to dominate colleagues and did not take too kindly 
to criticisms about his policy (see for instance his-reaction to Menzies' 
criticism of the Dakar incident. 
82) As Bruce told the new Australian- 
Prime Minister, Mr. J. Chifley in 1945', , rr 
With all his great qualities he is not a'co-operator and 
he appears quite incapable of realizing the developments 
that have taken place in Empire relations during recent 
years and the new status of the Dominions. The necessity 
of consulting hýe government. s of the Dominions always, 
irritated him. 
,C 
The information transmitted to the Dominions was not wholly dependent 
on Churchill's whims about the extent to which. they were to be 
consulted. As he told successive Dominion Secretaries he was very 
concerned that the security of war information should not be jeopardised, 
and this raised a genuine conflict of interests. The danger of 
leakages,, either because too many, individuals knew secret plans, or 
by the, intercept of cables, was a very real one and a very high proportion 
of Allied and Axis communications, were tapped during the war. Certain 
80. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965 
(London, 1966), p. 53. 
81. Garner, op. cit., p. 153. (In a similar vein, Amery commented "in 
the world of political ideas he. (Churchill) has never really advanced 
beyond the mid-Victorian, period ... He 
had never really sympathised 
with the developments of self-government in the Empire, even in the 
European Dominions". See C. Thorne, Allies of a King- United States, 
Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-1945, London, 1978 , PP"61"2") 
82. See pages 53-5 . 
83. Edwards. oD cit.. D. 404. 
65 
precautions were taken to reduce"this, possibility in Commonwealth 
communications. The. more secret messages were sent to U. K. -High 
Commissioners,. rather than'directly to Dominion Governments,. and were 
decoded only by. the head of the cipher staff and handled personally 
by. the High Commissioner. Precautions had also been taken inýLondon 
vis-a-vis -the, information shown to. the Dominion High Commissioners; 
documents were not shown to them, putside the confines of the. D. O. 
The Minister of State at the F. O., Mr. Richard Law, noted in 1943 
that after three and a half years of war there was, -no record of any. - 
leakage of information from Dominion sources. 
84 
Churchill obtained 
Cranborne's agreement that operational information should not be, given 
to the Dominions but he also tried to withhold. -other diplomätic/political 
communications, such as the correspondence with Stalin over the 
declaration of war against Hungary, Rumania and Finland". 
85; 
It was 
clearly difficult to draw the line and lay down what the Dominions did 
and did not need to see. The whole issue wasra very subjective one. 
If as allies Canada or Australia insisted that it had the right to be- 
informed of. certain developments, could or should the U. K. deprive, them 
of that information? Cranborne was not only keen to supply as much 
material', as he could, but seemed to appreciate that it was to the U. K. 's 
advantage to retain the initiative in 'its transmission by providing 
a good continuous flow. By doing this the U. K. could monitor exactly 
what it wäs telling the Dominions and try to ensure the maximum co- 
operation from them by its readiness to supply them with information 
and perhaps also by the careful phrasing of what they were told. He 
had told Churchill in December 1940 that sudden requests for information 
could be embarrassing. The other vital consideration for the U. K. 
1 
84. F. O. Circular, drafted by Law, March 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4984/68. 
For details of the extent to which telegrams were intercepted and codes 
broken during the war see F. H. Hinsley British Intelligence in the 
Second World War: Its Influence in Strategy and Operations Vols. 1& 
2 (HMSO, London, 1979 & 1981). 
85. Cranborne to Churchill, 18th November 1941, D0121/10A. 
66 
was the long-term effect its actions would have on the Dominions #'" 
Law explained it very well to F. O. ''officials in 'March 1943'when he- 
f'ý 
3ý 
. 
ý? said that failure to consult did not always lead to complaints from 
the Dominions, but that this did not indicate that no harm had been 
done; -' the eventual result could be to discourage the spirit of 
co-operation and increase the tendencies of Dominion Governments to 
take independent action. 
86 
In a minute toSir Alexander Cadogan, '-,, 
P. U. S. at the F. O., he expostulated 
We're-living in a fool's paradise: the Dominions are swallowing 
a great deal now (because we're at war'& because4'the prestige 
of the P. M. is so tremepdous) which they will not be prepared 
to swallow when the war is over. If we don't'watch out we're 
liable to wake up one morning & 'find that we're a small island 
-off the coast of Europe, with the influence that naturally 
appertains to (say) Belgium or any other small nation. 
87 
Dominion requests for information continued throughout the war, as did 
U. K. discussions about how much should be sent. However. -in the 
closing months of 1941, with the' deterioration of the Far Eastern 
situation and continuing problems in other theatres of the war, the 
main issue was no longer about information, but was increasingly centered 
on means o#'associating the Dominions more directly with the formulation 
of war policy. 
When war broke out the immediate objective of the U. K. had been 
to arrange for Dominion Ministers to visit the U. K. to acquaint their 
Governments with the situation and begin co-ordinating their efforts. 
88 
Accordingly 
messages were sent"to all the Dominion Governments on 21st 
September 1939. The Dominion Governments all accepted the invitations, 
but King urged that it must be stressed that the visit was only for 
the purpose of consultation and co-ordination, and that no suggestion 
86. F"ý. Circular drafted by Law, March 1943, OP-cit.. 87. Minute Law to Cadogan, March 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 88. See page 43. ,. 11 1 11 - I- 
I/ 
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was given that anything in the shape of an Imperial War Council was 
being established. He told the U. K. High'Commissioner that in the 
previous war'Canada had been forced by such councils into policies 
I 
which it disapproved of, and he wanted no repetition. ' However, 
when shown the proposed announcement, of the meeting; King had no 
complaints. 
89 All the U. K. High Commissioners were warned on'4th 
October of the line which was to be taken with the press about 'the 
meeting, namely that there was no question of 
departing from the well recognised principle that executive 
responsibility remains with the several Governments, 
individually .... For your own information object is of 
course to prevent description of ineetings, as an Imperial' 
War Cabinet or Council along the lines of that set up in 
1911: 90 
Despite these attempts by the U. K. to quash any other interpretations, 
the Canadian press ran a feature picked up from the London Daily Express 
which referred to the establishment of an Imperial War Cabinet. King 
was not surprisingly annoyed at the articles and worried about the 
possibility of an early Quebec election. 
91 
The Australian press also 
raised this question and reported a statement by Menzies, which he 
subsequentily denied, that he was to visit London early the next year to 
sit on a special War Council. Trouble also came from the Nationalist 
press in South Africa which referred to the meeting as an attempt- 
to subordinate further the economic life of the Union to the exigencies 
of war, predicting that in the end the Smuts Government would send 
troops overseas, despite his motion to Parliament. The visit in 
92 
November of Dominion Ministers was successful. A number of meetings 
were arranged with Service and civilian departments to co-ordinate 
actions and they travelled with Eden to France where they met General'" . 
89. Campbell to D. O., two telegrams of 3rd October 1939, F0371/23963, 
W14291/9831/68. 
90. D. O. to four U. K. High Commissioners in the Dominions, 4th October 
1940, ibid. 
91. Campbell to D. O., 4th October 1940, F0371/23967 W14473/14472/68. '\ 
92. D. O. to Whiskard, 5th October 1940; Whiskard to D. O., 6th October 
1940, ibid. 
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Gamelin and Mr. Daladier. 
In the Spring of 1940 the U. K. Qgain considered extending the 
arrangements-for collaboration. In February 1940 Lord Lothian, 
r 
U. K. Ambassador to the U. S. A. asked Lord Halifax if the'Government 
was contemplating setting up an Imperial War Cabinet, and"}telliäg" 
him that such a step would be advantageous to U. K. -U. S. relations, 
helping to persuade the Americans that the Dominions were not simply 
93 
the U: K.. 's dependents, and 'the war one between two imperialist"nations. 
Halifax passed this on to Chamberlain who minuted- 
The difficulty is in finding representatives of the 
Dominions who would be%a valuable addition to the Cabinet. 
Where is the Smuts? 94 
It is not clear whether Chamberlain ever seriously intended to'establish 
a Commonwealth body in London. From this it sounds as'if he would 
have-been willing, had he thought the right representatives were. 
available, 'and in the previous September, when'Menzies'had suggested 
sending-Bruce to the U. S. A., Chamberlain asked Bruce`tö tell Menzies 
notýto, `unless or until, Menzies could come to London as Prime Minister 
of-Australia and sit in the "Imperial War Cabinet". 
95 A month earlier, 
Chamberlain had questioned Hankey about inviting the-ex-Prime'Minister 
of Canada, 'R. B. Bennett to join "a War Cabinet. " ' Hankey'had'intimated 
that King would dislike this, and suggested Bruce. 'Chamberlain then-' 
expressed his annoyance with Bruce's criticisms of the U. K. 's re=` 
affirmation'of its guarantee to Poland after the'Nazi=Soviet Pact, 
which Hanley recorded has "muh -reduced'hisý'conf dencein'"Bruce'= 
never-, I''gather, very high". 
96 
Yet, Chamberlain then requested that 
Bruce should not be posted tothe"U. S. ""However -whetherthissuggestion 
93. Lothian to Halifax, 27th'February 1940, "DO35/998, WC7/1. }" ` 
94. Note by Chamberlain, 11th March 1940, ibid. 
95. " Bruce to Menzies, 19th September'1939, Australian'Documents`Vol. II, 
No. 233. 
96, -. Roskill, op. cit., p. 414. 
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of. ßennett's inclusion in a War Cabinet, or his remark about Menzies 
travelling to U. K. meant he seriously considered establishing an 
Imperial War Cabinet, is unclear. 
Sir John Stephenson, Assistant Under-Secretary at the D. O., 
considered in March 1940 a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
and/or the establishment of a joint council. Reviewing the practical 
considerations he noted the risks involved in air travel and the 
dangers of air raids in the U. K. There were also the problems of 
the extent to which a Prime Minister could absent himself from'his 
country in war-time and the timing of meetings. Stephenson questioned 
the fruitfulness of meetings to discuss general, lines of policy, when 
for long periods there would be no fully authorised Dominion representatives 
in London, even if the High Commissioners were to be supplemented 
by Resident Ministers. Considering the constitutional position, he 
thought that providing each were equally represented, and it was made 
clear that any decisions reached by a joint Commonwealth body were, in 
theory at least, subject to the approval of individual governments and 
Parliaments, there was no objection to a joint body. However, any 
suggestion that the power of decision-making should be entrusted to 
the U. K.; War Cabinet, with or without one or two Dominion representatives, 
would certainly give rise to constitutional difficulties. He suggested 
that it was inadvisable to raise the possibility of some permanent 
organisation in London to co-ordinate the Commonwealth's efforts except 
after a meeting of Prime Ministers, which ist should be organised 
ti. 
forthwith. 97 
In March 1940 Sir Eric Machtig, Deputy Under-Secretary at the D. O., 
noted that Eden'had seen Halifax about the machinery for Commonwealth 
consultation and that the latter had asked for information about the 
1917 position. Machtig emphasised in a minute that in the First World 
/' 
97. Minute by Stephenson, '18th March 1940, T035/998, WC7/1. 
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n 
War Smuts had been invited by Lloyd George to join the U. K. War, 
Cabinet in'a'personal capacity; it had not been 
an attempt to associate theýUnion Government or the other 
Governments of the Empire wl, th the British War Cabinet. 
The Imperial War Cabinet had not possessed a collective responsibility 
for decision-making for the whole Empire; its decisions were made by 
individual members as representatives of their several governments - 
thus it was more like an Imperial Conference than a Cabinet - and 
had only met twice when the Prime Ministers were in London. Machtig 
thought it unlikely that the Dominions would welcome a joint body. 
The whole trend of Dominion feeling during the last years 
has been to, indicate that anything in the nature of a 
super-cabinet which would take decisions for the United 
-: Kingdom and the Dominions as a, whole would be unacceptable 
and would, indeed, meet'with strong opposition. 98 
He agreed with Stephenson that the best way to approach the issue would 
be through a meeting of the Prime Ministers. The D. O. anticipated 
that Smuts and Menzies would want to attend a meeting, if their domestic 
situations allowed, and probably also Fraser if he won the election 
due in New Zealand. But it thought King would be less keen after he 
had shown signs of suspicion about the invitation to Dominion Ministers 
the previous Autumn. 
99 
The War Cabinet approved of the proposal, 
with Eden pointing out that the November discussions were already 
"rather out of date", and Chamberlain stressing that it should be 
l00 called an Imperial Conference and not a Cabinet. 
King\was concerned that the im Pression should not be given that 
the U. K. was in any way dictating policy to Canada. In January 1940 
he noted the announcement that Eden was planning a visit, and told Lord 
Tweedsmuir that: the whole Cabinet was opposed to it, because they did 
98. Minute'by Machtag, 19th March 1940, ibid. 99.. Memorandum for War Cabinet, drafted-by Stephenson, April 1940; 
submitted 12th April 1940, ibid. 
100. Memorandum by Eden, 2nd April 1940 CAB21/874; War Cabinet Conclusions, 12th April 1940, CAB65/6, WM(40)89. 
r 
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and want "any appearance of colonialism" to be`given. 
101 
In March '. 
1940, when Eden consulted Campbell (the U. K:, High Cocmnissioner in 
Ottawa) about the visit, the latter thought'that, it would be welcomed, 
but that Eden-should not mention anything about,, an Imperial War Cabinet 
in'connection with it, as opinion in'Canada was=very opposed to'this, 
102 
In April`Eden's visit-was still scheduled, arid, Stephenson suggested 
that telegrams should`be-isent to the Dominion Government about the 
proposed meeting of 'Prime Ministers, so that Eden"could clear up any 
misunderstanding of King about the U. K. 's`intentiotts. 
103 The four 
Governmentsrwere asked at the-'end -of April'if"they could attend'a 
meeting in the late Summer, but Edens trip'had already'been postponed 
because of the'worsening international., sitiiation, 'and"was finälly 
cancelled when'Churchill assumed office'and'Eden was moved to the 
War Office. 104 
The replies from the Dominion"Prime Ministers were much as the 
D. O. had anticipated; Menzies expressed his willingness 'to attend 
providing the political situation in'Aüstralia permitted, but had 
doubts withan'election in-the offing. 
105, 
Smuts. was, less prepared 
to come and mentioned a number of difficulties'inclüding the political 
situation in South Africa. Against: D. O. expectations he did-question 
the value of ameeting at such an early-stage of the-war, twhen'. war-time 
and post-war issues were still unclear. He-also suggested that it 
would be'ifficultrfor"Menzies to attend in light of his political 
problems and unnecessary for Fraser', as he had"do%e so as a Minister 
101. King Diary 1940, entry for 15th January 1940. 
102. Campbell to Eden, 2nd April 1940, D0121/66.. 
103. Minute by Stephenson, 8th April 1940, D035/998, WC7/1. 
104. Telegrams to four Dominions' Prime Ministers, ? 2nd April 1940, 
Prem4,43A/11; Note in file, 21st April 1940, D0121/66; The 
Eden Memoirs, op. cit., p. 98. 
105. Menzies to D. O., 2nd May 1940, Prem4 43A/ll, or Australian Documents 
Vol. III, No. 203. 
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the previous November'. 
106 
King wrote'a long reply in which-he 
suggested that the advantages-of a meeting would be outweighed by 
the disadvantages. ' He' thoüglt it would be a mistake for him to be'' 
away-from Canada for any length of time; that in the interests of 
Commonwealth relations with the U. S. A; °he was better placed in Ottawa 
than London; ' and that for the sake of Canadian unity it: =was inadvisable 
for him to attend. '' King expressed' himself entirely satisfied with 
the direct'-communications he received from the U. K., -supplemented as 
they were by the work of the two High Commissioners. `. 'In addition, - 
the new representatives Canada had posted to the other-Dominions 
provided him with a network unknown in the last war. 'These methods, 
plus'occasionai visits by Ministers, (which did not involve the 
same' risks of a'Prime Minister's`absence) were'satisfactory. - 
If at any time altered circumstances or special emergencies 
were to render these methods' of co-ordination, co-operation 
and consultation inadequate. for the most effective joint 
war effort in all its aspects, and a conference of Prime 
Ministers thereby became imperative, that would of°course 
necessitate an immediate review of the respective merits 
of the alternative considerations herein set forth. 
107 
ling was deeply'concerned with Canada's relations-w1thtthe U. S. A. 
He was always-convinced"of the importance of not only balancing Canada's 
relations with the U. S;. and the U. K., but also promoting better 
relations between these two nations. There were close economic -- 
ties between the Canadian and American economies, 'with U. S. investment 
amounting to 607. ' of 'all 'foreign' investment in Canada, and, this link 
had-b'een' cemented'by- the, trade treaties -of--1935 -and-1938. ----. ---These were 
no passport or visa controls across the 49th parallel, which promoted 
easy personal communication between the two. populations, King and 
106. Harding to D. O. 26th April 1940, Prem4,43A/11. (In August 1942 Smuts informed a friend in England that he was still wrorried about leaving South Africa, because although his_. opponents feared him while, he was there, that fear might not restrain them from "unwise action in my absence. I do feel strongly that my place is here during the war and that should be the first consideration with me". ý He, also doubted if he could stand the strain physically. Smuts to Gillett, 10th August 1942, Smuts Papers Vol. VI9 No. 574. ) 107. King to D. O., 10th May 1940, Prem4,43A/11 or Canadian Documents Vol. 7, No.. 558. 
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Roosevelt met each other frequently before and during the war, and 
while Roosevelt dominated the proceedings, King skilfully played 
up to the President, as well as feeding his own vanity. In 1940/1 
I 
U. S. -Canadian relations developed still further. In August 1940 the 
Ogdensburg Agreement established a Permanent Joint Board of Defence 
between the two countries, and in April 1941 King and Roosevelt 
signed the Hyde Park Agreement on defence production. These two 
agreements created closer ties than ever before which inextricably 
linked the defences and economies of Canada and the U. S. A. 
r 
Ironically, 
the U. S. 's entry into the war shortly afterwards changed the scene again 
by reinforcing U. K. -U. S. ties, which continued after the war; Canada 
tended to be squeezed out of the triangle and forfeited much of its 
capacity to play a lynch-pin role between the two major North Atlantic 
1O8 
nations. 
Chamberlain was undecided about the possibility of a Prime Ministers' 
conference when he received these replies and told Mr. Norman Rogers, 
Canada's minister of National Defence visiting the U. K. in April/May 
1940, ithat`such a meeting might not be advisable or necessary. 
109 
Two 
i 
days later the Chamberlain Government had fallen and Churchill had been 
asked to, form a new one. Churchill, faced with the desperate situation 
in France, as well as the problem of establishing his new team, wrote 
to the Prime Ministers the following month explaining that he did not 
think it possible to arrange a meeting in the near future, but he would 
keep 
`108. For detailed studies of -these two agreements, see J. L. Granatstein, 
Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie Kin 'Government, " 1939- 
1945 (Toronto, 1975), pp. 114-118; C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and 
Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945; J. L. Granatstein 
and R. D. Cuff, 'The Hyde Park Declaration, 1941: Origins and 
Significance', Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 55, No. 1,1974', 
pp. 59-80. (King was not too happy in August 1941 when Churchill, 
and Roosevelt met in Newfoundland with a full compliment of advisers', ' 
totally ignoring Canada. However, it was perhaps the Quebec 
Conference of 1943 which illustrated Canada's isolation best. See 
Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, pp. 233-234, and chapter 4, pp. 185-186. 
109. King Diary 1940 Vol. XIV, entry for 9th May 1940; Massey to King, 
8th May 1940, (enclosing message from Rogers) Canadian Documents 
Vol. 7, No. 557. 
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the proposal in mind. 
110 
The change of Government in the U. K. was generally welcomed by 
the Dominion Prime Ministers. Smuts told an old friend that Chamberlain 
had to go, not so much because of Norway, but because of events over' 
a longer period which had meant "his stock was exhausted, and it never 
was very great". As for Churchill, he commented that although he 
was dynamic, wiser colleagues would have to keep him out of trouble, 
"he is capable of much mischief as the past has shown". 
111 King 
, I: Aor felt tremendous sympathy for Chamberlain'9ý rejection by the U. K. 
Parliament and thought he had been unfairly treated. He had had to 
cope with the failure of his predecessors to appreciate the German 
situation, while being one'of the first to advocate rearmament strongly. 
King remained convinced during the war that if Chamberlain had not 
negotiated the Munich settlement, the Commonwealth would not have fought 
united, or the U. K. have been as well prepared. 
112 
King was undoubtedly 
impressed with Churchill and admired him enormously as a war leader, 
but there was an ambivalence in his attitude and some jealousy of 
Churchill and his popularity - not least in Canada, which tended to 
11 detract attention from himself. 
113 He recorded on May 11th that 
Chamberlain would have been the safer guide in the long run and 
although he modified this opinion later, he never revised his judgment 
of Chamberlain. 
114 
Menzies also had respect and liking for Chamberlain 
and although critical of his handling of Italy in the 1930s, he 
110. Churchill to Menzies, 10th June 1940, Australian Documents Vol. III, 
No. 353. 
111. Smuts to M. C. Gillet, 12th May 1940, smuts Papers Vol. VI, No. 495. 
112. Mackenzie King Record Vol. 1, pp. 78 & 179. (King also told The 
Earl of Athlone, Tweedsmuir's successor as Governpr-General, how 
he had supported the Munich Agreement but thought it could have been 
followed by a more positive attempt to hold an international conference. 
But he blamed the equivocation on the presence of a National 
Government. ' King Diary 1940, Vol. XXX, entry for 21st August 1940. ) 
113. C. P. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the North Atlantic Triangle (Toronto, 
1976), pp. 52-55; Garner, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 
114. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, p. 78. 
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always maintained the necessity for Munich, if the Commonwealth was 
to win the war. But he records in his memoirs that he did not think 
Chamberlain possessed the qualities of a war leader. This view is 
perhaps affected by Menzies' near adulation of Churchill. Although 
he could be critical of Churchill and was quite prepared to argue a 
point with him, as few were, he judged Churchill "the greatest man 
of the century". 
115 
Fraser's opinion of the two men is not known 
in detail, but he was the only Prime Minister at the time who had no 
real acquaintance with either man. 
The D. O. 's attitude towards improving the machinery of Commonwealth 
collaboration was fairly fluid, neither set on establishing an Imperial 
War Cabinet, nor 
determined 
to prevent a joint body from being set 
up. Its priority was to ensure that the Dominions were given every 
facility for consultations, providing these aided the joint war effort. 
The D. O. was aware of the differing attitudes of the Dominions towards 
collaboration and the basic problems involved. At a meeting with War 
Office representatives, Mr. Stephen Holmes, Assistant Secretary at the 
D. O.,; outlined the difficulties of increasing consultations at the 
highest levels and at the same time paying due regard to the Dominions' 
sovereign rights. He added that there was limited advantage in 
increasing lower-level liaison if this could not be extended to higher 
levels. Holmes . as demonstrating the D. O. 's appreciation of the 
problems 
which, 
as King had warned. -had not been solved before the 
war. Holmes proposed that unless there were a strong move by the 
Dominions, it would be best for the U. K. not to raise the subject, 
although he repeated the D. O. 's view that a Prime Ministers' meeting 
could be useful. 
116 
The attitudes of the. four Dominion Governments 
in many respects reflected a continuation of their pre-war policies, 
115. Menzies, op. cit., pp. 62-94 & 101-104. 
116. Report of meeting at D. O. 13th July 1940, -CAB21/488. (King's 
quotation see chapter 1, p. 38. ) 
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which^their domestic situations and geographical positions continued 
to shape. Thus Australia and New Zealand's desire for close co- 
operation was increasingly given extra force as, the Pacific situation 
worsened, while Canada and South"Africa's greater concern for their 
sovereign rights was also perpetuated by the more divided, domestic 
political scenes there. The principal reason for Smuts' being able 
to win the war debate in 1939 had been his'pledge that South African 
troops would not serve outside abroad, and King had also promised 
that there would be no conscription; the conscription crises of 1942 
and 1944 nearly wrecked the fragile unity of Canada as well-as King's 
own government. 
117 
Political considerations impelled the U. K. to emphasise Commonwealth 
unity and organise some practical demonstration of it. Spasmodic 
demands appeared in the press and in Parliament for an Imperial War 
Cabinet or Conference, and it would have eased the government's 
position if it had been able to convene an early meeting of Prime 
Ministers. 
118 
The Washington Embassy said that clearer indications of 
the Commonwealth's solidarity of purpose and action would improve the 
image of the U. K. in the U. S. A. Churchill told King in April 1943 
119 
that a Commonwealth meeting would have a very beneficial effect 
on world opinion generally. However, efforts to convene a meeting 
120 
of-all Commonwealth leaders failed until May 1944 partly on account 
of the P. *Is unwillingness to leave the Dominions and some scepticism 
of the value of such a meeting. King told Churchill in 1941 that 
117. For detailed studies of. the, Canadian conscription crisis, see C. P. 
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, op. cit., ' pp. 399-402 & 441-461ff; 
C. P. Stacey, 'Through the Second World War' in M. Careless and R. "C. ` 
Brown, The Canadians 1867-1967, pp. 293-297; J. L. Granatstein, 
Canada's War, o . cit., pp. 201-243 & 339-374; iiMackenzie King 
Record, 
Vol. I. pp. 331-407, Vol. II, pp. 111-277. 
118. See speeches by Lord Elibank and Lord Davies in the House of Lords, ' 
8th & 16th October 1940, Hansard House; of Lords Debates Vol. 117 and 
Mr. Granville's question in the House of Commons, 10th & 24th June 1941, 
Hansard House of Commons Debates: Vol.:,. 372, Cols. 30 & 957. - 
119. Lothian to Halifax, 20th February 1940, D035/990, WC7/l; Washington 
Embassy to. F. O., -7th May 1944, Prem4, "42/6. 
120. ` Churchill to King, 3rd April 1943, Prem4,42/2. 
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not only was he satisfied with the existing communications which 
had real advantages, but he thought it perilous to throw these away 
"for the appearance of something which might well prove to be less 
real and substantial. " He also 
r 
thought that rather than confirm 
the, unity of the Commonwealth, a meeting would be. regarded as an 
indication of "some want of confidence" in the Governments of either 
the U. K. or the Dominions, which was to be avoided. 
121- 
- At one point, 
in April 1943, Fraser was reluctant to attend a meeting in case it 
was regarded by the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. as antagonistic and 
prejudicial, to completely free discussions in the future. 
12 
The.. main advocate of direct Dominion participation  in, the 
direction 
of war policy was Australia, under all three war-time. Governments, 
and as early as September 1939 the U. K. High Commissioner in Australia 
reported that. there was a growing feeling there that those Dominions which 
were playing an active role in the war should have a seat on the U. K. 
War Cabinet. 
123 
_ Bruce posed the problem when he noted that the 
weak point is lack of opportunity to Dom(inion)s to 
initiate proposals with adequate knowledge of all 
factors or to be fully & continuously consulted with 124 regard to broad policy for conduct of war. 
It was the capacity to initiate policy, or at least change details of 
policy during its formulation which Australia, and to some extent New 
Zealand were anxious to secure. Bruce had no solution to the dilemma. 
121. King to Massey (enclosing message for Churchill), 26th May 1941, 
Canadian Documents Vol. 7, Nd. 563; King to Churchill 14th June 1941, 
ibid., No. 567. (King asked Massey to explain a further point to 
Churchill, Kamely that if he left Canada he would have to appoint 
Lapointe, the French Canadian Justice Minister as acting P. M. and 
that if while he was away, relations between the U. K. and France 
worsened, there was a conscription crisis, or any other racial or 
religious crisis, English Canada would centre Quebec out'for attack 
and Lapointe would be the main target. In return Quebec would change 
its whole attitude towards co-operating in the war effort, which up to 
then had been very helpful. King stressed that he could not take 
these risks and that it could not be avoided by appointing anyone 
else as acting'leader, because-then Quebec would take grave offence. 
King to Massey, 14th June 1941, ibid., No. 568. ) 
122. New Zealand Government to D. O., 22nd April*1943, Prem4,42/2. 
123. Whiskard to D. O., 20th September 1939, Australian Documents Vol. 11, 
No. 237. 
124. Note by Bruce (no date, filed with papers for the last week in May) 
Australian Documents Vol. III, No. 462. 
78 
He did not think his-fellow High Commissioners in London should be 
used more because "having regard to, their calibre (they) would be, 
useless on questions of high policy", nor did he think-it would be 
solved by an Imperial War Cabinet, although he gave no reasons for 
this. 
, 
occasional meetings of Prime Ministers would be invaluable 
in order to agree to the broad direction of policy, but not as. a 
suitable instrument for the continuous direction of, the war, "owing 
to, paramount part U. K. inevitably play. ", - 
Bruce's Prime Minister, Menzies, had clearer ideas as to what. 
should be done. He had been anxious in 1940 to have a meeting of 
Prime Ministers in London, 
125 
and when this was not possible he decided 
to visit on his, own. Menzies' anxieties about the position in. the; _ 
Pacific had been greatly increased in June. 1940, after the collapse 
of France, with the knowledge that, the U. K., decided that there was no 
longer any hope of its despatching a fleet to Singapore should japan,, 
take advantage of the European situation. Then, in October. 1940,,, the 
Singapore Defence Committee (consisting of representative', of the U. K., 
Australia and New Zealand), produced a. very gloomy report of the position 
in the Pacific, "stating that naval and aircraft were totally inadequate. 
It seems that this gave Menzies the stimulus to go to London personally. 
126 
In January 1941 he told Bruce that although he was anxious about the 
political situation in Australia he thought that the benefits of. a,. <- 
visit would be great, providing, he had the chance of, prompt and sufficient 
consultations with Churchill and the other senior, JIinisters. Bruce 
explained Churchill's domination of war policy and the timidity of his 
,ý 
Ministers in standing up to him, anticipating that while Churchill 
125. See for example Menzies to Churchill, 17thJunei1940, Prem4,43B/1. 
126. Caldecote to Whiskard (enclosing memorandum sent to U. K. Embassy 
Washington for Ambassador's guidance in talks with the U. S., to 
be'shown to'Menzies), 19th June 1940, Australian Documents Vol. III 
No. 406; J. M. McCarthy, 'Australia; A View from Whitehall,, 1939-1945', 
Australian Outlook, December 1974, p. 321., 
79 
would welcome Menzies fand invite him to meetings Of the War Cabinet, 
he tended to be elusive and discursive about they fundamental questions 
of policy and Menzies would have to be'prepared to have a "show 
down" with him. 
127 
Menzies left for London, arriving in February 
1941, ' determined to participate fully in war policy, tackle Churchill 
on many war issues (especially the Far East) and do what he could to 
persuade him to agree to the'establishment'of an Imperial War Cabinet. 
While in London Menzies` attended meetings of the War Cabinet, and 
held many others with the Chiefs of Staff, individual Ministers and 
the Defence Committee. He'sent reports to his Prime Minister on 
l2$ 
these discussions and U. K. plans for the future. 
It has been argued that, Menzies had little effect on U. K. policy 
during his time in London and that the visit caniot be termed asuccess, 
129 
The one crucial decision Menzies, made concerned'the deployment of 
Australian troops in the Greek campaign. He virtually committed them 
before he recommended the scheme to his colleagues in Australia, and 
seems never to have told them that the 
plan was 
to go ahead'for 
primarily political considerations and that their military doubts 
about its viability were quite valid. 
130 
This was an episode which 
surely demonstrates the fundamental problems of governments sharing 
strategic direction when one side is represented by only one individual. 
Menzies' position as Prime Minister gave him the authority to commit 
Australian troops, but it was a personal decision, not one made by 
his Cabinet. '. ' 
11 Menzies did have some success in'securing part of 'Australia's 
outstanding orders for aircraft. When he pressed for these, Cranborne 
127. Menzies to Bruce, 3rd January 1941, Bruce to Menzies, 5th January 
1941, Australian Documents'Vol. IV, Nos. 243 & 246. 
128. Menzies messages to Fadden, Australian Documents Vol. IV, especially 
Nos. 320'& 345. ' 
129. McCarthy, op. *cit. 
130. D. F. Woodward, 'Australian Diplomacy With Regard'to the Greek Campaign, 
February-March 1941', Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
1978, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 218-226. 
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argued to Churchill that it would be wise on political grounds to 
meet at least some of these demands, because Menzies was so obviously 
dissatisfied 'with the situation, and some orders were sent. Menzies' 
difficulties can be seen from the fact that the Secretary and State 
for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, was unhappy, about this; Churchill 
131 
commented that it was "unwise to fritter away aircraft" to Australia. 
The continuing peril of the U. K. made it difficult for British Ministers 
to appreciate the genuine fear of other countries for their own defence, 
although the question of priorities was admittedly'an extremely difficult 
rne. % 
When Menzies returned to Australia, he told his colleagues that 
in some respects the direction of war strategy in the U. K. was inadequate, 
especially the way in which the War Cabinet was run and the too great 
a burden being shouldered by Churchill. He appreciated that it was 
the Defence Committee which determined war policy, but criticised 
the acquiescence of the Service Ministers in Churchill's strategic views. 
He told his colleagues that the ideal solution would be a six man 
Cabinet with no departmental-duties, to include a-representative of the 
1 
Dominions. 132 While, he-was in London Menzies had told Churchill the 
same in pan'attempt to persuade him to inaugurate changes, but to no, 
avail. 
133 
Menzies travelled back via Canada and the U. S. A. 4n May 
1941 and held talks with King on his proposals. He repeated to King 
his criticisms of the U. K. War Cabinet being a 'one man show', with 
no-one taking issue with Churchill. King had nqintention of altering 
his own views on Dominion membership of the U. K. War Cabinet and pointed 
131. McCarthy, . op. cit., p. 322. 132. Australian Advisory War Council Minute, 28th May 1941, Australian Documents Vol. IV, No. 472. 133. W. S. Churchill, - Second World War. Vol. 3, The Grand Alliance (London, 1953), pp. 328-329. 
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out-the practical and constitutional difficulties which would result. 
He recorded that his impression had been that Menzies would "rather 
be in the War* Cabinet in London than Prime Minister of Australia. " , 
r 
King told Menzies that he would be worried about divisions occurring.: 
in his-Cabinet or country if he were-absent for any long period, and 
later told colleagues that he thought'it likely that Menzies would 
soon lose power --a prescient remark. 
134'Others 
agreed with Menzies': criticisms of Churchill's-running of 
the Cabinet and Defence Committee, sentiments no doubt aggravated by 
the fact that the war was going badly-in the Mediterranean in the Spring 
of 1941. Hankey's diary for April records several references to bad 
reports he was hearing about Churchill's conduct of the war and he 
outlined his own worries in a letter,. to. Halifax in Washington, in 
which he'also said that he hoped Menzies would return to London and 
join the War Cabinet. (Menzies delivered'the letter. ) Halifax was 
not surprised by'Hankey's views and said he had been disturbed to - 
hear Menzies' accounts of meetings . 
heg had' attended in London. " He 
supported the idea of a Dominion representative such as Menzies in 
the War Cabinet. Hankey also voiced his views to Cranborne, and the 
latter said he would personally like Smuts to be in the Cabinet, but 
135 
agreed that Menzies would be useful, A , Not everyone. in the U. K. 
agreed with the value of Dominion participation. At the beginning 
of the war Cadogan referred to the High Commissioners as, the "most 
undependable busybodies. Bruce is bad! I suppose they haven't 
really enough work to do", and he was equally unimpressed with Menzies 
during his visit. After a Cabinet meeting-in February 1941 he noted 
in his diary: "What irresponsible rubbish these Antipodeans talk! "136 
134. Mackenzie King Record Vol. I, ýpp. 213-215. (Menzies was forced 
to resign in August 1941. ) 
135. Roskill, op. cit., pp. 497-502,507 & 514. - 
136. D. N. Dilks ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 
(London, 1971) entries for 13th September 1939, p. 216 and 26th 
February 1941, p. 359. (Menzies' reaction to the latter entry was to 
say how disappointing Cadogan had been. See editing in diaries, 
p. 359. ) 
82 
(Such a remark was not-a reflection of, Cadogan's considered opinion of 
Menzies, but illustrates the pressure'and tension of war-time relations. ) 
Rebuffs from Churchill and King did not deter Menzies. In July 
1941 he wrote to King and Smuts reiterating his views and expressing 
his conviction"that a new War Cabinet should'be established' with one 
Dominion Prime Minister sitting on it. 
137 Although neither agreed 
with'Menzies, t views, by August 1941 he was announcing his intention of 
returning to, London-to deal with major questions of Commonwealth 
strategy, a"move which Cranborne interpreted as an attempt by Menzies 
"to'escape from a somewhat pnpleasant personal position" in Australia 
with colleagues "not unwilling" to see him leave-for London. 
138 Menzies 
was certainly hoping to be invited to join a U. K. War Cabinet, and 
had received his-own Cabinet's' approval to return; however, the 
majority of Labour members of the Advisory War Council-were"opposed 
to this, or what they saw as attempts by Menzies to'-secure their 
acceptance that he would not be deposed in his absence. After weeks 
of internal discussions, which seemed to have been as much about the 
internal politics as the best way to conduct Australia's war effort, 
Menzies' offer of an all-Party Government was rejected, and on 28th 
August 1941 he'resigned his office139 ; 
The Fadden Government, which succeeded Menzies', adopted a very 
similar attitude towards Commonwealth consultation and although Mr'. 
Fadden had no wish to sit in a U. K. War Cabinet he appointed a Resident 
Minister to the U. K. and asked Churchill to permtj him to'attend U. K. 
War Cabinet meetings when issues discussed affected Australia. Churchill 
137. Menzies to King, 7th July 1941, Canadian Documents, Vol. 7, No. 586. 
138. Cranborne to Eden, August 1941. Avon Papers FO 954/4, Dom41/14. 
139. Menzies, op. cit., p. 52; P. Hasluck, The Government and'Politics 
of the People 1939-1941 (Canberra 1952 , pp. 498-505 & p. 
533. 
(In November 1941 Menzies was indicating to friends in London that he 
wanted a seat on the War Cabinet, but he was deterred from pressing 
this. Prem4,50/15. ), 
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told the Australian Prime Minister that the U. K. would welcome their 
appointee, Sir Earle Page, and "confer with him freely on all matters 
concerning. Australian interests and the common cause. IJ40 Page 
arrived in London in September 1941, by which time Australia had 
four representatives there; Page, (the Resident Minister) Bruce, 
(the High Commissioner) and two political liaison officers, Mr. Stirling 
and Mr. Oldham, as well as service officers... However, what the 
Australians wanted was an adequate voice,. in the.. higher. direction, of.;, F. 
the war, and Page's appointment did not provide it. Page remained 
in London when the new Labour Government under Curtin. took office in 
141 
October 1941, and was preparing ä memorandum on the inadequacies 
of Commonwealth collaboration. 
Curtin came to power at a time of considerable deterioration 
in the Pacific situation. It necessarily became his-Government's 
first priority. Curtin was determined to press Australian interests 
and requirements. He stuck by the decision to withdraw the Australian 
Division from Tobruk. This had originally been made by Menzies and 
upheld byFadden. 
l42 
The withdrawal of these forces, which resulted 
in the loss of British naval forces,, angered Churchill considerably 
and from the beginning his relations with Curtin were bad. As one 
historian has suggested, the N. Z. Labour Government had had two years 
of war in which to prove its loyalty, but the Australian Labour Government 
was "larg' ly'an unknown quantity in London and Churchill and other 
imperially minded British Ministers were deeply suspicious of its 
140. Fadden to: Churchill, 6th September 1941; Churchill to-Fadden, 7th 
September 1941, Prem4,50/5. (Page was a senior Minister who, 
-like Bruce, had also been Prime Minister). 
141. For details of the fall of the Fadden Government, see Hasluck, 
op. cit., - p. -523ff. 
142. Ibid., pp. 616-624; I. Hamill, 'An Expeditionary, -Force 
Mentality? 
The Despatch of Australian Troops to the Middle East, 1939-1940', 
Australian Outlook, 1977, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 319-329. 
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constancy", 
143 
The attack on Pearl Harbour was a manifestation of all Australia's 
fears about its own vulnerability and the inadequacy in the defence 
of the Pacific. Curtin pressed both the U. S. and the U. K. for 
11 reinforcements to be sent to the Far East and for Australia'to bet 
Without any inhibitionp of any kind ... looks to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links and kinship 
with the United Kingdom. 
given representation on all Pacific war councils. on 27th December 
his famous article was published in the Melbourne Herald in which he 
asserted that the war against Japan was one in which Australia and the 
U. S. A. would have the fullest voice and declared that Australia 
He wrote that he appreciated the problems of the U. K., the threatened 
invasion and the dangers of its dispersing its forces, 
but we know, to that Australia can go and Britain can 
still hold on. 1" 
This article caused a considerable impact and produced a furious reaction 
from Churchill. Several explanations have been put forward about 
Curtin's motives. Cross told the D. O. in February 1942 that Curtin 
had regretted his words and would never have written them had he known 
how they would be interpreted. He told Cross 
. 
that he had merely 
wanted to indicate that Australia no longer regarded the U. S. A. as a 
mutineer against the U. K. and desired friendly relations with it. 
145 
Given the fact that since the beginning of the war Australia had vastly 
improved its relations and contact with the U. S. and had its own 
mission in Washington, this report lacks plausibility. 
Some historians have suggested that Curtin had not wanted any 
significance to be attached to his words, that originally it had been 
143. I. Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the 
Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942 (Unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, Leeds University, 1975) p. 490. 
144. For Extract of the speech see Edwards, op. cit., pp. 324-327. - 16- 
145. Cross to D. O., 5th February 1942, Prem4,50 7A. 
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written as a "platitude-laden" New-Year message, and that possibly 
it was drafted by an aide and never seen by Curtin. 
146_ The'article 
has also been compared with Menzies' appeals to Roosevelt in 1940, seen 
as a precursor to Curtin's statement. Although'there'is a 
147 
continuity with respect to AustraliC's, interest in closer relations 
with the U. S. A., Menzies' appeals' were made through diplomatic channels, 
and were essentially for U. S. assistance for the-U. K., or the whole 
association, rather than for Australia. R. J. Bell in his book 
Unequal Allies traces an interesting connection between Curtin's 
telegrams to Roosevelt, Churchill and Casey, (Australian Minister in, 
Washington) and the Herald article. On 11th and 16th December Curtin 
requested-that the U. K. deploy additional aircraft carriers east of 
Suez, and on 13th December he privately asked the. U. S. for closer co- 
operation and air reinforcements. Neither country agreed and after 
sending an additional telegram to both leaders on 23rd December, 
stressing the need for air cover, Curtin wrote to Casey on 26th December: 
Please understand that the stage-of, gentle suggestion 
(by Australia) has now passed ... This is the gravest 
type of,. emergency and everything will depend upon a 
Churchill-Roosevelt decision to meet it in the broadest 
way. 
The following day Curtin made his public appeal to the U. S. 
148 
Neither Curtin nor Evatt,, 1is Yxternal Affairs Minister, was 
anti-British. Nor were they attempting to re-orientate Australia's 
relations away from the U. K. towards the U. S. A. They did realise 
that close, co-operation with the U. S. would be necessary in a far, 
eastern war and welcomed this. Australia had slowly been increasing 
its contacts with America and particularly wanted individual recognition, 
instead of being treated as a satellite of the U. K. Many of Australia's 
,C 
146. Hamill, The Strategic Illusion, op. cit., p. 491. 
147. P. G. Edwards, 'R. G. Menzies's Appeal to the United States, May- 
June 1940', Australian Outlook, April 1974, pp. 64-70. 
148. R. J. Bell, Unequal Allies- Australia-American Relations and the 
Pacific War (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 44-46. 
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actions with regard to, the U. S. in the war were primarily aimed at 
altering Roosevelt's habit of using ChurchilUas'the"Commonwealth's 
spokesman, and disregarding the others, (except-'sometimes Canada). 
r 
Moreover, Australia was already looking to play a larger role in ,` 
international affairs, especially the direction'of the Pacific war, 
and the telegrams', the speech and other communications to the U. S. 
about representation on war councils'were sent-with this as a prime 
motive. 
149 
In addition to his appeals for military assistance from the U. S., 
Curtin demanded full Australian representation on'an allied War Council 
to be situated in the Pacific. This-was rejected by both Churchill 
and Roosevelt, and eventually two councils were set up, one'in London 
and the other in Washington. Australia's'representation on the latter 
council never gave it a real voice in policy decisions, with Roosevelt 
tending to inform the allied representatives, rather than consult 
them. 
150 
Meanwhile "Curtin had centred his attention on improving 
the position in London. On 21st January Curtin asked Churchill to 
accept an, accredited representative with "the right to be heard in the 
War Cabinet in the formulation and direction of policy". 
151 This 
was followed by'a further telegram concerning the abandonment of 
1 
Singapore, in which Curtin'said' 
after all assurances we have been given the evacuation 
of Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an 
inexcusable betrayal. 152 
In 1941-42 the U. K. was not wholly insensitive'to Australia's w. 
requests and-the D. O. was particularly concerned at the growing friction 
149. Bell, 'op. cit., pp. 38-66; Thorne, op. cit., pp. '256-267. 
150. Hasluck, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 44-48 & 151; Thorne, 'op. cit., ' p. 265; 
Bell, op. cit., pp. 60-66. 
151. Cranborne to Churchill, 21st January 1942, Prem4,43/A; Hasluck, 
op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 53-54. 
152. W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol. 4lThe Hinge of Pate (London, 
1953), pp. 61-62. 
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When Menzies had announced his intention of returning to London in 
August 1941, Cranborne wrote to Eden, (who was Foreign Secretary by 
then) outlining the difficulties of the situation and commenting 
I 
that none of the other Dominions would agree to one statesman representing 
them all in the War Cabinet as Menzies was proposing. Cranborne 
also said that although there were advantages in having a Prime Minister 
who could speak with authority for his country, it was doubtful how 
long Menzies could remain leader if he were away from Australia. If 
an absentee Prime Minister was forced to resign, he could no longer 
represent his country in the War Cabinet. Cranborne was clearly 
153 
worried and convinced that Menzies would continue to press his proposals. 
Cranborne told the War Cabinet that there was a genuine feeling in 
'54 
Australia that some change in Dominion representation was necessary, 
The U. K. agreed to the appointment of Page, promising to confer with 
him, and Churchill remarked to Cranborne 
we have got to treat these people who are politically 
embarrassed but are sending a splendid army into the 
field, with the utmost consideration. 155 
This was written before Curtin's Government came to office and stands 
in startling contrast to some of Churchill's later comments. Page 
was invited to attend a number of War Cabinet meetings, especially 
those discussing the Pacific. 
Churchill was never in favour of an Imperial War Cabinet and did 
not like the idea of permanent Dominion representation in the U. K. War 
Cabinet. In August 1941 he told the new AustralleaPrime Minister, 
Mr. Fadden, that for reasons of constitutional propriety it was impossible 
153. Cranborne to Eden, August 1941, Avon Papers F0954/4, Dom4l/14. 
(Eden was concerned about Menzies' returning as he thought he was in 
league with Beaverbrook and that he wanted to'get into U. K. politics 
via the War Cabinet. Harvey Diaries, o2. cit., 15th August 1941, 
& footnote 139; Churchill was also expressing Cranborne's point 
about the danger of a P. M. residing in London for long periods. 
Harvey Diaries, op. cit., 20th August 1941. ) 
154. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 29th December 1941, CAB65/20, WM(41)137. 
155. Churchill to Cranborne, 6th September 1941, Prem4,50/5. (For details 
of the Page's access to the War Cabinet, see minute by Garner, 13th 
February 1943, D035/1465, WC59/2. 
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for any Dominion Minister to join the U. K. War Cabinet. The sovereign 
autonomy of each Commonwealth country, with each having direct access 
to the Crown, meant that no-one who represented one legislature could 
be a member of a body representing. another. Churchill said that a 
Prime Minister's authority to speak on behalf-. of his country made him 
a valuable and welcome visitor to U. K. war councils, as a fellow head 
of government. By contrast a Minister only had the authority to speak 
within a very limited mandate and he thought that to give Ministers wider 
powers could prejudice Dominion policies. 
156 
Churchill was also keen 
for the U. K. War Cabinet to remain precisely that -aU. K. body - as 
it discussed many issues which were primarily of domestic concern and 
some which it would not want any other country to hear. When Bruce 
had suggested that the Dominions Secretary should be a full member of the 
War Cabinet, Churchill had asked if the U. K. could never hold a private 
meeting without the Dominions being represented. Later, when Bruce 
was allowed to attend some meetings, but wished to go to more, Churchill 
,i ýý 
often returned to this point. t 
Churchill was extremely annoyed at Curtin's article declaring that 
Australia looked to the U. S. A. He was visiting the United States at the 
time but', sent a message to Attlee, who was deputising for him, and 
Cranborne, saying that they should take a strict line with Australia's 
representative, Page, and said that there should be "no weakening 
or pandering to them at this juncture". 
157 
Lord Moran, who was with 
Churchill in Washington records Churchill's annoyance at the pressure 
and demands of Curtin and that he sent a "stiff note" to him. Moran 
added that he knew he had been persuaded to tone it down before it was 
sentX158 If Churchill's attitude to Australia was fairly hostile, 
156. Churchill to Fadden, 29th August 1941, Prem4,50/4A. -- 157. Churchill to Attlee and Cranborne, 29th December 1941, Prem4,50/15. 158. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival,, 1940-1965 
(London, 1966), p. 21; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol. 4, 
Pp. 22-31 & 61-62. 
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and if he was personally against admitting Dominion Ministers on to 
the U. S War Cabinet, it was becoming impossible to resist,. Australia's 
requests especially after the start of the Pacific War. It also 
seems that some domestic pressure was being exerted. Massey had LF F 
reported in August that some "groups and individuals" were supporting 
changes in Dominion representation partly to improve the war effort 
and partly because they wanted to see a Cabinet less under the authority 
of Churchill and saw an Imperial War Cabinet as a "can-opener" to pry 
the way open for further changes. 
159 
The U. K. agreed to the Australian request for an accredited 
representative, but the next day Curtin enquired whether this meant 
that it had a right to nominate someone who would have all the ordinary 
rights attached to membership and whether this was so whether or not 
the other Dominions followed suit. Churchill repeated his consistently 
held attitude that membership of the War Cabinet would be "constitutionally 
impossible" for an Australian representative, but he assured Curtin 
that the representative would have the right to be heard in the S 
formulation and direction of policy, as he had requested, and that 
this held true whatever the reactions of the other Dominions. 
160 
Curtin 
nominated Page as its accredited representative, a position he 
retained until the Spring of 1942 when Bruce took over. 
Australia's claim for greater representation was not fully shared 
by the other Dominions. New Zealand was also pressing the U. K. for 
a voice in Pacific policy and closer collaboratigrn with the U. S. A., 
but it disapproved of the idea of an, Imperial War Cabinet. ,,, In June 
,ý ýý 
1940, on. hearing the U. K. 's decision that itwould not, belableýto send:, 
159. Massey to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Mr. Lapointe) 26th August 1941, Canadian. -Documents, Vol. 7, No. 589. 160. Churchill to Curtin-, 22nd January 1942; ' Curtin°-to Churchill-, '28th January 
the House 
194of 
Co , 
43A/14. (Churchill announced the new representatioi 
nunons on 27th January 1942, Hansard House of 
`" Commons Debates Vol 377 Col. 614. -Also on 27th January, -telegrAms were sent to the other Dominions. Prem4 43A/14. ) 
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a fleet to Singapore, New Zealand reacted by sending its own 
representatives to the U. S. to improve its relations with Washington, 
and in November it sent a senior Cabinet Minister, Mr. W. Nash to the 
U. S. New Zealand also protested to the U. K. at the temporary closure 
of the Burma Road, in July 1940, both because it disagreed with the 
action and because it had not been consulted about it. 
161 
In 1941 
Fraser's main concern was to ensure U. S. involvement in the Far last, 
but he feared that if Japan attacked British or Dutch territories 
the U. S. would not commit itself. Fraser had been visiting London in 
August 1941 when Menzies announced his intention to return to sit in 
the War Cabinet. He expressed his view that no single Prime Minister 
could represent all the Dominions, "more especially now that each of 
the Dominions was a sovereign State", and that it was impossible for a 
Prime Minister to remain in office if he were away for long periods. 
162 
By January 1941 Fraser was setting out his views on the new situation 
to Chuchill. He expressed dissatisfaction that the same priority 
was not being given to the Pacific theatre as to the European and 
requested, that a supreme authority for the direction of the war against 
Japan be set up in either London or Washington with full Dominion 
participation. He stuck by his view that a Prime Minister should not 
163 
remain in London for long periods but thought there could be alternatives. 
On the 20th and 26th January Fraser pressed the U. K. for the establishment 
of a Pacific Council, expressing a preference for Washington, rather 
164 
than London, and full membership for Australia and New Zealand. In 
161. Fraser to Churchill, 30th July 1940, N. Z. Documents Vol. III, No. 8; 
Wood, op. cit., pp. 194-198. 
162. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 19th August 1941, CAE65/19, WM(41)84. 
(Fraser also told the Canadian High Commissioner in N. Z., Mr. Riddell, 
that he thought it would be "silly" for a leader to leave for long 
periods, and that he was entirely opposed to one P. M. representing 
the other three. Riddell to King, 21st November 1941, Canadian 
Documents Vol. 7, No. 590. ) 
163. Fraser to Churchill, 12 January 1942, N. Z. Documents Vol. III9 No. 117. 
164. Fraser to Cranborne, 20th & 26th January 1942, ibid., Nos. 124 & 129. 
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his telegram'of the 26th January Fraser'said that New Zealand did 
want representation on the U. R. War Cabinet on the same basis as 
Nash, Australia, and-this was confirmed'by him in a , later telegram)65 
who had previously been sent to-Washington, was New Zealand 's°'appointee, 
but he wasnever a permanent representative'in the'same'way'as Page or 
Bruce. ' He was'in-London froinJuly to August 1942 and again. fromý i 
' February to'April 1944, -attending'the same War-Cabinet meetings as 
äruce. 'RHe is better regarded asýa-visiting Minister than as a permanent 
representative. ' FIt would seem that Fraser decided to"accept the offer 
of representation when'the racific situation'looked-extremely dangerous 
as an, insurance3against further disasters-, but-never, fully"exercised it. 
A final point'to note is that war-time"relations-between'New Zealand 
and the-U. K. were generally'-good;, 'andýEatterbee. recalled that relations 
between Fraser-and Churchill-remained cordial'. 
166 
King-was the most vehement-'opponeit. of^an Imperial"War Cabinet and-, 
did not wish-for any Canadian'to sit in the U. K. Cabinet, (unless'he 
himself was-making"a short-visit. ) 'In November 1940 he-wrote a 
memorandum on the subject in which", he emphasised the need for Dominion 
Prime Ministers to concentrate on managing their own country's affairs and 
have ally their colleagues and advisers on hand when policy was decided; 
a policy which would be "an expression of view given in the atmosphere 
not of London but of the Dominion consulted". He concluded that 
although 
an Imperial War Cabinet would sound very imposing, it would 
i` 
be "sadly deficient in its most essential feature", that, of improving. : -; 
Commonwealth collaboration. 
167 
King's intense opposition is illustrated 
by his unexpected reply to a routine summary from Canada House on British 
165. Fraser to Cranborne, 26th January 1942 and 7tt February 1942, ibid., 
Nos-124 & 129. 
166. Interview between Wamill and satterbee, 1973. Hamill, Strategic 
Illusion, op. cit., p. 488. V 
167. Memorandum by King, 3rd November 1940,11 Canadian Documents, Vol. 7, 
No. 579. 
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I 
press attitudes to an imperial War Cabinet. Massey was sent a copy 
of"thenmmorandum which he referred to as "obviously drafted by Mackenzie 
King" . 
168 
King had tried to dissuade Menzies from his plans in May 1941. 
When the latter wrote in July, King continued to state his opposition. 
He agreed that Churchill was overburdened, but said this was the concern 
of the U. K. Parliament and people, not the Dominions. The inclusion of 
a Dominion Minister in a U. R. Cabinet would raise grave constitutional 
difficulties and King rejected the notion of one Dominion leader 
representing all the Dominions. There was no such thing as a "Dominion 
viewpoint" as opposed to a "United-Kingdom viewpoint". Finally he 
reiterated to Menzies his satisfaction with the existing machinery. 
169 
In August 1941 King was also visiting London, and he repeated his views 
in conversations with Churchill and told the War Cabinet of his preference 
for having everything in writing, for making his decisions when his 
advisers were present, and using the U. K. and Canadian High Commissioners 
only to convey the views of the respective governments. He concluded: 
the less it appeared that all matters were being settled by Cabinet sitting at Downing Street, the better it would 
be for the war effort of the several Dominions. That our 
people took their stand on the Statute of Westminster. 
170 
Massey was one of the High Commissioners who asked Cranborne if he 
would be' eligible to act as his country's representative, but it was 
never likely that King would have agreed to this. King's response to 
the W. K. 's offer to accommodate accredited representatives was extremely 
,t 
168. Pearson to King, 22nd October 1940, Canadian Documents Vol. 7, No. 578. (Massey was sent King's memorandum of 3rd November 1940 and told Mr. Loxley of the D. O. that Canada House had not expected any kind 
of reply and how surprised he was at receiving King's memorandum. Minute by Loxley, 1st January 1941, D035/998, WC7/11. ) 169. King to Menzies, 2nd August 1941, Canadian Documents Vol. 7, No. 588. (King shared Menzies' view of Churchill's dominance. Me commented to Lord Moran in September 1944 that the U. K. 'War Cabinet could be likened to schoolboys frightenc3 by a Meadmaster. Moran, op. cit., p. 180. ) 
170. Mackenzie Ring Record Vol. I, p. 241; King Diary 1941, Vol. XXIII, entry for 28th August 1941; Minutes of War Cabinet 28th August 1941, CAE65/19, WM(41)87. 
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clear. He, distinguished between an Imperial War Cabinet' and the 
arrangements concluded with Australia, and noted Churchill's own 
statement in*Parliament-that the-power to make decisions and-the 
4 
burden of responsibility, remained with: the"U. K. Cabinet. ', In-the 
Canadian House of Commons he reiterated this point, , -and 
&clared his 
171 
government to be-content with the existing arrangements. The 
Canadian Government: never appointed 'a ripresentative. 
Smuts saw no reason to increase South Africa's representation 
in London, but his own,, close relationship with Churchill and other 
senior"Ministers-no doubt eased his Government's position, as did 
South Africa's distance from-a key-war zone. However,, he-also saw 
dangers in grouping all the leaders in London,, telling Churchill that 
this was unwise given the_. "vast dangers"looming, in Africa and Pacific. " 
He added that 0t'. 1 1ý--t1, 
our-Commonwealth system, by its decentralization, isý 
well situated for waging world war, and diffuse leadership 
in all parts is a blessing rather than a handicap. 172 
When the U. K. had announced Australia's`new representation, Smuts commented 
that Australia's 
magnificent war effort'and present danger in Far East entitle 
her to generous treatment. Position of South Africa is 
fortunately different and we are satisfied with the present 
arrangements under which we, can directly through Prime Minister 
and otherwise through High Commissioner state our views and 
urge our claims in proper quarters. 173 
'Accedited representative' was not a title commonly used in the 
parlance of the Commonwealth. It is clear that Australia wanted'its 
representative to be in effect a member of the U. K. War Cabinet and had 
171. King to Massey, (enclosing message for Churchill) 29th January 1942, 
D035/999, WC7/64;, Massey to Churchill, (enclosing King's statement 
in Parliament) 30th January 1942, Prem4,43A/14. 
172. Mackenzie King Record Vol.. I, p. 247... (This telegram was shown to 
King by Churchill. ) 
173. South African Government to Waterson, (enclosing message for 
Churchill) 29th January 1942, D035/999, WC7/64. 
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asked Churchill to confirm that this would be the case, which he 
declined to do. It could be argued that Churchill was turning the 
arguments of'the Dominions in the 1930s against them, or against 
Australia. It had been the Dominions which had constantly stressed 
their independence and the inability of the U. K. Government to 
commit them to policies; now the U. K. was saying that a U. K. Cabinet's 
authority only extended to the Parliament and people of-the'U. K. 
Consequently anyone who was a member of a Cabinet which was responsible 
to a different Parliament and people, could not sit in a U. K. -Cabinet. 
It is unlikely that Churchill was consciously trying to turn the 
tables on Australia, not least because it had not been a strong proponent 
of the'reforms of the inter-war'years. But it is clear that King was 
continuing to use the arguments which had kept Canada uncommitted in 
the 1930s. out of any plans to centralise power during- the war. ' 
Reducing King's argument to its essence, and ignoring the important 
but subsidiary reasons why he did not want to leave Canada, he was standing 
by the maxim that power and authority over Canadian affairs hadrto 
reside with Canada and also in Canada. One man, whether Prime Minister 
174 
or of lesser standing, could not represent Canada elsewhere. 
If'the accredited Australian representative was not to be a member 
of the U. K. War Cabinet, what was his position to" be vis-a-vis that 
Cabinet? The exact position was always unclear and caused many arguments 
in the ensuing years. - The U. K. considered itself free to invite 
Page to meetings when it thought his presence world be useful, or 
necessary to. fulfil its promises to Australia. It did not consider 
him to have any automatic right to attend meetings of the War Cabinet. 
The crux of the issue became which meetings he could attend. Page 
did not remain as Australia's representative for long. He had been 
a member of the Menzies' and Fadden's administrations and it was not ` 
174. See also P. N. S. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience 
(London, 1969) 
p. 290. 
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to be expected that Curtin would retain his services indefinitely. 
But, instead of appointing a Labour Minister, Curtin asked Churchill 
to accept Bruce as the-new accredited representative. Although the 
U. R. did not like the idea of, an official=sitting in ona, political 
body; it agreed, possibly because°of Bruce's previous political 
experience. 
: Bruce was never fully satisfied with his invitations to war Cabinet 
meetings and, consistently; asked to attend more. The position for the 
U. K. was difficult, because as Machtig pointed out, it., could not exclude 
Bruce=on the grounds that an-issue did'not directly concern.. Australia, 
as it had conceded after "much argument and wrangling" the phrase 
'formulation and direction of policy' which was a point Bruce stressed 
in his requests to attend more meetings. 
175 
Sir E. Bridges (Secretary 
to; the Cabinet) thought there was "considerable margin for discretion 
and possible misunderstanding" between Bruce's obvious right to attend 
the Monday meetings (the regular weekly meeting to discuss the war which 
many Ministers outside the War. Cabinet attended) and the U. K. government's 
rightito meet alone to consider matters of domestic policy. He asked 
for guidance on this and was told by Churchill that. the number of 
meetings'; Bruce Attended should not be increased. The value of 
176 
Bruce's attendance, ( at less than half, of the scheduled meetings) 
can perhaps be judged from a comment by Bridges in-which heýnoted that 
the most : effective meetings from the point of view of deciding policy- 
were those which ti 
175. Machtig to Attlee, 9th June'1942, D035/999, WC7/96. (Evidence of 
strained relations between Page and Churchill when the former was 
attending the War Cabinet can be seen from Cadogan's Diary, entry 
for 19th January 1942, where he reports that Churchill lost his 
temper with Page). 
176. Bridges to Martin, 1 July 1942 and 6th July 1942; Martin to Bridges, 
4th July 1942; Churchill : to Bridges, 27th July 1942, Prem4,50/11. 
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in Ian informal atmosphere, all sorts of ideas are put 
forward acid tested, and some of them rejected. Yet these , are precisely the meetings, as I understand it, to which 
objection is felt to admitting the representatives of 
other Governments: l» 
In July 1942 the U. K. was expecting two representatives of India 
and had agreed that they should also be allowed to attend, the War 
Cabinet on the same basis as Australia. Attlee (as Dominions Secretary) 
and Bridges were anticipating complaints from Bruce, (and Nash when he 
SC. 
arrived) about this arrangement and suggested to Churchill that the 
Indians should only be invited to'the Möndäy 'meeting, but that the 
Australian and New Zealand representatives should attend one more a 
178 
week. Churchill'cýmmented 
This is the best we'can do. The`'Briti"sh War Cabinet 
must sometimes be allowed to sit ty5gther. We do not 
sit in on the Australian Cabinet. 
When Attlee wrote-to'Churchill urging`ehat he accept this two-stage 
treatment of the'different representatives, rhe'explained`frankly to 
Bruce that the U. K. had_to haie opportunities 'for domestic discussion 
and that he should not be suspicious_if he heard of-a meeting to. which 
he had not ,, 
been, invited. Churchill,. added the. comment,, that private 
180 
meetings could not always be confined to domesticltopics. 
By'February 1943 Churchill was clearly tired of-the endless, 
complaints from Bruce, some about specific meetings, to which, he had 
not been invited, others about his, general position.. Churchill, told 
Attlee that Bruce's position was "highly anomalous" now that Australian 
troops had departed from the general war zone, and said he saw no reason 
177. Memorandum by Bridges, received D; O. 14th July' 1942, ". D035/999, °- 
WC7/96. (Hankey referred in his diary to Bruce's troubles with 
Churchill in June 1941 and again in August 1942. r(: -In the latter 
entry he agreed that Bruce should not be restricted to matters 
dealing explicitly with Australia, and while being-critical-of 
Churchill, thought Bruce could make a possible Prime Minister, 
Roskill, op. cit., pp. 515 & 563. 
178. Minute by Bridges to Churchill, 16th July 1942, Prei4,, 43A/14. 
179. Note by Churchill on Bridges' minute of 16th July 1942, ibid. 
180. Minute by Attlee to Churchill, 22nd July 1942 and"Churchill's 
marginalia, ibid. 
97 
.1 
why heyshould continue to attend War Cabinet meetings when no other 
Dominion representative did. 
181 
Attlee said his position had always 
been anomalous, but reminded Churchill that the reason for Australia's 
representation was not its military contribution, but its exposure to 
attack from the Japanese, which still remained. To rescind the offer 
would create friction with Australia as well as laying the U. K. open 
to charges of disinterest in the Pacific theatre. 
182 A decision was 
postponed because an invitation had just been sent to Curtin to pay 
a visit. Before it occurred, another event caused further arguments. 
Bruce asked to attend a Cabinet meeting to discuss U. K. policy at the 
% 
forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow. Churchill's 
draft reply, which was submitted to tjie Dominions Secretary first, 
stated that the meeting 
will be. one of His Majesty's servants in the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Should the question of a meeting of the representatives 
of the Dominions with the aforesaid Government be necessary, 
you will certainly be invited, together with the representatives 
of Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, 183 
This was not sent to Bruce. Cranborne, by then back at the D. O., saw 
Brucesand ýn a "frosty conversation" explained the position. When 
Bruce asked for a formal written answer, Cranborne's draft was sent 
t 
which explained that the U. K. War Cabinet meeting was designed to 
enable U. K. Ministers to clear their own minds in the first instance, 
but that he was hoping to arrange a meeting of all High Commissioners 
with the Foreign Secretary. 
184 
This episode demonstrates Cranborne's 
greater tact in handling the Dominions. 
"Y 
Curtin did not visit London until May 1944, when all the Commonwealth 
leaders met to discuss the post-war. During this conference it was 
181. Churchill to Attlee, 12th February 1943, Prem4,50/11. ---- 182. Attlee to Churchill, 12th February 1943, ibid. 
183. Bruce to Churchill, 5th October 1943; draft reply Churchill to 
Bruce, 5th October 1943, ibid. 
184. Cranborne to Churchill reporting on a meeting with Bruce and 
enclosing draft reply which was sent, 5th October 1943, ibid. 
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suggested that the U. K. Prime Minister should meet the Dominion High 
Commissioners monthly to review the current 'situation. Curtin agreed 
and intimated- that it would remove Australia's need for an accredited 
representative in the U. K. Cabinet. Churchill, who was not at the 
meeting which discussed this, wrote to Curtin agreeing with the idea 
of monthly meetings and that it would no longer be necessary for Bruce 
to attend the Cabinet regülarly. 
185 
Bruce continued to receive some 
Cabinet papers, which the other High Commissioners did not, but the May 
1944 Prime Ministers' meeting saw the end of his special representation. 
Bridges commented to Machtig that he had never expected "this particular 
trouble would'end-so easily" adding that he was "very grateful to Bruce 
186 for the attitude which he has adopted about this business" Whether 
this remark referred to his attitude over the previous two years, or 
to the conclusion of his representation, is unclear. At all events, 
despite the arguments between Churchill and Bruce, relations with 
Australia improved from 1942 onwards rather than deteriorating as they 
might have done. Bruce was not always satisfied with his position, 
and as prepared as Menzies had been to take issue with Churchill, but 
he quickly appreciate" d that although there still were occasions when 
Australia wasnot consulted, this was not the result 
of deliberate 
intention but a reflection on Churchill's personality and the defects 
of his great qualities. 187 He and Massey both knew that many U. K. 
Ministers \were equally in the dark as to U. K. policy. 
188 
The second alteration to 'the U. K. 's machine r for. Commonwealth. 
collaboration was made at the official level and was due in part to a 
185. Churchill to Cranborne, 20th May 1944, D035/1490, WC75/37. 186. =, Bridges to Machtig, 2nd June. 1944, ibid. 187. Bruce to Curtin, 4th June 1942, D0357999,, WC7/96. 188. Massey Diary, 5th April 1943; Edwards, op. cit., p. 348. (For further details on Bruce's association with the War Cabinet, see*CAB104/180 & 181. ) 
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memorandum written , by! Page in December 1941. --In addition to suggesting 
that Australia ought'to-have an accredited representative4n the War"l, ' 
Cabinet, Page proposed more consultationýat the early stagesýof policy 
formulation. One-idea was for, Tominion s' representatives to be posted 
to the F. O. to see papers-and have, a chance to express their views 
before policy was decided. --He also proposed closer liaison on defence, 
including the suggestion that the Dominions had'a Minister each on! the " 
Defence Committee. 
189 
Cranborne, sent'a note of his conversation with- 
Page to Attlee and passed Page's memorandum to Eden; with a minute 
stressing the need to achieve some= satisfactory arrangement. He 
disagreed with Page's ideas, considering it impossible for, Dominion 
officials to work in the F. O. because there were many papers, 4ncluding 
some about the Dominions, which the U. K. would not-want them, to see. ' 
To strengthen-the F. O. 's liaison with the Dominions, -, Cranborre'suggested 
that a fairly senior F. O. official, (of'Under-Secretary'or Head'of 
Department rank) should-be appointed as Liaison Officerý'to'the'High 
Commissioners, who would be available for consultations', take the 
initiative`in approaching the Dominions, -and keep in close touch with 
the D. O. He did not think that such' an-appointment-would--duplicate 
the work of the D. O. too much, -, as-it was'often'not"involved in the early 
stages of policy making, Moreover, the main purpose' was'-t; "; ` 
not so much to, improvethe existing practice, asto satisfy``" 
the Dominions. 190 
CranborneI s recognition that the D. O. was often unaware of policy. until 
after it had been decided,. is important, because this was a major defect 
in its capacity to keep the Dominions fully informed of the direction 
in which U. K. thinking was moving, as opposed to only telling them of 
189. Memorandum by Page, " 31st; December' 1941". Avon 'Papers; 'F0954/4'. 
Dom42/2. 
190. Note by Cranborne'to Eden, 7th Januaryý1942; Cranborn'e'minute on 
Page's memorandum, 2nd January 1942, bid; note of conversation 
between Page and Cranborne, 3rd January 1942, CAB104/180. 
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policy already authorised by Cabinet. ' This was a gap in Commonwealth 
collaborationwhich the D. O. and-P. O. took up in their planning for the 
post-war period. More significant for the war is Cranborne's 
statement that the crucial factor was to placate Australia, rather than 
materially to improve the machinery, and it'is a measure of his 
appreciation of Australia's genuine fears that he stressed it. .I 
I 
ýý ý. 
I 
There was-a slightly varied reaction from the. F. O. to his suggestion. 
The Head of the Dominions Intelligence Department ý,. Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck, 
disagreed with Page's and Cranborne's proposals and thought the latter's 
would mean duplicating the work-tof the D. O. too much. 
191 1 The Minister 
16 
of State, 'Mr. R. Law, favoured a Liaison Officer. He pointed ; to. 
Cranborne's`explanation that the-D. O. 's principal task wasrto-communicate 
finished policy, which the Dominions could accept or reject, and that 
they had little'opportunity to'suggest alterations to policy before it 
was' finalised: '- He noted that Cavendish-Bentinck thought it was'a 
suggestion which'would only console Page for'--"aIfew, weeks" -and that.., 
it would mean that any mistakes made"incollaboration would henceforth 
be the responsibility of%the F: O. Nevertheless, Law said the whole 
question of consultation 'was "too big"'politically -not to adopt this 
proposalý'and that Eden wanted to-assist the Dominions in this. Cadogan, 
ti 
Cranborne and Law met to discuss'the proposals on 21st January and 
Cranborne'also spoke to Bruce who favoured: the idea of a liaison officer. 
Cadogan minuted that the U. K. 's prime objective was "to give satisfaction 
to Australliall"so it'should have regard to their preference. 'He' 
ti. 
spoke with Eden on 22nd January and the'Foreign Secretary approved 
the appointment, authorising Cadogan to approach Sir, Basil Newton to 
take up the position. 
192 
Newton was subsequently appointed as the F. O. 'sýLiaison Officer 
to the High Commissioners. His duties included the supervising of the 
/ý 
191. Minute by Cavendish-Bentinck, 12th January 1942, Avon Papers, F0954/4, 
Dom42/4. 
192. Minute by Law, 13th January 1942, andCadogan, 23rd January 1942, ibid. 
drafting of telegrams on foreign affairs and attending almost all 
meetings betwee:: the Dominions Secretary and, the High Commissioners 
at, the D. O. - Newton also arranged weekly meetings at the F. O. with 
, representatives of. the Political Intelligence Department and other 
political, departments . in order to acquaint,. himself with policy, and, 
them with the needs of the Dominions. There is not agreat deal', 
193 
of evidence of the High, Commissioners' reaction to, this appointment-, 
but Mr. A. Sltrling,. (Australia's Political Liaison Officer) recalls 
that Bruce "never derived much comfort from this--. palliative" and that-- 
Newton fretted that, the High Commissioners did not-respond to his 
presence or availability as much as he,, had-hoped. (Stirling-also says 
that after, considerable delay Newton organised meetings with High, 
Cocmaission officials, which were "irreverently christened by junior 
F. O. officers. as 'Newton's.. Imperial Conference' or 'The Children's 
I 
Hour "'. 
194 
Massey implies in his diary that Newton tende&to take 
a rather superior attitude with the High Commissioners. °. 'At a meeting 
101 
in October 1942 Massey records that after, he had made, a suggestion 
concerning prisoners of. war, Newton 
thought it was. his duty to give us-ad little primary 
education on diplomatic machinery to show why my 
suggestion was. impracticable. 
He adds s. F' iý., T 
as Waterson said going away, the. presence, of both 
Attlee and Newton at the same time is sometimes more 
than one can bear. 195 
If Newton did not manage-to establish close personal relations 
with the High Commissioners, he. did make great efforts to improve the 
information they received on foreign affairs and, possibly unknown to 
them, he consistently supported the rights of the Dominions and the D. O. 
193. Note. by Mr. Sloan=on the_Dominions, work of the D. I. D., 13th January 
1943, F0371/36605, W4373/4084/68. 
194. A. Stirling, Lord Bruce: The London Years (Melbourne, 1974), pp. 
242 & 310. 
195. Massey Diary, 27th October 1942. 
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within the F. 0.196 
Attlee's transference to the D. O. in February 1942 was the third 
change inaugurated by the U. K.; but his appointment did not solve 
the High Commissioners' complaints about lack of information. 
'Attlee's time at the D. O. indicates that membership of the War 
Cabinet was-not the crucial criterion in improving the information sent 
to the Dominions and importance to the High C"r, issioners, which many 
had supposed. He was not'only a member of the War Cabinet, he was- 
Churchill's deputy, and there can be no doubt that' he was as well informed 
as anyone, apart from Churchill'himself, of all developments. -Yet 
the High Commissioners continued to complain about lack of information. 
The principal reason seems to be that Churchill's policy. about the 
transmission of information to'the Dominions did not alter. - This 
was the most important consideration, not the position of the-Dominions, 
Secretary. ' Two other'factors affected the position, 'Attlee's-character 
and his other duties. As well as deputising for Churchill, Attlee 
was also leader of the Labour Party and to head a-`Party which was sharing 
poEerlduring"war-time must have addeO considerably to his burdens. 
Perhaps it was as well he had a spell at the D. O., for in'his memoirs 
in the short space he devotes to that Office he notes that he "had 
197 
plenty of time for my other duties"'. Attlee-was not'voluble or 
vivacious, and Massey notes that his natural reticence was a positive 
detriment to. his position as Dominions Secretary. 
198 
Sir Charles 
Dixon, Assistant Under-Secretary at the D. O., alto recalls Attlee's 
period of Office and his additional burden as Churchill's deputy. He 
comments 
196. See chapter 3, pp 
197. C. -R. Attlee, As It Happened (London, 1954), p. 125. 
198. Massey, op. cit., p. _301. 
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inevitably these major duties took up much of his time 
and thought. He gave the impression of being somewhat; w, ' 
aloof, but his was perhaps not a fair comment, as it 
was-largely due to his quiet manner, - and, although he' -, ', 
said very little at any of the meetings which I attended, 
., 
he was always ready to hear. and appreciate all that the, 
experts advised and to consider it fully before coming 
to a decision. 199 
But there are indications that Attlee's reluctance to pass on. information 
did not stem simply from reticence.; He seemed to"share"Churchill's, 
worries about the secrecy of information-to-perhaps a, greater-extent 
than others, 
200 
and was less inclined to tackle Churchill on, the. High 
Comissioners' behalf. Bruce recalls an, occasion-when he thought he 
should have been-invited to'a War Cabinet meeting and his conversation 
with Attlee to, try and secure admission. , -Attlee apparently agreed 
with Bruce, but-said it was niost, unlikely he would, be invited and 
rlN 
suggested that he put his views,, to Ministers -lat'er. ,, But,, as-Bruce,,,, 
noted, by then the policy-would have been decided; 
201 
Massey, doesý 
note occasions when Attlee agreed to: speak-to Churchill, but in April 
1943, after the High, Commissioners had not., been informed about the 
results-of,, the Teheran, Conference, he made an interesting comment 
about Attlee..,,; Massey and Bruce had resolved to speak to Cranborne: 
about this ommision, and Massey was, optimistic, that, something would. <; 
be done; for: 
This sort of-thing-happened often enough in Attlee's- 
regime when. the position was well-nigh hopeless, but 
': Cra9borne will be only too glad to put things right as 
farts it is in his power to do so. 
202 
This comment reveals as much about Cranborne as About Attlee. 
Bruce and Massey had means to circumvent the absence of official 
information. Bruce had assured Menzies at the beginning of the war 
that he was able to supplement D. O. 's information from private contacts 
199. Dixon, Memoirs, p. 55. 
200. Attlee to Churchill, 28th July 1942,, D0121/10B. 
201. Edwards, op. cit., p. 370. 
202. Massey Diary, 2nd December 1943. (On Cranborne's return to the D. O. 
Oliver Harvey commented that Attlee had been "a failure". Harve 
Diaries, 23rd September 1942. ) 
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and 'Massey notes that he heard all about the Teheran conference from 
Mr. R. - Barrington Ward, editor of The Times, not from the D. 0.203 
Contact between D. O. officials and those of the Dominion High Commissioners 
r` 
was also part of the process and apart from the official meetings there 
was regular informal contact which aided the Dominions. Massey clearly 
had many conversations with Machtag, the P. U. S., which were of value, 
although he recognised that the prohibitions placed on the circulation 
of documents made it difficult for Machtig. Massey described Machtig 
as being "in full sympathy with our grievance" (lack of consultation 
over the shackling of prisoners in January 1943) and doing "as he 
alwaysýdoes, --all he can to help". 
204 
Three months later Massey 
described Machtig as understanding the Commonwealth as few people did. 
205 
One further alteration to the U. K. 's machinery for collaboration 
11 1 
with the Dominions occurred at the beginning of 1943, during Attlee's 
tenure, at the D. O., and concerned the F. O. 's supply of information to 
the, Dominions and its liaison with the High Commissioners. Between 
1929 and=1933 there had been a Dominions Information Department of 
the F. O. set up to supply information on foreign policy to the Dominions, 
deal with inter-Imperial relations in so far as they affected the F. O. 
and cope with matters of protocol affecting the foreign relations of 
the Dominions. The changed status of the Dominions under the Statute 
of Westminster made the department unnecessary and it was wound up' 
in 1933 with its remaining function] supplying information on foreign 
affairs, being transferred to 'the Treaty Department where a Dominions w 
Intelligence division handled them. From 1939 a separate Dominions 
Intelligence Department (D. I. D. ) was established in the F. O. for providing 
203. Massey Diary, 29th November 1943. 
204. Massey Diary, 27th January,, 1943. 
205. Massey Diary, 29th March 1943. (Nicholls described Machtig as a 
"brilliant Permanent Head". Nicholls, op. cit., p. 384. ) 
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information to the Dominions (via the D. O. ). 
206 
During the early, 
years of the war the staff in the D. I. D. were increasingly used as 
the F. O. 's representatives on the Joint Intelligence Committee, spending 
less time on their Dominion responsibilities. The appointment of 
Sir Basil Newton, in February 1942 had increased the F. O. 's activity 
towards the Dominions, but in November 1942 Sir John Stephenson, Under- 
Secretary at the D. O., wrote to Newton expressing the D. O. 's concern 
that the Dominions were not receiving enough material on foreign affairs. 
He acknowledged the other work which was occupying the department, but 
urged that measures should be taken to ensure that information reached 
the D. O. more quickly and that the D. O. had better warning of proposed 
press announcements. 
207 
Newton recorded his own opinion that the Dominions work of the 
D. I. D. had-been unsatisfactory for some time, and that-both he and the 
one junior official working on Dominion needs agreed with the D. O. 's 
criticisms and thought that a genuine D. I. D. should be re-established. 
He stressed that this was particularly important because 
in the\future the question of securing co-operation with 
the Dominions in foreign affairs will in the long run 
prove even more important. 
Newton thought there was a danger of the Dominions' own foreign services 
developing apart from the U. K. 's'if it did not respond to'the existing 
receptiveness of the Dominions and provide them with the guidance and 
information they needed. 
208 
The F: O. agreed, with Stephenson's and 
Newton's. arguments and Mr. Ashton Gwatkin, Assistwant` Under-Secretary 
at the F. O., told the Treasury that the Foreign Secretary had decided 
to separate the Dominions and intelligence functions of the department 
/C 
206. See P. R. O. Handlist 31/19. 
207. Stephenson to Newton, November 1942, D035/1002, WF52/10. 
208. Minute by Newton, 25th November 1942, ibid. 
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and asked for authority to appoint a new First Secretary. 
209 The 
Treasury was not keen to authorise this expansion, "in these days 
of manpower shortage" and suggested that the geographical Departments 
'r .. could jointly handle the problem in co-operation with the Political 
Intelligence Department. However, at the beginning of March 1943, 
Newton and Stephenson held a meeting with the Treasury representative 
and persuaded him of the necessity of these proposals. 
210 Mr. Greenway 
was appointed as Head of the new D. I. P. Immediately the work of that 
department expanded rapidly. Byrthe 16th March Greenway was asking 
for additional staff. Newton supported his request, but Mr. Gwatkin 
decided that it was too soon to approach the Treasury again. 
211 
Though the F. O. staff on the whole had virtually no experience 
of the Dominions and little of Dominion personnel, 
212 
the staff of the 
D. I. D. quickly appreciated some of the problems involved in Dominion 
collaboration. Greenway encouraged the D. O. staff to contact him 
directly in an attempt to speed up communications 
with the result that by personal intervention I am often 
able to get a decision taken or a reply sent much more 
expeditiously than by the normal channel of written 
communications. 1 
With-its expansion the D. I. D. began to play a more' innovatory role, 
not just`bringing items to the attention of theDominions or the D. O. 
209. Gwatkin to Wilcox (Treasury), 26th January 1943, ibid. 
210. ' Wilcox to Gwatkin, no date, and 2nd March 1943, ibid. 
211, Minutes by Greenway, 16th March 1943, Newton, 17th March 1943 
and Gwatkin, 2nd April'1.943, F0371/36605, W, 4373/4084/68. 
212. Cavendish-Bentinck of the, D. I. D. noted in January 1942,, during 
the discussions on Newton's appointment, that it would not be 
, 
appropriate to transfer all liaison on foreign affairs from the 
D. O. to the F. O. "as without intimate knowledge of the conditions 
in the various Dominions and of the mentality of their respective 
Governments we should be likely to make mistakes". Avon Papers, 
F0954/4, Dom42/4. (For later F. O. discussion about liaison on 
foreign affairs, see 'chapter 3, pp. 157-160). 1 
ýr :ý, 
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but increasing their own direct liaison with Dominion personnel and 
contemplating ways in which the general machinery of Commonwealth 
co-operation could be improved. 
213 
,, There were problems in the F. O. 's 
Dominions work. " There was a significant diversity of opinion within the 
Office about the Dominions and how they should be treated, and the 
very size and preoccupation of the Office with world events meant'that 
Dominion, requirements were not always fulfilled. '' It was the burden 
of the D. I. D. to try and ensure that items of interest to the Dominions 
were brought to their attention. 
214 The increased activity of the F. O. 
did not completely quench the appetite of the High Commissioners' for 
information. In November 1944 they requested more F. O. telegrams 
and Cranborne contacted Eden about this, reminding him of'Churchill's 
previous restrictions on telegram circulation. He said that this'' 
resulted in his having to read aloud extracts from telegrams which 
the High Commissioners were not allowed to see. - This he thought 
unsatisfactory as"it meant reading a mass of information each day 
which was difficult for them to assimilate. With the increase in 
the different categories of F. O. telegrams Cranborne thought. that the 
High Commissioners could be given more, and asked for Eden's assistance 
in this. 
215 
Eden supported the Dominions Secretary, perhaps because 
of the F. O. 's increased involvement in Dominion collaboration, or 
because he remembered similar difficulties when he was Dominions 
Secretaryi Bridges and Ismay were also consulted, and although they 
both thought that the position was adequate and should not be altered, 
they felt their arguments could not override the strongly expressed 
wishes of the Foreign and Dominion Secretaries. Churchill finally 
decided not to alter the position at that time. 
216 Such incidents 
/. 
{ 
213. See chapter 3. 
214. Minute by Cadogan, 29th May 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 
215. Cranborne-to Eden, 16th November 1944, F0371/42684, W16621/15409/68. 
216. Eden to Churchill, 28th November 1944, minute by Churchill, 3rd 
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1945, Prem4,7/5. 
108 
suggest that if the D. O. was able to mobilise the F. O. 's support 
for its policies, the chances of acceptance increased. This was 
the'positive"side of closer collaboration between the two Offices on 
Commonwealth relations but, as the D. O. was to discover in the next 
five years, there were disadvantages too. 
The direct correspondence between Churchill and the four Dominion 
Prime Ministers offered no uniform system. There was considerable 
divergence of subject and detail in messages sent to each P. M., but 
they did supplement the official communications. The Commonwealth 
had a`strong tradition of direct contact between the Prime Ministers 
and even the more routine business generally passed between the 
Dominions Secretary and the External Affairs Ministers (or Prime 
Ministers when those offices were not separated. ) This was in deliberate 
contrast to communications with foreign powers, usually conducted 
through ambassadors. The U. K. made strenuous efforts to retain this 
method of direct communication when South Africa and Eire were making 
attempts to place communications in the hands of official representatives, 
217 
and"King had expressed his concern in 1939 that the practice was , '` 
developing for the U. K. to use its High Comaaissioner in Ottawa to 
deliver; communications. 
218 
1 
Churchill corresponded most frequently and fully with Smuts, seemingly 
because he knew him better than the other leaders and had a great respect 
for his o\inions. Churchill and Smuts exchanged information on future 
plans, military and political;. and Churchill sent him a considerable- 
amount of information about impending operations which he did not allow 
to be'sent to the others. Smuts'was also told of many of the 
'conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill and on occasions sent 
the actual correspondence. He also received full 
information 
about 
217. Minute by Mr. Joy (Commonwealth Relations office), 5th September 
1947, F0371/65574, W6365/7/68. 
. 
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the 1944 Quebec conference and the pans concerning Greece. 
219 
After 
his trip to Moscow in 1942, Churchill told Attlee to send Smuts full 
details of the discussions, but added that'there was no need to go °', 
j- 
into similar detail to the other~Dominions. as they had'not been told 
,. ' about 'Torch' (the Anglo-American operation against French North 
220 Africa). As this operation concerned South Africa more directly 
than the other Dominions, it might be reasonable for Smuts to have-' 
advance notice of the planning; but it does seem that generally he 
received, far more information about military operations than his " 
counterparts. This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the 
1 friendship between the two, Smuts' vast experience and the fact, he4 
11 
was a military man himself, which the other leaders were not. ' 
Menzies corresponded often with-Churchill and'never hesitated 
to give him opinions on policy, or the lack of it; but as he told 
Churchill in October 1940, this did not detract from Australia's or 
221 his own wholehearted support for the U. K. Despite the sometimes 
stiff words exchanged between the two there was mutual admiration and 
respect between Churchill and Menzies. The former did not mind 
i 
receiving Menzies' criticisms and suggestions, but asked him to send 
personal messages directly to him, adding 
there are some things I must say to you in Australia 
that I should not care to mention to a single soul here 
beyond our limited circle. I think it important that 
we should 2ý5eserve a direct channel for exceptional 
messages. 
} 
Churchillcontinued to correspond directly with Fadden and Curtin although 
his relations with the latter went through a very bad period in late 1941 
and for much of 1942. Churchill'reacted violently to Curtin's demand. --.! 
to withdraw the Australian Division from Tobruk,, his article about 
219. Churchill to Smuts, lQ; h August 1941 and 22nd December 1944, D0121/109. 
220. Churchill to Attlee, 16th-August 1942, D035/1002, WF48/12. 
221. Menzies to Churchill, 4th October 1940, Australian Documents Vol. 
IV, No. 158. 
222. Churchill to Menzies, 7th June 1940, Australian Documents Vol. IV, 
No. 491. 
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Australia looking towards the U. S. A. and his telegram which said that 
to abandon Singapore would be an "inexcusable betrayal". - The telegrams 
which passed between them in these two months were sharp and-uncompromising 
and Churchill decided at the end of January to suspend his personal 
correspondence with Curtin, in view of the "tone" of his telegrams. 
However, this series was later-restored. 
223 In February the two, 
governments argued over the diversion of Australian troops to Rangoon. 
Churchill began diversion procedures without receiving the Australian 
government's authorisation, but when Curtin insisted that the troops 
should go direct to Australia, the original order was rescinded-, 
224 At 
this point Australia had not been informed of the-decision by. the U. K. 
and the U. S. in December 1941 that priority was to be given to the 
European theatre over the Pacific. . Had it 
known this, Australian 
protests to both the U. K. and the U. S. would no doubt have been even 
more vehement. It seems that Page was told of the decision in January, 
but that he told neither Bruce nor Curtin. 
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Official notification 
came from London in May 1942, and Bruce commented how that decision had " 
affected all Australia's requests about the Far East and was a 
principle we might have fought successfully if we had 
known of it at the time. Now it is almost hopeless to ... -r 
get\it reversed. 226 
Differences between the two countries were not confined to the 
Pacific or to military policy. Churchill made a very bad impression 
on Curtin over the way in which he appointed Casey, Australia's Minister 
in the Middle East. Although Churchill asked Curtin in March 1942 
ti 
223. Churchill Minute 30th January 1942, Prem4,50/7. 
224. Hasluck, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 73-87; Edwards, op. cit., pp. 333-336; 
Avon Papers, F0954/4, Dom42/12-13. 
225. C. Thorne, 'MacArthur, Australia and the British, 1942-43', in 
Australian Outlook, April 1975, Vol. 29, No. 1', p. 61. 
226. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 362-363. (Casey, Australian Minister in 
Washington was in close contact with the British Embassy-but, - 
according to A. Watt the Australian Head of Chancery, he knew 
nothing about the priority beipg given to the European war. A. Watt, 
Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan'Watt, (London, 1972), p. 39. 
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about the proposed appointment, Curtin clearly did not want Casey to 
leave the U. S. A. and was not pleased when Churchill persisted in his 
requests and contacted Casey himself, to offer the post. However 
on this occasion, "Curtin was as annoyed with Casey, for accepting the 
appointment and choosing to serve the U. K. rather than Australia, 
asrwith Churchill. 
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Relations between the two Prime Ministers and 
the two countries did begin to improve, a fact which Cranborne 
remarked when he returned to the D. O. 'in October 1943. Churchill- 
228 
records in his history of the war that when "the pressures from all 
sides were so fierce" he was conscious of the "depth and number of 
differences" dividing him and Curtin, but regretted any "traces of 
impatience" that his messages bore. 
Later in the war, in easier times, when he came over to 
England and we all got to know him well, there was 
general' respect and lik n for this eminent and striking 
Australian personality. 2ý 
Churchill's relations with Fraser and King were much easier and 
although he corresponded directly with both men, it was a more routine 
correspondence for the purpose of sending particularly secret messages 
1ý 
for their information only, such as advance notices of operations or 
meetings which later received a general press release. Fraser was 
naturally concerned with the position in the Far East and was not afraid 
to offer Churchill advice, or ask for changes in policy; as he had 
over the urma Road and in connection with the establishment of a Far 
Eastern Council. On occasions Fraser, like Curtin, felt the sharp 
end of Churchill's pen, but their relations were never as tense as those 
L 
between the other two. 
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Not only had Fraser's government been in 
227. Avon Papers, F0954/4, Dom42/19-21;, Dom42/34; jDom42/38-44. 
Full correspondence between Churchill, Curtin and Casey. 
(Apparently. Menzies. name was. also put forward for the post of U. K. 
Resident Ministerin the Middle East. See, C. Hazlehurst, Menzies 
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230. Fraser to Churchill, 24th May 1941 and Churchill to Fraser, 24th 
May 1941, Avon Papers, F0954/4, Dom41/5A & B. 
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power longer, but Fras*er"ha'd visited England twice before the start 
of the Pacific war. This personal contact possibly facilitated 
relations.. King was the least concerned of all the Prime'Ministers with 
gaining a voicekin the direction"of strategy. He expected to be kept 
informed of all major developments, and his chief complaint was the lack 
of recognition accorded to the Commonwealth's war effort, as opposed 
to the U. K. 's, and especially Canada's. 
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Massey denied a statement 
b y,, Attlee that Canada had not been concerned with the direction of the 
war and gave, examples of its interest. Without detracting from these 
or Massey's own personal interest, Attlee's comment is a fair one, 
especially as he contrasted Canada's attitude with Australia's. King, 
as he demonstrated at the 1943 Quebec conference, was not primarily 
I 
interested in military strategy, although he was more concerned with 
the arrangements to be made to end the war, establish the peace and 
232 Canada's position vis-a-vis the U. S. and the U. K. in the post-war world. 
The U. K. 's appointment of High Commissioners to the Dominions before 
and during the war had an impact on war-time collaboration, most 
notably, inAustralia where it seems no coincidence that a period of , 'ý 
difficult U. K. -Australian relations occurred after the appointment of 
two rather unsuccessful High Commissioners. Before the war the U. K. 
233 had. posted civil servants of varied Whitehall experience to the Dominions. 
Sir, G. Whiskard, who was posted to Canberra in 1936, was the first D. O. 
man to be appointed, (although he was a late-comer to that office) but 
it. seems as if he was not a success. In addition to'lacking zeal 
_and enthusiasm, 
he regarded the job rather in the manner 
of a rest-cure - hence his remarks 
231. Mackenzie King Record Vol. Is pp. 525-528.1 
232. -C.. P. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the North Atlantic Triangle, p. 56. For Quebec conference see chapter 4, p. 186. 
233. See Garner, o . cit., 'pp. 43-53 for a discussion of the early policies 
of U. K. representation in the Dominions and the D. O. 's initial 
battle to get the representatives under its authority not the F. O. 's. 
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This is a most amusing-job; but by God, I shall ýb e 
tired of it before I've finished it 
and 
? here really is very little work'for the H. C. to do 
, 
here ... It's the rarest, thing in the world for me' 
to go to the Office in the afternoon. 
He also displayed an aloofness and superiority more serious in their 
effects. He was extremely scathing about Australian Ministers and 
officials and his lack of political judgment can be seen from his 
verdict on Menzies. 
Menzies has no more backbone than a jellyfish. It is 
regrettably true that Menzies would not-last a day if 234 
there were any visible alternative, but there is none. 
Yet when this was-written in 1940, Menzies had already been making it 
I 
clear to Churchill that he was not prepared to be disregarded. In 
R., 
1941 Churchill decided to appoint politicians with some Ministerial 
experience=to the Dominions. Although there was some suggestion that 
this was a convenient way of side-tracking individuals, it was also 
an attempt to ensure good co-ordination of the various war efforts. 
235 
Sir R. Cross, previously Minister for, Shipping, was appointed to succeed 
Wiiskard,; but rather than reversing the former's sad example, he 
appears to have continued it. Hasluck has described him as "one of 
the less, successful occupants of that'post" because he saw himself 
as a "guide and mentor with whom the colonials should seek to have 
consultation". 
236 
It is clear from his messages to London, and especially 
from his 
ýwn 
review of his appointment in 1944, that he never gained 
the confidence of the Australian government, thatý'he found them 
234.: Garner;,, op. cit., 'p. 47: 
235. There were those who suggested that Churchill was findingýa convenient 
-:: method of side-tracking politicians, see Garner, p. 181. Whatever 
Churchill's reasons for appointing Cross and Harlech. MacDonald. did 
not stand high in his favour. Cadogan, who had a high opinion of 
MacDonald and would-have liked him as Foreign Secretary, noted that 
Churchill would not have him because he regarded him "as rat-poison 
on account ofahis. connexion with the Eire ports", Cadogan Diaries, 
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uncongenial and that he was convinced the Labour Party was responsible 
for deliberately stirring up anti-British sentiment in Australia. 
None of this facilitated his task. His advice to Cranborne in January 
r 
1942 that the U. K. should be unaccommodating in its financial and 
couanercial dealings with Australia in order to induce a less pressing 
attitude about its political representation in London and on other 
war councils, a proposal rejected out of hand by Cranborne, gives an 
indication of Cross' lack of diplomatic talent. 
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There were genuine 
problems in Anglo-Australian relations which did not possess easy 
solutions during this period, but the role played by Cross as the U. K. 's 
representative can, have done nothing to ease them. 
Another politician appointed in 1941 was Lord Harlech, (W. Ormsby- 
Gore) who had been Colonial Secretary in 1937-38 before moving to the 
upper House. . Sir E. Harding, previously Permanent Under-Secretary 
at the D. O., had been appointed to Pretoria in 1940 but suffered bad 
health which led him to resign. Churchill wanted to appoint Lord 
Winterton but he declined the appointment because he did not want to 
give up his', seat in the House of Commons. Harlech, described as being 
too "autocratic and impetuous", did not establish close relations with, 
Smuts, who preferred to deal with the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr. C., R. 
t 
Price. 
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The effects of Harlech's appointment were minimised by the 
close relations between Smuts and senior U. K. Ministers. 
Undoubtedly the most successful politician appointed as a High 
Commissioner was MacDonald. Despite his youthfulness he did have 
greater experience of various offices than the other two Ministers; but 
his success seems to have stemmed from his approach to the task and his 
own abilities. Having concluded two successful terms of office at the 
237. Cranborne memorandum to Churchill, 22nd January 1942, Prem4,50/7A; 
'',, Garner, o . cit., pp. 187-188. ý 238. Garner, op. cit., p. 182. 
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D. O. and with his Ministerial future lying in the balance because of 
his lack of a party base and his rather cool relations with Churchill, 
it is likely that if MacDonald had not begun a career as a diplomat 
his talents might have not been utilised. In Ottawa MacDonald succeeded 
Sir Gerald Campbell who had no experience of, the D. O. or of the Dominions 
fr ". ": 
Ftw. r 
(he had previously serviced in the Consular Service) and while he 
performed more than adequately, trying hard to interpret Canadian 
opinion and attitudes to the U. K., he seems never to have fully understood 
them and particularly King. 
239 
However, it was no small task to 
understand and then establish close relations with-the Canadian Prime 
Minister, who was an extremely complex individual. 
240 Perhaps the 
outstanding aspect of MacDonald's period in Ottawa was the close relations 
he managed to forge with King 
241 
The one D. O. official appointed as a high Commissioner during the 
war, Sir H. Batterbee, had been Under-Secretary at the Office under 
Harding. He went as the first High Commissioner to New Zealand shortly 
before war broke out and stayed there until 1945. Batterbee had long 
experience, of Dominion affairs and by all accounts was successful in 
Wellington. Garner describes him as devoting himself to his new task 
"with vigour and enthusiasm", and while commenting that his excitability 
sometimes failed to appeal to some Ministers and officials, says that 
he maintained close relations with the government and was "regarded 
everywhere with affection". 
242 
The two potentially difficult Dominions, 
in terms of their involvement 'in the war and theft definite attitudes 
towards collaboration, were Australia and Canada. The better relations 
which the U. K. experienced with Canada were perhaps not unconnected with 
the calibre of its representation there. 
239. Garner, op. cit., pp `46 176-179. r 
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The war tended to illustrate more starkly the divergent attitudes 
of the Dominions towards collaboration which had already been visible 
during the inter-war years. The debate over whether to establish 
an Imperial War Cabinet amply demonstrated Canada's determination to 
stand by the maxim that Canadian policy would be decided by the elected 
Canadian Government, and not be delegated or shared. Joint Co onwealth 
bodies were undesirable because they would result in too great a loss 
of control over policy, because the Canadian people wanted to see policy 
formulated in Ottawa, not London or Canberra, and because ultimately 
they would weaken and destroy the association, not strengthen it. King 
and his Government appreciated the need to co-ordinate policies during 
the war but their aim was to pursue parallel, mutually beneficial 
policies, rather than a common policy dictated by London. 
South Africa took less share in the war than the other three. Dominions. 
No troops fought outside Africa and its contribution reflected the 
tense political situation there. The hesitancy of its support for 
U. K. Policies in the 1930s and the division within Parliament when the 
crucial vote was taken in September 1939, derived from growing Nationalist ; 
Opposition towards the Commonwealth connection. Although relations 
between Churchill and Smuts remained extremely close, those between 
the two governments were more muted. To a far greater extent than 
Canada, South Africa could not be seen to be involving itself in joint 
schemes which would in any way prejudice South Africa's independence. 
Smuts hadýbeen the driving force in bringing South Africa into the war 
and remained the most important figure in its Commonwealth connection. 
But, by the 1940s Smuts was in his seventies, increasingly reluctant 
to leave his country (although he did make war-time trips to London 
and Cairo) and not the dominant fixture he once had 
been. 
In comparison 
with the prominent place South Africa had occupied in Commonwealth 
z r, 
affairs in the 1920s and early 1930s, during the war it played a rather 
peripheral role. 
ýýr 
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During the war New Zealand generally displayed a calm countenance' 
of co-operation combined with a firm regard for its own interests and 
'. N independence. Although alarmed and worried by the developments in 
the Pacific in 1941-3, it never demonstrated the aggressive fear of 
its neighbour. New Zealand's requests for consultation were as 
much attempts to achieve fuller co-operation from the U. K. as they 
';. were assertions of its own independence. Perhaps the major difference 
between New Zealand and Australia was that it never really doubted 
that U. K. and New Zealand interests were ultimately compatible, and 
abided by Savage's dictum that the fates of the two were bound together. 
However, its war experience and especially its closer association with 
the U. S. in fighting the Pacific war, did make New Zealand more conscious 
of, and experienced in, international affairs and it certainly developed 
as an independent international actor during the war. 
243 
Australia's concern for the position in the Far East; -. the general 
direction of war strategy, and the U. K. 's consultation procedures, 
together with a very real fear'for its own future, did not"manifest 
itself in an isolationist or anti-British posture. As-in the inter- 
war years, Australia looked for greater co-operation and consultation 
with the', U. K. although this was sometimes done in an aggressive'männer. 
Its sense of its own independence greatly increased during'the war', 'as'- 
did its perception of its own interests. Both attitudes were-largely 
forced upön Australia by the threatening actions of Japan, which-were 
by far the worst danger the country had ever hadto face. Although it 
can be argued in hindsight that there was never any real danger of an 
invasion of Australia, at the time this fear was very strong. 'On'16th 
February 1942 Curtin announced that "the fall of Singapore can only be 
described as Australia's Dunkirk" adding that it initiated, the "Battle 
243. - For an impression of Fraser's premiership and working habits, see Alistair McIntosh, 'Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime: Personal 
Reminiscences', in N. Z. Journal of History, 1976, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
pp. 3-20. 
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of Australia 
244 
In 1944 a member of the., U. K. High Commission, .!, 
Mr. W. Hankinson, attempted to sum up Australian fears in 1942-1943, 
commenting 
She (Australia), had been brought up to rely on the, _protection- of the Royal Navy. Her whole strategy was based on that and 
on the fact that Singapore, which she had been assured time 
and time again could hold out for three months, was her bastion 
in the, north. In that faith she. hadtsent. herfidivisions to 
help us (the U. K. ) in the Middle East, and it was entirely 
understandable that when her props fell one by, one in quick, 
succession and the enemy was at her very gates, she shout 45 
say things which in her heart of hearts she, did not mean. 
The reaction of the Australian Government to its predicament, was to try 
and ensure that it had a larger voice in the decision-making because 
it believed that : Commonwealth strategy should 
be jointly formulated in 
order to protect the interests of all-its members. This contradicted, 
Canada's view, yet neither country could be said. to be less concerned 
with its vital interests. The answer to this dichotomy, seems to 
lie in the nature of the two countr. s war efforts and in two different 
theoretical views about the Commonwealth. 
Australia's troops were more involved in operations against the 
Axis powers', and at an earlier stage than Canada's, and significantly 
fought in the Middle East and Asian theatres while. Australia was 
threatened in the Far East. This was the main reason for Australia's 
anxiety to have a voice in the strategic direction of the war. Australian 
governments, Menzies' and Curtin's, also believed that their interests 
would be Liest secured by making the-Commonwealth a closer, partnership. 
They did 
not 
want tobe dictated to bthe U. K. qy more than Canada 
did, but they, believed that, the more U. K. policy could be modified by 
them, the better this would be for Australia. Inherent in this attitude 
was the view that British policy so dominated the whole association, at 
least in time of war, that it effectively determined the options open to 
the other members. Thus, rather than stand apart to some extent, as 
244. Hasluck, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 70. 
245. Hankinson to Stephenson, 26th May 1944, D035/1118, G579/25. 
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Canada chose to do, Australia must try to impress its wishes on the 
U. K. and needed a voice at the centre of the U. K. 's Operations. The 
military contributions of the two countries, and "especially their 
deployment, are crucial to the respective attitudes, and it remained 
to be seen whether Australia would retain this conception of Commonwealth 
collaboration in peacetime. 
It could be argued that the most appropriate description of 
Commonwealth relations during the war is one of monopolisation by 
the U. K., rather than genuine collaboration by all the members. Despite 
elements of inequality in the relationship and^some dissatisfaction 
about the extent of collaboration, such a description would not be 
accurate, or at least not a fair reflection of the efforts made by 
the U. K. to associate its Commonwealth partners with the war. Perhaps 
the most significant aspect of the U. K. 's provisions for collaboration 
is the fact they were not static arrangements which the Dominions had 
to accept for the duration. If there were inadequacies, there were 
also'continual efforts to improve the position at all levels of contact, 
Ministerial. and official. Moreover there were three important factors 
which made an equal partnership impossible. First, the difference in 
status and capacity between the U. K. and the Dominions; the U. K. was 
a leading world power with widespread interests and responsibilities 
and effectively dominated the international diplomatic arena during 
the early stages of the war. By contrast the Dominions were minor 
international actors, militarily and industrially.,. much weaker and lacking 
in experience of world affairs. London was necessarily the centre 
of the war effort and equally the"U. K. the guiding force in its direction. 
Second, the fact that the Dominions were geographically so far-flung 
raised enormous practical difficulties for Commonwealth collaboration 
in terms of the physical presence of senior Dominion Ministers or officials 
oýsý_yY 
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and `for the *security of crucial'info`rmation. It,,. is arguable whether 
Churchill was too security-conscious, whether more-information couldT 
have been safely"sent to the-Dominions, but. the secrecy of almost 
"r 
any"information relating to the'war was a-crucial factor, and to 
multiply the recipients of this-by'a factor-of four obviously 
contained dangers. ' Third; -the'entry into the war of'the U. S. S. R. 
and the U. S. A. created new problems for Commonwealth collaboration. 
Because of the size of these countrieä'-war efforts and'their political 
importance internationally',, their entry inevitably meant that they, 
together with the'U. K., dominated the direction of the'second half of 
the war. ' Nor was'it merely'a questionýof: the U. K. having, to co-" 
ordinate strategy first with itsý-new'allies; it also lost some control 
of policy and was not always able to''keep the Dominions privately 
informed of events or'plans before they came-public"knowledge. - If a 
decision was reached, as at Cairo-between the'U. S. A., the-U. K. -and China, 
it was not always possible to-persuade the other=Powers-to: delay an 
announcement` while information went'to the Dominions., :, Protests followed, 
some of which were legitimate because of negligence or slowness, on the 
part of the U. K.; ' others were not. '°' 
TheU: K. did try to mould its machinery of collaboration, to meet 
the desires of Ithe Dominions and some important, concessionsýwereýmade, ýt; 
particularly allowing the Dominions to appoint accredited representatives 
to'the U. K. War Cabinet. -- Although`this arrangement did'not lead to 
an always "easy relationship between Bruce and Churchill, it improved 
upon' the previous position andd'most importantly was an attempt, to, comply 
with' Australia's demands. '' Similarly, while the meetings between-the 
Dominions-Secretary and the-Dominion High *Commissioners 'did not always 
keep the latter as'well informed as they wished, they were positive l., 
attempts, within Ithe-'confinesof`security requirements, to keep' the 
Dominion-'re`presentatives*"up to date. 'Moreover, as the war progressed, 
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first a military liaison officer and then, an F. O. liaison officer 
were appointed to meet Dominion complaints. An important development 
`during the war was Newton's appointment as F. O. Liaison Officer 
to the High Commissioners-and the later expansion of thelD. I. D. of 
the F. O. During the discussions about Newton's appointment there was , 
a recognition that the'responsibilitiesjof. the D. O. mainly encompassd 
the presentation of policy decisions to the Dominions, as' opposed to 
liaison about policy during its formulation. This reflected the 
absence of much consultation on incipient policies, in the 1930s,, but 
also the inability of the D. O. Sto keep in close contact with all, 
aspects of U. K. policy while it was under consideration in the various 
U. K. Ministries unless it was brought to their attention by officials 
from those Offices. The D. O. was able to give definite Dominion 
views on policy, or at least offer their'likely opinions, -, either by 
reference to their High Commissioners or simply on the basis of their--,; 
experience. Nevertheless, the initiative in-placing prospective U. K. 
policy before the Dominions came mainly from other Ministries. The 
expansion of the D. I. D. into a genuine department for Commonwealth . 
liaison wasa recognition of the increased appetite, of the Dominions 
for information and consultation on foreign affairs and, the need to i 
improve the U. K. 's liaison activity in this sphere, which meant increasing 
the .. role. of the F. O. in-C" -onwealth relations. The extent to which 
there cou Id or should be consultations on policy before Ministers made 
decisions was a subject much discussed during theti, latter stages of the 
war-and the early years of peace. The identification of the-problem 
and the respective roles of the D. O. and F. -O. constituted an important 
development in the U. K. 's policy towards the Commonwealth. Closer 
relations between these two Offices improved the U. K. 's relations with 
the Dominions and, contained advantages for the'D. O. in'its dealings with 
them. As the`F. O. 's involvement in Commonwealth relations increased 
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and the Dominions extended their international activity, the question 
arose of increasing the F. O. 's involvement, perhaps to the exclusion 
of the D. O. 
During the war the Commonwealth acted together as a unit to a 
far greater extent than in the previous two decades. In addition 
to the extensive co-operation between the U. K. and each Dominion, 
inter-Dominion co-operation also increased. Representation by the 
Dominions in each other's capitals expanded rapidly from 1939 and the 
Dominions worked together in such projects such as'the Air Training 
Scheme. 
246 
For the first time the Dominions began to develop the 
habit of genuine inter-Commonwealth consultation, completing the circle 
of Commonwealth communication which had hitherto been mainly bi-lateral. 
With , the end of the war in sight, the Commonwealth could be proud of its 
achievements and each member of its individual contribution. The 
Dominions' experience of the war, and the confidence which resulted from 
their participation, caused each to see the prospect of taking an 
's"h- 
international role of some significance. They had proved themselves in 
the war and , entered the discussions about the post-war world eager to 
take a more active part in those deliberations. As the. Minister of 
the State, at the F. O. had noted in 1943, the Dominions, despite their 
complaints, had put up with considerable dominance by the U. K. during 
the war and all hoped that the return to peace-time conditions would 
allow them more scope. Moreover, the fact that Europe and Asia lay 
ravaged by the war, while they ' had. expanded their,, economic and industrial 
capacities and were untouched by any fighting on their territories, 
made them optimistic about their future roles. 
246. For details of the Air Training scheme see Granatstein, Canada's War, o . cit.,; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, op. cit.; J. M. McCarthy, 'The Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme, 1939-42', in Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1974, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 326-334. 
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Chapter Three rr` 
United Kingdom Plans-for Post-war Collaboration within-the 'se° 
British Commonwealth, 1943-1944`- 
While the war was still being fought, governments turned their 
attention to the peace and the policies they would pursue once the 
hostilities were over. In its planning the U. R. gave prime consideration 
to the establishment of an international organisation to supersede 
the League of Nations. As well as considering its own position within 
this body, it also had to give thought to the Dominions' position and 
the way in which the whole Commonwealth might be represented inter- 
nationally. There were many facets to this planning, including questions 
- 4", ý "Y 
such as the position to be accorded-the Great Powers, the establishment 
of regional councils, and whether it was desirable or possible"for the 
British Commonwealth to be represented as a simple unit. As well as 
planning for international co-operation, the U. K. also turned its 
attention to its own requirements in the post-war world and, having 
identified ; the need for increased collaboration with its Commonwealth 
partners in all aspects of foreign policy, it considered ways by which 
it could improve the machinery of collaboration to fit its own needs 
and those of the Dominions. As the Dominions became more interested 
in foreign affairs, the F. O. recognised they would have more important 
roles to play in world affairs and that as an Office it would be more 
closely associated with Commonwealth relations than hitherto. This 
led to considerable planning by the F. O. on the subject of collaboration 
with the Dominions, a development, which followed on from the expansion 
of the Dominions Intelligence Department of the F. O. 
... 
fir 
, .,.. 
-' 
In the autumn of 1942 the U. K. Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, 
began to give serious attention to the U. K. 's-post-war policy. In, - 
October he sent a memorandumrto Churchill entitled 'The Four Power-Plan',, - 
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a document of thirty-nine pages, discussing the organisation of the 
peace' on the basis of the dominance of'the four major Powers -'the 
U. S. A., the U. S. S. K., 'the U. K. and China. 
l (The latter was included 
because Eden assumed that the U. S. A. would insist upon this. ) Churchill 
showed a reluctance to discuss post-war policy and in hisfreply`to 
Eden he was disparaging about the point of formulating such plans so 
far ahead of the end`of the war when the's'ituation could change totally. 
He ended with the backhanded remark that those who'had nothing else 
to do could study such documents, but that for him the first objective 
was to beat the enemy. 
2 
Churchill did, agree eventually that Eden should submit a paper to 
the War Cabinet. Eden identified the first'aimof the"U. K. as continuing 
to "exercise the functions and to bear the responsibilities of a'world 
Power". The second aim lay in the U. K. 's historic concern for a free 
and independent Europe, which not only ensured the U. K. 's own defence, 
but enabled it to protect its interests elsewhere. In order to 
fulfil these objectives, Eden stipulated 
We have to maintain our position as an Empire and a Commonwealth. If we fail to do so we cannot "exist as 
a world Power. 
Eden was convinced of the need for the Great Powers to take a firm 
and positive lead within the, United Nations Organisation citing his 
experience of Geneva as evidence that only when the major Powers provided 
a lead, were the smaller ones prepared to follow. But in taking this 
lead it was. important for the Great Powers to cq; operate most fully 
and Eden warned against the danger of Great Power rivalry. In 
referring'to the Great Powers; and discussing the need to 2 nclude the 
U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. 's insistence on including China, Eden mentioned 
1. Memorandum by the P. O., 'The Four Power Plan', October 1942, Prem4,100) 
2. Minute from Churchill to Eden, 18th October 1942, ibid; see P. A. 
Reynolds and E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley- 
Webster and the United Nations, 1939-46, pp. 29 & 
31-37, for Webster's account of Churchill's reluctance to consider 
post-war issues. 
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t 
the "British Commonwealth"'as the fourth Power. 
3 
In a', subsequent 
memorandum to the'War''Cabinet, in January 1943 Eden continued to speak 
of-'the British Commonwealth'as one of'the members of an executive 
committee of the"U. N. 
4 
ý: Although Eden had maintained in-his; paper. ' 
of November-`1942"the need for the U. K. to keep its position: as-an 
Empire and Commonwealth, in neither memorandum did-he-explain how the 
Commonwealth as-'a'whole'wäs tobe. represented as one unit'-on a`council'. 
`' In' Februaryy 1943, the U. K; !s association, with its Commonwealth-r?, 
partners'wäs'taken üp'by MacDonald, the U. K. 's High -Commissioner in- 
Ottawa and-formerly'Dominions Secretary, and Attlee, the presiding: " 
Dominions' Secretary. -MacDonald considered the likely position of 
the U. K. after'the war and concluded that, despite the great moral 
authority which it would possess', --it would lack sufficient weight in.: 
terms-'of-°populätion. 'and wealth to stand on equal terms with the U. S. A. 
and the , U: S. S. R. 
If Britain stands alone-after the war, - she will gradually °°Ba 
sink to the position of a second-class Power in world affairs. 
Ma- cDonald's solution was for the U. K. to establish itself as the central 
member of he Commonwealth which collectively would be as powerful as 
either of the other twos But MacDonald was not advocating any 
disregard for the Dominions' independence, let alone their relegation 
to an inferior status with the U. K. speaking on their behalf. He 
supported the right of the Dominions and other small Powers to have 
a voice in affairs and while acknowledging the need for the major Powers 
to possess special authority and powers as leaders of the international 
community, he thought these should not be exclusive. He believed 
that if the U. K. did not champion the right of the Dominions, and others, 
3. Minutes between Eden and Churchill 19th October 1942 änd"hst October 
1942, ibid.,. and, Memorandum by Eden to War Cabinet, 8th November_1942, 
WP(42)516, CAB66/30. 
4. -, Memorandum by, Eden-to. _War_Cabinet,,, 
16th January 1943, WP(43)31, CAB66/34. 
5. Memorandum by MacDonald, 23rd February 1943, WP(43)115, CAB66/35. 
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to be, associated with international councils and have some share-inýthe 
authority and responsibilities of the post-war order, it would lose-, 
their confidence. The U. K. needed to lead a Commonwealth that 
actively collaborated in a more extensive and productive manner and 
the need to consult the Dominions before policy was decided was 
particularly stressed. Thus MacDonald seems to have envisaged a 
Commonwealth acting together on major issues providing the U. K. fought 
for the rights of the Dominions and improved its methods of collaboration. 
He.. did not specify how the Commonwealth should. be, represented inter- 
nationally, but the implication was that one or two Dominions should 
be members of world councils, in their national capacity, as should 
some other smaller Powers, and that with limited and changing Dominion 
representation the U. K. as the leading nation of the Commonwealth would 
retain its world Power status. -, 
A month earlier Attlee had presented a memorandum to the War, Cabinet 
in which he referred to some of the points made by the Foreign Secretary 
and urged on the Cabinet the need to-realise the position of the 
Dominions. He stressed that the U. K. could only maintain the Commonwealth/ 
by-continued close collaboration, which would depend on the Dominions' 
satisfaction with the post-war order. Attlee referred to Eden's 
naming of the British Commonwealth as one of the four members of the 
council and commented that there was no such organ of government as the 
British Cpmmonwealth. He added 
there are formidable objections and difficulties about 
joint representation on an international body of all 
the Empire countries by any one of them 
However, Attlee thought that the Dominions would be dissatisfied if they 
held no representation on a four Power body of which the U. K. was a 
member, referring to Canadian demands for representation according to 
the capacity of nations to contribute to the tasks of a particular body. 
6 
6. Memorandum by Attlee, 28th January 1943, WP(43)44, CAB66/34. 
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LikeýMacDonald, Attlee seemed-to anticipate demands«from the Dominions 
for some measure of 'representation; but although he mentioned in this 
paper that joint, representation would, be open to grave objections, he 
did not express his own views, as to how the` association should be, 
represented. " His main concern at that pointrwasr. to stress to his 
colleagues the need to consider the position which the'Dominions"should 
occupy' when -formulating plans for-the, post-war organisation. 
There was some disagreement-within the U. K. about theimportance 
of the Dominions and the: D. O. tended to., place. greater'. premium on-the 
value of the Commonwealth. 
, 
MacDonald and'Attlee had both stressed- 
the importance of the Commonwealth-partnershipein the-future and 
Mr. Stephen Holmes, (the. D. O. 's-representativeýin Washington)'put g; " 
forward a rather extreme view when, in emphasising the-needYfor °y. 
Commonwealth unity he said it'ahould 
be 
remembered that-with there" : fitv 
recognition of Dominion status the U. K. had ceased to be a great Power, 
with the only great British'Power being the British. Cou onwealth. 
7 
Officials in the F. O. 'were not so convinced of-the-crucial importance 
of the Commonwealth to the future of the-U. K. ' Mr., J. °DirCampbell, a- 
junior Official-in-the D. I. D. of the F. O., thought that while the Dominions 
were potentially useful, they were not-an essential adjunct, -and=that 
the U. K. would remain a Great Power without, them. 
8 
Mr. °Gladwyn, Jebb, 
Read of the Economic and Reconstruction Department of the-F-. 0., fiercely 
denied HolmesI contention and argued that on grounds of, population 
military. strength, financial power, and its incre4sed-international '"' 
prestige, the country would remain--a Great Power whatever the policies 
ofr-the - Dominions. This seems as 'overstated as Holmes' comment,, and 
Jebb- did concede that there were advantages to be gained from the---' 
Commonwealth, 
., 
that if the members'pursued common policies onät, least 
7. S. Holmes to MacDonald, no date (pre-May 1943), F0371/36608, W6886/ 6886/68. 
8. Minute by Campbell, 13th May 1943 ibid., and memorandum by Campbell 22nd July 1943, F0371/36607, W12262 5467/68. (Campbell left the F. O. in 1945. ) 
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all major issues""that would'add vastly to ý the" importance,, which' attaches 
to ail parts of it` (the C-W; ) in world"affairs. "9 ý'As Eden's'early 
memorandüi had indicated,, 'the Commonwealth' was' therefore accepted'to' 
be of value ' in'maintaining'the'U K. 's'-position'after the-war. '' It' 
remained to be"seen how' the Dominions could be`'associated"with'"the U. K. 
to-promote the'latter's position. ' Both'Cämpbell and Jebb thought it 
would be'wrong"for"the U. K: =to start'with the admission- that Dominion 
support' was vital. This approach when later set out in an F. O. 
memorandum, received support from the Senior, Secretary at the U. K. 
High Commission' in Ottawa; Garner who, - while convinced of the U. K. 's 
need of the Commonweal th; "commented that'it'was preferable to'overstate 
the U. K. 's'strength`after' the war than' t o', admit that it would, be: very 
weak . and require all the'assistance it"could, including, that-ofthe 
Doininions. l0` But this was a question of tactics, not a-denial'of the 
Commonwealth's increasing value. 
One notable st mbling block, whichl`confounded-many efforts; to reach 
agreement within the Commonwealth onvthe'best method of international: ` 
representation, lwas the problem of whether the' association could function 
as a' corporate entity, with one member''in 'a position to speak'ýand act. 
on behalf of, the others. Some- limitation on the number of states 
which `could sit on`the world council was clearly'necessary. -A Jarge 
body would' be unwieldy and ineffective and -the major states were claiming 
tiie `rightto 
sit on a council which, would attempt to regulate world peace. 
If the U. K. was to be a member of'that body ; `andit-was the Commonwealth 
member with the best' claim-to a seat, should it act in an individual 
capacity* 'or 48 `the spokesman for`t'the whole association? Moreover, 
9. Minute by Jebb, 26th May 1943, F0371/36608, W6886/6886/68. 10. -Ibid., and minute by Jebb 16th March 1943, - F0371/35362, U1677/310/70; Garner to Costar, 4th. February 1944, D035/1204, WC75/23..,:,.. 
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would such unitary representation on this world council necessitate 
similar representation on all other; international bodies, or could 
the Commonwealth choose individual, and perhaps multiple representation 
on lesser committees and, only resort to representation as one corporate 
body on the world council?.. The aim of theU. K.,. as Eden, Attlee and 
MacDonald had all said, was to retaif. 0its leading position within the 
Commonwealth in order to retain, its own position internationally; but 
as one official put it,, ... 
the problem is how this combined influence can be exerted 
or how the combination of the members of the British 11 Commonwealth can be effected for international-purposes. 
From December 1942 onwards, F: O: officials tackled, the question. of 
Joint-or unitary representation. They conceded the possibility of,.., 
a Dominion representing the whole association "as-circumstances might 
show, to be suitable". 
12 
Mr. Nigel Ronald, the superintending Assistant 
Under-Secretary of the F. O. -. Economic and Reconstruction Department, - 
advocated this and defined those areas where he thought representation 
could be undertaken by the Dominions. Major political questions would. 
,f have to be the_p ogative of the Great Powers (and therefore of the U. K. ) ' 
through diplomatic channels. Other issues, such as the operation-and 
supervision of multilateral agreements under the charge, of, formal, 
committees were as capable, of being handled by the Dominions as the 
U. K. 13 Jebb had reservations, and doubted the practicability of unitary 
representätion without an imperial legislature to provide the authority 
and the. identity of the delegates,, and thought, thqt. without this, ,;: 
representatives would give primary attention to their. own government's 
interests and only secondary consideration to those of other, members. ". 
He also doubted whether the Dominions would agree to the practice 
11. S. Holmes to Hall, 18th March 1943, F0371/35362,, U1548/310/70. 12. Minute by Jebb, 28th December 1942, F0371/35362, U310/310/70. 13" Minute by Ronald, 31st Deceaber 1942, ibid. 
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since it would be reversing the whole 
k 
process which 
had'resulted'in the Dominions staying within the` 
Empire instead of breaking away 
ox , ý. 
., 
-+ýýrr` 
Jebb's idea for a legislature was one in which . 
the members of the.,. 
Commonwealth would be represented in proportion . to, their. total populations 
and he assumed that the Dominions would regard this., as a, surrenderrof 
part of their sovereignty. 
14 
Ronald denied the need for,, such, a body, 
confident that the co-ordination of views could be achieved through 
existing channels of communication. 
15 
Mr. Nevil-, Butler, Head of 
the North, American Department. of, the F. O. , , saw _dangers, 
for,,, the,, U. K.. 
in any scheme of unitary representation. Hewarnedthat.. a Dominion 
might become "hostile" towards the. U. K.,, but, not sufficiently "disloyal" 
to have left the association. In such a situationyrepresetitatives of 
P', 
that country would make poor'trustees of U. K., interests. 
16 
., _ The one 
occasion-'in which soane, 'of_the members were representedby=an Australian 
d Attlee delegate did not rove, a wholly-satisfactory experience., and 
for one thought that public opinion in the U. K. ~ would, not welcome its 
interests being entrusted to another country, even if. it was one of, its 
Commonwealth partners. 
l$ 
The D. O.. was concerned to secure for., the DominionsKthe. greatest 
measure of representation, possible, in a form acceptable to them and 
compatible with the U. K.! s objectives. To some extent it acted, as., 
a watchdog over the F. O., checking that the latter took account of 
Dominion views and did not commit the U. K. to a. scheme which, would, be 
unacceptatile to them. Early'-in 1943 Attlee and XacDonald had presented 
some preliminary considerations which had to be borne in mind, and. S. 
Holmes, who by March 1943 was stationed in Washington with the task of 
,< 
14. Minute by Jebb, 28th December 1942, ibid. 
15. Minute by Ronald, 31st December 1942, ibid., 
16. Minute by Butler, 17th January 1943, ibid. 
17., This was when the'Australian,. Mr. - MacMahon Ball, represented Australia, New Zealand,. 'the U. K. ý and India on the Tokyo Council in 1945. See 
chapter 7, pp. 363-368. 
18. Memorandum by Attlee, 15th June 1943, WP(43)244, CAB66/37. 
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co-ordinating with Dominion representatives, wrote a memorandum on 
Commonwealth representation which circulated within 'the F. O. Holmes 
concluded that the Dominions' opposition to any cöllective representation, 
particularly Canada's, meant that the only possible alternative was 
for the U. K. to work on the`principle of informal acceptance of general 
responsibility for the interests of-those members not represented on 
a council by those who were, the emphasis being placed on ttie wo d 
informal. r ,. >;, 19 
Campbell, commenting on this memorandums thought that such a 
solution (which was essentially little different from the pre-war situation) 
possessed merit, providing the informal representation was, on major 
issues, i undertaken by the U. K. 'More . generally he, . wrote, 
The present fluidity in our relations with the Dominions 
is, I think, more likely to, preserve the unity of the 
Commonwealth than an attempt to form a united bloc strong 
enough to stand up_to the United States and Russia. This 
would antagonise those with whom it is most essential' 
that we should co-operate, would not meet with the approval 
of the Dominions themselves, and would not achieve the object 
for which it was designed owing to the inconvenient fact of 
geography and the dispersed interests of its components. 
20 
Campbell went on to reflect upon 
i 
world, as an argument that could 
bloc within the states system. 
Commonwealth to both the U. K. an 
the growing inter-dependence of'the 
be used against too structured a' 
While stressing the value of the 
d the Dominions, he concluded that 
,r 
representation. In June 1943 Attlee stressed the need for independent 
the association was likely to be "ore beneficial to all concerned, and 
survive linger, if not too closely defined. 'This viewpoint was closer 
to the D. O. 's attitude than to other F. O. discussions about collective w. 
Dominion representation and the difficulties if any country attempted 
to act on behalf of the others, adding that 'provided the system of 
collaboration worked effectively, a U. K. representative would in fact 
19. Memorandum by S. Holmes, 15th March 1943 enclosed in despatch from 
Lord Halifax, 26th March 1943, F0371/36608, W6886/6886/68. 
20. Minute by Campbell, 13th May 1943, ibid. -, 
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be able to, speak with the confidence that his views would be broadly 
acceptable to the other members who were not, represented. 
21 
If members of the F. O. were accepting the impossibility of, unitary 
S 
Commonwealth representation, some did so with regret, remarking, on it 
with disappointment and commenting that the idea, of the association's 
-interdependence needed longer to take root. 
22 There", are signs, thatýa 
minority did, not want to jettison schemes of joint. action because, of 
Dominion opposition. Ronald was certainly of , this opinion.. 
He felt 
strongly that it was, in the Commonwealth's interest to arrange for 
representation of the, whole, association and that the U. K.,, should 
continue to work towards this end. Ale anticipated "occasional-, 
hysterical. cries", but thought, success could-be , 
achieved jf the U. K. 
was patient and did not, present the Dominions with out and dried choices, 
but rather worked "towards our., end according to a preconceived plant 
23by a series of apparently, ad hoc decisions". ". This should not, 
be 
taken, as F. O. policy, for, it was a personal-opinion expressed-in a 
departmental minute not written . 
for:, the consumption of outsiders, and 
it isicleax that the Foreign. Secretary, had doubts about the, feasibility 
of collective representation. 
. At, a meeting in May, 
1943 with his 
official's, he particularly questioned whether one of, the Great Powers.., 
. on. the proposed-four Power Council could be - 
termed "The, British 
Commonwealth of Nations" as in earlier papers, and expressed his own. 
doubt that the Dominions would agree to the U. K. 's. representing"them 
24 
on a world council. Memoranda by D. O. officiaas. and the Dominions 
Secretary had been available to Eden, but he also had considerable 
personal experience of the Dominions. Not-only had he , 
been. Dominions 
Secretary 
. 
for the first nine months, of the, war, but -he. had . worked with 
21. Memorandum by Attlee, 15th June 1943,. WP(43)244, CAB66/37. 22. Minute by Viscount Hood, (Economic & Reconstruction Department) 9th April-1943, F0371/35362 
23. Minute by Ronald , U1568/310/70. 
, -10th April 1943,. F0371/35362, U1567/310/70. 24. Record of meeting between Eden and F. 0 officials, 12th May 1943, F0371/35396, U2196/402/70. ! 
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the Dominions'at Geneva'before the war and was'conseqüently well` 
aware of their staunch defence of their independence. ' 
In April'1943`Attlee discussed the question of Commonwealth 
representation with the Dominion High Commissioners (in the presence` 
of the F. O. 's Liaison Officer to the latter, m, Sir Basil Newton). 
There was general agreement among the-High Commissioners that i 'measure 
of control by the major Powers 'was necessary, but'they. 'did not accept 
the idea of no Dominion"representation on supreme world bodies. They 
felt themselves and the"lesser Powers entitled tö'a degree of 
representation =and ithought the criterion 'for"selecting membership -'°'' 
of international councils should be the capacity `of a nation to fulfil 
the functions required by each council. 
25 By'June 1943 the''D. O: had 
clarified'its`position on representation and'the jrobable attitudes 
ý'"' 
26 
of the Dominions. " Attlee'identified the need to reconcile the U. K. 's 
desire to maintain the'unity of" the`Cömmonwealth (in order to uphold 
its own'position)'with the need to satisfy the-legitimate claim of 
each Dominion to rank as in independent nation. An obvious''solution 
was for all 'members to be represented and Attlee 'said thi's' was''ideal 
for political', or technical conferences which were open to all members'" 
of the U, 'N., but as soon"as it`becaine necessary to make some sehection 
amongst nations "the inclusion of all the--Dominions is 'clearly unacceptable 
to foreign governments". There was the question'of joint, or unitary 
representation, either by the U. K. always "'acting on behalf of the 
others, or by alternating the member country which. would act as spokesman 
for the rest. The'idea of British representation of the whole association 
was described by Attlee as a "reversion to the pre-1914 arrangement" 
and thought to be unacceptable to the Dominions by obscuring their 
25. Meeting at D. O., 1st April 1943, `7FO371/35362, U1537/310/70. (The D. O. 
note of the meeting' mentions these discussions and notes they were, 
recorded separately. No note of them is contained in the D. O. files. ) 26. Memorandum by Attlee, 15th June 1943, WP(43)244, CAB66/37. 
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independent` status, denying them a share in the direction of affairs, 
and likely to impose obligations upon them without consultation. Even 
if the latter two drawbacks could be overcome bylan improvement in 
consultation, the vital first consideration was' insurmountable. ' -Nor, 
did''the D. O. think the Dominions were likely to favour a joint system 
of representation in which each would be entitled to act in turn as 
a leading member. This possibility had already arisen in'connection 
with. h membership of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration. There had been the suggestion that the answer to 
Canada's desire for representation on this, was for it to sit on the 
Central Committee as the Commonwealth representative instead of the U. K. 
Canada had rejected this notion outright because it, disagreed with-such 
collective representation. 
27 Attlee noted this instance and äddedrthat 
although this solution'was theoretically attractive as'demonstrating 
the parity and unity of the Commonwealth, in practice the Dominions 
tended tofbe more jealous of each other and preferred to entrust, 
their interests to the U. K. than to one another. The fourth-suggestion 
which was most favoured by the D. O., was essentially a , continuation 
of the pre-war system, whereby the U. K. and one Dominion sat on inter- 
national', 
ti 
councils, the Dominion as'a temporary member, -with neither 
country acting on behalf of the other members. This did at least 
make it clear to other nations that each member of the Commonwealth 
was independent, although Attlee noted that such a system could only work 
if a 
moderate, though not a drastic, degree of selection 
can be exercised 
in the membership of councils, because if a Dominion had a seat, other 
/ýý6-ýýý 
small nations would also feel entitled to representation- 
.ý 
27. For discussion of the Canadian attitude to U. N. R. R. A., see chapter 
6, pp. 296-297. 
,.. .. 
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4s" There, was little new `in the D. O. 's proposals, and a , recognition 
thativno 'system was ' ideal; - 'that'}it- was a 'question ýof finding 3 the '° 
`formula , least °ob jectionable. -, 7. The pattern of, the previous two decades 
with, the -continued emphasis placed-by the Dominions ' on 'their 'independent 
status had put paid =to any unitary-plans. As oneofficial had `_'il 
suggested -a 'few months 'earlier, it would not 'be ,. inconsistent ' with 
the Balfour`ýReport for the Commonwealth to develop a`system"of'collective 
-, representation, I. °'l^ 1"ý1 ``' ,'" 
abut in the! seventeen years which have elapsed practice" 
has been all in the other direction, with separate 
Delegations, separately empowered, and the' separate' 
signature of the resultant instrument in respect of each 
'participating member of-the Commonwealth. '- r 
r ýýý. 
, 
*ý 
.. r 
., :ý 
Another consideration which-acted'against the notion of collective 
representation was, the possibility that once the Commonwealth` formed 
rI 
-a collective or corporate presence,, separate*representation"by each 
member! would not be , allowed. on' other bodies. 
28 
If ý this view of the' 
; likely attitude-of other states' was correct-, ' and , there; certainly existed 
enoughv confusion in the, minds' of, most' countries as to the' precise 
relationship of the Commonwealth "countries', '= then* 'the, members "would be 
faced with a straight choice between unitary representati'oi1 or its 
previous; practice of' as many individual delegations as` possible:. ' 
Faced with this, it ' is; highly 'improbable' that> any member' would have' 
favoured permanent unitary representation. In the June°memorandum'ý'' 
it. 'was, suggested that 
some system'of grouping, -involving the'surrewder of 
some part of the rights of independent sovereign 
States may grow up. But this development is for the 
future, and the Dominions cannot be expected to lead 
the way in reversing their progress to independent 
States. 29 
The P. O. plans for the post-war, especially theýUnited Nations, 
reflected its commitment to the need for, the major., Powers to take,. a 
28. Memorandum by S. Holmes, ý15th March 1943 enclosed in despatch from Lord Halifax, 26th-March 1943, P0371/36608, W6886/6886/68. 
29. Memorandum by Attlee, 15th June. 1943, wp(43)244, CAB66/37. 
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lead in international affairs and reserve to themselves the main 
responsibility for keeping the peace. The dominance of the major 
Powers would-clearly have a great effect on the participation of 
the lesser states, including the Dominions. By March 1943 the F. O. 
was anticipating a two-stage arrangement for the postrwarjus. In the 
initial period the major Powers would, with the consent of the United 
Nations, assume leadership for themselves by forming a provisional 
executive council for the whole association until it was found practicable 
to establish a more permanent body. 
30 But there was an indication 
that the F. O. knew that it had to accommodate the smaller states. Jebb, 
the author of the draft memorandum, stressed the need to "sell" the idea 
to the Dominions by playing down the four Power council and stressing, 
that it was designed to execute two runctions - to harmonise the 
policies of the major states, and ensure that between them,, they, could 
amass sufficient armed strength to act in the name of the U. N. to resist 
any renewed aggression. 
31 
He also stated elsewhere that this had been 
included because Mr. Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner, had said 
it was important to say that the "whole thing will be temporary 
and provisional, pending the 'general consent of other nations"'. 
He emphasised the primary function of the council to produce a consensus 
, 
between the Powers so as to make'it "more palatable to the Dominions 
.. '' and other small states! Some alterations to Jebb's 
draft memorandum 
might haveicome from Professor C. K. Webster, who had been seconded 
to the F. O; 's Research Department and worked closcly with Jebb in the 
planning of the U. N. O. He thought it was important to present the 
4 
plan in language which was acceptable to the Dominions and other small 
nations and suggested that as the council would have to summon such 
30. Draft F. O. memorandum 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement' written 
by Jebb, 26th March 1943, F0371/35396, U1823/402/70. 
31. Minute by Jebb, 18th March 1943, F0371/35362, U1548/310/70. 
32. Minute by Jebb, 20th April 1943, F0371/35396, U1823/402/70. 
li/ 
states when it was settling disputes between them, it would be 
advantageous if it also promised to invite them'to its"discussions 
when issues of vital importance to them were being considered, 
33 
Eden did not think that'`the"major Powers'could'dominate the post- 
war organisation completely. ' 'In May 1943 he"told'his officials that 
while there was a need 'for a pr'ovisional'executive committee of'four, 
he himself was convinced that we could not' stick to`' 
Four-Powers forever. A kind of 'Inner Council' of the 
Four Powers, primarily, designed to iron out difficultiesY 
arising between themselves was of course possible, and 
might even endure as a system: but he was convinced 
that some. rather34arger Council would shortly be shown 
to be necessary. r"' 
In a Cabinet memorandum of July 1943, the F. O. 's proposals'did attempt 
to combine the importance of four Power leadership with some'regard for 
the other states, and in this paper Eden referred to the'need to include 
adequate representation of the smaller 'Powers on any world Council, while 
stressing'that the final decisions on issues of'peace or`-war, had to be' 
taken by the Great Powers acting unanimously. ''` Contained in the paper 
35 
were a number of suggestions for associating the smaller nations with 
the work oft the various committees which would be needed, and some /ý 
greater detail, on how the F. O. envisaged the. Commonwealth"functioning 
within the U. N. 
One method of associaFting the Dominions and other sma11'ations 
in the work of then world organisation; was by their membership oof 'rT!, 
'lesser' committees which dealt with subjects in which'süch nat'ions` 
had an interest and a capacity to contribute to tlleir 'solution. `-This 
could give the Dominions a share in decision-making without weakening 
33. P. A. Reynolds. and E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles: 
Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939-46, (London, 1976), 
pp. 18-19. The authors suggest that Webster had a strong influence 
over altering Jebb's draft to accommodate the interests. of the Dominions. 
But, Jebb's'minutes indicate that Bruce and others had made him aware 
of this before Webster gave . 
his'views. 
34. Record of meeting between'Eden and F. O. officials, 12th May 1943, 
. 
F0371/35396, U2196/402/70. 
35. Memorandum by Eden, 7th July'1943, WP(43)300, CAB66/38. See also 
F0371/35396, U1823/402/70. t, 
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the position of the Great Powers. But which subjects could be dealt 
with by councils containing. small and major powers alike? . _Jebb 
, recorded 
that' it had been assumed that various ecotiomic matters would 
be suitable, but that discussions on the United Nations Relief and 
-;,, Rehabilitation Administration had demonstrated the political importance 
of-such issues; it had then been decided-to-refer all discussions on 
" this to the Great Powers, an event which prejudiced the smaller 
Powers against the four Power thesis-generally. However; he still 
thought it might be possible to-associate the Dominions with economic 
bodies. 
36 
As one F. O. official explained, the smaller countries 
rightly expected to have representation where their interests-were, 
involved and especially when they-were. in a. position to contribute, 
something in terms of special experience or technical-knowledge. 
37 
In 
the memorandum presented to the Cabinet in July,. Eden explained that if the 
major Powers assumed the responsibility for maintaining. peace, 
they should be careful to see that schemes which deal. with--, 
economic issues, so long as they do not endanger security, 
are handled by wider assemblies. 38 
Regional Councils offered another means to involve the Dominions. 
In January 1943 Eden had suggested-that such councils should be encouraged 
providing they were subject to the world organisation, provided the 
principle was accepted that no one country had; sole responsibility for 
keeping the peace in any given area. He envisaged councils, for the. 
various geographic areas. of, the world, on which members of the Commonwealth 
would sit according to their geographical positions, plus the "British 
Imperial Conference" as a separate regional council. 
39 In the July 
Cabinet-memorandum Eden reiterated the importance of subjugating regional 
36. I A4/'c A. eeU ? 'O')UWk 7 /943 f' 3i' Jsd6A, 
37. Minute by Sir David Waley, undated, Ft 71/35362, U1677/310/70. 
(It seems that this was a later minute by Waley, as he only 
transferred to the'F. O. in 1948 according'to Who's Who. ) 
38. ' Memorandum by Eden, 7th July 1943, WP(43)300, CAB66/38. - 39. --Memorandum by Eden, 16th January 1943,, wp(43)31,. CAB66/34. 
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councils to the authority of the world organisation and the dangers 
of regional rivalry-if it was not accepted that the major powers all 
had an equal interest in maintaining order throughout the world. It 
was suggested that regional councils would be used for specific, but 
wide-ranging purposes, including defence collaboration and economic 
and political*ýdo-operation. This, would allow small powers to have 
authority at least in regional affairs, and such coup is could be 
used as a basis for selecting representatives to sit on the world 
council. 
40 
Churchill favoured regional groupings and in May 1943 outlined his 
ideas in a conversation with a group of Americans at the British Embassy 
in Washington. He explained that he envisaged the four Powers forming 
a Supreme. World Council, under which would be three regional councils$ 
one each for Europe, the American hemisphere and the Pacific. - The 
Prime Minister agreed to other nations being elected from the'regional 
'bodies to the Supreme Council, but said he attached great importance 
to the regional bodies as only those countries directly affected by a 
dispute could be expected to apply themselves to its settlement. 
41 
This conception was at variance to the F. O. 's'idea of more numerous 
regional bodies with specific functions subordinate within a general 
organisation., Moreover, Churchill outlined his scheme without reference 
to the F. O. and clearly caused annoyance within that Office. 
42 
Until 
the 1944 Prime Ministers' meeting Churchill and Eden held differing 
views on regional councils. 
Regional councils would particularly affect the Commonwealth because 
of its diverse geographical composition. Some officials in the F. O. 
though that such councils could partially solve Dominion objections to 
40. Memorandum by Eden, 7th July 1943, WP(43)300, CAB66/38. 41. Memorandum by Churchill, 10th June 1943,. WP(43)233,. CAB66/37. 42. P. A. Reynolds and E. J. Hughes, op. cit., p. 20. Webster's diary desiribesthe consternation of the F. O. at Churchill's statement at 
some length. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this subject. 
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the four Power thesisýby providing, them with an arena in which'to 
express their individuality. 
43 Jebb supported the 
., 
plan as', a means- 
to, enable smaller nations to feel-that they were pulling--their weight 
. 'i and allow. them to achieve their "national, destinies"; 
44 
' The 
feasibility of such councils and their acceptability-to-other states 
could not be determined by-the U. K. -, While°the-scheme might provide -- 
the U. K. with the means of satisfying the Dominions'desire, for°. a, ',, +'° 
share in the; decision-making, it was also potentially dangerous for 
an association of scattered states to; emphasise'their differences. ', -, 
For if the Dominions participated only innregional councils; their "'ý 
contact with each , other would tbe. reduced, and, perhaps moreimportantly, 
suchýa system could serve to reinforce interests which were'not shared 
by-fellow members, rather than those. which were. -Me only{two Dominions 
likely to draw more closely together under-'such a system wereýAustralia 
and New Zealand, who were already improving their bi-lateral contacts. ) 
In a Cabinet memorandum-of°July 1943 the Dominions Secretary, ` 
Attlee, expressed agreement with; the -principleiof regional councils'" 
'' 
as long as`thereý. was adequate opportunity for discussions"and. co=operation 
between, Commonwealth members as, well, and provided countries: ' could '. °' 
belong to more than one council where their interests justified this. 
He cited the example of Canada as an Atlantic and , Pacific Power. 
(Attlee doubted if Canada would wish-to be a member,, of the Pan American 
Union if that body was-solely concerned with the Americas, but. thought 
it might if that association became part of the world organisation. ) 
The Dominions Secretary also warned his colleagues, ' --r 
It will of course be of the highest importance to secure 
that the regional organisatipp does, not impair the unity 
of the British Commonwealth. 
_ ýä 
43. Minute by J. E. Coulson (Economic-& Reconstruction Department), 30th 
January 1943,; F0371/35396, U402/402/70., 
44. Minute by Jebb, 2nd February 1943, ibid., and 16th March 1943, 
F0371/35362, U1677/310/70. 
45. Memorandum by Attlee, 19th July 1943, WP(43)321, CAB66/39. 
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Attlee"noted that Australia was capable of playing an-important role 
it the P-cific"region'but'that to do so'it would need to be backed by 
the' 'full weight of the`Cemmonwealth. A matter of some concern to 
Attlee was the role of the U. S. A. 'in"Europe. ' Be thought-that-if the 
U. S. Aid nöt, co-operate with the U. K., and'the latter was'forced to ., _ 
concentrate all its reso-rces'in'Europe'while the U. S. attended to the 
Far East; dit would cause tröuble"forýthe Commonwealth:, The international 
position of the Dominions in their own regions would=be, weakened as 
they would be' unable to' count on 'thefull' military' support of "the U. K. 
Their increasedreliance'niight have a disruptive effect on the association. 
Lord Cranborne, Dominions Secretary' before and after'Attlee, had 
greater doubts about regional'coüncils. Early in'the war he had, been 
worried about the implications of American' defence policy which he felt 
ran counter to the U. K. 's principle that the world's'peace'awas { 
indivisible and that all nations should co-operateýwith'each other, 
in`its defence. He'expressed his fear to Churchill that the U. S. A. 's 
policy, could lead}t'o its withdrawal after the war into its own hemisphere, 
taking with it "Canada and'the'reat of'Eritish America and possibly i' 
Australia too. "46 In the Spring of 1944, after returning to-the D. O., 
Cranborne told the Cabinet of his strong doubts'as to acceptability 
of regional councils tö'the Dominionshif'this would exclude them from 
having a voice in Europe, a region which'they'had twice fought to 
defend. In a private minute to Churchill, Cranborne`wrote that he 
thought the plan for regional bodies' contained "t eI possible seeds'of C 
47 Imperial disruption". There seems therefore to have been an-appreciable 
difference between Attlee's and Cranborne's views on this question, 
with the former much more . 
inclined to favour regional bodies. However, 
46. Minute from Cranborne to Churchill, 5th March 1941, Prem4, 
_43B/2. 47. Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, 27th April 1944, WM(44)58, CAB65/42, 
and Minute from Cranborne to Churchill, 11th May 1944,. D0121/10A, 
No. 62. 
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't ; 'ýi, 4J n_µF 
_both 
appreciated that there were problems for the Commonwealth in such 
a scheme, notably the danger of reinforcing existing differences rather 
than promoting centripetal forces. 
'}ý"` No final decision could be made by the U. K. on arrangements for 
'^ 3 the post-war phase, and by the Summer of 1943, more detailed discussions 
were needed with the other Powers. Eden's two Cabinet memoranda of 
July 1943 clarified the objectives of the U. K. and the kind of machinery 
which could bring them about. He allowed for the association of the 
Dominions with international bodies on the lines of the League of 
Nations precedent - rotating Dominion membership in conjunction with 
the U. K. - without specifying precisely the arrangements. These two 
memoranda also envisaged Dominion participation in regional bodies 
and on specialist committees. 
48 
The association of the Dominions 
with the work of the supreme political council would depend on the size 
of that body. Attlee, in a memorandum of 19th July 1943, accepted 
the Foreign Secretary's allowance for the general participation of the 
Dominions in international councils and expressed the wish that the 
main , political council should have a membership of around eleven states, 
rather than just the four major Powers, so the. Dominions and other 
small States could be represented on it. He also accepted that 
specialist bodies and regional councils could provide for further 
Dominion participation in international affairs. Above all, Attlee 
. 
I' 
stressed' he need for consultations with the Dominions to discuss these 
issues. This could be begun-by talks with officials and telegraphic C 
correspondence, but he suggested that a full Prime Ministers' Conference 
49 
should be called. 
As the end of the war approached and more attention was devoted 
48. Memoranda by Eden, Ist July 1943 and 7th July 1943, WP(43)292 and 
WP(43)300, CAB66/38. 
49. Memorandum by Attlee, 19th July 1943, WP(43)321, CAB66/39. 
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to the post-war situation, collaboration between the members of the 
Commonwealth and any changes which needed to be made to the machinery 
became increasingly important. The D. O. had emphasised the need to 
hold discussions with the Dominions about the arrangements for the 
future, and was also concerned that the Dominions were kept fully up 
to date with all aspects of U. K. foreign policy. With-. the prospect 
of a Prime Ministers' meeting the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at 
the D. O., Mr. Paul Emrys-Evans, convened a meeting between the D. O. 
and the F. O. in March 1943 to discuss liaison in relation to post-war 
issues. At the beginning of 1943 the D. I. D. of the F. O. had been 
expanded and centred its attention whölly on liaising with the D. O. 
on foreign policy issues which the Dominions. should be informed about. 
50 
Although never a large department within the F. O. its staff did grow 
quite quickly, dependent on the personnel and finance available at 
the time, and as the department grew it became the better able to 
initiate greater co-ordination of policy; it could cover a wider range 
of papers and was less reliant on other departments' remembering to 
11 
pass material on to it. However, with the work of the F. O. divided 
by region, and despite a number of circulars sent round to each, it 
remained the responsibility of the D. I. D. to ensure that the Dominions 
were informed of all development's which would be of interest to them. 
According to the Minister of State at the F. O., Mr. Richard Law, 
the purpose of the D. O. in calling the meeting was not to berate the 
F. O. for ignoring the Dominions, but to suggest the advantages of closer, 
contact between the two Offices at an early stage in the discussion of 
policy, so that the D. O. could have a chance to give the F. O. an 
indication of the probable attitudes of the Dominions to any U. K. 
proposals. 
51 
It is clear from the D. O. 's record of the meeting-that 
50. See chapter 2, pp. 104-106. 
51. Minute by Law, 26th March 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 
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it was not happy with the system as it had been operating and the 
minutes show a general agreement that the F: O. should consult as 
soon as ideas began to'täke shape. Furthermore when issues were 
under consideration in a committee, it was agreed thathe D. O, ý'should 
be shown a draft report so that a document could`be put forward which 
would have the approval of both ýffices-. 
52 
In"a note to'Law, ` Emrys-Evans 
urged that inter-departmental consultation should take place before 
papers were submitted to. the Cabinet; although` 
the'DD. O. could not 
speak on behalf of the Dominions, it could fr'eqüently suggest modifications 
53 
which were likely ao make proposals more Iacceptable to''the-Dominions. 
The D. I. D. produced a draft circular for all heads of F. O. 
Departments which laid down guidelines for improved liaison'with the 
D. O. Law had clearly been impressed with the arguments of'the D. O. 
and he passed the draft to Sir Alexander Cadogan) theäPermanentýUnder- 
54 
Secretary at the P. O., with the comment that it seemed "quite sensible". 
As well as stressing ~ the importance of consultations with the 
' D. 0. , 
the circular advocated the sounding out of prospective policiesin the 
Dominions before they had become officialU. K. policy. Cadogan'pointed 
out the problem of communicating information before the Foreign Secretary 
had seen'papers and particularly doubted the wisdom`öf'informing 
Dominion Governments of proposals that were still under discussion: 
He anticipated objection from Churchill to telegrams from any Dominion 
/ý 
C 
Prime Minister which commented on issues which had not been discussed 
by the U. 
K. 
Cabinet. 
55 
Law conceded that the draft might be rather 
52. D. O. record of inter-departmental meeting, 11th March 1943, F0371/36605, 
'W8107/4084/68. =='(Law and Ronald attended for the°ýF. O., Emrys-Evans, 
Machtag and Stephenson for the D. O. ) In November 1942 Stephenson 
f`had written to Newton'about sending more information to the Dominions. 
See chapter 2, p. 105.1 
53. -Emrys-Evans, toýLaw, 16th-March 1943, ibid. 
54. Minute from Law to Cadogan, 26th March 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 
55. : -. Minute by Cadogan,,!, 27th March 1943, ibid. 
>r .; 1 . 
. Mars 
;ý 
145 
too sweeping, but he urged Cadogan to consider . the, 
issue seriously. 
Law thought the Dominions were tolerating an inadequate system of 
collaboration because of the war, but that in the future they would 
W 
be less prepared. to put up with it. If the U. K. did not take 
measures to improve its performance it could lose its Commonwealth 
partners and sink to, the level of a small,. insignificant island. 
Law also noted that the draft had not recommended consultations with 
the Dominions prior to the Foreign Secretary receiving papers, only 
that the D. O. should be kept fully informed of developments by, the 
D. I. D. 
56 
. The timing of consultations with the Dominions was a perenniale 
problem for the U. K., as was the decision to make informal soundings. 
There were obvious difficulties in formally consulting Dominions 
Governments before the U. K. Cabinet had made a decision. on policy, -- 
but there were other-methods of guaging opinion. As Mr. P... Grey, -Law's 
Private Secretary, noted, the F. O. often had discussions with the 
Head of a foreign mission and sometimes with a foreign government before 
the Foreign. Secretary decided on a line of policy. It seemed reasonable 
for the U. K.. to take the same care to consider the opinion of the 
Dominions before committing itself to a definite line of action which--° ti 
would affect the Commonwealth. 'He saw nothing wrong'if the D. I. D. 
informed the D. O. of proposals, the D. O. then sounded out the High 
Commissioner's opinion and the latter, unofficially sought the opinion 
of his own government. It would only be when a . Eolicy 
had Cabinet 
approval that Dominion Governments would be formally consulted. Grey 
thought they did not sufficiently trust the discretion or use the 
advice of the D. O. and its representatives, and doubted whether the 
F. O. could refrain 'from exchanging ideas with the Dominion Departments 
/f 
56. Minute by Law, no date,, ibid. 
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of External Affairs. He commented that such great effort was being 
expended in keeping the U. S. A. in step with themselves that the 
least the U. K. could do was to allow the Dominions the chance of 
commenting on policy. 
57 
This was the essence of Law's proposal, 
which he had urged not just because it would make an improvement for 
the Dominions, but because of the importance to the U. K. of carrying 
the Dominions on foreign policy questions. 
Some officials in the F. U. had reservations about such close 
consultation and about the D. O. 's ability to conduct such close 
collaboration. Jebb expressed concern at the danger of becoming 
"muscle bound" if all records of meetings had to be forwarded to the 
D. O. Furthermore he was alarmed at the prospect of leavingýto the 
D. O. 's discretion what material should be passed on to the, Dominions. 
Jebb thought that the D. O. was already well enough informed, of events 
because it usually had an official sitting on U. K. inter-departmental 
committees; and he objected that the D. O. 's judgment tended to be 
sometimes 
ýmore'Royalist than the King' and so sensitive of Dominion 
opinion that they hardly welcome any expression of views 
by H. M. G. at all! 
58 
Mr. Greenway, Head of the D. I. D., "agreed with Jebb that there were some 
officials in the D. O. who were "somewhat uncontrolled", but he was 
confident that the D. I. D., together with other D. O. officials such 
as Mr. N. E. Archer, an Assistant Under-Secretary, "who shares our 
views and is most helpful in every way", could cope with greater 
11 
consultation with the Dominions. He said that trouble only tended 
/ý 
to arise when an issue went straight to the D. O., rather than via the k 
D. I. D. 
59 
These minutes illustrate a slight friction between the, D. O. and 
57. Minute by Grey, 1st April 1943, ibid. 
58., Minute by Jebb, 10th April 1943, ibid. 
59. Minute by Greenway, 3rd May 1943,71-bid. ' 
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F. O. which was a permanent aspect of Commonwealth collaboration while 
the two Offices remained separate. Before the war the F. O. had had 
comparatively little active collaboration with the Dominions who in 
turn had underdeveloped foreign policies. From 1942/3 onwards the 
F. O. was increasingly involved in Commonwealth collaboration in foreign 
affairs and consequently had more contact with the D. O. The F. O. 
tended to regard the D. O. as being too sensitive to Dominion sensibilities, 
as Jebb's'minute indicated. There was some justification in this, 
but the D. O. considered that its main responsibility was to ensure 
that Dominion views were taken into account and while other offices 
showed a tendency to ignore the Dominions unless prompted by the D. O., 
it would continue to stress the importance of adapting U. K. policy to 
accommodate the Dominions whenever possible. At two points in the 1940s 
there were serious discussions within the F. O. on the subject of that 
Office's assuming responsibility for foreign affairs collaboration with 
the Dominions. On neither occasion did this lead to a change in the 
D. O. 's authority over all aspects of'Commonwealth relations, but an 
element of, friction remained. 
60 - 
The D. I. D. had made efforts in 1943 to improve the information 
passed on to the D. O.; but the F. O. had no up to date instructions 
about the marking of papers to be sent to the D. I. D. The instructions 
of 1927, when a Dominions Information Department was first established, 
were the 
only 
ones in existence and these were not only inadequate, 
but had long been forgotten. Ronald supported,. Greenway's request 
61 
to fill this gap in office procedure, making the observation that if 
the D. O., and through it the Dominion Governments, were kept better 
.< 
informed, the latter were less likely to send embarrassing telegrams 
60. See pages 157-159. 
61. Minute by Greenway, 28th May 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 
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to the Prime Ministers than they then did in their state of "incomplete 
knowledge". 62 Cadogan agreed that new instructions should be issued 
to Heads of Departments concerning the papers which should be forwarded 
on to the D. I. D., but he warned Greenway that this could never 
guarantee that all papers did reach his department and that it would 
be the D. I. D. 's responsibility to keep track of what was happening 
and maintain close contact with all departments, 
63 
The circular issued in May 1943 covered three main points. First, 
that the fullest amount of information likely to be of value to the 
Dominions in`the formulation of their policies should be sent (via the 
D. I. D. and the D. O. ); the paper mentioned the safe methods of 
transmitting information which until then had been foolproof. 
64 
Thus 
Heads who had previously withheld matters on security grounds should 
have no worries. Secondly, it was laid down as a matter of principle 
that the Dominions should be informed before, or simultaneously with, 
the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. Thirdly, the Dominions were to be notified 
of all decisions which would affect the British Commonwealth as a whole. 
This was essential if the. association was to function as a group, but 
explicit concurrence, or specific coctmaent, 'fromýthe Dominions was not 
necessarily required. It was the act of notification which was critical. 
(This was in line with the D. O. 's practice, and intended to accommodate 
the difference in attitude between the Dominions: Canada regarded 
the majority of communications from'the U. K. as informatory, and often 
did not wish to comment upon them, while Australi8, and sometimes the 
other two, frequently sent their views on U. K. policy. ) The circular 
allowed, if the situation demanded immediate action or the U. K. 's allies 
insisted on a delay in the announcement of decisions, for the Dominions 
to be informed simultaneously with the action contemplated. However, 
62. Minute by Ronald, 28th May 1943, ibid. 
63. Minute by Cadogan, 29th May, 1943, ibid. 
64. For details-see chapter 2, ; p. 65. 
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officials were warned that the Dominions should not be left in the 
embarrassing position of procuring knowledge from the press, rather than 
frost', the U. K. Government. On major issues--the Dominions, -were 
generally infouned at least before the world press, although this 
often did not satisfy their requirements. Sometimes during the 
three or four Power meetings it was difficult to keep the Dominions 
in touch with the proceedings, for instance during the Cairo conference 
of November 1943. The communique outlining the aims of the allies 
fighting the Pacific war was rushed to the Dominions, especially 
Australia and New Zealand, hours before the time of the press release. 
This fulfilled the minimum requirement but led to protests from 
Australia, which felt it should have been consulted about the 4; s, 
65 
Commenting on the importance of keeping the other members of the 
Commonwealth abreast of events and policies, the circular cautioned 
F. O. officials: 
Failure to consult or inform a Dominion Government does 
not always or even often-lead toýprotests fromý-them, but 
the absence of complaint does not indicate that no harm 
has been done. -, Not only may there be, short term adverse 
result, e. g. irritation which may lead to refusal to co- 
operate regarding some other-issues of-importance to us, 
but there is, in any case, the long term effect of 
discouraging the spirit of co-operation and encouraging. the 
tendency for Dominion Governments themselves to take 
independent agion in matters which'may be of vital concern 
to ourselves. 
This passage closely mirrored Law's minute to Cadogan of two months 
before, and indicates that the D. I. D. had grasped the importance of 
Commonwealth consultation if the U. K. was to receive the active 
co-operation of its Commonwealth partners. The U. K. could not take 
the Dominions for granted. Their alsistance was seen to be a positive 
asset, if not an absolute pre-requisite, for the U. K. 's post-war 
65. Attlee to Churchill 29th November 1943; D. O. to Australian and New 
-Zealand Governments, 30th November 1943; and-D. O. -to all four 
Dominion Governments, 1st December 1943, D035/1666, WG573/17. 
66. F. O. Circular no. 14,31st May 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. 
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position and that co-operation had to be earned. The circular 
concluded that if the U. K. Government was to succeed in its policy 
of making Dominion partnership a reality and of maintaining 
the British Commonwealth as. an essential element in the 
British position'in world affairs, the fullest use must.. be 
made of the existing machinery of consultation and co- 
operation and whenever possible this machinery will gave 
to be developed and improved by all possible means. 
After clarifying internal office procedure the D. I. D. turned its 
attention to methods of improving collaboration with the Dominions and 
in p articular its own role. Underlying these discussions lay three 
basic assumptions about the future of the Commonwealth. First, 
the Dominions seemed likely to continue to extend their activities 
in world affairs. The establishment of missions abroad was one 
indication of this and, perhaps more importantly, the Dominions appeared 
to regard themselves as fully entitled to have an effective voice in 
world councils. If Australia and Canada were the most developed in 
this respect, it was assumed that the other two would not be far behind. 
Second, and closely related, was the expected manner in which the 
Dominions would exercise this increase in their status. It was generally 
anticipated that they would become more assertive and Law had warned 
that the U. K. could not expect automatic co-operation from them. 
Australia had given indications during the war that she would assert 
her independence vigorously. Finally, there was the recognition of 
a shift in the balance of world power towards the U. S. S. R. and the 
U. S. A.; and the support of the Dominions for U. K. foreign policy 
ti 
would assist in maintaining the U. K. 's world position. 
High-level collaboration between Commonwealth countries was fairly 
well-established. Newton noted that if the scheme mentioned by the 
Australian Prime Minister, Curtin, for an Empire Council and Secretariat, 
were implemented in some form, 
67. Ibid. (Author's italics. ) 
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no doubt the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs"would 
be closely concerned on the highest level and some F. O. 
official would presumably participate in the work of the 
Secretariat. 
Such matters would await the Prime Ministers' meeting, but Newton and 
his colleagues were keen meanwhile to investigate ways to improve; 
lower-level official collaboration, and thought that this might be, 
equally important for the Commonwealth in the long run. 
68 
In July 1943 Campbell (D. I. D. ) drafted a memorandum on, British 
Commonwealth relations. In this he attempted to highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Commonwealth;, the basic feeling of 
loyalty, to the "Commonwealth idea" and the sentimental attachment 
of the Dominions to the 'Mother country' on the one hand, and their 
extreme sensitivity_ for their individual rights as independent nations 
on the other. He identified the task for the future as being' the 
preservation of Commonwealth unity, whilst allowing the Dominions the 
independence they possessed and wished to exert. He rejected 
alteration of the basic structure of the Commonwealth, believing that 
its survival depended on the existence of common interests, -rather 
than, formal ties. In addition Campbell saw the future as depending,, 
_, _ 
on the U. K, 's leadership, for if it ceased to be a Great Power, the, 
association would dissolve, as none of the other countries possessed 
sufficient in common with one another. To achieve this the U. K. 
should not woo the Dominions, but demonstrate to them its strength 
as a European Power, its ability to co-operate on. equal terms with the 
U. S. A. and its 
, progressiveness in all fields of policy. He suggested 
two particular lines of action for the U. K. First, it should not 
regard the Dominions as offspring, but as fellow members of the 
international 
community whose friendship it already possessed and 
wished to retain. Second, it should accept with "good grace" a certain 
68. Minute by Newton, 4th November 1943, F0371/36605, W16485/4084/68. 
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U. S. presence in'`Commonwealth affairs.. Relations between the English- 
speaking world could be endangered if the U. K. resented either the 
behaviour of the Dominions or the intervention of the3U. S. A., and 
a workable collaboration was necessary between these nations. 
69 
Officials in the F. O. who commented on this memorandum agreed with 
Campbell's basic thesis. Greenway, his departmental Head, described it 
as a lucid and just summing-up of inter-Commonwealth relations, 
70 
although there was some disagreement over particulars. Butler (Head 
of the North American Department) thought it preferable to stress the 
dependence of the' Commonwealth on the U. K. 's naval and air forces in 
places and at a level which'contributed to the security of the Dominions, 
rather than the U. K. 's progressive policies. He agreed that there 
would be greater 'contact between the U. S. and the Dominions, anticipating 
a defensive arrangement between the two antipodean Dominions and the 
U. S. along the lines of the Canadian link. He agreed that the U. K. 
could not stop this contact and to do so would only anger both the 
Dominions'and the U. S. 
71 
Newton approved of the memorandum, but pointed 
to two omissions from it; reference to Dominion representation inter- 
Ile nationally, ', and an apology for lumping all the Dominions together, 'when 
they were in many respects different. 
72 --Campbell's-'p'aper-became the 
basis of !a memorandum sent to U. K. "Missions abroad to clarify Commonwealth 
relations, and stimulate interest, in the-'problem of how to concert 
foreign relations within the Commonwealth, 
73 
the final version owing 
much to Newton's work. This paper reflected a change in the F. O. 's 
perception of the Commonwealth. In it and many of the replies, there 
was an appreciation of the Dominions as important international actors. 
69. Memorandum by Campbell, 22nd July 1943, -F0371/36607, W12262/5467/68. 70. Minute by Greenway, 27th July 1943, ibid. I 
71. Minute by Butler, 28th July 1943, ibid. (Butler's prediction proved 
correct. In 1951 Australia and New Zealand signed a defence treaty 
with the U. S. A. ) 
72. Minute by Newton, 19th August 1943, ibid. The latter point was 
mentioned in the F. 0. 's circular accompanying the memorandum when 
it was sent to H. M. Missions. 
73. Circular to Foreign Missions by Foreign Secretary accompanying F. O. 
memorandum, 11th December 1943, ibid.. 
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Most importantly there was a readiness to treat them as allies and 
near equals. However, perhaps distinguishing the F. O. 's attitude 
from that of-the D. O., such equality did not necessarily allow for 
the intimacy which had always characterised the D. O. 's pursuit of 
Commonwealth relations, and the F. O. tended to regard the Dominions 
5a 
in a more 'rough and ready'fashion, as merely other allies. This no 
doubt reflected the lack of first-hand experience of F. O. officials 
with Dominion-personnel and in handling Commonwealth relations. 
In the discussion of Commonwealth representation internationally 
there had been some disagreement within the F. O. on the future of the 
U. K. if it lost the Dominions. Campbell had stressed the need for 
their support and also added the observation that the Commonwealth could 
probably only survive if the U. K. remained a Great Power, implying 
that the Dominions might not think the association worthwhile otherwise. 
74 
75 
Other officials agreed with the importance of the Dominions to the U. K., 
but while acknowledging this the memorandum stressed the fact that the 
U. K. was, a Great Power even without the Dominions. This was one aspect 
of the paper with which the D. O. dis greed when it was informally 
submitted in draft form. Mr. N. E. Costar, a Principal in the D. O., 
though the usefulness of the Dominions to the U. K. should be stressed 
1. 
more, as in terms of industrial potential, population and raw materials 
the U. K. could hardly equal the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. 
In short, insofar as a Great Power maintains its position 
through sheer strength, as time goes on the U. K. will 
have ä greater need of the Dominions than in the past, 
and it should therefore be a major U. K. interest to preserve 
the integrity of a willing Commonwealth. 76 
Commenting on the final draft, Costar noted that a reference had been 
added on the value of the Dominions, but thought it could have been made 
74. Memorandum by Campbell, 22nd July 1943, ibid. 
75. Minutes by Grey, 6th August 1943 and Newton, 19th August 1943, ibid. 
76. Minute by Costar, 13th September 1943, D035/1204, WC75/23. 
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more foa; ibly, as it was a factor U. K. officials abroad too often 
77 forgot. Here a tactical element was present for as Garner 
(Senior Secretary, at the High Commissioner in Ottawa) recognised,, it 
was often sounder when approaching either foreign, or,, Dominion Governments 
not to, under-sell the U. K. 's potential. 
78 
On the other hand, in purely 
domestic discussions, the D. O. wanted the importance of the Dominions 
to be acknowledged. Costar also appreciated, that the - benefits. were 
by no means one-way, and reinforced a point made by Newton that the 
Dominions had access to information by their association with the U. K. 
which would. be beyond their grasp as independent. nations. 
79 
The general opinion in the D. O. of the memorandum can be illustrated 
in the correspondence between Sir John Stephenson (Assistant. Under- 
Secretary at, the,. D. O. ). and S. Holmes (the D. O. 's representative in 
Washington). The latter had asked if the D. O. had , approved, of 
the 
document and was told. that it had been submitted to the D. O. for its 
consent to its circulation and that some suggestions; made by the 
D. O. had been incorporated. Stephenson added__, 
While we see no reason to. object violently to anything in it'i we must not be taken as endorsing any particular 
opinion or emphasis it may contain. 80 
This wasa rather vague reply. However, the High Commissioner in 
Ottawa thought that things had come to a "pretty pass" if the F. O. had 
sent material to its missions relating to the Dominions without having".,, 
previouslobtained. D. O. approval for that document "in its entirety, 
both in form and substance". "Garner,, who transmitted MacDonald's 
views, criticised the memorandum for being written from a superior 
82 
standpoint. According to Greenway, the D. O. had from the start 
77. Minute by Costar, 9th November 1943, ibid. 
78. Garner to Costar, 4th February-1944, ibid. 
79. Minute by Costar, 13th September-1943, ibid. 
80. Stephenson to S. Holmes, 12th January 1944, ibid. 
81. Garner to Costar (quoting MacDonald) 4th February 1944, ibid. 
82. Minute by Greenway, 16th May 1943, F0371/42674, W6458/11-03-7-68. 
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disliked the fact that the F. O. had taken the initiative, in the 
83 
matter. 
Fifteen replies were received from Foreign Service representatives, 
some enclosing additional memoranda on collaboration. All demonstrated 
considerable, -enthusiasm for, and interest in, the Commonwealth. There 
was some justification for Garner's criticism that the memorandum 
was patronising, containing as it did the assertion that. the U. K. would 
be a Great Power with or without the Dominions and with its-concentration 
on the pre-eminent position of the U. K. within the association. 
However, it did attempt an honest appraisal of Commonwealth relations 
and stressed the need to treat the Dominions as equals. The replies 
echoed the honesty and , intent of the original memorandum and took. 
Commonwealth collaboration seriously. For instance Sir N. Bland, the 
U. K. 's representative to the Netherlands Government, urged that-the 
closest possible contacts be established with Dominion officials, 
especially at foreign capitals where personal contact and friendly 
advice, if "given unpatronisingly", 'would be very important. 
83 
Similarly Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, U. K. Ambassador to Turkey, 
I 
thought it important to have the right human approach to Commonwealth 
relations and that the U. K. needed "to avoid giving, however unintentionally, 
i 
an impression of superiority". He also thought it would be helpful ' 
if the Dominions tried to eliminate their "baseless inferiority complex". 
84 
The 1attýr was perhaps not totally' unfounded as both these letters 
do seem to imply that in the'past U. K. representatives had tended to 
be patronising towards their Dominion colleagues. Yet at least there 
were indications of a change in attitude on the F. O. 's part. The 
replies received contained a number of different proposals and these, 
It 
83. Bland to Eden, 9th March 1944, F0371/42674, W3794/1103/68. 
84. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, 29th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2369/1103/68. 
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together with others put forward by those on the P. O., were eventually 
presented in a further F. O. memorandum which formed aprogrämme of 
contributions to improve Commonwealth collaboration. 
Closer contact with the D. O. was'seen by most as a vital factor 
in increasing the F. O. 's involvement in Commonwealth collaboration`and 
to some extent the meeting between the two Offices the previous March 
had begun an improvement in this area. Emphasis was also placed on 
more consultations with the staff of the High Commissions in London, 
85 
which mirrored proposals put forward within the F. O. Members' of the 
D. I. D. were unhappy about their contact with staffs of the High 
11 
Commissions and Greenway, responding to a suggestion from Grey for 
greater personal contact between Commonwealth officials, explained 
the difficulties he had encountered. He wrote that although progress 
had been made with the younger officials, "the High Commissioners 
themselves are godlike and aloof", expressing his regret that they had 
not taken more interest in the work of the D. I. D. 
86 
There is little 
record of close contact between the High Commissioners and D. I. D. 
officials, N, apart from the attendance of Newton and sometimes Greenway 
at the meetings between the Dominions Secretary and the High Coamaissioners, 
and the!, latter seemed to confine their'acgtiaintances mostly to D. O. 
officials and Ministers of the Crown. 
87 
Newton endorsed Greenwäy's 
consnent`, 'although he-did note that the lack of staff at the High 
Commissions and the F. O. 's own manning problems were partly responsible. 
Suchliaison was to be encouraged'and Newton saic the aim of the F. O. in 
the future should be to provide a "Dominions corner" by setting aside 
85. "Enclosure by Mr. P. Carron, officialrat Lisbon. Embassy, in letter 
from Sir R. H. Campbell to Eden, 13th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2571/1103/68. 
86. Minute by Grey, 21st June 1943 and minute by Greenway, 22nd June 1943, 
F0371/36607, W11982/5467/68. 
87. The Canadian High Commissioner gives the impression that the Dominion 
High Commissioners found Newton rather difficult to communicate with. 
See V. Massey's Diary, 27th October 1942, (chapter 2, p. 101 ). 
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a room for Dominion officials to consult with D. I. D. members, who 
in turn would act as intermediaries between Dominion staff and 
officials indifferent P. O. departments who were dealing with subjects 
of interest to the rest of the Commonwealth. At the end of the war the 
D. I. D. did try to provide such a service and generally promote contact 
with Dominion officials. This developed slowly. 
88 
The draft F. O. 
programme of contributions included the suggestion that each Dominion 
High Commission should have an official who would give priority to 
foreign affairs and liaison with the F. O., adding that this should not 
detract from the High Commissioners own interests in foreign policy, but 
"facilitate and increase the scope of that interest". 
89 The D. O. 
agreed in principle, but recommended that the question be discussed 
by the Expert Committee which had been proposed at the Prime Ministers' 
Conference to discuss Commonwealth collaboration. 
90 The final programme 
merely stated that the P. O. hoped staff at the High Commissions would 
91 
be adequate to allow one member to devote his time to foreign affairs. 
Some representatives thought the policy of treating the Dominions 
c 
as fellow members of the U. N. rather than 'offspring' of the U. K. should 
be implemented by transferring the responsibility for Commonwealth 
relations in foreign affairs to the F. 0.92 Such proposals amounted to 
an amalgamation of the D. O. under the aegis of the latter, or at least 
the curtailment of a vast amount of the D. O. 's activities by their 
transference to the F. O. Various reasons were suggested to justify 
this development, but most agreed that such a ch ge would be-welcomed 
by the Dominions and that it would be to the U. K. 's advantage to have 
88. Minute by Newton, 4th November 1943, F0371/36605, W16485/4084/68. 
89. Draft 'Programme of Contributions from the F. O. Towards Commonwealth 
Collaboration', written by Newton, 17th April 1944, F0371/42674, ' 
W2571/1103/68. 
90. Stephenson to Newton, 29th June 1944, D035/1204, WC75/39. 
91. Final 'Programme of Contributions from the Foreign Office towards 
Commonwealth Collaboration', 25th'April 1944, F0371/42674, W5904/1103/68. 
92. Skrine-Stevenson to Eden, 24th January 1944, F0371/42674, W1116/1103/68. 
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all its foreign relations handled by one department qualified in such 
matters. Sir K. Cornwallis, U. K. Ambassador in Baghdad, thought 
that once all external-relations came under the F. O., U. K. representation 
in the Dominions coulddevelop on "sound lines" from a pool of men 
specialising in that field. 
With United Kingdom missions on a properly organised 
basis established in each Dominion and in charge of 
representatives selected with particular regard to 
their suitability for employment in 'new' countries 
directed by a Secretary of State in London in active 
contact with foreign problems, the task of inter- 
imperial consultation and co-operation would, 'I feel 
sure, he greatly simplified and improved. 093 
This proposal implied that the usual practice within the F. O. of posting 
officials to a'great variety of locations and departments would be 
abandoned, but if a group of'specialists was established for the 
Commonwealth, but not elsewhere inthe Office, there was surely-the 
danger of divisions developing within the Office. 
r) 
Sir R. C. Skrine Stevenson, U. K.. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, thought 
the amalgamation of the D. O. and F. O. would be a symbolic step in the 
Commonwealth's evolution. He was critical of the D. O. for being too -. iýI 
like the Colonial' Office from which it was born, and thus indicative 
94 
of the U. K. 's failure to recognise the Dominions' independence. 
Another official who had previously been posted to South Africa, referred 
to the "vaguely proprietary flavour" of the term Dominions Office, 
describin it as a half-way house between the C. O. and F. O. and he said 
that many\South Africans disliked its existence. 
94 
Mr. Shuckburgh, 
a junior official at the U. K. Embassy in Buenos Aires who had also. 
had experience of the Dominions, was another advocate of amalgamation, 
seeing it as an extension of the practice of seconding F. O. officials 
to U. K. High Commissions and D. O. men to Foreign Service missions. 
93. Cornwallis to Eden, 6th February 1944, F0371/42674, W2572/1103/68. 
94. Minute by Mr. Wallinger (Later Head of Central Department, 1948) 
2nd August 1943, F0371/36607, W11982/5467/68. 
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Ultimately he thought this process would. lead, to the unification of 
the two Offices which he considered performed, identical functions. 
95 
This was a proposal which would take time to evolve, and Shuckburgh's 
Ambassador, Sir David Kelly, while agreeing with his subordinate's 
objective, thought it-was only practicable for the distant future. 
However, when it occurred, he expected it, to 
remove any feeling that the Dominions Office is only a 
transitional compromise between the Colonial Office, 
from which it sprang, and the w situation acknowledged 
by the Statute of Westminster. 
The Head of the D. I. D., Greenway, also agreed that Commonwealth 
collaboration on foreign affairs should be the responsibility of the 
F. O. The D. O. could continue to exist as a department,, but wouldi"be 
reduced. in its areas of function so as to lay claim no"longer to itst 
own Secretary of State. Such a move would mean"more staff, for the 
F. O. and an enlarged D. I. D. possibly with representativesof the Dominions 
in it. Greenway thought it possible that the Dominions would 
suggest 
this development, and was certain they would be wholly in favour of it*, 
He also speculated that it could lead to the creation of a joint 
th Secretariat. One of the principal advantages of the Commonweal 
97 
D. O. to the Dominions was that it gave them direct access to a Secretary 
of State', normally in the Cabinet, who could specialise in their affairs. 
If Commonwealth foreign affairs collaboration was assigned to the F. O., 
the Dominion Governments and High Commissioners would be just one extra 
responsibility for an overworked Foreign Secretary, in an Office which 
approached foreign policy on distinct regional lines, not necessarily 
the most suitable means of handling relations with a geographically 
disparate group of states, and strove to produce diplomats with wide 
/( 
95. Memorandum by Shuckburgh, enclosure in letter from Sir David Kelly, 
U. K. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, to Eden, 26th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2573/1103/68. 
96. Kelly to Eden, 26th January 1944, ibid. 
97. Minute by Greenway, 2nd February 1944, F0371/42674, W1116/1103/68. 
(This reference to a Commonwealth Secretariat presumably meant a joint 
Commonwealth body along the lines Curtin was'suggesting. See chapter 
4, pp. 206-209. ) 
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general knowledge, rather than specialists. Newton who did not think 
amalgamation would be desirable pointed to the benefit the Dominions 
derived from having the full attention and authority of a Secretary 
of State, adding that in practice they also had direct access to the 
Foreign Secretary and the F. O. when necessary, a useful double 
advantage. 
98 
The Permanent Under-Secretary also doubted whether the 
Dominions would in fact favour the proposal, especially an expanded 
D. I. D. with their own representatives in it as Creenway had suggested. 
This could make them suspicious of a British attempt to dictate Commonwealth 
foreign policies from Whitehall. 
99 Law, -the Minister of State, did 
think the abolition of the D. O. would be welcomed by the Dominions, 
providing the F. O. took over the handling of their relations on the 
same basis as it conducted relations with other states#100 The Foreign 
Secretary did not officially comment on this suggestion in these papers, 
and whatever their individual standpoints, officials agreed that the F. O. 
should not raise the issue itself. Greenway and Newton considered it 
possible that the matter would be raised by the Dominions at the forthcoming 
Prime; Mini, sters' meeting, but thought it an issue to which the F. O. 
101 
could only be prepared to respond, not initiate. 
The F. O. decision to await events on the issue of fusion did not ti 
prevent the suggestions from being known outside the Office. The D. O. 
had seen the original circular to H. M. Representatives and was also 
shown the draft summary of replies. - Creenway expected it to object 
to some ofI the pr oposals but* thought "it would ire wiser to be 
ingenuously honest over this". 
102 
Possibly he thought that by showing 
the paper to the D. O. the F. O. could air the question of amalgamation 
without officially raising it themselves. Campbell's summary noted 
98. Minute by Newton, 4th February 1944, ibid. 
99. Minute by Cadogan, 4th February 1944, ibid. 
100. Minute by Law, 8th February 1944, ibid. 
101. Minutes by Greenway, 2nd February 1944, and Newton, 4th February 1944, 
ibid. 
102. Minute by Greenway, 13th March 1943, F0371/42674, W3280/1103/68. 
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that the F. O. had decided not to put forward the suggestion as it should 
be properly raised by the Dominions themselves. 
103 
The D. O: not suprisingly opposed any such development and was 
critical of the F. O. 's justification for not changing the arrangements. 
Machtig said it amounted to little more than saying that as the Dominions 
were likely to be satisfied with the D. O. 's continued handling of 
Commonwealth relations for some time to come, there was no need for 
any alterations. In his opinion. 
The fundamental consideration is that the relations between 
the Dominions and the United Kingdom are (and it is to be 
hoped, long will be) very different from those between foreign 
countries and the United Kingdom, and that this is necessarily 
reflected in business with the Dominions being entrusted to a' 
separatelt4nister and Service with special experience and 
outlook. 
The D. O. did not believe that there was no difference between the 
functions of the Foreign and Dominion Services, as Shuckburgh and'Kelly 
had argued. It distinguished between the U. K. 's foreign and Commonwealth 
relations, for membership of the Commonwealth involved a country in a 
wholly different association with the U. K. from that of even its closest' 
I 
and most valuable allies. In the Commonwealth members were united by ý /< 
common allegiance to the Crown and thus bound by a more powerful link 
than self interest or political expedience. There was an intimacy 
absent from relations with any other state. Moreover it was a total 
relationship embracing all aspects of those country's affairs; and the 
D. O. firmly maintained that Commonwealth relations should always be viewed 
as a whole,, not separated into their different facets under different 
Offices. 
The final draft of the circular containing the Programme of Contributions 
reflected the tone and arguments of Machtig's minute. It stated that the 
issue of amalgamation had been raised on previous occasions, but had 
never found favour with the U. K. Government because the position of the 
103. Memorandum by Campbell, 22nd March 1943, F0371/42674, . 
W4861/1103/68. 
104. Minute by Machtig, 24th July 1944, D035/1204, WC75/39. 
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Dominions was fundamentally. different,,, from that of: foreign countries -,, 
and the existence of a separate department specialising in Dominion},,, 
relations reflected and safeguarded that position. 
105 Although the 
issue was not raised by the Dominion Prime Ministers at the meeting 
in, May 1944, the matter was by no means completely laid to rest. With 
the increased scope of the F. O.! s participation in Commonwealth affairs, 
_greater 
enthusiasm within the F. O. fora, the, Commonwealth, and a much 
the debate about responsibility for Commonwealth. relations continued. 
Between 1946 and 1948 the F. O. tried to increase its. authority in this 
sphere. The issue was finally settled with the fusion of-the two 
offices in 1968.106 3Si, 
In the 1930s the F. O. had begun the practice of seconding junior 
officials to serve in U. K.: High Commissions in the Dominions. Until 
1943 the experiment had been limited to two capitals,, Ottawa and Pretoria; 
but amongst the suggestions for improving liaison were proposals for 
extension. One official who had spent some time. in Ottawa described 
such postings as being of the greatest value to the official, and ., 
earlier had, commented that as the Dominions increased their international 
activity it was important for F. O. officials to know and understand 
them better. 
107 
The F. O. did not want a seconded officer to become 
"merely another hand in the High Commissioners' Office" and lose touch 
with the F. 0.108 it wanted him to maintain direct contact so as to 
,r 
discover reactions to policy initiatives and the information it sent 
via the D! O. 
"The 
arguments put forward for increasing this direct contact 
at Dominion capitals smacked of those used on the issue of fusing the J 
105. Final 'Programme of Contributions from the Foreign Office towards 
Commonwealth Collaboration', 25th April 1944,, FO371/42674, 
W5904/1103/68. 
106. For the 1948 discussions see chapter 9, pp. 450ff. 
107. Memorandum by Shuckburgh, enclosure in letter from Kelly to Eden, 
26th January 1944, F0371/42674, W2573/1103/68. 
108. Minute by Newton, 4th November 1943, F0371/42674, W1103/1103/68. 
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F. O. and D. 0.109 There were those who thought that F. O. representatives 
were more capable of negotiating with Dominion officials. Wallinger, 
who had previously been posted to Pretoria, said F. O. officials could 
consider local problems more objectively and set aside the "self- 
conscious awareness, on the part of the D. O., of the 'constitutional 
issue"'. He summed up the difference by the statement that an F. O. 
official regarded a Dominion as a "potential enemy", while a D. O. man 
was afraid that it could be a "potential renegade". 
110 In June 1943' 
Greenway had sent instructions to thc> two F. O. reptesentatives in Ottawa 
and Pretoria, Mr. Maitland and Mr. Sullivan, stating that the F. O. 
wanted to learn as much as it could about factors influencing Dominions' 
policy, and urged them to do all they could to extend their personal 
contacts with External Affairs officials. 
ill Sir R. H. Campbell also 
urged that such contacts were established to "foster the sense of 
membership of the same family", 
112 
The D. O. felt generally satisfied with the F. O. representatives 
posted in Dominion capitals. M. MacDonald told Newton that Shuckburgh 
had been especially good, and thought that his replacement, Maitland, 
109. This was reflected in Knatchbull-Hugessen's comment that the F. O. 's 
aim should be "the direct association of'the Dominions with foreign 
affairs through Dominion personnel, and not second hand as hitherto", 
or to turn the phrase round, the direct association of F. O. officials 
with Dominion personnel and Dominion policy. Knatchbüll-Hugessen to 
Eden, 29th January 1944, F0371/42674, W2359/1103/08. Mr. Alan Dudley 
(North American Department) also favoured closer contact between F. O. 
and\Dominion officials. Minute of 1st October 1943, F0371/36605, 
W11178/4084/68. 
110. Minute by Wallinger, 2nd August 1943, F0371/36607, W11982/5476/68. Mr. 
P. Mason of the North American Departmentäho had also served in 
Ottawa thought that secondments were beneficial to the individual, but 
doubted any wider value because the advice needed, and the information 
received, by the High Commissioner did not transcend the capacity of _ any trained official from any department. It is not clear precisely 
when Wallinger served in Canada, (he says this information was not: 
included in the F. O. List) but it must have been early in the 1930s 
and this no doubt was the-reason for his remark about the scope of-'- 
action for an official. The F. O. were certainly anticipating an even 
greater increase in'diplomatic activity at High Commissions. (Minute 
by Mason, 3rd April 1944, F0371/42674, W4861/1103/68. ) 
111. Greenway to Maitland and Sullivan, 10th June 1943, F0371/36605, 
W11178/4084/68. 
112. Sir R. H. Campbell to Eden, 12th February 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2571/1103/68. 
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was aettling'down'well. 
115 
. Some surprise'. was'expressed by'Mr. Pugh, 
(Acting Principal at the D. O. ) at a comment by Mr. Sullivan that he 
had felt there to have been some jealousy when he first 'arrived in 
Pretoria. Pugh commented that the D. 0. ' had' wanted to retain Sullivan's 
predecessor, Mr. Busk, and requested that a replacement be sent for him. 
Pugh said his own impression was that", all' the- staff had welcomed 
Sullivan's arrival and tried 'to facilitate his 'contacts with the 
Department of External Affairs. 
114 
There was, as Mason remarked, bound 
to be some "good natured" chaff between the two departments, but Pugh's 
and MacDonald's comments indicate that the"D. O. was not averse to the 
practice. Mason also gave a timely reminder to officials; 
The F. O. man should remember that it is he who is being 
educated - an education, worthwhile -' quite apart, from the 
useful contribution he canlTgke himself to the general 
work of the H. C. 's Office. `r 
When Greenway told the D. O.! that the F. O. wished'to"extend the 
practice of secondment to the'other two Dominions, Itheinitial reaction 
of Mr. Archer, (an Assistant Secretary`in the'D. O. ), was favourable. '' The 
question which had tobe settled was the'rank and experience of the=men, 
which theiF. O. wished to raise-. }', -' The D. O. "'wanted a junior official who 
could perform useful functions without posing a threat to its own 
management of, and responsibility for, liaison with the-Dominions; This 
threat, was acknowledged by"Newton when'he said that he{'wanted the 
officials to approximate'to the position of Commercial-Secretaries; -`, 
... _ww . commenting 
113. Minute by Newton, ý4th November 1943,. F0371/36605, "W16485/4084/68. 
The F. O. was not so satisfied with Maitland. Newton thought,, that - 
his reports were uninformative, despite their length, and that 
the appointment was "inadequate". But this seemed to have been a case 
of one individual not fulfilling expectations. Minutes by Newton, 
20th October 1943 and 3rd November 1943, F0371/36605, W12589/4084/68.,, 
114. Minute by Pugh, 14th September 1943, F0371/36605, W12717/4084/68. 
115. Minute by Mason, 7th October 1943, ibid. 
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"I realise that such, a development may seem to pave the ý.. 
way for the establishment of a U. K. diplomatic mission 
in the Dominions. My answer would be that if this is. ' 
goingto come it will come anyway and that we should not 
,,, be deterred, 
by, such- fears from developing, our liaisoný-t., 
machinery along the most practical lines. After all, 
permanent missions have evolved precisely, because they :-"- 
were the best method of keeping in touch with another 
Goverment on. foreign affairs: it -would, be absurd if 
for-, 
the sake of apprearances we were to put ourselves at a 
disadvantage with foreign missions, in,, Dominion capitals-, -,, - 
and to deprive ourselves of the best machinery we can 
devise for keeping in touch witü our fellow governments 
in the British Commonwealth. 116 
Newton added that he thought the improvement in liaison between the F. O. 
and External Affairs Departments would enhance the superior and 
privileged nature of the U. K. High Commissions, compared with foreign 
diplomatic missions at the Dominion capitals. The F. O. was envisaging 
a man of eight or ten yearsexperience in the service'117 but as Newton 
told the D, O, it was willing to accede to the D, O. 's request that a 
Dominiön official would act as number two in the High Commission. 
Newton also noted that there could be some delay in implementing the 
new proposals, because of staffing shortages, but wanted a decision to 
be reached in principle so that budgets could be worked out. 
118 Machtig 
agreed in principle to the scheme, and to the F. O. 's choice of a First 
Secretary or Junior Counsellor. 
119 
Another 
aspect of collaboration was the improvement' of contact 
between Co 'ýý" nuaonwealth officials at foreign capitals. The number of 
Dominion missions would continue to grow. Sir Nevil Bland, Ambassador 
116. 
, Minute by Newton, 4th November 1943, F0371/36605, W16483/4064/68. (Others$ 
such as Jebb, who wanted the F. O. 11o take responsibility for foreign affairs collaboration with the Dominions, took note of 
o1'5 warning and thought it would be a "healthy development". 
117. MinMinuute-by Jebb, 11th November 1943, ibid. - 
and es by Mr. I. Mallet (Head of Personnel Department), 
July 1943 
118. Newtö$llinger, 2n`d August 1943, F0'371/36607, W11982/5467/68. 
(M$ n to Machtig, 13th August 1943, F0371/36605, W17181/4084/68. 
fin$ 
let 
warned Newton of substantial delays in procuring the extra 
119. Mach Ce for these posts, 5th November 1943, F0371/36605, W16485/4081/68). ti 9 to Newton, 7th December 1943, F0371/36605, W17181/4084/68. 
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to the Netherlands Government, suggested that it was easier to influence 
people when they were abroad than at home, and that much could be done 
through the Dominion Missions at foreign capitals to present U. K. policy 
in an acceptable fashion to Dominion Governments. 
120 
Proposals 
centred on the sharing of information and co-ordination of action. 
This type of co-operation had been begun in Moscow,. and Newton urged 
that it be followed elsewhere. Consultations and shared information 
were obvious benefits to be gained from the presence of multiple 
Commonwealth missions. By forming close contacts-and by keeping up 
or increasing the amount of 
. 
information the Dominions received from 
U. K., sources, the F. O. hoped to counteract any divisive tendencies which 
could result from the extension of-the Dominions' own Foreign Services. 
The U. K. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Sir Philip Nicola, was worried 
that Dominion Services would become too distinctively. different from the 
U. K. 's. 
. 
He thought that it was important for them-to share-certain 
qualities, methods and traditions. Or, as Bland phrased it, -every 
effort had to be made by the Foreign-Service to "keep in" with the 
Dominion representatives. 
121 
Two ambassadors saw positive advantages 
stemming from the Dominions' expansion of their foreign services. , Sir 
C. Orde,; Ambassador at Santiago, thought that this would facilitateýa 
greater appreciation of foreign affairs and of the coýmon interests-of. 
all the Commonwealth, and Lord Killearn, Ambassador to. Egypt, envisaged 
Dominion fissions as providing a useful counterweight to , the efforts 
122 being made by other Powers to'penetrate the. Middl East. 'These 
comments assumed that greater knowledge would make the Dominions agree 
120. Bland to Eden, 9th March 1944, F0371/42674, W3794/1103/68. 
121. Mr. Balfour of the U. K. Embassy in Moscow reported that close 
co-operation between Commonwealth missions already took place 
in Moscow. Balfour to Eden, 23rd January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2496/1103/68; Nichols to Eden, 20th January 1944, op. cit.; 
Bland to Eden, 9th March 1943, op. cit. 
122. Orde to Eden, 21st February 1944, F0371/43674, W3675/1103/68, 
and Killearn to Eden, 23rd February 1944, F0371/42674, W3280/1103/68. 
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z 
more often with the U. K. and that they would support U. K. policy in 
the Middle East. However, while these were speculations, both men 
did at. least demonstrate a positive attitude towards the Dominions. 
If neither hope transpired, it would indicate a more serious problem 
with the relationship. 
A rather more politically sensitive suggestion was also put forward 
by Lord Killearn for Dominion representatives to be attached to U. K. 
Embassies where the Dominions had no missions themselves. 
123 It was 
noted that this had been tried successfully in the case of Mr. Keith 
Officer's appointment to the U. K. Embassy in Washington; the qualification 
that ! 'he was an unusually co-operative and 'British' person" was added. 
'24 
The plan had advantages but assumed a Dominion willingness to accept 
something which might smack of political subservience. Another 
possibility was for all despatches from Embassies where-there were no 
Dominion missions to be forwarded to Dominion External Affairs Departments. 
This was acknowledged to take place to a limited extent, but it was 
thought -. that it could be intensified to give the Dominions a fuller 
appreciation of the U. K. 's policy. 
125 
Campbell suggested that the 
information already sent via the D. O. covered this suggestion and that 
direct despatch of telegrams would only lead to repetition. This was I 
not a view which the Dominions would have necessarily shared, especially 
Australia, and in November 1942 and in March 1943 the D. O. had told'the 
F. O. that \it thought the information sent should be improved. 
126 
There were some proposals for more in-servict training of F. O. 
officials, (lectures and courses while t hey were stationed in London) 
and a general encouragement for -representatives to visit Dominion capitals 
123. Killearn to Eden, 23rd February 1944, ibid. 124. Margin comment on Campbell's minute of 22nd March 1944, by Law MI F0371/426741 W4861/1103/68. (Officer had been appointed in 1937 before Australia established its own mission two years later. See chapter 1, p. ) 125. Skrine Stevenson to Eden, 15th January 1944, F0371/42674, W1116/1103/68. 126. Minute by Campbell, 22nd March 1944, F0371/42674, W4861/1103/68, 
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when they were en route elsewhere, where finance and time permitted, 
to consult with officials in the External Affairs Departments. 
127 
When the F. O. * included, under the general heading of visits to the 
. Dominions, the notion that the Head of the D. I. D. should also travel, 
it met opposition from the D. O. After a meeting'between the two 
Offices, the'Assistant Under-Secretary at the D. O., Sir John Stephenson, 
wrote to Newton confirming that the D. O. did not want it to beýa 
recognised function of the Head of the D. I. D. to pay such visits. 
Cranborne's Private Secretary explained later that'the former was 
opposed to the idea because he felt the official channel 'between the 
F. O. and the Dominions should continue to be the D. 0.128 
From a , purely domestic standpoint, various ideas were put forward 
to educate the British people about the Commonwealth: Lord Killearn 
stressed the need for a greater awareness of the Commonwealth which 
would "instill a less insular attitude of mind", and Sir Kinahan 
Cornwallis, Ambassador at Baghdad, thought the politico-economic 
importance Of the Dominions-should be'brought home to the British people. 
129 
Sir P. iNichols suggested the extension ol`the curriculum in schools, 
more arranged tours to the Commonwealth and more contacts between 
professions and work associations, so that more people could have first 
127. Sir 0. O'Malley (U. K. Ambassador to Poland). to Eden, 15th December 1943, F0371/36607, W17625/5467/68, and Draft 'Programme of 
, 
Contributions from the Foreign. Office towards Commonwealth 
Collaboration', 17th April 1944, F0371/42674, W2571/1103/68.. 
128. Stephenson to Newton, 29th June 1944 and minute by W. A. W. Clark, (Secretary of State's Private Secretary) to'Stephenson, 7th September 1944, D035/1204, WC75/39. (S. Holmes informed Stephenson that the High Commissioner in Ottawa, MacDonald, was keen that any officials 
who visited the Dominions should contact the High Commission first. Although all official visitors were supposed to, this had not always happened, apparently sometimes with disastrous results. Holmes did not give any examples of the latter. Holmes to Stephenson, 5th March 1945, ibid. ) 
129. Killearn to Eä 
,. 23rd February 1944, F0371/42674, W3280/1103/68, and Cornwallis to Eden, 6th February 1944, F0371/42674, W2572/1103/68. 
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hand experience of the Dominions. 
130 
Officials also considered proposals for the direct secondment of 
Dominion diplomats to the F. O. and other Whitehall departments. On 
W 
the whole representatives advocated short-term secondments of junior 
officials as a way of keeping Commonwealth policies in tune with each 
other, 
131 
Most also suggested an exchange of officers between the 
F. O. and the Departments of External Affairs as away°of maximising 
contacts, with the main emphasis on familiarising officials with each 
other to eradicate suspicion that stemmed from ignorance and misunderstanding2 
Here the most radical proposals came from Sir Hughe Knatchbull'-flugessen, 
who suggested that each Dominion should post a senior official to the 
F. O., possibly attached to the P. U. S., who would be in close touch with 
policy and keep his Government informed of it. He envisaged a 
reciprocal arrangement with the Dominions. He-also advocated the 
appointment of a junior official to serve in the D. I. D. in conjunction 
with an official from the D. O., with the former department becoming 
the official channel of communication between the U. K. and the Dominions 
in foreign affairs, except in matters of the highest importance, when 
contact would continue at the Prime Ministerial level. It should be 
remembered that Hugessen favoured'the fusion of the two offices and 
also advocated a centralisation of Commonwealth institutions which went 
beyond any other proposals, and certainly beyond what the Dominions 
would accept. He admitted that his plans for a supreme Commonwealth 
ti 
130. Nichols to Eden, 20th January 1944, F0371/, 42674, W1103/1103/68. He 
added that direct contact was important because "imagination has never 
been our strong point". (The D. O. was involved in generally promoting 
contacts within the Commonwealth, but this task was mostly left to 
non-governmental bodies. The F. O. does not seem to have taken any: 
positive action in this direction. ) See Cranborne's speech November 
1943, Chapter 4.1 
131. This was suggested to Skrine Stevenson, 15th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W1116/1103/68; Nichols, 20th January 1944, F0371/42674, W110311103/68; 
Killearn, 23rd February 1944, F0371/42674, W3280/1103/68 and Shuckburgh, 
26th January 1944, F0371/42674, W2573/1103/68- 
132. Sir R. H. Campbell to Eden, 12th February 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2571/1103/68, and memorandum from Mr. Adrian Holman (Counsellor at 
H. M. Legation Teheran) enclosed in despatch from Sir R. Bullard 
(Minister to Teheran) to Eden, 25th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W1912/1103/68. 
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authority with unified foreign and defence services, a joint economic 
board and even a Commonwealth Cabinet, were probably not practicable, 
but he thought secondments were. 
133 1 
While the original F. O. circular was being studied by Foreign 
Service representatives an official at South Africa House' unofficially 
raised the question of appointing a South African official to the F. O. 's 
Reconstruction Department so he could learn about the subject, and 
the machinery for dealing with it. 
134 
Campbell and Greenway for the 
D: I. D. were keen on the idea, but when it was discussed with the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department, difficulties arose over security. Too 
many papers within the department were not suitable to be seen by. 
the Dominions, either because they contained secret material which could 
not be divulged outside the circle of the Great Powers, or simply 
because the U. K. would want no other country to see it. _135 Newton 
said he appreciated these difficulties, but questioned whether in the 
long run complete frankness might not be advantageous. He was reluctant' 
to snub this tentative suggestion. -The D. O. was informally consulted 
through Stephenson, and no objection was voiced providing that the 
i 
official severed all links with his own Government during the period of 
secondment, a matter already agreed upon in the F. 0.137 The matter was 
put to Cadogan, and after reassurances on a number of points from Newton, 
such as communication between the official and his home department, it 
was approved providing an official request came from the South African 
133. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, 29th January 1944, F0371/42674, 
W2369/1103/68. He makes. no mention of his ideas on Commonwealth 
collaboration in his memoirs Diplomat in Peace and War (London, 1949). 
134. Minute Campbell, 25th November 1943, F0371/36598, W17543/1091/68. 
(The South African official was Mr. Sole. ) 
135. Minutes by Mr. J. G. Ward and Mr. J. E. Coulson of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department, 25th November 1943,1 ibid. 
136. Minutes by Newton, 26th November 1943 and 1st December 1943, ibid. 
137. Newton to Cadogan, 31st December 1943, F0371/42674, W1211/1887-68-- 
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Government. It was left to Mr. Sole, the official who had suggested 
the scheme, to persuade his own government to take it up. 
138 "(The South 
African Government never officially requested an officer to be ättached 
to the F. O. - nor did any other Dominion Government ever do so. ) 
p. 
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen's idea of attaching senior Dominion 
officials was thought to raise more problems. Mr. I. Mallet again 
raised the problem of security, and Newton did not think the Dominions 
would find this acceptable, except perhaps Australia. Cadogan was 
perplexed as to how a plan to attach four senior officials to his office 
139 
could work. These proposals were deleted from the Programme. 
Finally, ' during the discussion on the posting of F. O. officials 
to U. K. High Commissions, the D. O. made a suggestion which was incorporated 
into the F. O. 's Programme. Machtag proposed that a D. O. öfficial'be' 
appointed to U. K. Missions where 1there was multiple 
Dominion representation. 
He thought this officer should be of slightly higher rank than F. O. 
officials at High Commissions, because he would be dealing with Heads 
of Missions. 
140 
(A precursor of this had been Mr. S. Holmes' appointment 
to Washington in 1943). 141 The F. O. showed scant enthusiasm. It 
thought its own officials"were capable of liaising with Dominion officials, 
that the'` Dominions would prefer to deal directly with'F. O. staff, that 
the Heads of Dominion Missions would wish to communicate only with the 
Ambassador or his Deputy, 'and that the appointment would make'other 
,ý 
countries doubt the independence of-the Dominions or suspect that the 
138. Minutes by Cadogan, 6th January 1944 and Newton, 25th January 1944, ibid. 
139. Minute by Mallet, 31st March 1944, F0371/42674, W4861/1103/68; minute by Newton, 17th April 1944 and minute by Cadogan, 23rd April 1944, F0371/42674, W5904/1103/68. 
140. 'Machtig to Newton, 7th December 1943, F0371/36605, W17181/4084/68. (This idea had been suggested by Shuckburgh, but had not been taken 
up-by the F, O,, 26th January 1944, F0371/42674, W2574/1103/68. ) 141. S. Holmes, although posted in Washington with the rank of Minister, kept in close contact with M. MacDonald at the High Commission in Ottawa, where he had previously been posted, and MacDonald told Machtag how successful he thought Holmes' appointment to Washington had been. MacDonald to Machtig; 16th December 1943, F0371/36605, W17181/4084/68. 
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142, 
Commonwealth was trying to form a united front agai`tist them. However, 
} 
Campbell and Newton did not think that' the idea should be dismissed, 
the former conceding that a junior official could be generally useful 
and that it would help to develop- closer'relationsý with the D. O. Newton 
thought the F. O. should agree to the ideü'in principle and reserve its 
right. to decide in each, case, as long as it did not restrict contact 
between the Heads of Missions; ' the, official' "is nöttö lengthenfthe 
way between them, but to broaden it,, 1 
143 "Newton also 
' 
thought that 
ý ,I aý.. I .'- ý'' agreement would, incline the D. O. to be 'slightly more receptive to the 
F. O. 'sýown proposals. - The final Pragramme of Contributions towards 
Commonwealth Collaboration noted thi's``proposal which had been agreed 
in principle between officials144, 
After fairly extensive replies from Foreign Service representatives, 
and substantial-discussions between F. O. officials, Creenway suggested 
that a memorandum containing a summary of the proposals should be 
submitted to the Cabinet; Law and Cadogan concurred. 
145 
The F. O. was 
also keen to have its proposals discussed in some format the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
had. prepared, a Cabinet Memorandum on Co-operation within the British 
Commonwealth. This dealt mainly with high level co-operation, while 
the F. O. 's, -in the words of Newton, 
may.,. . .. seem unimpressive'but we must build brick by brick 
and collectively they may amount to a substantial contribution 
to the improvement of our conta is & collaboration with the 
Dominions in foreign affairs. 146 
142. Minutes by Mr. Compton (D. I. D. ) 17th December 1943; Campbell, 22nd 
December 1943; and Greenway, 28th, December 1943, F0371/36605, 
W17181/4084/68. (Butler, Head of the North American Department, 
especially feared American reaction to appearance of a Commonwealth 
front, 6th January 1944, ibid, and Mallet stressed thatýthe Dominions 
would not welcome such an arrangement, 13th March 1944, F0371/42674, 
W4861/1103/68. ) 
143. Minutes by Campbell, 22nd December 1943 and'Newton, 5th January"1944, `F0371/42674, W17181/4084/68. 
144. Circular despatch to it. M. Representatives abroad, with enclosure, from 
Eden, 3rd October 1944, F0371/42674, W17181/4084/68. 
145. Minutes by Greenway, 15th February 1944, Cadogan, 25th February 1944, 
and Law, 1st March 1944, F0371/42674,142369/1103/68. 
146. Minute by Newton, 28th February 1944, ibid. (For discussion of Dominions Secretary memorandum, see chapter 5, pp. 256-258. ) 
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Some officials thougbtthe D. O. 's attitude towards future collaboration 
too negative, that to expect Curtin and King to fight the subject out 
between themselves while suggesting few positive measures itself, was 
inadequate. But Cadogan and Newton both agreed with_Cranborne's 
tactics of putting forward the U. K. 's proposals when divergences 
between the Dominions had emerged. 
n By the time the F. O. 's memorandum 
14 
was ready, it was too late to be submitted to the Ministerial Committee 
which had co-ordinated,. U. K. preparations for the Prime Ministers' meeting. 
However, Law, the Minister of State,; was, a member of the committee and 
Greenway'attended two of the three meetings held, in the Spring of 1944. 
At these meetings the F. O. had an opportunity of commenting on proposals 
for collaboration, some of which were similar to its own, and raising 
other subjects. On the 27th April the Cabinet agreed that the F. O. 's 
paper"should be submitted to Cranborne for his consideration. 
l48 
In chapter five the, range of issues . 
broached with the Prime Ministers 
and senior Commonwealth officials is discussed, , together with 
the D. O. 's 
plans. " Stephenson, commenting on the F. O. 's paper, was critical of 
certain aspects but gave, general support to the notion of increased 
co-operation between the F. O. and Dominion Departments of External Affairs. 
Machtig thought it a comprehensive memorandum, but advised his Minister 
that it rather went "off the rails" in some places. He thought the 
only-two points worth discussing with the Primer Ministers were more 
Dominion liaison officers with the F. O., and secondment of F. O. officials 
to the Dominions and vice versa. Even these would be better tackled 
with senior officials rather than their political chiefs. 
149 
The D. O. 
was ready to'hold discussions with the F. O. but there was a delay until 
147. ' Minutes by Newton, 14th February 1944, Greenway, 11 April"1944-and 
Jebb, 12th April 1944, F0371/42681, W2162/2145/68. (For further 
details see chapter 5, pp. 259-260. ) 
148. Law to Eden, 25th April 1944, F0371/42674, W6723/1103/68; Minutes 
of D. 'P. M. Meetings see CAB98/27, and chapter 5, pp. ; War 
Cabinet Conclusions of 27th April 1944, WM(44)58, CAB65/42. 
149. Minute by Stephenson, 3rd May 1944, and Machtig, 6th May 1944, 
D035/1204, WC75/39. 
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the delegations were on the point of leaving the U. K. because Cranborne 
had been extremely busy with the Prime Ministers' Meeting. Law 
pressed Cranborne for more positive efforts from the D. O. to convene 
a meeting. He said that he understood the D. O. had suggested that 
the proposals should be examined, in conjunction with others on`defence 
collaboration, by a technical committee, but said that he felt this 
decision could not apply to the F. 0. Is proposals as they were not ' 
concerned with defence co-operation. 
150 
Cranborne replied that in' 
his opinion the F. O. 's ideas fell into. twoýcategories, those which 
concerned the internal administration of the=U. K. Government, and those 
which directly affected Dominion Governments. The first should be`the 
subject of departmental discussion, the second be held over' for 
consideration by the proposed Expert Committee. Ile said that the 
suggestion for this had come from the Australian Prime Minister'and 
that it was not to be confined to defence subjects; Cranborne preferred 
therefore that the U. K. should not tp }ce the initiative in raising these 
subjects with Dominion, officials during their present visit, but that 
if they themselves did so, then, the. F. O. and D. O. should discuss the 
issues with them. 
lsl 
The Head, of the D. I. D. thought the'Expert` Committee 
would confine itself to defence. discussion and in fact doubted wlhether 
it would ever meet at all, referring to the D. O. 's attitude'as 
"destructive". 152 The two offices managed to produce a memorandum 
acceptable to both, which toned. down some of the F. O. 's'proposals so that 
the U. K. appeared not to be initiating plans, but, indicating the kind 
of alterations which it would welcome. This revised' memorandum"was 
sent to F. O. Missions abroad. 
152 
150. Law to Cranborne, 25th May 1944, ibid. (Cranborne also had to take 
care of the additional duties-of being Leader of the House of Lords. ) 151. Cranborne to Law, 27th May 1944, ibid. 152. Minutes by Stephenson, 28th June 1944 and 20th July 1944, ibid. F. O. Circular to H. M. Representatives abroad, 3rd October 1944, F0371/42674, W12206/1103/68. 
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Such episodes in relations between the F. O. and D. O. illustrate 
tensions between the two and began a five year, period in which both 
Offices tried to exert their authority over Commonwealth relations. 
The D. O. fought'a rearguard action in defence of. its responsibilities, 
while the F. O. moved to increase its activity in this sphere. It 
would'be wrong to suggest that either Office placed inter-departmental 
rivalry above its responsibilities to the Commonwealth; but the situation 
did not make co-ordination any smoother. Each Office had fairly set 
views about the other, which hindered collaboration, and the relative 
standing of the two within the Whitehall hierarchy exacerbated the 
situation. The'F. O. was one of the most weighty Offices of State and 
in`some senses separate from the rest of the Civil Service, with the 
Head of the latter exercising no control qver it. The D. O., on the 
other hand, was a comparative newcomer' and had found it difficult to 
shake off the impression that it`was little more than'a post office. 
The fact that it rarely secured a Minister of the highest reputation 
did nothing to improve its standing. 
While it is not easy to extract quotations from F. O. files to 
^ 
LLt 
demonstrate the feeling of superiority within the F. O., the papers 
leave such an impression, not unknown to the D. O. There were those 
who considered F. O. officials more able to handle relations with Dominion 
representatives because they could tbce a more objective attitude and 
. were less preoccupied with constitutional considerations, or simply 
because of the general calibre of the respective. pfficials. 
153 
It could 
be argued that this reflected a consciousness of their expertise in 
foreign affairs together with a lack of distinction between relations 
with the Commonwealth and those with foreign state. However, when the 
153. Minute by Wallinger, 2nd August 1943'1, FO371/36607, W11982/5476/68; 
Minutes by Mr. T. North Whitehead, 17th April 1941 and Mr. R. T. E. 
Latham, 16th April 1941, (Officials in The General Department), 
F0371/26149, A1893/18/45. Mr. Crompton, (a junior official in the 
D. I. D. ) thought F. O., officials were perfectly capable of liaising 
with Dominion representatives, minute, 17th February 1944, F0371/36605,1 
W17181/4084/68. 
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F. O. discussed collaboration with the Dominions during the early stages 
of policy formulation, Jebb expressed a rather derogatory view of the 
DSO. -1- 
-I, am rather alarmed at leaving to the Dominions Office's 
discretion the decision on what exactly is suitable for 
passing on to the Dominions. 
and Greenway referred to some "uncontrolled elements" within it. Skrine 
Stevenson was critical of the D. O., telling his department that-it was 
too similar to the C. O., and there seemed to be a feeling that once 
the Dominions had demonstrated their increased international status, 
it was time for relations with them to be handled by a senior, more 
competent department. Cornwallis commented that as the Dominions had 
achieved 
complete equality of status ... it is time that the' 
handling of our relations with them and with foreign 
countries should be coordinated in one department of 
State charged with the supremelylýipportant task of 
conducting our external affairs. 
Not all F. O. officials shared this attitude; Newton consistently upheld 
the rights of the D. O. over Commonwealth relations and seems`to have 
had a rather higher opinion of it than some. Moreover Mr. P. Grey had 
expressed his opinion that the F. O. did not trust the discretion, or 
use the advice, of the D. O. enough. Perhaps an indication of the 
importance F. O. officials and Ministers attached to the D. O: may be 
derived from comments written about it in their memoirs; these are 
very sparing. 
155 
The p. 0', possessed a collective confidence which was possibly a 
reflection of the high standard of entry into it and its continuing 
recruitment from the social and intellectual elite of the U. K. It 
154. Minutes by Jebb, 10th April 1943 and Greenway, 3rd May 1943, 
F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68; Skrine Stevenson to Eden, 24th January 
1944, F0371/42674, W1116/1103/68; Cornwallis to Eden, 6th February 
1944, F0371/42674, W2572/1103/68. 
155. Minute by Grey, 1st April 1943, F0371/36605, W8107/4084/68. '(There 
are, for example, very few references in The Memoirs of Lord G1a. dwyn 
(London, 1972) Lord Avon's memoirs devote comparatively little attention 
to his time at the D. O. (see The Eden*Memoirs: The Reckoning (London, 
1965). The picture is the same for Foreign Service officials such as 
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. 
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undoubtedly coveyed this to U. K. and Dominion colleagues and both 
the D. O. and Dominion representatives were sensitive about their own 
positions. Massey records that generally Dominion Ministers or 
officials were often too inhibited in their speech and actions when 
they visited the U. K. and later at San Francisco Evatt, the Australian 
Minister of External Affairs, complained about the F. O. 's attitude to 
the Dominions. 
156 
Garner records that as the D. O. grew apart from the 
C. O. it developed a closer affinity with the F. O. and "began to shed some 
of its feelings of inferiority" towards it, indicating that this 
sentiment had indeed been conveyed. He adds that despite this relations 
with the F. O. in the 1940s were not wholly harmonious, and quotes a 
number of patronising comments by Cadogan about the Dominions to indicate 
this. 
157 
So many of the F. O. 's suggestions for closer collaboration 
did affect its role in Commonwealth collaboration and the D. O. was 
particularly sensitive to any F. O. initiatives which increased this; 
hence the D. O. 's rejection of the idea that the Head of the D. I. D. should 
visit Dominion capitals. Garner noted that the D. O. "was ever vigilant" 
to protect itself against F. O. encroachments. 
An incident during inter-departmental discussions illustrates the 
tension in the relationship. A member of the D. I. D. informally showed 
a copy of the F. O. original memorandum to Mr. Ritchie of Canada House, 
which the D. O. only discovered when Ritchie asked for permission to send 
a copy informally to his government. The D. O., annoyed at this 
disclosure, agreed, after consulting its represen_atives in Ottawa, to 
prevent a garbled version based on memory being sent. The High 
Commissioner, MacDonald, was reported as thinking it "a grave mistake 
to have shown the document to Ritchie" and assumed that the D. O. would 
156. V. Massey, What's Past is Prologue, (Toronto, 1963), pp. 310-311. 
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have left tbe'F. O. "in'no doubt as to their views". 
158 Subsequently, 
when the F. O. asked if it could 'discuss a despatch from Lord Halifax, 
at'the'Washington Embassy, on Commonwealth Relations with Mr. Norman 
Robertson'. Head of the External Affairs Department"in Canada, the D. 0. 
s'a'id it did not-want` to give a copy to} him even unofficially, though 
no'objection was raised to the F. O. 's doing so, provided the paragraph 
on the D. O. 's representation in Washington was omitted. 
1S9 'This 
section was a piece on the position of S. ` Holmes` in Washington', which 
stated that he was not used as the principal contact with Dominion 
representatives in order to avoid a feeling on"the part of the Dominions 
that they were special, different and not entirely equal to their foreign 
counterparts. It also noted that this"was äl'sö`to avoid the danger 
of the D. O. man becoming a shield, rather than a promotor of more 
contacts'between Dominion and F. O. personnel. 
S. Holmes wrote to the D. O. about this passage stressing that there 
was something "special" about the relationship and deploring the tendency 
to smooth this away to obscurity. He insisted that there was the 
closest contact between him and Dominion representatives'(a fact the 
memorandum had not denied) and concluded with the comment 
If"therefore there is'anything at all in the idea behind 
this passage, it surely is that we regard the Dominions 
as not only 'special' but in some way inferior. It would 
certainly suggest something inferior about the Dominions 
"Office which nevertheless happens to be the Department through 
which their Governments have their dealings with the 
Government of the United Kingdom. 160 
This was perhaps a rather stiff reaction. The Washington despatch seems 
essentially to have pointed out the dangers of antagonising the Dominions 
and of the D. O. man becoming a barrier to closer consultation generally, 
a point made by Newton+in the more general discussion of D. O: ' postings 
to U. K. Missions. 
161 
158. ' Garner to Costar, 4th`February 1944, D035/1204, WC75/23. 
159. Minute by Greenway, 16th May 1944, F0371/42674, W6458/, 1103168. 
160. - S. Holmes to Stephenson, 24th April, D035/1204, WC75/23. , 161. Minute by Newton, 5th January 1944, F0371/36605, W17181/4084/68. 
(see p. 173). 
180 
Commenting on the D. O. 's insistCce that the paragraph on the 
position of the D. O. official should be omitted, Creenway described it 
as "foolish", but part of the D. O. 's policy of "censoring anything which 
might, cause the recipients even to raise en eyebrow". He added that 
the D. O. had from the start disliked the F. O. 's taking the initiative 
on Commonwealth collaboration which that office regarded as "poaching" 
on their preserve. Creenway suggested that the whole memorandum 
should be shown to Robertson and the other three Heads of External 
Affairs Departments. "I think we should in fact resist D. O. 's perpetua 
attempts to censor our communications". 
2 
It is not clear whether 
16 
the D. O. made its request as a result of S. Holmes' comments, or because 
it considered the matter to be a purely domestic one for the U. K. It 
is also possible that after the F. O. 's original indiscretion, the D. O. 
was less inclined to be co-operative on such issues. It was Newton 
who once again came to the defence of the D. O. when he reminded his 
colleagues that "The D. O. are responsible for our relations with the 
Dominions so we must accept their views. "163 The offending passage 
was not sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. 
164 
The U. K. Embassy at Washington had also received the F. O. 's 
memorandum on Commonwealth relations and returned two despatches, one 
which dealt speci-fically with the position of the Crown and a second more 
general piece. In his paper which had formed the basis of-the-F. O. 's 
memorandum, Campbell had detected a feeling of loyalty "if not to the 
Crown, at any rate to the Commonwealth idea"165 bjut in the memorandum 
no reference was made to the position of the Crown, and noý, other reply 
considered this aspect. Lord Halifax was disturbed at this omission 
which he thought impaired the balance of any picture of the Commonwealt 
He did not doubt the need for improvements in the machinery for co- 
162. Minute by Greenway, 16th May 1944, F0371/42674, W6458/1103/68. 
163. Minute by Newton, 17th May 1944, ibid. 
164. Minutes by Greenway, 26th May 1944 and Newton, 14th June 1944, ibi 
165. Memorandum by Campbell, 22nd July 194.3, F036607/W12262/5467/68. 
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operation or adaptations to fit increased Dominion independence, but 
warned against under-estimation of the probably increasing value of 
the Crown which remained the only effective symbol of, unity and common 
organism. 
Its appeal to powerful sentiment and emotions which are 
not transitory but permanent, invests it with a quality 
largely independent of the changes and chances of politics. 
These, however disquieting or reassuring at any particular 
time, are likely often to be. fallacious as. i nfigations of 
the real forces affecting permanent relations. 
He suggested that since the 1926 report the members' appreciation of the 
value of the Crown had increased as its meaning had been more fully 
apprehended. Halifax also referred to M. MacDonald's memorandum of 
February 1943 in which the High Commissioner had stressed that Dominion 
links with the Cröwn'should be strengthened, and suggested that the 
Royal Family should'not just go to the Dominions for periodic visits 
there, but also for periods of residence. 
167 
Halifax agreed and 
was convinced that such a practice would "deepen the foundations of 
loyalty, extend our horizons of Imperial thought, and infuse new strength 
into our Imperial partnership. " 
'Halifax and MacDonald were senior and important representatives. 
Halifax had been Viceroy of India and Foreign Secretary; and MacDonald, 
who stood on excellent terms with Commonwealth Prime Ministers and 
High Commissioners alike, was not part of the Service, which possibly 
added weight to his opinions. Both men stressed an aspect of Commonwealth 
relations about which it was always difficult to be precise. However, 
Pý f 
few people doubted that the loyalty of the majority of the Dominion people 
towards the Crown had an effect on the decision of the Dominions to enter 
the war in 1939. There seems to be no record in the D. O. of any 
166.. Halifax to Eden, °2nd February 1944, F0371/42674, W2370/1103168. 
167. Memorandum by MacDonald, 23rd February 1943, WP(43)115, CAB66/35. 
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discussions on this despatch from Halifax, but one could surmise that 
it would have been in agreement with him. The F. O. paid little attention 
to this aspect of Commonwealth relations. There was little internal 
" 
discussion on Halifax's remarks, Newton merely noting that it was an 
"interesting suggestion" which went beyond the sphere of the F. O. and 
should-be passed on to the D. 0.168 The attitude of most F. O. officials 
towards treating the Dominions as allies, much like any others, seems 
to have been reflected in this lack of appreciation of the position of 
the Crown and the underlying forces of the relationship. Although it could 
later. justify its attitude by pointing to the change in the Crown's 
position with India's. entry into the Commonwealth in 1949, this arrangement 
did not alter the position of the older Dominions, or the need to 
appreciate the meaning, of the Crown in those countries. Common interests 
could lead to close alliances but, as Halifax stressed, there was a 
fickleness to. political perceptions of joint interests, whereas the 
Commonwealth had been founded on a basis which might at times appear 
less relevant, than other factors, but could have a more enduring effect. 
(The, second despatch from the Washington Embassy, which arrived after 
the F. O. 's programme had been drafted, confirmed rather than supplemented 
the other discussions. However it does provide an interesting comparison 
with Lord Halifax's speech in Toronto in January 1944 and will be studied 
in that connection. ) 
169 
Opinions on Commonwealth collaboration and plans to improve it are 
difficult to separate into a strictly chronological order, or place into 
distinct categories. Many aspects mentioned will recur in connection 
with statements made by Commonwealth leaders and in the talks at the 
May 1944 Meeting. While emphasis has been given here to the F. O. 's 
proposals, plans were also being developed in the D. O. These will be 
given consideration in the context of the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting. 
168. Minute by Newton, 2nd March 1944, F0371/42674, W2370/1103/68. 
169. Halifax to Eden, 14th A ril 1944, F0371/42674, W6458/1103/68. 
See chapter 4, p. 227ff. 
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Emphasis is placed on the F. O. for two reasons; first because so 
much time was spent on this subject, not only within the D. I. D. 
The F. O. would clearly have more contact with the Dominions the more 
the latter voiced'their opinions in world councils; but these papers 
show that its interest went beyond what might have been expected. 
The second reason for concentrating on the F. O. 's plans lies in the 
motive behind its study. The cardinal point is that once the Office 
appreciated that'the Dominions would become increasingly active in world 
affairs-and tha't'-the U. K. was likely to have reason to call upon them 
for support, its objective was to increase the co-operation between members 
and its own role in this process. The F. O. thought not only of 
friendlier"relations, but of foreign policies closely aligned with 
that of the U. K. The early acceptance that the Commonwealth was unlikely 
to become a genuinely corporate body, a posture not necessarily welcome 
to the'U. K. ', "did not distract the F. U. from its task. Rather, it 
meant that it concentrated on a multitude of schemes "bythich the 
evolution of an Empire foreign policy would be facilitated". 
170 
w 
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170. Minute by Law to Eden, 25th April 1944, F0371/42674, W6723/1103/68. 
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Chapter Four 
Dominion Views on the Post-War World 
"By, 1943, with eventual victory insight, -Ministers and-officials 
in' the Dominions were turning their attention to the -future with the 
expectation that they should contribute towards international planning 
for-the post-war. Dominion plans ranged over the'establishment of an 
international organisation, the international, representation of the 
Commonwealth and the mechanisms of Commonwealth collaboration. Much 
of the impetus came from the Australian government. -. ",,; Its-Prime Minister, 
Mr. John Curtin, and-his Minister, ifor External Affairs, Dr.: Herbert 
Evatt, made a series of statements in 1943 andi-1944 about their views 
on the future. These, together with statements by spokesmen of-the--- 
other Dominions, provided the background to much-, of the'discussion at- 
the 1944 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting and assisted -in -informing 
members of the lines: along which the'other governments' 'policies were 
progressing. In some cases there were clear signs of modifications 
to proposals, in light of reactions'fröm other, members, and as Newton 
commented in' connection with a speech by Lord Halifax in Toronto, it 
was beneficial, for'. all. members to "learn how we respectively feel about 
such matters". ' At'the same time the major Powers were convening a 
series'of meetings'at which decisions'were taken which crucially -'r 
affected the future international environment. 
In January 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill had met at Casablanca. 
Their, discussions-included 
the status of, the, Free French, military 
strategy in both major theatres of war and 'the pledge of unconditional 
surrender as the'only'basis on which the allies' would accept-peace with 
the Axis Powers. (A phrase not included-in-the communique, but-, announced 
1, Minute by Newton, 2nd February 1944, F0371/38553, AN704/29/45. "--". 
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by Roosevelt in a press conference. ) In August those two leaders 
met again, this time in Quebec, and in. the predominantly bi-lateral 
discussions which took place they covered the issues of Italian surrender, 
the second front and Far Eastern strategy, as well as the "tube alloys" 
project, which pooled the resources of both countries in the research 
and, manufacture of the atomic bomb. Two months later the Foreign. 
Ministers of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A. and the U. K. met in Moscow where 
agreement was reached on important aspects of the post-war world. The 
Four Power Declaration pledged those governments, and China, to the 
creation of a general international organisation for the maintenance 
of peace and security; advisory commissions were agreed for Europe 
generally and Italy in particular; __ an 
independent Austria was accepted 
by all three; and co-operation on the. punishment of war criminals was 
, accepted. 
Then the leaders of the U. S. A., the U. K. and China met at 
Cairo. There the Far Eastern settlement was discussed, and the communique 
outlined, the territorial terms they would impose on Japan. At, the 
end of the year Roosevelt and Churchill met Stalin at Teheran to consider 
a great number of issues-concerning all theatres of warand. many aspects 
., of the peace settlement,.? :. 
A number of, meetings open to all the allied countries, to discuss 
issues such as Relief and Rehabilitation, had a bearing on the latter 
stages of the war as well as, the beginning of the peace. One such 
meeting was the Food,, and_Agricultural conference at Hot Springs, in June 
1943.. All, allied countries were invited to send delegates for the 
purpose of discussing policy which would, then be referred back to each 
Government. 
3 
However, during 1943 and the beginning of 1944 the. 
2. For fuller details of these conferences see Sir E. L. Woodward, 
British` Foreign Policy in the Second World War. 
3. For discussions on Hot Springs Conference see H. V. Evatt, Foreign 
Policy of Australia (speeches) (London, 1945), and J. W. Holmes, W"' 
The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order 1943-1957 
Vol. 1 (Toronto, 1979), pp. 47-52. 
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majority of the allies, including the Dominions, had virtually no'' 
part inthe decisions which were beginning to be made about the peace 
settlements and the general shape of the post-war organisation. Canada, 
which played host to the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in 
August 1943, was not exempt from this isolation even on that occasion. 
The * U. k, had' considered the role of the Canadian Government, (MacDonald, 
had written to the D. O. pointing out the delicate position in which 
King's government would be placed) and it had been suggested that King" 
and his principal military advisers should attend the plenary sessions, 
while allowing time for bi-lateral U. K. -U. S. discussions However, ` 
Roosevelt had vetoed this, anticipating requests from many other 
nations to attend if Canada were admitted. Consequently, talthough 
Canada-and the U. K. held discussions, and King and Rossevelt had 
a meeting, King and his Chiefs of Staff did not attend any-of the main 
meetings. Canada's participation was confined to King's'chairing a' 
press conference with the other two leaders, and entertaining them 'at 
two dinners. ' While Roosevelt was no doubt right to expect-other-nations 
to want-the right of entry, it is significant that King went to some 
lengths to assure both leaders that he was not pressing for` Canadian 
particip'ation and was confident that Roosevelt and Churchill would' 
ensure that adequate discussions would be held with the Canadian Staffs. 
This episode reflects the fact that King never attempted to claim anything 
like the same influence in the military policy-making of the allies as 
Menzies Or Curtin did. 
4 
w 
While 
the major Powers were meeting separately, the D. O. tried'to' 
ensure that the Dominions were kept informed of the U. K. 's policy and *'-'-' 
the dis,, u8Sions being held. In March 1943 it had initiated discussions 
11 with the F. O. to try and eisure that the Dominions were kept abreast of 
jY 
4. Cagadtan 
Documents, Vol. 9,1942-43, Nos. 234-239 and The Mackenzie Kin Record 
unc o 
PP" 527-560. (See chapter 2, p. 94 King's relative 
ncern for the higher strategic direction of the war. ) 
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events, 
5 but in the. case of top-level meetings, this inevitably meant 
that it could do little but provide them with information, about decisions 
already agreed upon. . The 
dominance by the major Powers of these early 
. or meetings and the scant attention they seemed to-pay, to the opinions 'of 
their lesser allies upset the Dominions, especially Australia;:, and'led 
them to voice their views publicly. - Speeches made by Dominion spokesmen, 
particularly Australian Ministers, -have- to be seen against this background. 
During the war,, as we have seen, Australian governments had pressed 
the U. K. for a greater share in. the. decision-making, -to which some 
accommodation had been made by acceptingkan accredited representative 
to the U. K. War Cabinet. 
6q 
In 1941-42 U. K. -Australian relations had, - 
reached their lowest-point, with added acrimony-over the deployment of 
troops. Coincidentally with this temporary rift in relations, the U. S. 
entered the war; and while, this fact would inevitably have led to close 
co-operation between Australia and th". U. S. A., the state of relations 
with the U. K. led. Australia to concentrate even greater attention on 
the U. S., than it otherwise might have done., The U. S. A. was a3Pacific 
Power and as the situation in the Far, East. worsened; Australia: had 
recognised the importance of relations between- the two. -,, It had 1j ' 
first placed a representative, in Washington in 1937, and established 
its own Mission there in 1939.7 
,. 
In the first two years, of the war- 
Menzies had urged Roosevelt to do all-he could to assist the-allies, 
especially during the crisis. of, May r June-1940,8 and when'Curtin assumed 
office the Far Eastern situation had further deteriorated, as had 
1 
Australia's contacts with the, U. S., and this was an obvious -consequence' 
5. See chapter 
6. See chapter 22 ' 
p. 105. .,. -. 
7. See chapter 11 
, 
pp* 86ff. 
p. ýand M. R. Megan, 'Undiplomatic Channels: Australia's e resentat ion in the 
8 
he United States 1918-193Historical Studies 1973, Vol. 1ST No. 60, pp. 610-630. .A ustralian 
380,384,4D°c nts, Vol. 3, Jan. -June 1940, Nos. '280,300,307, 
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of the U. S. A. 's entry into the war`,, quite apart from the difficulties 
with' the U. K. Moreover, 'in addition to a desire to co-operate closely 
with the U. 'S. A., Australia felt a need to try to change the tendency 
of the U. S. A. 'to regard all the Dominions as mere adjuncts of the U. K., 
usually addressed through' the U. K., (if at all) which was reflected 
by the fact that until 1943 relations with the Dominions were dealt 
with by the European Division of the State Department. By December 
194V Curtin' was' in"private contact with Roosevelt, appealing to him 
for assistance in meeting the defence of Pacific Islands; 
9, 
then at 
the end of the month Curtin wrote his article which said how Australia 
looked'to the U. S. 'for its main support in the Pacific battle. In the 
following year Australia continued to try and improve, its, relations, 
with the U. S. A., 'with Mr; Richard Casey (the Australian Minister in 
Washington) working hard to put across his Government's policies-'and 
an extended visit by Evatt-in June 1942.10 
However, Australia did not have a great-deal of success in its 
n 
political initiatives towards the U. S. A. ` Scope for itsparticipation 
on the`Washington Pacific'Council-was severely limited by Roosevelt, and 
Australian officials found it difficult to turn their closer: relations 
with American colleagues to any-practical advantage. "- A close relationship 
developed between Curtin and General MacArthur; (American Commander, 
in Chief in the Pacific) although some people have argued that this 
worked toýAustralia's disadvantage because of Curtin's-relinquishment 
of control of Australia's military forces to MacArthur; ... but from 1943- 
onwards there was. dissatisfaction over the deployment of Australian troops 
to ancillary campaigns, and some friction within Australia over the 
presence of American'troops. By March 1943, Curtin was acknowledging 
that Australia's opposition to America's policies in the Pacific had 
9. Curtin to Roosevelt, 13th December 1941, R. J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American 
Relations and the Pacific War, (Melbourne, 1977), p. I 10. Ibides pp. 58-63. 
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largely been ineffective, and in April a Department of External 
Äf fairs' memorandum was warning the Government of the likelihood of 
Austrälia being dominated in the Pacific by the U. S. and in need of 
some "European counter-weight". 
1Y 
The lack'of'consultation over the 
'Four Power Moscow declaration or the Cairo communique on the Far 
Eastern peace settlement, seemed only to have confirmed to Curtin's 
Government that the U. S. A. would not allow Australia the representation 
to which it felt entitled, and that the U. K. was a more reliable ally. 
Thereafter Australian pronouncements took on a more aggressive attitude 
towards the U. S. 
In the first few months of 1943 Evatt made various references to 
Australia's continuing desire to play an active role in the South-West 
Pacific. For instance at a press conference in Washington in April he 
said it_"would have special concern in the economic as well as the 
strategic arrangements of the PacifiS after the war. "12 In August 
Curtin declared that Australia had already achieved a place of respect 
within the international community, but that after the war it would be 
necessary to increase collaboration with Commonwealth countries and 
13 
other allies. Curtin followed this by stressing Australia's 
prominent position in the Pacific and its need for a voice in the 
decisions taken for that area, making particular reference to the likely 
14 
economic competition in the Far East and to the problem of bases there. 
11. R. J. Bell, op. cit., pp. 135-142, and C. Thorne, Allies of a King: 
United States, Britain and the War against J. pan, 1941-1945, (London, 
1978), pp. 364-365. Also John Robertson, 'Australian War Policy, 
1939-1945', Historical Studies Vol. 17. No. 69,1977, pp. 489-504, 
and C. Thorne, 'MacArthur, Australia and the British, 1942-43', 
Australian Outlook, April and August 1975, Vol. 29, Nos. 1&2. 
12. Speech by Evatt, quoted by Sir-R. Cross (U. K. High Commissioner to" 
Australia) in a report to the D. O., 18th February 1944, D035/1993, 
WR227/21. (Circulated to the War Cabinet on 29th March 1944 as 
WP(44)169, CAB66/48. 
13. " "Speech by Curtin, l4th`August 1943. 'See P. ' N. S. IMansergh, Documents 
and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. 1, p. 562. 
14. ' Ministerial statement by Evatt, 'Australia's War Aims', 14th October 
1943, H. V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia (speeches), (London, 1945), 
pp. 135-153. 
190 
In October 1943 Evatt made a major policy statement in the Australian 
House of Representatives in which he prefaced his remarks on the post- 
war settlement with the comment 
Australia's right to take part in all aspects of the 
post-war settlement being undoubted ... 
and went on to declare Australia's interest in Europe; "the centre 
of the British Commonwealth"; and its right to a voice in the measures 
taken to secure a lasting peace there. But the Pacific, especially 
the South and South-West Pacific, was the prime area of interest for 
the Australian Government, including the eventual settlement with 
Japan and the status of all'territories within the region. Evatt took 
up Churchill's suggestion for regional councils, provided they were 
subordinate to the world organisation, and proclaimed Australia's 
right to be heard in the decisions affecting the area because of its 
geographical position and its special knowledge, maintaining it had a 
contribution to make as well as an interest in the region. He did 
not conceive of an isolationist role for Australia, emphasising the 
need to associate any regional bodies with the central world council; 
he insisted on the need for a general world organisation, denouncing 
the prospect of a treaty of alliance between the three or four Great 
Powers. While agreeable to their taking a lead in the organisation, 
he said it was vital for the smaller states to be brought into the 
framework of a group of nations determined to give effect to the 
declared objectives of the United Nations. 
14 
Curtin and Evatt were determined that Australia should extend its 
international activity. Traditionally the Australian Labour Party had 
been extreme in its isolation, unconcerned for, and at times positively 
opposed to, an active foreign policy. The U. K. High Commissioner, Sir 
Ronald Cross, told Cranborne of the frequent occasions when Curtin had 
said it was useless for him to discuss with the U. K. post-war arrangements 
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until his own Party had modified its position. 
15 
, 
It might then 
be assumed that one of the reasons for the statements made by the 
two men was to impress upon their own followers the need to abandon 
their isolationism. Certainly in December 1943 Curtin determined 
to change Labour policy. At the triennial, Party conference, he 
appealed to his supporters to jettison their past attitude and support 
increased collaboration with all Australia's allies within. the United 
Nations. Curtin retained the Commonwealth as the principal vehicle 
and inspiration for further co-operation, and at the end of, the 
conference proposed two mot1ons; that the evolution of the Commonwealth 
had exemplified the manner in which autonomous nations could co-operate 
on matters of mutual-interest; that participation in the development 
of co-operation within the Commonwealth and with nations, of the, world 
generally, and Pacific nations in particular, should be subject to; 
the sovereign control of the Australian people, , 
Parliament and Government. 
16 
Cross described Curtin's speech as the "outstanding feature" of the 
conference. He reported that Curtin had asked for, , a, 
free hand in 
external affairs and had been completely successful in, his. bid. Although 
the conference had been private, the Prime Minister had given the full 
text of his speech to the press who had awarded it an.. appreciative 
reception. Cross said that the only dissenting voice. had come, from 
Menzies who described the speech as a "complete. disappointment", 
containing nothing which had not been fact, for the; country or the, 
Commonwealth for years, and criticised Curtin, for. not travelling abroad 
more often and for failing to consult with his Commonwealth colleagues. 
The High Commissioner agreed that there was little novelty in Curtin, 's 
speech, but emphasised that its significance lay in being delivered to 
15. Cross to Cranborne, 13th January 1944, WP(44)136, CAB66/47. r 
16. Speech by Curtin, 14th December 1943, P. N. S. Mansergh, Documents 
and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. 1, 
pp. 563-565. 
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the Labour Party conference'and in"the reception which it received' 
from'those members. Even Menzies agreed that signifying'as it did 
,a reversal in Labour policy, the 'speech was to be welcomed. 
17 
", In-addition to these policy statements, Evatt conceived of a more 
positive demonstration of Australia's intention to`make its weight 
felt in Pacific affairs, "while at 'the same'time showing the solidarity 
of the two antipodean Dominions. Contact between Australia and New 
Zealand had'gradually increased as they each extended their foreign 
affairs activities. In December 1938, for instance, Mr. Savage, 
the New Zealand Prime Minister, had'contacted the'-Australian leader, 
Mr. Lyons, advocating discussions about closer liaison between the 
two courtries, and in March 1939 Lyons confirmed Australia's willingness 
to exchange information. In July 1940 we find Mr. Peter Fraser, 
18 
Savage's successor, telling of his views on the Fax Eastern situation 
and stressing the importance he attached to exchanges of view. 
19 'At 
this point there was no formal mechanism of consultation, ' and no" 
interchange of High Commissioners. There was a submission by the 
Australian Minister for External Affairs, in August 1940 for an inter- 
change of officials with'New Zealand, but although this was accepted in 
principle, it was not implemented. 
20 
The U. O. had the impression 
that in the early years of the war New Zealand generally took the 
initiative in seeking co-operation, and New Zealand suggestions in 
March 1941 for a Council of Ministers or periodic meetings of Ministers 
were only rather grudgingly taken up in an agreement to form a joint 
Supply committee by Mr. A. Fadden the Acting Prime Ministers. He 
CÖmntented to Menzies who was visiting London that New Zealand had given 
. 18. , 
4* 6, Coh3 
Savage to Lyons, 22nd December 1939, Australian Documents Vol. 1, 
No. 335. Lyons to Savage, 3rd March 1939, Australian Documents Vol. 
2, No. 35, and New Zealand Documents Vol. 1, App. 3. 19" Fraser to Menzies, 30th July 1940, Australian Documents Vol. 4, No. 42. zp" Memorandum by Minister of External Affairs, Mr. J. McEwan, 13th 
August 1940, Australian Documents Vol. 4, No. 71. 
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the arrangement greater importance than "the circumstances warranted". 
21 
The New Zealand official war historian describes how it was common for 
the two governments to discuss issues before sending their comments to 
London and how with the accession of Curtin's Labour Government in 
Australia closer collaboration grew up between two likeminded governments, 
although this did not always mean an identity of views. 
22 The two 
countries exchanged High Commissioners in February 1943. In October 
1943 Evatt proposed talks between the two about the future of the j 
Pacific, stating that Australia and New Zealand should be the foundation 
of the British sphere of influence in the South and South-West Pacific 
and that the future of both depended upon having a decisive voice, in 
the area. 
23 
This led to an invitation to a conference at Canberra 
in January 1944. 
With the background of the Moscow Declaration and the Cairo 
communique, about which Australia had been informed but not consulted, 
Evatt's initiative to call a conference seems to have stemmed from a 
desire to ensure the unity of the two countries in pressing their agreed 
views in London, Washington and elsewhere. 
24 
The announcement of the 
meeting described it as being for the purpose of preliminary discussions 
on the South and South-West Pacific before consultations with other 
Powers. (By this time the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers had 
been fixed for May 1944). Evatt was the principal architect of the 
conference, with the rest of the Australian Cabinet having only a vague 
idea of what was intended. It had been pointed oUt that Curtin was 
only told of Evatt's proposals to produce a formal agreement at a late 
21. Minute by Shannon, 25th January 1944, D035/1991, WR227/16; Australian 
Government to Mr. Anthony (N. Z. Minister without Portfolio), 4th 
March 1941, and Fadden to Menzies, 11th April 1941, Australian 
Documents Vol. 4, Nos. 329 and 398. 
22. F. L. W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War: Political and External 
Affairs, (Wellington, 1971), pp. 310-312. 
23. Ibid. and P. Hasluck, The Government and the People Vol. 2.1942-1945, 
(Canberra, 1970), p. 479. (For details of the development of Australia 
and New Zealand External Affairs Department see P. Hasluck, Diplomatic 
Witness: Australian Foreign Policy 1941-1947, (Melbourne University 
Press, 1980), pp. 3-16 and op. cit., pp. 304-308. 
24. P. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 111. 
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stage when his approval was necessary. From Paul Hasluck's account 
of events. it appears that Evatt had only envisaged, themeeting 
agreeing to a series-of resolutions, but that the day after the 
conference began, Evatt suggested to his senior officials that'a 
formal agreement should be concluded. 
25 
"1. 
The New Zealand Delegation received a series of papers' prepared 
by-the Australian External Affairs Department, with which they - 
substantially agreed. 
26 
The delegates negotiated a. formal agreement 
which did go beyond the original description of the meeting, not least 
because it was not confined to Pacific policy, but dealt with more 
general issues and, like several-of-Curtin's and Evatt's-speeches, ' 
stressed the right of the Dominions-to representation. " Clause seven 
read: I 
The two Governments declare that they have vital interests 
in all preparations for any armistic ending the present 
hostilities or anyfpart thereof and also in the arrangements 
subsequent to any such armistice, and agree that their 
interests should be protected by representation at the ' highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies. 
27 
and the agreement proposed a regional defence zone in their area which 
would be part of a general system of world security. The Governments 
stressed the "cardinal importance" of their association in the planning 
and the establishment of this international body which had been heralded 
by the Moscow Declaration. The agreement did give emphasis to Far 
Eastern subjects and noted that the wartime construction and use of 
bases did not afford any territorial rights or. claims of sovereignty 
in peacetime and stated that as interested parties, Australia and New 
Zealand should be consulted on the disposal of all enemy territories 
and any change of sovereignty in the Pacific. In addition to the security 
25. T. Reese, 'The Australia-New Zealand Agreement, 1944 and, the United States', Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, 1966, Vol. 4, 
pp. 3-15 and P. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 112. 26. Reese, o . cit. 27. Text of Australia-New Zealand Agreement 21st January 1944, D03S/1214, WR227/11 or ii. V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, pp. 179-188. 
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zone, the agreement proposed a South Seas Regional Commission, -to, further 
the welfare and advancement of the native peoples, on which they and 
other colonial Powers would be represented. With a view to continuing 
close co-operation between the two governments, machinery for joint 
collaboration was set up to cover foreign, defence, economic and 
colonial policy, including the establishment of a joint secretariat. 
The mostinbitious aspect of the agreement was the proposal to convene=, 
a conference of all nations with interests in the South and, South West 
Pacific -the U. K., the U. S. A., France, the Netherland and Portugal - 
in Canberrt to discuss -the problems of security, post-war development 
and native welfare. "This, together--with the Antipodeans', claim to 
be heard in the general armistice arrangements, does seem to have 
been specifically directed towards the U. S. A. and its reluctance to 
take note of Australia's views or allow it`to'participate in key 
discussions. Thorne describes the agreement as "clearly directed, 
in'the main against United States' high-handedness", and Reese observes 
that it v: as a reaction to Australia's concern at U. S., dominance of 
the Pacific028 ` 
The Australian delegation was the more ambitious in its proposals, 
with the New Zealand delegation hesitantly agreeing to a formal 
agreement and toning down some of Australia's suggestions. Fraser 
informed the U. K. High Coxnissioner in Wellington, Sir Harold Batterbee, 
that he was slightly nervous of American reactions, but this had not 
diminished his resolve to sign the Agreement. 
29 Fraser was not 
easily persuaded'to act against his willand despite the fact that 
Evatt seemed to regard New Zealand as a "fruitful seconder of his motions" 
the New Zealand-Australia 
relationship did not always work so smoothly 
for Evatt, because Fraser and Nash (Deputy Prime Minister) held strong 
28 Ce Thorne, 
Allies of a Kind, p. 480; and Reese, op. cit. 29. . Reesea o cit. 
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ettitudes. 
30" 
New Zealand agreed with the clauses in the agreement, 
but left to its own'devices might not., have, publicised them in the 
same way. It was the New Zealand delegations which insisted that 
a report ofthe conference should be scut to London-in order not to 
offend the U. K. or those who might fear that the Commonwealth was being 
undermined, 
31 
The U. K. certainly had little advance notice that the two governments 
were seeking an agreement. Cross told the D. O. that he knew about 
the meeting from his colleague in New Zealand, Batterbee, only two 
weeks before it met; when he enquired of the Australian Government 
he was told that it was'for preliminary discussions on local-issues. 
On the third day of the conference, January 19th, Cross saw press reports 
referringrto:, issues of more general significance and soughta meeting 
with Curtin, when he was-informed that Australia and Net; Zealand were 
contemplating signing an agreement: 
32, 
On 19th January several messages 
were"exchanged between the D. O. and the High Commission-in-Canberra 
about this revelation,, with Cross-trying to, recoup the position by 
getting Curtin's assurance that Australia would announce that the 
first-objective would be'to hold'consültationsýwith the U. K.,. when, 
the agreement'was made public. While-, the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments did inform the U. K., on 25th January about the-details, of'the 
agreement (the day it'was publicly'announced); ý`explaining that'they 
desired-tö protect their interests in'Europe and the-Pacific at the 
highest levels and that they wanted a share in the planning, Curtin 
neglected"to-include'in`his speech the two governments' intention'. of 
seeking-immediate-consultations with the U. K. --before holding-talks with 
any other countries. -Curtin told Cross thatýhe had overlooked this 
30. Batterbee to D. -O. -, -ist-February 1944, D035/1214, WR227/10; P. " 
Hasluck-, Diplomatic Witness, *pp. '109-110. 
31. Reese, op. cit. 
32. Cross to Cranborne, 27th January 1944, D035/1993, WR227/21. 
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in the hurried preparation of his speech. 
33 
In his detailed account, Cross emphasised the lack of information 
him self and his staff were provided with, and commented: 
there has throughout been an atmosphere of secretiveness 
both on the part of Ministers and officials which must 
,, have been a deliberate policy firmly impressed on all 
concerned. 
He thought this had been due to Evatt's 
personal desire to burst upon the world with what he 
regards as a development in British Empire relations 
and to appear as the author of a foreign policy which 
was obviously free from overseas influence, an attitude 
with which the Prime Minister must at a later stage have 
agreed. 
Cross thought it possible that Curtin did not know originally what Evatt 
was planning; however, it made "immense demands upon, one's credulity" 
to suppose he was as ignorant as he had protrayed. 
34_ 
This episode 
makes startling reading as a description of communication between 
two Commonwealth governments. The explanation may lie partly. in 
relations between the U. K. High Commission and the Australian government. 
Hasluck says that Australia's omission to inform London about the 
agreement was "not deliberate", and comments that Cross "was. one of the 
less, successful occupants of that post" who saw himself as the "guide 
and mentor with whom the colonials should seek to have consultations". 
He adds that with very little exertion Cross could have found out much 
more than he did and kept his government better informed. 
35 
Two 
years earlier, when Labour came to power, Cross certainly sent some 
conviction that a unusual reports back to London which indicated hit. 
, 
virulent anti-British campaign was being conducted by Australian Ministers 
and he advocated stern sanctions in economic matters as a way of forcing, 
Australia to co-operate more fully with Britain. As one historian 
has commented, Cross' appointment did not help Anglo-Australian 
33. Cross to D. O., 19th January 1944; Australian/N. Z. Governments to 
U. K. 25th January 1944, ibid., and Cross to D. O. 26th January 1944, 
D035/1989, WR227/12. 
._,., 11 11 34. Cross to D. O., 26th January 1944, D035/1993, WR227/21. 
35. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 117. 
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relations. 
3ý' 
No doubt Cross would have received more co-operation 
during the Australia-New Zealand conference if he had previously 
established good relations with Ministers and officials. 
Cross told the D. O. that he suspected Curtin of knowing more than 
he had revealed; that Evatt could not have failed to divulge his 
intentions. We have seen how Evatt decided only on 18th January to 
ask for an agreement, at which point he did seek Curtin's approval, 
but the relationship between these two Ministers is interesting. -There 
is evidence to suggest that Curtin was not especially interested in 
foreign affairs. He certainly did not travel abroad to discuss 
with other leaders very often, and it was the opinion of the New 
Zealand delegation to the conference in January 1944 that Curtin was 
uninterested in most of the discussions and in overseas affairs 
generally. 
37 
Cross suggested to the D. O. that relations between 
Curtin and Evatt were not good, that there was a tendency for them 
each to work in "watertight compartments". 
38 However, Hasluck thinks 
that Curtin appreciated Evatt's abilities, while knowing that he needed 
watching. Nine months before, when Evatt was leaving for the U. K. 
and the U. S., Curtin seems to have attempted to control Evatt when 
he advised him against wakening "disfavour by forcible intrusion". 
39 
It is clear in 1943 and afterwards that Evatt was the dominant and 
initiating force in Australian foreign policy and that Curtin was content 
to allow this. However, this does not signify any disagreement between 
the two, or any lack of authority on Curtin's part. It is possible 
that Curtin used his brilliant, but abrasive, External Affairs Minister 
as a foil to his own role of honest, solid broker. The Americans tended 
to hold contrasting views of the two'ien, generally disliking Evatt, 
36. C. Thorne, 'MacArthur, Australia and the British, 1942-1943', 
Australian Outlook, April and August 1975, Vol. 29, Nos. 1&2. 
(See chapter 2, pp. 112-113. ) 
37. Batterbee to Cranborne, 9th February 1944, D035/1993, WR227/21. 
38. Cross to D. O., 19th January 1944, Prem4,42/2. 
39. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 126, and C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 
p. 364. 
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n 
but holding Curtin in high regard. However, with gvatt', s, dominance 
over policy, and his attendance at so many meetings, other countries' 
views, and especially the U. S. A. 's, on Australian foreign policy became 
coloured by their personal reactions . towards 
Evatt, which often, had 
an adverse effect on Australia's foreign relations. 
40 At the major,., 
post-war meetings to which the smaller, Powers were invited, such as 
the San Francisco Conference, Evatt's style,, of diplomacy affected the 
outcome of Australian policy. 
41 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement caused a reaction in the, 
U. K. and the U. S. A. For two countries of the international stature 
of these Dominions to publish 
_a 
formal, agreement., on procedures for 
peace-making and announce their intention to organise a major conference, 
was running the risk of censure from the Great Powers for sheer 
arrogance, and a diplomatic snub of the first order. Coming after , 
many speeches by Curtin and Evatt in the same vein,. the conference 
proceedings left little room for confusion as to Australia's ambitions 
and these were now publicly shared by New Zealand. Cress informed 
the D. O. that Australia thought that the U. K. conceded too easily to 
U. S. proposals touching on the Pacific, without first consulting 
Australia, and he had been given to understand that the claims made 
for consultation in the Agreement were intended to, securelthat the p 
U. K. should not acquiesce to any U. S. proposals without prior. discussion. 
He quoted, Evatt's attitude as being "it needed saying. You couldn't 
say it. We could", and that this was a view frequently expressed in 
42 
Government circles. There"is an element of truth in Australia's 
claim, as the consequences of a rift in Anglo-American relations would 
have been far more damaging to the U. K. and the Commonwealth,, than U. S. 
40. See P. G. Edwards, 'Evatt and the Americans', Historical Studies 1959, 
-VoI.,. 18, No. 79, ýpp. 546-560. 
41. See chapter 7, p, 347-348. 
42. Cross to D. O., 26th January 1944, '-D035/1989', LLWR227/12. 
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irritation at Australian action, 'and this'view was shared by`the Head 
of the F. O. 's North American'Department.; Mr. Nevileßutler said the 
fbminions could say things to'the U. S. "which it would be most impolitic 
for London statesmen to say" and said he thought Casey (the Australian 
Minister in Washington) had been able to speak more-plainly in 1940-41" 
than Lord Lothian or'Lord Halifax., He said if the U. K. had issued 
the agreement it would have provoked angry discussions and possibly 
have had dangerous consequences for the settlement of Lend-Lease. But 
he thought there were occasions when it was inevitable that the U. S. 
should have their way 
if only in the major interest of the Prime Minister 
preserving his very special relations with President 
Roosevelt, and in the constant need for give and take 
as between e. g. American interests in Latin. America 
& our own in the Middle East. 43 
Butler also interpreted the Agreement as a movement away from the U. S., 
now the fear of invasion had receded, and concern at being too closely 
associated with the U. S. A. 
44 
The U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, replied to the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments acknowledging their desire to 
consult together on issues of common concern but said he was "frankly 
disturbed" at the suggestion of an e x1y conference. He argued that 
the war had still to be won and such a meeting would be premature, 
adding that Roosevelt and he were also worried that a formal conference 
would, be prejudicial to the united war effort: 
Such a conference might well arouse supicion. s and 
possibly bring into focus conflicting opinions on 45 
matters which do not require decision at this time. 
The other reservation entertained by the U. S. A. concerned the proposed 
regional security zone. It interpreted the Agreement as advocating 
such a zone before the establishment of a world security system, which 
it thought could jeopardise the latter. Hull ended with a request that 
43. Minute by Butler, 9th February 1944, F0371/42681, W2145/2145/68. 
44. Minute by Butler, 5th February 1944, ibid. 
45. Hull to Curtin and Fraser, 1st February 1944, D035/1990, WR227/15. 
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the countries took no further action until they had held talks with 
the President and himself in Washington. 
Hull's reply caused no surprise. The Dominions had admitted 
that the whole exercise had been largely directed against the U. S. 
and they did not expect it to be enthusiastic. Despite the questionable 
wisdom of such forthright speaking, Butler for one said that generally 
the U. S. A respected the tactic of hard trading. 
46 
Yet the reaction 
of the U. S. was not dissimilar to the U. K. 's. Both were irritated 
by the lack of consultation, although on slightly different accounts, 
and neither welcomed'the prospect of a conference. The Permanent 
Under-Secretary of the D. O., Sir Eric Machtig, noted his misgivings: 
I do not for a moment suppose that the Government here 
are anxious to take part in a Conference in the Pacific 
with foreign countries about the Pacific. The Prime 
Minister's view will probably be that such issues ought, 
to be dealt with here ed between him and the President 
in the first instance. 
This, of course, was precisely the view which the two Dominions were 
trying to counter. 
The initial reaction of the D. O. 
was 
one of astonishment at the 
two governments' publication of an agreement of such scope and import. 
Mr. Boyd Shannon, a Principal at the D. O. who wrote a detailed minute 
on the agreement, could not hide his amazement. , 
Referring to the 
claim in clause seven to representation at the highest, levels, of all 
armistice planning, he commented that if this meant representation on 
a level with the Great Powers, it was "absurd". He noted that the 
demand for a voice in the establishment of the world organisation had 
also been made by the Canadian Government, but more moderately,, and that 
although the U. K. agreed with the statements about bases, it had not,,; x 
found it necessary to say it "so bluntly". The section on trusteeship 
would, Shannon thought, appear to the C. O. -and the other colonial countries 
46. Minute by Butler, 5th February 1944, F0371/42681, W2145/2145/68. 
47. Minute by Machtig, 27th January 1944, D035/1989, WR227/12. 
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"as an impertinent claim by two very minor countries with a few 
island dependencies of whose administration they have not made a 
conspicuous success", and his patience., was, finally stretched to the 
limit with the proposal-for a conference. He wrote; 
the declaration by a small country. of an intention toer".. 
convene a Conference including Major Powers, without 
first consulting any of the other Governments, is an 
extraordinary and impudent way of conducting affairs. 
Assessing the agreement as a whole for the Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir 
John Stephenson, Shannon concluded: 
But when all allowances have been made it remains a 
deplorable monument-of egregious amateurism in international,;: y, 
affairs. It will not; I think, prove helpful to the 
Commonwealth Government or to Dr. Evatt personally, in 
international affairs. It is too early yet to judge 
whether, it-will, have any adverse effect on British policy., 
48 
After submitting a draft to the War Cabinet, -Cranborne. replied-to the 
two Dominions in a"cautious and tactful manner. -. -He did not, 
labour 
the-U. K. 's annoyance at the-lack of consultation, but was not enthusiastic 
about'many aspects of the Agreement, stressing the importance, of 
ensuring the success of a general world security system before any 
local arrangements were concluded, and emphasising theinterests of 
the other Powers. r. 
' However, the U. K. 's, position was not helped by, a conversation ., 
between Cadogan and-the Counsellor, at, the U. S. Embassy,. Mr., Bucknell. 
The latter showed Cadogan a copy of, Hull's reply and'-asked for, guidance 
on the U. K. 's-attitude.,, Cadogan told him that although. the, U. K. had 
welcomed the-agreement, it'had doubts about,, the wisdom, of calling 
a conference, but he was uncertain whether the two Dominions had, or 
would'be, told'of these, adding that he could safely, tell, Bucknell, that 
they existed and that the U. K. saw the matter__in,, the. same- light _as. 
the. 
48. Notes on Australia-New Zealand Agreement and Minute by Shannon, both 
of 25th January 1944, D035/1214, ý'-WR227/11. 
203 
U. S. 
49 
The D. O. was not pleased with Cadogan's remarks which 
Machtag described as "a little unfortunate". He argued that the 
War Cabinet had approved the reply given to the Dominions, while the 
U. S. had been given the impression that the U. K. Government concurred 
with the U. S. against the two Dominions. Machtig was also worried 
that the Dominions would hear of the episode and object. Cranborne 
agreed that the conversation could have been phrased rather better 
and thought that the almost identical replies to the two Dominions 
would make them suspicious of collusion. The only option was to 
stress that. there had been no communication with the U. S. Government, 
as he had already done to Mr. Walter Nash, the visiting New Zealand 
Minister,. and to instruct the U. K. 's High Commissioners to repudiate 
any` suggestions of collusion. Evatt did comment to Cross on the 
similarity of the replies, stating that it looked as if there had 
been consultations between the U. K. and the U. S. 
50 
If the D. O. did-not wish, to highlight the similarity between the 
n 
attitude of the U. S. and itself, neither did the F. O. intend to be pushed 
by the Dominions into any friction with the U. S. A. Australia's 
reply to. Hull demonstrated no softening of attitude. The suggestion 
that the New Zealand Government should send an identical reply Fraser 
turned down as being likely to cause offence. 
51 
Evatt challenged U. S. 
objections to Australia's calling an early conference and reasserted 
its right', to be consulted. It did agree to talks in Washington in 
May,. but also mentioned July as a possible date for the conference, 
52 
as the Head of the D. I. D., Mr. Greenway, commented, Evatt did not 
"mince his words". 
53 
Butler warned his colleagues against being. drawn 
49. Minute by Cadogan, 10th February 1944, F0371/42681, W2483/2145/68. 
50. Minutes by Machtig, 14th February 1944, D035/1990, WR227/15 and 
Cranborne 18th February 1944, D035/1991, WR227/16. 
51. Batterbee to D. O. 26th February 1944, D035/1990, WR227/15. 
52. Evatt to Hull, 24th February 1944, F0371/42677, W3317/1534/68. 
53. Minute by Greenway, 2nd March 1944, ibid. 
!I3 
204 
,.. 
into an anti-American stance by Evatt "whose intrigues with the 
Republican Party and general behaviour made him persona7ingratissima 
to Pres Roosevelt and his Administration". Butler recorded that in 
1942 Evatt had acted badly towards Roosevelt and said that since Evatt 
was clearly the author of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement which 
had been sprung at such short notice on themselves and the U. S., it 
would not be necessary to "hasten to support him". Butler obviously 
did not trust Evatt and seemed to suspect him of calling a conference. 
in order to manoeuvre an alignment o£, the U. S. and China on one side, 
and the British Commonwealth on another, a situation to be avoided, 
or at least deferred. 
54 
However, there was no substantial difference 
in the attitudes of the D. O. and F. O.; rather, their perspectives 
were different. The D. O. saw the danger that the Dominions might 
suspect or find evidence of any collusion with the U. S., while the F. O. 
was more concerned to ensure that the U. K. 's relations with the U. S. 
were not damaged by the actions of the Dominions. On the whole the 
conference and the agreement were not prejudicial to the U. K. 's interests. 
The Cabinet, though regretful at the lack of consultation, thought that 
the events might be useful, especially the public statement of the 
Dominions' interest in the defence of the Pacific. Mr. H. 0. Clarke, 
an official in the F. O. 's North American Department, suggested that it 
was encouraging in terms of the world influence of the Comonwealth, 
and Butler thought parts of the text had served as a useful reminder 
to the U. S. A. For its part, the U. S. A. did not,, suspect the U. K. of 
using the Dominions to launch an attack on it, but seemed to accept 
the responsibility of the Dominions. The two Dominion Prime Ministers 
accepted the offer of talks with the President immediately prior to the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, and Shannon commented that the 
54., Minutes=by Butler,, lst March 1944, F0371/42681, W2762/2145/68, and 
2nd March 1944, F0371/42677, W3317/1534/68. (See P. G. Edwards, 
'Evatt and the Americans', Historical Studies 1979, Vol. 18, No. 73. ) 
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U. K. could leave "the further disillusionment" of Curtin and Fraser 
to the Americans. 
55 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments had made some positive 
comments in the agreement which were relevant to the prevailing 
situation. They knew full well that the major Powers were planning 
and taking decisions which would affect the peace settlement and they 
also knew that the smaller allies' Y-lp was still required in the final 
stages of the war. Moreover, if they said nothing until the end of 
the fighting, a great number of decisions would already have been taken 
which would prejudice any final settlement about the peace, or the 
world organisation. These two were upholding the right of the smaller 
allies to have their views considered and protect their interests 
before it was too late. Hull's assertion that an early conference 
could cause unnecessary disunity among the allies was possibly right; 
but Evatt regarded such a process not as unnecessary, but as the only 
way of making the U. S. take notice and "avert the grave risk of 
insufficiently considered decisions which ... could prejudice a 
final peace settlement. "56 
``I 
Given the worries of the Australian and New Zealand government 
both as to the scale of the U. S. activity in the Pacific, and the 
tendency of the major powers to settle outstanding questions without 
due regard to the views and interests of others, was there any chance 
of gaining a real voice in the decision-making? Did either Dominion, 
or both together, have any chance of getting the principles laid down 
in the agreement put into practice? Politicians and officials of both 
countries realised that regardless of the justice of their claims, 
or the amount of noise they made, they were incapable on their own of 
affecting the decisions to any great degree. But the sentiments 
55. Minute by Shannon, 26th February 1944, D035/1991, WR227/16. 
56. Evatt to Hull, 24th February 1944, F0371/42677, W3317/1534/68. 
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expressed by Evatt and Curtin in their public speeches, and in the 
Agreement with New Zealand, were not wholly expressions of vain 
aspirations, because they were combined with a scheme for strengthening 
the unity of the Commonwealth so that individual 'members would have' the 
power, to act with the knowledge that the support and power'of'the whole 
organisation was behind it. Many of the changes desired by the 
Australians were designed to improve collaboration; the result of; -all 
the changes was''to make'the Commonwealth a more cohesive body which 
had the capacity to be a major force- in international affairs. 
In contrast to past noýions`for'ýstrengthening the unity of the, 
Commonwealth, Cnrtin's government did not envisage a tightly-knit 
corporate body with common policies conceived-1in'London, with the 
rest" of the members playingYa supportive role: 'Nor were there any 
plans for an' Imperial- Parliament or Cabinet`; '` and, in ý considering his 
plans wwmustkeep in mindithe"second motion Curtin"proposed'to his 
party conference; that'co-operation within'the'Cominonwealth, with 
the`nations'of'the world generally', and those'of the , Pacific in'particular, 
should be subject to the sovereign control"of the Australian people; 
Parliament, and'Government. 57 ..,, $ 
In'his'August'speech, Curtin followed-his commitment to increased, 
collaboration generally with an'assertion that some'forni f imperial' 
consultation had to be developed: 
I do not believe that Britain can manage the'Empire on the'--T' basis purely of a government sitting in London. I believe 
some'Imperial authority must be evolved so that the, British Commonwealth of Nations will have, if not an executive body, at least a standing consultative body. 58 
The progress in communication meant that meetings could be more frequent, 
it being possible for members to have immediate consultations when an' 
57., Curtin's motion to the Australian Labour Party Conference, 14th December 1943, P. N. S. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. 1, pp. 563-565. 58. Curtin speech of 14th August 1943, ibid., p. 562. 
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urgent matter arose. In September Curtin expanded on his Ideas for 
the post-war Commonwealth. Ile suggested a Council, on the lines of 
the Pacific War Council, which would, ronsist of representatives of 
all members, possibly High Commissioners replaced at times by'Ministers 
which, befitting the equal status 
of. all members, would not confine its 
meetings to London. To enable this-Council to function properly a 
Secretariat was envisaged consisting of men as expert in the problems 
of peace as'those then advising the councils were in war. 
The most detailed outline of Curtin's plans for the Commonwealth 
was delivered to his party conference, and then issued to the press. 
To his followers he spoke of, the Commonwealth moving into its fourth 
era where the independent peoples would be associated in a common policy 
on matters which were of common concern. , 
Once again, -no 
doubt-, with, a 
mind-to his, critics elsewhere in the,. Commonwealth, he stressed that 
the. aim was full and continuous consultation which was consistent,: 
with the sovereign control of each government over its policy. Curtin 
upheld the periodic meetings of Prime Ministers as the principal element 
of the machinery, for "no one else can speak with the same authority"., 
Ministerial meetings would discuss such questions as. trade or communications. 
In, the background to these channels would be accredited representatives, 
of each member to their partners, which Curtin saw as a vital personal 
link that could supplement the frequent correspondence between-them. 
The High Commissioners could also be ready to represent its government 
on any specialised committee which considered, issues of special 
Commonwealth interest, such as the Committee of Imperial Defence in 
London. 
These methods of collaboration would involve men already accepted 
as part of the machinery of Commonwealth co-operation, although the 
participation of High Commissioners in the sub-committee would have 
brought a change in their status. The establishment ofra Secretariat 
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to the Imperial Coiifvrcnce wau the most novel aspect of his plans. 
Curtin gave a precise descripLian of its functions. It would] consist 
of officials of all members and be based in London, but move according 
to the place of meeting. 
It would be responsible for seeing to the preparation and 
presentation of information on subjects to be considered 
by the Conference from time to time. It would have regard 
to the completion of action or resubmissions to the Conference. 
It would provide the Conference with an agency for continuity 
in its detailed work which is important in view of changes 
which occur in governments and Prime Ministers. 
To reassure those who might fear the creation of a 'super bureaucracy', 
Curtin added the condition that 
The Secretariat would not supersede the present established 
direct channels of communication between governments though 
its members would be directly responsible to their respective 
Ministers. "'` 
Thus the' Commonwealth wasyto continue as an'association based on inter- 
governmental co-operation, with no body'standing above each national 
Parliament. The Heads of Government"would meet to discuss issues` 
which were of common interest"to all and would be supported by a body 
of`officials;, but neither the politicians nor the officials would 
possess any corporate powers, merely the inclination to reach a consensus 
on policy. Curtin's'plans anticipated by some twerty-twO years the 
Commonwealth Secretariat eventually established in 1965. The Australian 
government hoped that by strengthening the Commonwealth machinery it 
would not only achieve closer co-operation, but also the elevation of 
each member's status. As he announced in September 1943: 
The place Australia will occupy in the Paci Lic after the war 
can never be the same as it was up to 1939 and she must have 
available the advantage of concerted Empire policy if she is to 
be a Power to stand for democracy in the South Pacific. 
Similarly the power of Britain as a force for peace in the 
future will be strengthened in the world if the firm voice 
against potential aggressors comes from the Empire, and not 
merely from London. °" 
Evatt echoed his Prime Minister's conception of the future Commonwealth. 
He announced to Parliament that membership of the Commonwealth, the 
59. Curtin speech of 14th December 1943, ibid., pp. 563-65. 
60. Curtin speech of 6th September 1943, ibid., p. 563. 
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retention of ties of loyalty with the throne, and the affections which 
united everyone of British kin, were fundamental'to Australia's foreign 
policy. It was because of those basic tenets that his government 
placed so much emphasis on improving the machinery of consultation, 
and he referred to Curtin's "positive suggestion" as providing a 
possible solution to the problem. 
61 
If Curtin and°Evatt agreed on 
the desirability of improving Commonwealth, collaboration, however, 
it was perhaps strange that the conference with, New Zealand, was 
characterised by so singular a lack of consultation with their, fellow 
members. The British High commissioner in Canberra had not been fully, " 
informed of the scope of the subjects to be-discussed, and there had,,,,, 
been no consultations with either the U. K. or the rest of the-Commonwealth 
before publication. 
62 
The Australian Government explained that YR 
consistently with their intention to speak more plainly to, the U. S. 
it would have been impossible. to have discussed the, agreement with the 
U. K. Such consultations would have embarrassed the U. K. which would 
have had to ask for modifications in the text. This was true, as 
63 
Butler had realised, and one can assume that. consultations with, Canada 
would have seen the same result. 
Two distinct strands stand out in the Australian Government's,, 
discussion of the post-war world. First, its position as a small power 
in aregion dominated by one of the Great Powers, and second, its 
membership of the British Commonwealth. The Government's planning. 
was designed to cover both aspects: of its foreign,, identity, as Evatt 
outlined to Parliament: "_ 
61. Evatt speech to House of Representatives, 14th October 1943,. 
H. V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, p. 148. 
62. Batterbee to D. O., 1st February 1944, D035/1214,. WR227/10. 
63. Cross to D. O,, 18th February 1944, D035/1991, WR227/16. 
210 
There are two means open for expression of the Australian 
Governments' views on international affairs. One is by 
, consultation within the British Commonwealth with a view 
to joint action. The other is by the exercise, where that 
is thought appropriate, of Australia's distinct international 
status. Both these means haave to be used to ensure that 
reasonable Australian requirements are satisfied. 
64 
There'were likely to be occasions for Australian action on an'issue which 
did not concern the rest of the Commonwealth, or only New Zealand, 
and one would assume from Evatt's statement that it would-then`'ütilise 
its own international position. However, Australia was moving towards 
a form of Commonwealth unity where, in instances where there was not 
an issue of common interest, one member could act in a particular region 
with the knowledge that it possessed the full support of the Commonwealth. 
Such a conception did not necessarily require any form of joint action. 
Rather, it became a question of confidence, both-within the, 'association 
and-as transmitted to the rest of the world. If this coüld-be achieved 
the two aspects of Australia's status could be reconciled to some 
extent, and its external policy made more effective. 
With the publication of the agreement, and the ensuing discussions, 
the scene was set as far as the Australian and New Zealand governments 
were concerned for the Prime Ministers' conference in'May. '' By their 
public announcements the two governments had offered the rest of the 
Commonwealth much food for thought, even if the methods were not 
universally approved of. The U. K., Canadian and South African governments 
each had their own views on their individual positions in the post-war 
world and that of the Commonwealth as the Australiap and New Zealand 
governments found when they arrived in London in May. 
Among the Dominion Prime Ministers, Field Marshal Smuts looked to 
the peace settlements and the arrangements for the post-war world with 
the degree of objectivity and a disinterestedness befitting aýstatesman 
who had contributed so much to the 1919 settlement. Smuts had been 
64. Evatt speech to House of Representatives, 14th October 1943, op. cit., 
p. 147. 
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more closely connected with the prosecution of,. the war than the other 
Dominion leaders and might have been expected to play a significant 
role in' the peace-making, or at-least in.. the formulation of the, policy 
which the U. K. "and perhaps the U. S. -would follow towards the. Russians. 
He-did'continue'to take arclose interest in foreign policy, and Mr., 
Heaton: Nicholls recalls that he'always made prompt observations on the.. 
information he'received from the U. K. Government. Smuts was also 
65 
keen to contribute towards the planning of the peace. alle told Lord, n k 
Harlech'in`February 1943'that hebanticipated an early end to the war 
in Europe and expressed his'ýdesire to get to London swiftly to 
participate in the formulation of, the post-war world.,. But, by the 
later stages-of-the war and the first years. of peace. Smuts. was 
increasingly pre-occupied by, domes tic, cors corsiderations. The Nationalist 
Partyrunder Malan's-leadership was increasing_in strength,, and mounting,. 
a fierce challenge on his, -Covernment, and. there was . the, interminable,,.. 
issue=of'the-status of Indians in-South Africa which took, up much of 
Smuts' time--and `energy until, hisfall from office. In 1945 he told.,,,, 
an old-friend-that it was only his sense-of duty., which would take him 
to"San' Francisco, for, he was badly needed in South Africa. 
66, Furthermore, 
by this 'time Smuts was approaching his mid-seventies, and: he,, 
-seemedýto retain his vigour remarkably well. 
67 
Though age, the 
illness of. his wife and, domestic-pre-occupations,. restricted his, 
participation, he did play. an . 
important- role at , 
San . Francisco , and when ,, 
`considering his'part in the immediate,, post-war, ygars. it is important,. 
to remember-that he was the-most influential. of all the Dominion Prime., 
Ministers, not merely in the U. K., but internationally. His relationship 
65. 
_G. _Heaton 
Nicholls, South Africa in My Time (London, 1961), p. 387. 
66. Harlech to Attlee, 1st February 1943, Avon Papers, F0954/4, Dom43/3; 
Smuts to M. C. Gillett; 4th March 1945. Smuts''Papers, Vol. 6, No. 662. 
67. Minute by Jebb, 19th December 1943, F03715-5443, U6254/1216/70. (He 
said he detected a note of tiredness in'Smuts' speech and a lack'of 
dynamic appeal. ) 
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with Churchill. was, in the words of Eden "incomparable", and he was 
one. offew whom Churchill respected intellectually., : This esteem 
was, shared by most U. K. Ministers., Eden recorded "there was no 
man living whose wisdom I respected more" and Nicholls remarks 
68 
that after Labour took power, Bevin was""always solicitousýof his (Smuts') 
good opinion and had remarked that he thought Smuts an even greater man 
than Churchill". 
69 
In November 1943 Smuts delivered a speech-to the Empire Parliamentary 
Association. He took that opportunity to voice "certain lines of 
thought which are running through`my mind. " They concerned the peace 
settlement, the alignment of powers after the war, the future of colonies 
and the questions, -of race and colour which would be dominant in the 
future. He warned his audience of-the dangers of oversimplifying the 
problems ahead, and trying"to find easy solutions, believing'that in 1919 
the leaders had rushed the peace settlement; if that error were repeated 
"we shall move to. even greater disasters than we have seen in the past. " 
To ensure careful consideration he thought it might be necessary to have 
a comprehensive armistice and., then-proceed by investigations and 
researches over along period, before a final solution was reached. 
7° 
Eight, months earlier, in a letter to his old friend M. C. Gillett, 
Smuts had bemoaned the fact that in 1919 the leaders had scrapped the 
vast amount: of; preparatory work which had been done. "It must'not be so 
again", he said, but feared that_it would. 
7' He cautioned his audience 
against simple,. prescriptions. for the Empire's problems of race, colour, 
culture and civilisation,, and said these called for wisdom, humanity'and 
farsightedness, and were onlylikely to be solved by trying different 
methods, over a. period of time. 
68. The Eden Memoirs Vol. 2. The Reckoning, p. 350 and p. 68. 
69. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 387. 
70. Smuts' speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association, 25th November 
1943, D035/1205, WF201/12. 
71. Smuts to Trygve Lie, 12th November 1942, Smuts' Papers Vol. 6, No. 584. 
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Smuts was concerned with the question of power and leadership. 
He referred to the cliches used during the'second war; that the 
democracies were fighting for freedom while the Axis fought for 
the leadership principle. Such catch-words would not help to secure 
a safe and stable future, for without leadership freedom was inadequate. 
Similarly he thought that the experience since 1919 had shown that 
universality and the avoidance of a Balance of rower did not solve 
the problem of world security. Idealism had reigned after the 
previous war and the fundamental question of power had been ignored; 
Smuts' advice for the coming, settlement was for them to continue to 
provide for freedom and democracy, but also to provide for leadership 
and power. Unlike other Dominion Prime Ministers Smuts wanted the 
Great Powers not merely to take a lead, but'to dominate certain aspects 
of the post-war world. He advocated a trinity, the U. K., the U. S. and 
the U. S. S. R., at the head of the United Nations and responsible in the 
first instance for maintaining security, a task which would not be 
affected by those duties resting on the other members of the United 
Nations. This arrangement would prevent a repetition of the debacle 
under the League of Nations, where "what was everyone's business in the 
end proved to be nobody's business". Apart from this alteration to 
the world organisation, Smuts praiseO-other aspects of the League of 
Nations and hoped that they would be continued, with an even heavier 
emphasis on economic factors which were crucial and had tended to be 
ignored in the past. 
70 A year earlier Smuts had outlined his views 
on the importance of Great Power leadership to Mr. Trygve Lie, Norway's 
Foreign Minister. He commented that the presence of a powerful, 
predatory power in the middle of Europe made the position of all other 
nations there precarious without a fully effective peace organisation. 
In the new world organisation it would be necessary for the Great Powers 
214 -- 
to take=the. lead, and assume the main burden of responsibility which 
they had failed to do after 1918. lleradded - -1- - 
The"'smaller powers will-no doubt, welcome this development- 
even if it may appear to affect their technical sovereign 
'rights. The'modern developments of war have'. brought about 
a far-reaching change in our7 ? ld-time concepts of 
=t" neutrality and sovereignty. 
In London the F. O. "had been-basing its plans for the futüre'on the 
primacy of the' Four- major Powers` (including' China) and generally:: agreed " 
with Smuts' point' about the need for. leadership by them. However, s; ro-v 
it had made room for representation by-other: states, 'not leasttbecause 
of. pressure from theýD. O., and the Head of-the F. O. 's Economic and 
Reconstruction-Department; Jebb, while welcoming Smuts' comment that 
universality was not'the answer. toi. theýworld's problems, thought it 
rash to'speak in terms of a trinity. 
72 
', Smuts-had suggested to-Lie 
that the-smaller powers would welcome the lead oUthe major ones. The 
other Dominions did not=deny the need for a lead, or that the Great 
Powers=would have to bear the major responsibility for keeping peace, 
but did not favour the dominance which Smuts seemed to be advocating. 
Perhaps-reflecting the tendency, of the other Dominion Prime Ministers 
to view issues from the point of view of the international status of 
their own countries-,, the Canadian'reaction'to Smuts' speech was 
disapproving., The U. K. Deputy High, Commissioner there, Mr. J. Garner, 
reported particular hostility to the speech for revealing a mind 
thinking 
in terms of the bad old days of balance of power and 
betraying a shameless advocacy of machtpolitik for the 
Great Powers. '-This is particularly offensive to Canada who 73 had always supported the rights of the smaller powers. 
72. Minute by Jebb, 19th December 1943, F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70. 
73.,. Garner to D. O,, _20th 
January 1944, D035/1205, WF201/12. 
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Nor was Smuts' plan well received by the opposition in South Africa. 
In a debate in the next session of Parliament where Malan used parts 
of the November speech against Smuts, one part of the motion stated 
that a stable and just peace was impossible by the "domination or so 
called leadership" of any combination of Great Powers supported by 
their armed forces. In that debate Smuts countered that Malan's 
solution meant a recreation of the League and all its inbuilt weaknesses. 
74 
One fact determining Smuts' convitction of the necessity for strong 
leadership was his conception of Europe at the end of the struggle. He 
thought that the shape of that continent would be drastically altered 
with three Great Powers disappearing; Germany, Italy and France, perhaps 
never to emerge again as a force in the world. That left the U. K. 
and the U. S. S. R. He described the Soviet Union as the "new Colossus", 
a fact that must be reckoned with "coldly and objectively". He 
recognised Russia as having the power to dominate Europe, not least 
because it was likely to be unchecked by Japan in the East, and so 
being in the position of power which no other European nation had ever 
achieved. The remaining state in Europe would be the U. K. and despite 
its achievements during the war and its great moral prestige, it 
would be'weak and poor. The retention of its Empire would continue 
its world base, but its European position would be weak and crippled. 
Smuts' picture of the future was therefore an extreme one; on the 
one side ', the Great Powers, on the other the small powers, with three 
major European states and Japan having been redu&ed to the lower ranks. 
As to the role of the Great Powers, he rejected an alignment between 
the U. K. and the U. S. on the grounds that it would be too powerful`a 
combination that would provoke opposition and international 
emnity. 
Instead, the three should lead the world together. Although this view 
74. Lord Narlech (U. K. High Commissioner in South Africa) to A. O. '25th 
. January 
1944, ibid. 
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of the future seemed to most people to be rather too severe, it was 
remarkably prescient. By the end of 1945, the situation corresponded 
quite closely to the vision he had outlined two years earlier. 
Having outlined the problems which the U. K. would counter as a 
result of its war effort, Smuts could not see how it could equal the 
U. S. and the U. S. S. R. and he thought this inequality was a destabilising 
factor, particularly for Europe. This view led him to suggest his 
most controversial plan - that the U. K. should strengthen its position 
by working closely with the small democracies'of western Europe. He 
pointed to the similarities between them and their vulnerability after 
the war. `He assumed they had realised that neutrality and isolation 
did not work, and that'to stand alone-in the future would be impossible. 
Instead, there existed in the form of the Commonwealth a"tried and tested 
s srt 
organisation, stable and permitting the closest co-operation and mutual 
security, while also allowing the retention of'full sovereign status 
and all the rights and'institutiöns which went with it. It was for 
the smaller democracies to decide, 'bait he thought they could help 
themselves 
by helping to create out of closer union with Great 
Britain 
a great European State, great not only in its worldwide.. 
ramifications, great not only as an Empire and a Commonwealth 
stretching over all the continents, but great as a poweron 
this Continent, an equal partner with the other Colossi in 
the leadership of the nations. 75 
Smuts outlined-this aspects of his, speech more precisely in a separate 
paper which he sent, to Law and Eden.., -The countries 
he had in mind 
w 
were Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, with the possibility 
of other western and southern ones entering too. The Commonwealth 
thus constituted would emphasise "its truly international character", 
would lose. its British complexion and become a real Commonwealth of 
free nations. 
76 
75. Smuts' speech to the Empire Parliamentary-. Association 25th November 
1943, op. cit. - 76. Smuts' Paper to Law, 'The New Europe, the New Commonwealth and 
World Security', 2nd December 1943, F0371/35443,, U6263/1816/. 70. 
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The F. O. did not agree with his assumptions about Europe's 
future. Jebb commented on the rashness of supposing that, three, 
major'states in Europe would disappear and remarked on the often 
astonishing ability of nations to recuperate. He thought that-to 
lump France with Germany and Italy was "not only a lapse of. taste 
but also probably a mis-statement of fact". The picture of Russia 
as a Colossus in Europe was an exaggeration, as that country would 
be weak and exhausted too, and the description of the U. K. was too 
exaggerated in the opposite direction. Mr. Roberts, Head of the:, 
Central Department, minuted that Smuts' remarks about Russia had 
been regarded by them as a "thinly disguised invitation to"thisy. country 
to prepare to stand up to Russian domination after the war". He=. <« 
thought the whole speech was badly conceived as propaganda to Germany, 
and had annoyed the French and most other small allies who disliked 
the references to France. 
77 
The F. O. 's repudiation of Smuts' thought 
on the-likely configuration of Europe is extremely revealing. Jebb's 
notion that it was exaggerated to imagine Russia as a Colossus of 
Europe-and-the implied shock of another Head of Department that the 
U. K. might have to counter Russian domination of Europe after the war, 
demonstrate a"severely limited outlook of possible developments and 
of the potential strength of the U. S. S. R. After all, these minutes 
were written only-fifteen months before Yalta. 
78 
Mr. NevileButler, Head of the North American Department, objected 
to Smuts'-public statement that France, Germany and Italy would be 
exhausted, and said it was not good for the U. S. to hear such comments; 
Europe, ; father they needed to have the enduring value of Europe 
brought home to them much more. As to the association of the U. K. 
and the west European states, Jebb said that he had sympathy for the 
77. Minutes by Jebb, 19th December 1943, and Roberts, 22nd December 1943, 
F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70. 
78. For an example of Jebb's optimistic view of the U. K. 's strength 
after the war, see chapter 3, p. 127. 
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idea 'as it would increase the political bargaining power of the U. K. 
and link its fate decisively with Europe, but he doubted if Smuts 
had chosen the right time to put forward the idea. Roberts approved 
only if the association would include France, if it was a natural 
growth, and if it did not give the ircression of dividing Europe into 
zones of influences. (On this latter point Smuts had written in 
79 
his other paper to Law that a group such as he contemplated would not 
prevent other groupings, or a Council of Europe, which would include 
the U. S. S. R. and the U. K., plus some other European states, but he 
thought that the League had shown them that to have only a world 
organisation was inadequate for keeping peace; less universal and 
ambitious groups that corresponded to natural affiliations were also 
needed. 
80 
Elsewhere Smuts' plans received varied comments. The Nationalist 
opposition in South Africa attacked this portion of the speech as well. 
Malan ridiculed the suggested expansion of the Commonwealth to bolster 
the U. K. 's position. He thought the central European states should 
be kept strong as a bulwark to communism, and took up Smuts' description 
of the U. K. 's weakness after the war as a justification for South Africa's 
leaving the Commonwealth and becoming an independent republic. 
81 
Canada interpreted the plan for the Commonwealth, and its position as a 
balance to the other two major powers, as advocating a single foreign 
policy and centralised machinery to which it was opposed. 
82 
The U. S. A. 
was puzzled by the speech. According to the U. K. Ambassador it was 
only the genuine veneration in which Smuts was held that had prevented 
more criticism. The Americans questioned whether he was advocating 
a naked Balance of Power that made it imperative for the U. K. to surround 
79. Minute by Butler, 26th December 1943, F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70, and 
minutes by Jebb and Roberts, 19th December 1943 and 22nd December 1943, ibid. 
80. S s' Paper to Law, 2nd December 1943, op. cit. 81. Harlech to D. O., 25th January 1944, D035 1205, WF201/12. 82. Garner to D. O., 20th January 1944, ibid. 
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itself with European satellites solely for the purpose of propping 
itselfýup against the U. S. and U. S. S. R. llalifax said the U. S. 
approved of Smuts' rejection of a U. S. N. K. condominium, and he thought 
it a 
useful, corrective the view too often taken we'come as a 
suppliant seeking an American Alliance because without it 
we should be unable to hold our own in a post war world 
dominated by Russia. 
On the other hand the mixture of imperial sentiment and admission of 
economic weakness were ingredients unlikely to receive sympathy in the 
U. S. Halifax thought the Americans had only read versions of the 
speech reproduced there, which were without the section on the 
Commonwealth and Empire, which, -had no doubt-reduced the criticism 
voiced in the U. S. A. As to the"rest of''Smüts' remarks, the"absenceý 
of any-reference'to China had been noted, and the French'had-been 
offended, but Halifax thought'it important that the U. K. 's, strong 
pro-European disposition had been put across, and said it could not 
have been said-so well by anyone else. `According to'him, Smuts' prestige 
in the U. S. was second only to'that of'Churchill's and Smüts'upbringing, 
personality and general outlook` provided an almost perfect'embodiment 
of the American'national ideal; a'combination of "benign practical 
83 
wisdom-with vision, strength and enterprise of rugged pioneer. " 
The other main subject discussed by Smuts was the'future of the 
British Empire. He drew attention to'the fact that whereas the 
Commonwealth'was a highly decentralised body, the Empire was exactly 
the opposite with everything' originating from London, and questioned 
whether this dichotomy could endure Ne proposed that the dualism be 
reduced and the two associations brought closer together. . Decentralising 
from the C. O. in London would mean giving administrative powers to 
83. Halifax to F. O., 11th December 1943, ibid. 
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small units, many of which were in primitive and, differing stages of 
development.. To counter this problem Smuts` suggested that the 
situation should be tidied up by combining units, so`power could be 
given to. moreýviable entities. When` such a situation had dev'eloped', 
he thought the' Dominions 'close to certain colonial' groupings'could 
take a greater interest in them, and thereby bring the Commonwealth 
more: closely, into contact with the Empire. With this more decentralised 
association would come the prospect of regional conferences and co- 
operation, as. well as the` existing imperial conference, which would 
create; -- 
in our great worldwide Commonwealth; a new esprit de corps, 
a common patriotism, and a larger human outlook. 04 
Smuts' colonial plans were thought by Jebb to be largely inspired 
by South Africa's own desire to annex Swaziland and Basutoland and 
establish one native policy throughout the country, although he did 
think there was something to be said for regional groupings of'colonies. 
Roberts was terse in his reaction, stating that the colonial passages 
were "frankly reactionary and embarrassing". 
85 
As was seen from" 
Halifax's letter, the U. S. reports did not carry this section, but 
in Canada, Garner reported little enthusiasm for sharing colonial 
responsibilities. 86 The question of the future of the colonial'Empire 
was discussed at the Prime Ministers' meeting of May 1944.87 
Despite criticisms of individual passages in Smuts' speech, the 
general reaction was-not wholly unfavourable. 'Jebb, for instance, 
thought it contained much "good sense", although 
some things should 
84. Smuts' speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association, 25th November 1943, op. cit. 85. Minute by Jebb, 19th December 1943, and Roberts, 22nd December 1943, F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70. 
86. Garner to D. O. 20th January 1944, D035/1205, WF201/12. 87. ---Smuts was not the only-person to-raise this issue. Eden had-advocated 
closer association between the Dominions and the Colonies in a speech to the annual conference of the Conservative Party in May 1943, (Times May 31st 1943) and Massey reported to his Government that this issue was frequently being discussed in London. (Massey to Canadian Government, 25th May 1943, MG26, J I, Vol. 346, p. 298439. ) 
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have been left unsaid; "Toute verite nest pas"bo4ä dire. " Butler 
thought most of his comments would make healthy reading for, the Americans, 
although Halifax's report, had demonstrated interest rather than 
approval. But there were some who thought it a mistake. Greenway, 
Head of the D. I. D., thought the good effects were far outweighed by 
the bad aspects, and he said that echoes were reverberating back. 
"asdic-like", and Roberts also thought it had done more harm than 
good. Law, (Minister of State at the F. O. ) in common with the Dominion 
High Commissioners, thought that despite everything it might-be an 
advantage that the speech had been delivered. He minuted 
I think that everything that Smuts said was wrong, & yet I 
have a feeling that, in the long run, it may have been a 
good thing for him to say it. It must be a good thing to 
make people think. 
88 
According to Sir Basil Newton (F. O. Liaison Officer to the High 
Commissioners) when the matter was discussed with the High Commissions, 
Massey, with the agreement of his colleagues, had called the speech 
a valuable contribution to the debate as it would force people to 
face up to the issues. lie felt this even about the doubtful reference 
to France for if it did cease to be a Great Power then the world should 
be prepared, and if not, France would act as a spur. He also said 
that no-one from the U. K. could have made such a blunt speech, and 
that only Smuts outside the U. K. possessed the detachment and authority 
to make such an effective pronouncement. 
89 
However, in a telegram 
to his government, Massey described Smuts' reference to France as 
"lamentable", declaring that it was no time to sthte that France was 
gone, possibly throwing it into the arms of Germany in the process. 
In the same message he also referred to the suggestion that the U. K. 
be more closely associated with western democracies as unfortunate, 
88. Minutes by Jebb, Butler, Greenway, Roberts and Law, December 1943 
and January 1944, F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70. 
89. Minute by Newton,. 30th December 1943, ibid. 
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saying that the Germans had made much of it in their Dutch propaganda. 
90 
Massey makes no reference to Smuts' speech in his diary or his memoirs, 
but his telegrams to Ottawa reflected official opinion there, as 
reported by Garner. There is some divergence between his statements at the 
High Commissioners' meeting at the D. O. and his comments to his own 
government, but it is possible his reaction to the 
4 
speech was much 
the same as Law's, objecting to its particulars, but feeling that it 
was a positive and useful text to have been given. ` - 
The publication of the speech produced a 'variety of responses; ' 
but -one important fact is that it was never intended : for publication. 
It was delivered to a private meeting and it'was only when M: P. s, asked 
for copies that Smuts' consent for it tobe published`was requested and 
given. Thus an address, delivered' informally to a group of M. P. s, was 
circulated worldwide, whereas i'paper designed for the purpose might 
not have contained material which Smuts himself had called explosive. 
The decision to publish was taken by'Sir Drummond Shiels and Mr. Amery, 
Chairman of the U. K. Empire Parliamentary Association, and was not' 
referred to Eden, Cranborne or Stanley. "° So, as Newton noted, criticisms 
as to how Smuts''remarks would be'äccepted abroad, should be directed 
against the fact of publication, and so to the E. P. A., and not against the 
speech itself. 
91 Another consequence of publication was the speculation 
that the speech reflected the official attitudes of`the'U. K. government. 
Mr. Shinwell "'asked in the House' of Commons whether- or not, - ' in' view of 
the fact Smuts was an acting member of the War Cabinet, the speech's 
92 
references to France reflected the opinion' of the Government. ' Attlee 
denied that it was a statement of Government policy, but Greenway, for "» 
one thought that whatever was said the Russians, ' French and others"would 
never believe that it was not an officially approved indication of the 
90. Massey to Canadian Government, 28th December 1943, MG26, J I,; Vol. 347, 
p. 299101. 
91. Minute by Newton, 30th December 1943, op. cit. 
92. Parliamentary Question by Mr. Shinwell, 7th December 1943, Hansard 
Vol. 395, Cols. 773-4. 
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1 
U. K. 's position. 
93 
Smuts, aware of the comment surrounding the 
publication of. the text, was anxious not to embroil the U. K. in any 
further problems. He had earlier written a paper dealing with 
particular aspects of his address and this he sent to Law shortly 
before he left England for his and Eden's perusal, with a note that 
he had refrained from discussing the subject with them 
so that I may not be taken as having in any way committed 
the Foreign Office or British policy by my Address. 94 
If Smuts tried to reduce the effects of his speech, the F. O. were not 
so tactful in shielding him from predictable criticisms. The D. O. 
intervened with considerable spirit when the F. O. were proposing to 
forward to Smuts the protest of the French Committee. Stephenson, 
the Assistant Under-Secretary at the D. O., minuted that there was no 
reason to bother him with "this futile, complaint", and his Permanent 
Under Secretary, Machtig, thought it would be "intolerable" to send it, 
regretting that the F. O. had been so half-hearted with the French 
representative Mr. Vienot; a view which the Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State, Mr. P. Emrys-Evans, concurred in. Cranborne informed the 
F. O. of his strong opposition to the despatch of the protest, a measure 
which he said would accomplish nothing ý-nd only irritate Smuts who 
r 
would be well aware of the French reaction. 
95 
In his November address Smuts did not dwell entirely on Commonwealth 
matters. , 
Consequently his attitude to future co-operation within that 
body remained rather uncertain. From his remarks about the Colonial 
w. 
Empire and the Commonwealth it is clear that he did envisage the 
a 
closest co-operation continuing in the latter association, and he was 
more specific in answering a question In Parliament the following March. 
When the Prime Minister declared that in view of the dangerous world they 
93. Minute by Greenway, 28th December 1943, F0371/35443, U6254/1816/70. 
94. Smuts to Law, 2nd December 1943, F0371/35443, U628311816/70. 
95. Minutes by Stephenson, 9th December 1943, Machtig 10th December 1943, 
Emrys-Evans 9th December 1943, and Cranborne 11th December 1943, 
D035/1205, WF201/12. 
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lived in, he was keen to harmonise South Africa's policy with those 
of its friends. He announced that he was going to London'to discuss 
with the other Commonwealth leaders ways in which'they could co-operate 
together and endorsed King's statement that there`shoüld be the closest 
co-operation within the Commonwealth, declaring that nothing he had 
said should be construed as meaning anything else. In reply to an 
interjection, he said that South Africa's friends would not 'b6 confined 
to the other Commonwealth countries and that he desired the closest 
relations with their neighbours in southern 'Africa. The prime consideration 
would be South Africa's interests. 
96 
r 
In statements about the arrangements for the post-war world the 
Australian government had been the first to press 'for- closer co-operation 
within-the Commonwealth. ' At the same time, ` Australia sought to reduce 
the dominance°of the leading Powers. " In' contrast; the SouthhAfrican 
government was suggesting that the Comm6nwealth;; 
`possibly1with an 
expanded European membership, would provide its leading 
country with 
support to enable 'it to join a triumverate of Powdrs-which'would head 
a pyramidally 'organised post-war world. On November 2nd 1943, Lord 
Cranborne joined the debate on the future of the Commonwealth when he 
replied to two motions In the House of i. 'rds which related to Curtin's 
proposals. 
In'this"speech he said that he was' cöncerried'tö'detect'in the 
statements by his fellow Peers the suýge'sti'on' that-the" Commonwealth 
was directed from°London, without adequate consultations'with the Dominions. 
He welcomed discussion of the subject an'd`stressed that the'*association" 
was dynamic and changing', which meant that-machinery must adapt-to 
meet new situations. ' However, he told'his Peer's-that'' they 
were, under 
a' misapprehension if they thought that exc-ept in unusual' exigencies of 
96'" Lord Ilarlech to D. O., 18th March 1944, D035/1204-, WC7S/31. 
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was. there was any lack of co-operation with the, other members. 
97 
Three weeks later,, Cranborne addressed an audience at the Guildhall 
on thefsubject, of "Unity within the Empire". lie began by defending 
the U. K. 's Imperial record towards its Colonies, contrasting it to 
others' such as Hitler's New Order which had barely survived its 
creators. The British Empire (and here he was meaning the Colonial 
Empire and Commonwealth) had lasted because it was based. on the concept 
of one family of nations that included different races, cultures and 
religions. _It. was 
impossible to standardise policy towards the 
Empire because of the different development of the territories, but 
the policy pursued. with regard to the Dominions in the previous two 
decades had been vindicated in September 1939.,.,,. Cranborne explained 
that., the. Dominions. had appreciated the immensity of the issue and 
sacrificed everything for the common cause, realising that isolation 
had been impossible, in an association that straddled the globe. Looking 
to the future of the Commonwealth, Cranborne asked if such unity was 
possible in peace-time? He told his audience that he had no fears: 
They could not expect unanimity in virile communities, , 
but unity of view in important matters was as essential 
to the world as to the Commonwealth itself. 
The essentials for the post-war. Commonwealth he; d-tfined as a, single .. r 
foreign policy, a coherent scheme of defence and close mutual 
understanding, not just. between governments, but between peoples. 
He referred to the extensive machinery already in operation,. but, -,. - 
added, that this was, note necessarily enough for. the future.,., Cranborne 
made reference to the. "most interesting proposals" put, forward by Curtin 
and others, and said that these must be discussed with the other Prime 
Ministers as, soon as possible. Mentioning another. aspect. of collaboration, 
Cranborne suggested that the conferences between, the Great. Powers (such 
as the Moscow meeting) had demonstrated the improvement , 
in, communications 
97. Hansard House of Lords Debates, Vol. 129, Cols. 510-518.,.. 
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and mobility and that annual meetings of Ministers of External 
Affairs would not be unpractical. He emphasised that the most 
crucial component in the Commonwealth was undoubtedly the mutual 
understanding between the peoples of each country, and that if that 
was lacking the machinery would be "like a skeleton without flesh 
and blood". He suggested that migration could promote this understanding, 
adding that it was unhealthy for the U. K. to be overpopulated and 
over-industrialised, while the Dominions were the reverse. Another 
remedy he proposed was improved facilities for travel, so that everyone 
r 98 
could be familiar with each other in their own environments. 
Cranborne's speeches were imprecise in their details, but his 
general line of thought is clear; close collaboration without the 
dominance of the U. K. in, or unanimity of, Commonwealth policy. His 
views will be studied in the context of the U. K. 's preparation for the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting; but one significance of these 
two speeches lies in the use which Halifax made of them as guidance 
for his Toronto address of January 19,44. Halifax had not only been 
Viceroy of India and a Minister in every Conservative cabinet since 
Bonar Law's of 1922, he had been Foreign Secretary at a most critical 
time in the 1930s and for the first fifteen months of the war. During 
this period he had had many dealings with Dominion High Commissioners 
and was well known to most leading Dominion Ministers. He understood 
the complexities in Dominion thinking and the inter-war problem of 
Canada and South Africa's refusal to be committed to policy, notwithstanding 
their wish to be kept closely informed of events. Halifax's 
'progressive', liberal attitude towards the Commonwealth is evidence 
from his term as Viceroy of India. During this difficult time he won 
the goodwill of Indians, (and the hostility of many British diehards) 
for his sympathy with Indian aspirations and his Viceroyalty did much 
98. Cranborne speech at the Guildhall, 23rd November 1943, The Times, 
24th November 1943, p. 2a. 
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to pave the way for the 1935 Government of India Act. So as an 
experienced British statesman who had had a long association with 
the Empire and Commonwealth affairs, Halifax was well qualified to 
speak on the future of the Commonwealth and made some perceptive 
comments which tended to be ignored in the wake of some virulent 
criticism. 
Addressing the Toronto Board of Trade on January 24th 1944, Halifax 
briefly surveyed the development of the Dominions since the Durham 
report and remarked on the unusual character of the association, 
resting as it did on principles of unity under a single Head, but 
still allowing for the sovereign independence of each unit. He 
considered the position of the Commonwealth in 1939, when the U. K. 
declared war on Germany, and how although the Dominions had been 
informed of events, and had had some influence on U. K. policy,, they 
had not been responsible for that policy or committed to it; and indeed 
Eire had illustrated the freedom of action they enjoyed. He paid 
tribute to the crucial part the Dominions had played in the war, but 
questioned whether they should be content with the existing situation: 
there is a real danger that, with this experience before 
our eyes, we may be tempted to conclude that all is for 
the best in our affairs. 
Although the Commonwealth with its allies would win the war, they had 
not previously managed to save the peace. Halifax declared that the 
Statute of Westminster had recognised the Dominions' right to equality 
of status and to complete self-government, but he-, thought it had left 
unresolved the problem of equality of function; how to regularise 
foreign and defence policy. In September 1939 the Dominions had been 
put in a difficult position: 
Either they must confirm a policy which they had had only 
a partial share in framing, or they must stand aside and 
see the unity of the Commonwealth broken, -perhaps fatally 
and forever. 
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The fact most of them did enter the fight had not removed the dilemma 
which, existed because equality of status did not correspond to equality 
of function. The Dominions were free to do anything they wished but 
each time there was a crisis in 
international affairs their predicament 
was highlighted. 
Halifax suggested that there were two ways of overcoming the problem. 
Either the Dominions would choose the road of national isolation, 
deciding that their foreign policies would be concerned only with 
immediate national interests and not reflect an underlying unity of 
ideal or strive towards unity in action, or they would strengthen 
and multiply their contacts with the other members of the Commonwealth, 
so there was great unity of thought and action in all international 
matters. The former was an old policy which in a shrinking world was 
difficult to pursue and unlikely to get any easier; but Halifax thought 
the second alternative did offer a viable future. He argued that the 
association had twice proved that it was a powerful and beneficient 
force in the world and that instead of drawing apart the Conunonwealth 
should strengthen its relationship. He rejected the notion that the 
Commonwealth ought to "retrace our steps along that path that led from 
the Durham Report to the Statute of Westminster. To do so would be 
to run counter to the whole course of development in the Commonwealth". 
The Commonwealth must achieve greater unity in matters of common interest. 
Acknowledging the obstacles, Halifax suggested that the machinery of 
consultation should be extended. 
Halifax described the Statute of Westminster as a declaration of 
interdependence as well as one of independence. He thought it was a 
recognition of the impossibility of existing alone in the twentieth 
century world, and that in not laying down a rigid formula of co- 
operation, but by leaving the greatest latitude of behaviour, it left 
the members to discover that interdependence and independence were not 
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incompatible concepts, but complementary and necessary to each other. 
Looking to the future and the predictable dominance of the U. S., the 
U. S. S. R. and China, Halifax pointed to the impossibility of the U. K. 
equalling their strength on any criterion. Yet he predicted that 
after the war western Europe would look to the U. K. as never before 
for leadership and guidance, so if the U. K. was to play its part it had 
to have behind it the support which had sustained it through the war. 
Not Great Britain only, but the British Commonwealth and 
Empire must be the fourth power in that group upon which, 
under Providence, the peace of the world will henceforth 
depend. 
Halifax added that to attain such a position was not a selfish claim 
on the U. K. 's part, for Commonwealth unity would be a necessary condition 
of a working partnership with other three major Powers, not an. obstacle 
to it. He ended with the assertion that if the Commonwealth was to 
play its-part in the peace it could only do so if it were'"united, 
vital and coherent". Only then could it hope to achieve the "high 
purposes to which we are dedicated by the suffering and sacrifice of 
war', 
99 
Halifax's speech combined aspects of Curtin's and Smuts' pronouncements 
Like Curtin, he stressed the need for closer consultation between members; 
but he placed more emphasis on the leadership of the major-Powers, as 
an inevitable development, and agreed with Smuts that it was important 
for the U. K. to have the backing of the whole Commonwealth, and the-, 
support of western Europe, if she were to co-operate equally with the 
other Great Powers. However, he did not fully 
support Smuts' vision 
of Europe's future or the trinity ofrstates taking responsibility-Ifor 
security. Halifax had stressed the independence and equality of the 
Dominions and it is even clearer from a letter to Eden'the following 
April that he had no sympathy for the notion of a centralised Commonwealth, 
99. Halifax speech at Toronto Board of Trade, 24th January 1944, D035/1204, 
WC75/9. 
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dominated by the U. K. 
Replying to the F. O. 's memorandum on Commonwealth, collaboration 
in foreign affairs, 
100Halifax 
suggested in April 1944 that the test 
for the Commonwealth would be 
whether membership will ... enable the component States to 
pursue the policies, which their respective interests 
require, with greater freedom, force and effectiveness than 
if they were not members, of the Commonwealth... 
This would mean that 
subject always to agreement, on major lines of policy, 
members should not be bound always either to consult 
or to act together, but rather should be free to adapl01 
their tactics to the needs of changing circumstances. 
As at Toronto, Halifax stressed the Ci mportance of consultations, 
but 
recognised that it might not always be advantageous for members to take 
simultaneous action. ° He also envisaged occasions when it would be 
appropriate for some, but not all, members to consult together, an 
important recognition of the flexibility needed within, this diverse 
'group of, states., s Halifax suggested to Eden that the only means of 
achieving "this interdependent freedom" was to have a minimum of. 
formal machinery and, a maximum of close, continuous. consultation. 
(Like Cranborne,. Halifax mentioned the benefit of meetings between 
Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, and the, need for permanent co- 
-ordination of, Commonwealth defence,! and co-ordination; of. this with United 
Nations defence. He said that having set up a, system. during the, war, 
"however imperfect, it should be; kept and improved upon; -, a reference 
'-to~the Washingtonjoint Chiefs of Staff with whit, , as"Ambassador 
Halifax had been closely involved. ) 
Like the F. O. 's North'American. Department, and again drawing upon. 
experience in Washington, Halifax-favoured closer relations between all 
members of the Commonwealth and the U. S. A., -: echoing Evatt's, remarks 
when he suggested v::, 
100. See chapter 3, pp. 181-182. 
101. Halifax to Eden, 14th April 1944, F0371/42674, W6458/1103/68. 
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on many subjects representatives of the Dominions can 
speak to the United States with more acceptance than 
those of the United Kingdom. 102 
He rejected the view that the Commonwealth would be weakened by multiple 
contacts with the U. S. A., and stressed that the *U; K. should not expect 
its partners to always follow a lead from an Anglo-American combination. 
Above all, Halifax took a very positive attitude towards the future. 
He told Eden that it was wrong to talk of. ! 'preserving" the' Commonwealth 
"as if it were a venerable but hoary building, which has to be shored 
rýý 
ýý 
t 
and buttressed", adding that this was especially so in conversations 
with the Americans who responded best to self-assurance. Secondly, 
we must once and for all forget in thought, and abandon 
in-action, any lingering, tendency to assume that the-n 
States members of the Commonwealth are in any way less 
than equal, or that the United Kingdom should consider 
herself as oming first or as inherently entitled to T03 
leadership. ,. ý. 
This statement demonstrates conclusively Halifax's acceptance'of the 
equality and independence of, the Dominions.. He had emphasised in 
Toronto that the Commonwealth should°not-retrace its steps away from 
the Statute of Westminster, and it is clear that his desire for-closer 
collaboration did not involve-any, centralising restrictions on the 
tt_.. - xr. t) 
j. 
individual members. It is perhaps unfortunate that Halifax had not 
included such sentiments more explicitly in his Canadian speech, as 
this might have forestalled the considerable opposition aroused by the 
address. ., The Canadian public and government misinterpreted Halifax's 
views, perhaps because of his references to the Dominions'-, supporting 
the U"K as a Great Power. 
King's reaction to the first reports, of the speech was to be. "simply 
dumbfounded", 104 
and he-and his government objected to the-speech on 
several grounds. First impressions in Ottawa, seemingly gained from 
press headlines and frantic telephone calls, were that the main theme.. 
102. for Evatt's comments see" '' 
chapter 4, p. 199. 103.104. Kalifax to Eden, 14th April 1944, op. cit. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944, and Mackenzie-Kiig Record 
PP. 637-8. 
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0 f'the speech was imperial centralisatiön, 'and there was a feeling'' 
of'outrage that' the U. K. Arbas, sador'to the U. S. should have made such 
a speech in Canada, 'let'alone''in'Toronto. `ý To the Earl of Athlone, 
the Governor-General' of Canada, King expressed his incredulity that 
Halifax should have come to"Canada and, without'a word to him, made 
105,, 
As a speech' "which raised theimost'controver'sial issue'we had". 
Massey'was told by his departm6nt°; the speech was 'made without prior 
consultation with any'Canadian'aüthörity and was 
already causing serious domestic political difficulties 
and it was in our view most inopportune. 
106 
Massey wrote in his diary for that day that he thought the speech would 
cause trouble and the next day he explained to the Dominions Secretary 
the sensitivity of these issues in Canadian party politics, the likelihood 
that the speech would be construed as an official statement by the U. K. 
Government and as an attempt to influence Canadian policy. He added 
that Halifax's position as ambassador to the U. S. and member of the War 
Cabinet was likely to give credence to this view. 
107 
The intensity of King's reaction is shown clearly by his diary: 
it seemed such a 
, 
complete bolt out of the blue, like 
'a conspiracy on the part of imperialists to win their 
own victory in the middle of the war. I could not but 
feel that Halifax's work was all part of'a plan which 
had been worked out with Churchill to take advantage 
of the war to try and bring about this development of 
centralization of makings of policy in London. 
108 
If the Canadians did have one issue upon which they tended to react 
irrationally and in an extreme fashion, it was over any hint that a .' 
centralised Commonwealth should be run from London, and especially 
if such sentiments were voiced by a member of the Conservative Party. 
King always attached great importance to party labels, allowing for 
little variation in attitude within a party, or over a, span of years. 
105. Ibid. ' 
106. Secretary of State for External Affairs to Massey, 25th January 1944, 
MG26, J I, Vol. 366, p. 317471. 
107. Massey'Diary, 25th January 1944. 
108. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944, and Mackenzie King Record, 
n_ 637_ 
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Thus, in his diary he refers to the Byng incident of 1926 and quoted 
Asquith's remark about English Tories who possessed "the tranquil 
consciousness of effortless superiority" that made them so intolerable 
to others. 
109, There were some extreme diehards in the Conservative 
Party and Churchill was not its most liberal member when it came 
to Empire and Commonwealth affairs. However he recognised the 
independence of the Dominion's policy and Halifax could certainly not 
be classified as a 'Tory Imperialist'. 
King did have some reason to be worried about the Canadian domestic 
political reaction. The role of Canada in the Commonwealth was an 
issue of party politics in Canada, and one capable of dividing French 
and English Canadians. The one basic tenet of icing's leadership, 
especially during the war, was to keep Canada united and while on 
some occasionsýhe might have used this situation to avoid awkward decisions, 
it was asincere and necessary basis for his policy. The Progressive- 
Conservative Premier of Ontario was Colonel Drew, a particularly outspoken 
critic of King's Government, and the Deputy U. K. High Commissioner, 
Sir P. Duff told the D. O. that the more Drew managed to. use Halifax's 
speech to fuel-his attack on the. Government, the more-the rest of, 
Canada would interpret the speech as an attempt by the U. K. to influence 
opinion behind the back of King's Government. Duff confirmed Massey's 
comments that Halifax's position in the War Cabinet would lend weight 
to those who were convinced that it was an official statement of 
policy; and as such an unwarranted interference in Canadian affairs. 
110 
In a subsequent telegram reporting press reactions, the D. O. was told 
that the importance of the critical comments should not be under- 
estimated as Canadian nationalist opinion was very "touchy" after the 
speeches by Smuts and Curtin, and suspicious of appeals to unity* 
ill 
109. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. 
110. Duff to D. O., 25th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 111. Duff to D. U. 27th January 1944, ibid. 
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A further entry in King's diary noted the progression of events; 
Smuts' speech, Casey's appointment first to the Middle East and 
then to India and the fact that the London newspapers all had editorials 
prepared for the following morning; on which he commented "The whole 
2 11 The High Commission in Ottawa also thing, a complete frame-up". 
reported on 27th January that the Progressive-Conservatives had begun 
a strong attack on the Government and that the likelihood of an 
election during that had heated the issue. 
113 
Stemming from King's anger that such a hornet's nest had been 
aroused was his annoyance and hurt that Halifax should have been 
responsible. Although King and Halifax do not seem to have been 
particularly close acquaintances, they had known each other for a great 
number of years in the course of their political careers and Halifax 
was highly respected in Canada, especially by the French Canadians. 
114 
MacDonald, the U. K. High Commissioner, reassured King that Halifax 
would not intentionally do anything to injure him politically, and 
told King of the high regard in which Halifax held him, quoting Halifax's 
praise of the Prime Minister in the speech. King was predictably 
flattered by the remarks, and admitted that he could not accuse Halifax 
of deliberately trying to undermine his Government; however, he still 
thought it all reflected a "Tory attitude of mind". 
115 In an 
attempt to understand the reason for Halifax's action, King suggested 
to MacDonald that it had been a subject which Halifax had been 
considering for many years and probably thought h& was handling in 
a philosophical manner. But King thought 
112. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. 
113. Duff to D. O., 27th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
114. U. K. High Commission to D. O.; 27th January 1944, ibid. 
115. King Diary Vol. XII, 26th January 1944, and MacDonald to D. O., 
28th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. (The U. K. 's copy of the 
speech from the British Information Service did not include Halifax's 
personal remarks about King. ), 
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it was a case of a philosopher building his city of 
God - working out the ultimate way of ruling the world 
without any political sense as to what effec is 
statement would have on existinc conditions. 
1lo 
King's reaction was extreme, but not greatly different from that of 
his colleagues (according to his own account). Ile records that when 
he met his Cabinet, Ministers and officials were incensed, uttering 
remarks such as "no worse treatment could have been meted out to anyone", 
and "Halifax had shown how unfit he was as an Ambassador". The Head 
of the External Affairs Department, Mr. Norman Robertson, and the 
Head of the P. M. 's Office, Mr. Arnold Heeney, were both said to be 
"appallingly depressed". 117, Duff told the D. O. that although officials 
in External Affairs might personally agree that close scrutiny of the 
speech revealed no sinister meaning, large sections of the press would 
118 
interpret it differently; hence the Government's annoyance. 
Halifax was inevitably taken aback at such reactions to his speech. 
Apart from the mis-interpretations of his words, he does not seem to 
have anticipated that to speak on Commonwealth relations in what was 
considered to be a traditional stronghold of the Canadian Opposition, 
would be contentious. He had not consulted the Canadian Government 
about the speech, believing it to be uncontroversial, and the only 
indication he had given was in a conversation with the Canadian 
Ambassador in Washington, Mr. McCarthy. Halifax asked the latter to 
suggest a theme, and McCarthy had proposed that of unity, but the 
Canadian Ambassador assured King that they had never discussed the 
subject again. 
119 
Nor did Halifax communicate kith the U. K. High 
Commission about the content of his speech, but this would have been 
unusual unless he had been concerned that he might be broaching 
sensitive ground. (MacDonald was in fact away at the time, and did 
116. King Diary Vol. XII, 26th January 1944. 
117. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. 
118. Duff to D. O., 25th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
119. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. (When King first rang 
McCarthy the latter said he had known nothing about the speech, as 
the Mackenzie King Record shows. However, later McCarthy rang 
King back to tell him of this one conversation. ) 
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not return until the morning after the speech. ) 
Although speaking in Toronto, and naturally stressing the Canadian 
aspect, Halifax's speech was concernCl with the general theme of 
Commonwealth relations. In the previous four months Curtin, Smuts 
and Cranborne had all spoken on the subject. Halifax obviously 
assumed that it'was a perfectly safe topic. However, his speech made 
a far greater impact in Canada than the others by being delivered in 
that country. Halifax later told Eden of his distress that any words 
of his should have caused his government embarrassment (by being 
intepreted as an official statement), and assured Eden that he had no 
intention of making "exciting" speeches. He also explained to Eden 
that he thought he had kept well within the bounds of Cranborne's 
speech the previous November at the Guildhall, not an unreasonable 
comment. 
120 
Halifax had also written earlier to Cranborne to express 
his regret, and had sent a personal note to King, apologising for any 
difficulties he had caused him. This reached King at the same time 
as a mollifying one from Churchill, and MacDonald reported that both 
had an excellent effect. 
121 
King's suspicions about the U. K. 's intentions had been fuelled 
by the publication of the speech, and editorial comment, in the U. K. 
press. This also produced some consternation in the U. K. as the D. O. 
and F. O. were unprepared for the speech. It turned out that Halifax 
had sent copy a few days in advance through the British Information 
Service in New York, so that the press could carr 
wy 
the speech, but 
neither the D. I. D. nor the D. O. had received the text. Apparently 
the Ministry of Information (M. O. I. ) was sent a copy and contacted an 
official at the D. O., but without indicating that anything out of the 
ordinary was to be said. 
122 
The F. O. 's Nees Department had received 
120. Halifax to Eden, 21st February 1944, F0371/38553, AN704/29/45. 
121. MacDonald to D. O., 28th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
122. Minute by Stephenson, 27th January 1944, 'D035/1204, WC75/9 and 
minute by Nevil Butler, 2nd February 1944, F0371/38553, AN704/29/45. 
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a copy, but did-not pass it to the D. I. D. or the D. 0.123 A gap 
in the U. K. 's screening processes had meant that the U. K. Government 
were'not,, able to forestaff the crisis; however, it must be questionable 
M 
whether anyone would have taken steps to alter or stop Halifax's 
speech. 
After the fuss had died down and King himself was calmer, the 
speech was studied more carefully. There remained major differences 
between Canada's viewpoint and that adumbrated by Halifax. On the 
question of-greater-, co-ordination of policy, King told MacDonald that 
he saw the only consequence being the derogation of the Dominions' 
sovereignty-and MacDonald was unable to persuade him otherwise, despite 
quoting from Halifax that the only basis of co-operation had to be 
the preservation-of each's sovereign independence. 
124 
The Canadian 
government chiefly, opposed not Halifax's actual words but the 'scheme'. 
An External Affairs paper on the speech said any centralisation would 
be a reversal-of-the previous decades, while there could be no "equality 
of function" unless responsible government was to be abandoned or 
each country had a power of veto over the others. The first alternative 
was "taxation without, representation" and the second the "complete 
absence of dependable 'Power"', which was not what Halifax was 
envisaging; in fact totally opposite to it. 
125 
In a paper drafted 
by Mr. Hume Wrong before Halifax's speech, it had been argued that a 
common policy was impracticable. What would happen if one Parliament 
rejected the policy? Would sat^tions or expulsiQU follow? Could 
no policy be pursued which did not have the unanimous support of all? 
It also questioned the criteria for deciding which policies should be 
'common', and which not, and whether the issues which made up Canada's 
foreign policy to the U. S. should be submitted for the approval of the 
! ý3" Mý[. % Gýiýý r7 /9 ,d . O. 
3S /Zo9 NGZ c 1. 
124. MacDonald to D. O., 27th January 1944, ibid. 
125. Paper entitled 'Lord Halifax', no date or authorship, MG26, i 4, 
Vol. 237, pp. C. 160231-160236. 
238 
others. The Canadian policy-makers did not consider any formal 
common policy wcrkable. 
126 
These criticisms. are difficult to 
refute, except by noting that, -. when close co-ordination, is seen, as 
vital, either in war or peace, nations., have managed to, circumvent . 
the difficulties, or at, least have considered the sacrifices in terms ,,, 
of'-their sovereign rights worth the benefits gained. This, was so 
during.; the war and also afterwards in associations such as N. A. T. O.. ,, 
and the E: E. C. 
King was disinclined to discuss the subject before the end of the 
war and-when MacDonald told ,, him, that it would almost certainly, be 
raised at the Prime Ministers' meeting in May, -King said he was concerned 
that-this would lead to disagreement.! 
- 
He thought the meeting should 
be confined to issues connected with winning, the war,. and that co- 
operation was working well enough and would. continue to develop. 
satisfactorily providing they did not accept too many precise, definitions 
and seek too perfect unanimity. 
127 
Wrong, in his draft paper echoed 
this: 
-_, The-Commonwealth contains many parliaments and many, 
cabinets each of which is responsible to its own people 
-, for the conduct of their affairs. To impose rigidity 
on its methods of operation is to invite disruption. 128- 
The Canadian Government did not object to any schemes for closer unity 
simply because it preferred a loose-knit arrangement; it also feared 
the consequences of such moves, convinced that it would wreck the 
association. This explains King's diary entry for 31st January which, 
if rather histrionic, expresses this view. 
I saw again that it has fallen to my lot to have to make 
the-most difficult of all fights. - This perpetual struggler__ 
to save the Empire despite all that Tories policies will do 
by fighting the Tories, save the British Empire,. from. its 
dismemberment through its own pouicies. l29 
126. Draft paper by Wrong "Intra Commonwealth Relations" pre 24th January 
1944, MG26, J 4, Vol. 237, pp. C. 160263-160272. 
127. MacDonald to D. O., 28th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
128. Draft paper by Wrong, op. cit. 
129. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944, and Mackenzie King ecord, 
p. 637. 
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In his speech to Parliament King reiterated the satisfaction of the 
Canadian Government with the existing; machinery of consultation, 
and questioned the need for more collaboration, maintaining that 
every topic could be, and was, discussed between members. 
130 
Yet 
the Canadian Government's requirement for collaboration and co-ordination 
of policy during the war was significantly less than Australia's. 
King was satisfied with the existing machinery because he did not want 
the degree of collaboration which others favoured. Canada did not 
desire levels of co-ordination which Curtin, and to some extent the 
U. K., did. This divergence, in the basic objective, rather than the 
means to achieve it, was always bound to engender serious differences, 
as the May 1944 Prime Ministers' meeting showed. 
The Canadian government had some reason to be optimistic about 
that meeting because it identified a change in Australia's attitude 
towards the Commonwealth compared with the 1930s, and also some 
mellowing of Curtin's view in the months before the meeting. There 
had been comparatively little public comment in Canada on Curtin's 
proposals, especially those of August and September 1943. From 
correspondence between Robertson and Massey it seems that this was 
due to the press' preoccupation with the Quebec Conference. Garner 
also commented how surprising it was in light of the muted reaction 
to Curtin's proposals that Smuts' speech had aroused so much publicity 
and criticis 131 m" Mr. Davis, the Canadian High Commissioner to 
Australia, commented on the underlying motives behind Australia's 
plans. Ile suggested that Australia's attitude towards the U. K. was 
no longer one of subservience, as it had been before the war. Rather, 
the Australian 
government felt that its future was inextricably tied 
130. MacDonald 
to D. O., 1st April 1944,1)035 1204, WC75/9. 131. Garner 
to D. O., 20th January 1944, D035/1205, WF201/12. 
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up with the U. K. 's and in order for its interests to be properly 
considered, wanted more involvement in decision-making. Closer 
consultation was considered the best way of protecting its town 
position. 
132 
It is significant that Canadians appreciated that 
Australia was determined not to lose its independence,, even though 
Canada's attitude was very different; if Canada had assumed that 
Australian subservience of the pre-war years still remained, any 
talks would have been virtually impossible. 
An official in External Affairs detected a change in Curtin's 
policy in his December speech, and one for the better from Canada's 
point of view. Mr. John Holmes minuted that. Curtin's stress on 
the consultative nature of the machinery he proposed; the need for 
governments to retain control of policy; the fact that the Council 
would be merely one item in a variety of methods of co-operation and 
one which would have no executive capacity, making it a less revolutionary 
proposal; and finally, the emphasis placed on common interests of the 
Commonwealth and United Nations, which avoided any implication of an 
Empire bloc, made'these proposals more palatable. 
133 
Given the close 
relationship with the U. S. A., the last factor held considerable 
importance for Canada. King had Always been opposed to the Commonwealth's 
acting too much as a bloc and öne official5summed-up his attitude 
when he rejected any attempt to make ä "synthetic great power" out 
of'the Commonwealth. This would arouse suspicion and resentment among 
others, could lead to conditions which'might'result'in another war, 
and'was anyway unpractical. 
134 
Wrong described the Commonwealth as 
132. Davis to Robertson, 17th March 1944, MG26, J 4, Vol. 248, File 2564, 
pp. C. 166585-166586. 
133. Notes on Curtin's speech to the Australian Labour Party, December 1943, 
by Holmes, MG26, J 4, Vol. 237, '°ppp. 0.160249-160251. 
134. Paper entitled 'Lor'd Halifax', no date or authorship, MG26, J'4, 
Vol. 237, p. C. 160233. 
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an "entente cordiale" and a tough and enduring one, but added that 
each member should be ready to co-operate in an unexclusive manner 
135 
with all likeminded nations. The entente was not a closed circle. 
Many Canadian commentors assumed 'hat Halifax had implied, by his 
reference to the British Commonwealth as the fourth Great Power, that 
the Dominions should side with the U. K. against the U. S. A., and this 
was particularly-criticised. In fact it is clear from Halifax's 
letter to-Eden that-he favoured the closestrelations within the 
English-speaking world. 
136 
Finally, one point which Canada did share with Australia,, but not 
with South Africa or the U. K., was its attitude towards the role of 
the Great Powers. In a draft. prepared for King, the thesis that peace 
depended on the Great Powers' being equal in strength, or that the'U. K. 
would need buttressing by the Dominions was challenged. There should 
be co-operation between likeminded nations and the establishment of 
a preponderance of power on the side of, peace, not a balance between 
three or four Great Powers. It would be best to 
aim at the necessary superiority of power by creating 
an effective international system inside which the co- 
operation of all peace-loving cc ntries is freely sought 
and given 
Halifax's proposal that Canada's first commitment should be to a common 
policy framed and executed by all governments of the Commonwealth ran 
counter to this and was. therefore not in the true interests of the 
association. 
137 
For all the opposition to Halifax's speech, äcnd King's personal 
anger, the Canadian government's public reaction was very moderate and 
restrained. King told his Cabinet that he would address Parliament 
135. Draft paper by Wrong "Intra Commonwealth Relations", pre 24th January 
1944, MG26, J 4, Vol.. 237, pp. C. 160270-160271. :. 1 136. See P. 230. (MacDonald also thought that this was the one fault of 
Halifax's speech. MacDonald to Cranborne, 12th February 1.944, 
D035/1204, WC75/9. ) 
137. External Affairs, paper, no title, date or authorship, MG26, J 4, 
Vol. 237, pp. C. 160226-160229. 
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on the 31st January, and that he would not speak to the press before 
then. 
138' He told MacDonnld that he had considered cabling Churchill 
to complain, but had decided not to, and assured MacDonald that he 
was determined not to make the situation any more difficult while the 
war was raging, 
139 
The messages from Churchill and Halifax obviously 
calmed King down and he told the High Commissioner that he would try 
and restrain others and make an uncontroversial speech himself. 
140 
In 
his statement in the House of Commons, King began by supporting the 
policy of full co-operation within the Commonwealth; he then announced 
that he would not attempt to interpret Halifax's view, emphasising that 
it had been a personal statement on a subject close to Halifax's heart 
and that many aspects of it had been misunderstood. He did add that 
he thought it unfortunate that the speech had been delivered at that 
time. 
141 
King could have made more political capital out of this 
event. His diary shows that he even considered dissolving Parliament, 
commenting that Halifax's words would have ensured the Liberals' 
return at the polls. 
142 
However, he abided by his resolution not to 
raise contentious matters during the war. 
MacDonald's reaction to Halifax's speech is unclear, because 
King'srecord'of his attitude does not accord with his own comments 
to the D. O. According to King's diary, when they met on 25th January 
Malcolm was quite frank in saying he deplored the whole business. He went on to say that it was difficult not to believe'it was all part of some carrying on of Tory Imperialist policy of which Churchill's talk about Empire and Commonwealth, etc. was part. 
King also records MacDonald's denial that Halifax would do anything 
138. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. 139. King Diary Vol. XII, 26th January 1944; Mackenzie King Record 
pp. 638-9; and MacDonald to D. O., 27th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
140. MacDonald to D. O., 28th January 1944, ibid., and King Diary, Vol. XII, 29th January 1944. 141. MacDonald to D. O., 1st February 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 142. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944, and Mackenzie King Record, p. 637. 
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to undermine his government. 
143 
MacDonald did attempt to explain 
to the D. O. the Canadian reaction, but. he commented that the speech 
had "quite unwarrantably" put King into one of his worst moods, and 
led him to talk of imperialist plots and fighting elections, which 
was very disappointing. 
It indicates that Canadian politicians are still capable 
of moods in which they do not do themselves justice as 
leaders of a mature democratic nation. The real thing 
which bedevils such situa ions as this is the bitterness 
of party politics here. 14' 
The reliability of King's diary must be questioned here, especially as 
the language which he attributes to MacDonald is so similar to his own. 
It is likely that seeing King's nervous irritability, MacDonald did 
express some sympathy with his views, waiting until later, when he knew 
he would have calmed down, to attempt a serious discussion with him 
about the speech, as he tried to do on the 27th January. 
145 Looking 
to the future, MacDonald cautioned the D. O. from being too annoyed 
and apprehensive about Canada's attitude. He was sure that Canada 
would work with the U. K. and the rest of the Commonwealth, providing 
the U. K. did not create too many difficulties by doing or saying things 
which upset responsible Canadian opinion or suggested an infringement 
of national sovereignty. 
146 
The first reaction of the D. O. had been to tell MacDonald to make 
it clear that the speech had not been authorised by the Government, 
and that Halifax had been doing no more than Cranborne himself had done 
at the Guildhall, which was to underline some obvious considerations 
affecting Commonwealth relations which seemed to call for study after 
Curtin's statements, Cranborne stressed that there had never been any 
question of the U. K. 's pressing a particular view; it had always been 
considered an issue to be discussed by all members. 
147 Beyond this 
143. King Diary Vol. XII, 25th January 1944. 
144. MacDonald to D. O., 27th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. 
145. Ibid. 
146. MacDonald to Cranborne, 12th February 1944, ibid. 
147. Cranborne to MacDonald, 27th January 1944, ibid. 
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comparison with Cranborne's speech, there is little indication 
in the D. O. files of the attitude of its staff to the content of 
the speech. Its main concern was to reduce the effects of Halifax's 
statement and explain the circumstances of, its appearance in the U. i:. 
Churchill's view is much clearer, He minuted to Cranborne 
It seems to me that Lord Halifax, ought not to have made 
this very important speech at Toronto without reference here 
beforehand. It is in effect an interference in Canadian 
politics, turning markedly against Mackenzie King. 1118 
However, it is not known whether Churchill had studied the speech, or 
merely read the Canadian press reactions. 
Generally'the F. O. approved of the content of Halifax's speech, 
even if it agreed the circumstances were less than perfect. For 
instance Jebb minuted 
This speech may not be popular with some Canadians, but 
it seems to me to be excellent none the less. Lord 
Halifax makes no specific proposals; he merely points 
the way. 
1 1: 
Newton agreed with Jebb that the "actual matter" was sound and hoped that 
it would receive the serious consideration it deserved. But he admitted 
that in the wake of Smuts' and Curtin's statements and considering the 
location, it was not surprising that many thought it tendentious. 
Newton also agreed with MacDonald's judgment about Canada's future 
co-operation. Despite the fact it had shied away from any political 
commitment in theory, in practice it had proved co-operative and 
efficient as had Massey and the High Commission staff in London. 
149 
The Head of the North American Department, Nevile Butler, had only 
one criticism; that by stressing the U. K. 's weakness and its inability- 
to live on equal terms with the U. S. and U. S. S. R. without the Dominions, 
Halifax had encouraged the "unfortunate belief", fostered by, Smuts, 
148. Churchill to Cranborne, 31st January 1944, ibid. 
149. Minutes by Jebb, 2nd February 1944 and Newton, 2nd February 1944, 
F0371/38553, AN704/29/45. 
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that'the U. K. would be too, weak to "play at Balance of Power" ;..,., 
without the Commonwealth. ' Another officinl in the Department also 
thought it a pity. to, justify closer collaboration by giving, "less 
than credit to Britain's strength". The P. U. S., Cadogan, also found 
that aspect of the speech unacceptable; the rest he thought "admirable", * 
150 
This is,., further example of the F. O. 's denial of Britain's likely, weakness 
internationally after the war. 
151 
The various statements made by Commonwealth spokesmen, illustrate, 
a deep-concern for the future, if. not a great measure of agreement 
as to what it-should be. The role of the Commonwealth internationally 
produced a significant divergence. .., From. Halifax and Cranborne we 
see again the U. K. 's appreciation of the need for more support, from 
the Dominions,, while both stressed-unity. rather than unanimity, although 
Halifax was rather more ambiguous in his Toronto speech, especially. 
in his references to the, Commonwealth acting. as the fourth Great. Power. _ 
In sum, the U. K. wanted,. informal unity, within: the Commonwealth, so as  
to use the members' basic concurrence with its, policies when necessary, 
while not being weighed-down by a formal unity which they thought, rý. 
0 
unattainable. The Australian government was, probably more in , 
tune 
-, 
with the U. K. than with Smuts. As the Canadians-had appreciated,,.,, -, 
its suggestions for greater consultation were based on the, recognition 
that its interests were-linked with the U. K. 's but-Curtin-and Evatt, 
had also made it abundantly clear that they intended to take an 
independent stand in the Pacific,, although they wanted the general 
backing of the association. The New Zealand government,;. like, Australia, 
desired close contacts, with the U. K. but also to play its. part in the 
region,, in its-, own right and as a member of the Commonwealth., 
The position of, South Africa was notably different from that, of,. -, 
the other Dominions. It had no Great Power as a neighbour and in the"'` 
150. Minutes by Butler, 2nd. February 1944, Cook (? ), 3rd February 1944 
and Cadogan, 3rd March 1944, ibid. 
151. See also p. 217. 
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early 1940s none showed much interest in southern Africa. Moreover, 
Smuts ' suggestions for the organisation of the post-war world reflects 
his own assessment of what was required, based on his role as an 
elder statesman with experience of the 1919 settlement, rather than, 
his position as Prime Minister of South Africa. Whereas King epitomised 
the hopes and fears of the majority of Canadians, Smuts did not always 
reflect opinion in his country, especially with regard to foreign policy. 
His elevation of the status of the Great Powers was not just based on 
their likely domination of the post-war world, but was what he 
considered desirable for the stability of international affairs. By 
contrast, King's and Curtin's conviction that the preponderance of the 
Great Powers must be curbed rested on their belief that smaller powers 
should have their interests protected and be allowed a say in matters 
affecting security. These Dominions, and New Zealand, took on-, the 
mantle of most small powers when discussing the role of the Great Powers, 
and the relevance of their Commonwealth membership lay in the assistance 
it could give them to intrude into those circles and achieve some 
recognition for the rights of the smaller nations. Canada was perhaps 
more tolerant of some degree of Great Power leadership, as it had to 
admit that according to the functional principle it was their responsibility 
to provide for security. 
152 
It also had no intention of unnecessarily 
arousing the emnity of the U. S. A. and. it thought that Australia would 
153 do well to cultivate both the U. K. and the U. S. 
If the Commonwealth was to take a clearer international position, 
whether or not it attempted to act as one power, the question remained 
whether any change in the machinery of co-operation was necessary. 
There was more agreement on the question of co-operation than might 
appear. MacDonald and Newton recognised the willingness of Canada to 
152, Robertson 
memorandum for King, 17th March 1944, MG26, J 4, Vol. 234, 
153. t P; C" 158503. 
is to Robertson, 17th March 1944, MG26, J 4, Vol. 248, pP" C. 166585-166586. 
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co-operate and expected this to continue; but we have seen King's 
stern opposition . to the centralising and tightening of the processes, 
which stemmed from his belief that too great a rigidity would destroy 
the Commonwealth. Smuts', discussing the two prevailing tendencies 
within the Commonwealth, separation and federation, criticised both 
and stood on the rights of the Dominions under the'Statute'of Westminster. 
154 
The U. K. sought some improvement in the methods of'cö-operation, 
especially between High Commissioners and Ministers for External' Affairs. 
However, the government was careful in its official statements not 
to advocate particular proposals, and stressed that any change had to 
be made only after agreement by all members. Thus the scene was set 
for the Meeting of Prime Ministers in May 1944. In the months before 
the views of each Government had been aired and discussed, so'that the 
others had at least been able to consider the proposals seriously. 
4 
.. ý,. 
154. Harlech to D. O., 18th March 1944, D035/1205, WF201/12. 
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Chapter Five 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 
With the exception of Curtin, "all the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
had visited England during the war. Until 1944, however, they held 
no full meeting. We have seen the reluctance of King and'Smuts-to 
leave their countries because of practical problems, domestic 
difficulties and the difficulty of delegating their responsibilities 
to a suitable deputy. The experience of Menzies offered a powerful 
lesson to all of them. Fraser had the fewest domestic problems 
but in common with the others believed that a Prime Minister should 
be predominantly at home supervising the war effort. 
l Curtin was 
reluctant to visit the U. K. for two reasons. First, he seemed to 
prefer to concentrate his efforts on domestic rather than foreign 
affairs and was content to give Evatt a fairly free hand in the latter. 
Evatt had already paid two visits to London during the year. Second, 
as he told the U. K. High Commissioner, he wanted to see the tide of 
the war against Japan turn and have time to modify his own party's 
attitude towards foreign policy. 
2 Moreover, Churchill felt no desire 
to convene a meeting An the, early stages of the war, and it was-only 
in 1943 that the U. K. Government began toýpress strongly for one. 
From 1943 the major allies had begun to discuss plans for concluding 
the war and establishing, a new international framework-for the peace; 
1. See chapter 2, pp. 71-73 & 90. (Smuts had told Harlech in February 1943 
of'the difficulty of entrusting the leadership to a deputy, and 
commented that Rofineypr was "too clever" and "no leader". Harlech 
to Attlee, 1st February 1943, Avon Papers, F0954/4, Dom43/3. )0 
2. U. K. High Commissioner Canberra to Cranborne, 13th January 1944, CAB66/47. 
WP(44)136 of 28th February . 1944; Curtin to Attlee, 20th April 1943, 
Prem4,42/2. (Evatt visited the U. K. in the summers of 1942 and 1943. 
Many British Ministers and officials found his forceful and aggressive 
personality rather to their disliking and this is reflected in a minute_. 
on Eden's copy of the telegram informing the U. K. of his 1943 visit. 
Someone commented "The uninvited guest! ". For further views on Evatt, 
see chapter 6, pp. 373-377. 
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In April 1943 the U. K. Government suggested a meeting of the lenders to 
be held that summer and stressed the need for the Commonwealth to 
collaborate to enable the association to take its full share in the 
planning of the peace. 
3 
No-one but King could visit the U. K. at 
the time suggested, but the D. O. was anxious to convene a meeting and 
Attlee told Churchill that apart from needing to discuss important 
post-war issues 
n 
It is moreover of the first importance from the'point 
of view of keeping together the British Commonwealth. 
4 
When commenting on the Foreign Secretary's memoranda on the future world 
organisation in July, Attlee had urged the need to discuss with the 
other leaders ways in which the Commonwealth could act together 
internationally, and in September he advised his Cabinet, colleagues 
, of 
the need to press the Dominions strongly for a meeting because 
it was imperative to discuss policy and the machinery whereby, 
in collaborating with the major Allies, the British5 
Commonwealth will be able to express a united view. 
Another consideration was the need to bolster the Commonwealth's 
position in the eyes of the rest of the international community. Thus 
Attlee reminded his colleagues of 
the important question of the prestige which a meeting 
between the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth at 
this stage would have in the world generally. 6 
This appreciation of the attention which a Commonwealth meeting would 
attract was reinforced by Halifax immediately before the conference. 
He told the F. O. how closely the Americans would.. be watching the 
proceedings and how it could affect their attitude towards post-war 
3. Churchill to four Dominion Prime Ministers, 15th April 1943, Prem4, 
42/2. (Telegram to Canada was sent on 12th April. ) 
4. Minute Attlee to Churchill, 27th April 1943, ibid. 
5. War Cabinet Memorandum by Attlee, 17th September 1943, CAB66/41, 
WP(43)404. See also War Cabinet Memorandum by Attlee, 15th June 1943, 
CAB66/37, WP(43)244. (In July, Attlee had stressed the need for 
a Commonwealth meeting during the discussions of the F. O. 's Papers 
on the world organisation. ) 
6. War Cabinet Memorandum by Attlee, 17th-September 1943, "op. cit. 
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. 
collaboration; the greater the solidarity, demonstrated by the 
association, the more the U. S. would respect it,,, though the conclusions 
reached and the manner ofttheir presentation would also, count for much. 
If the emphasis lay on exclusivedessý, in, the shape of imperial 
Preferences or otherwise, _it would adversely effect 
America's willingness 
to consider,, plans,, for,, international co-operation. If, on the other 
hand,, the Commonwealth's-cohesion was expressed. in conjunction , with:;, r.. 
a willingness to consider, wider international co-operation, and as a 
contribution to it, theU. S. would regard that favourably4and., be 
encouraged to work with the Commonwealth and other nations. "A good 
deal may depend on, this", he concluded.? 4 
The War Cabinet decided at the end of September', 1943 that, a Prime 
Ministers' meeting should be convened and the. U. K. tried to arrange one 
for November. Complications arose when it was decided to hold a 
meeting between the U. S. A., the U. K. and the . 
U. S. S. R., at Teheran at 
the end of November, and it was decided to. postpone the Commonwealth 
meeting until the New. Year.. .. This incident revealed a , 
degree, of irritation 
on Churchill's part at Dominion requests to be told full details of U. K. 
policy and participate in high level talks. He minuted in October 
that it was impossible to inform the Dominions in advance of British 
Ministers' views as they were 
trying to go. with open minds to hear for the first time 
the formidable demands which will be made by Monsieur 
Stalin 
after his great victories, adding 
1. 
we must be= careful, that"the Dominion claims to' representation 
at discussions do not make, all discussions impossible. 8 1 
F' . 
It was finally agreed that May would be the most suitable date for the 
Commonwealth meeting, with Smuts'visiting at"fthe end of the year as 
planned and; then returning for the main meeting. 
9 
7. Halifax to F. O., 7th May 1944, Prem4,42/6. 
8. Minute by Churchill, 2nd October 1943, Prem4,43A/14. 
9. Minutes by War Cabinet Meeting, 22nd September 1943, CAB65/35, WM(43)130. 
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" The-May 1944 gathering was termed. a Prime Ministers' Meeting, not 
an Imperial-Conference. Rather more than a change of-nomenclature 
was involved. King first assumed that. the U. K. wanted an Imperial 
Conference, in which issues such as the future status of India and 
other. constitutional matters would be discussed and he told Churchill 
of his relief at discovering that a meeting of Prime Ministers, was 
proposed; 
10 
the implication being that the latter would involve serious 
discussions between peers, on immediate issues of, common interest,, - 
rather than a full-blown imperial gathering, orchestrated with all 
the trappings of Empire, which would consider the constitutional basis 
of the association.. - King also tookup the point Halifax made later., 
and expressed concern_. lest other allied nations, especially the U. S. A., 
should misunderstand the pur pose of a Commonwealth meeting and look= 
upon it with suspicion. Smuts and-Fraser. -likewise warned the U. K. 
Government against giving this , 
impression,. stressing that the meeting 
should confine itself to war issues. 
11 
When Attlee extended new 
invitations in September 1943,, he told the Prime Ministers that the 6 
meeting was not to be a formal Imperial Conference of the pre-war type, 
but ,a gathering of the five leaders with the attendance of officials 
kept to the minimum. 
12 In January 1944, when the subject was, again 
before the War Cabinet, Cranborne who had returned to the D. O., 
reiterated to his colleagues that it was to be a. personal meeting,, 
and, the replies from the other leaders stressed this aspect too. 
13 
,. 
10. King to Churchill, 14th April 1943, Prem4,42/2., 
11. King to Churchill, 26th April 1943; Smuts to Churchill, 19th April 
1943; Fraser to Churchill, 22nd April 1943. (King had also told 
MacDonald after Halifax's speech that he did not want to discuss 
inter-Commonwealth collaboration until after the war had ended. 
MacDonald to D. O., 28th January 1944, D035/1204, WC75/9. ) 
12. D. O. to four Dominion Governments, 8th September 1943, CAB66/41, WP(43)404 
13. War Cabinet Memorandum by Cranborne, '7th January 1944, CAB66/41, WP(44)41; 
War Cabinet Minutes of 20th January 1944, CAB65/41, WM(44)9. See also 
telegrams to and from the Dominions, ' March 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44)8, 
18th March 1944. 
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By 1944 there was less reluctance on the part of the Dominion Prime 
Ministers to discuss post-war issues and these were included on the 
agenda. (However, King told MacDonald in January 1944, after Halifax's 
speech, that he wanted to postpone all consideration of inter- 
Commonwealth relations until after the war had been won. ) Perhaps 
the most important consequences of the change in the description 
of the meeting was the strengthening of the expectation that although 
opinions would be readily exchanged, few conclusions would be attempted; 
that it was for the purpose of mutual understanding rather than a 
common policy. 
The emphasis placed on the size and personal nature of the meeting 'ý_ 
caused one complication, (which might have arisen anyway) about -the 
position of India and Southern Rhodesia. In September 1943 L. S. Amery, 
the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Attlee urging that 
representatives of the Indian Government and the Indian States should 
be invited. He noted their participation in Commonwealth discussions 
over the previous twenty-five years and their right to representation in 
the U. R. War Cabinet during both wars, adding that he had the backing 
of the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in this plea. 
14 
This question was 
discussed at the War Cabinet on 22nd September when Amery again 
pressed for their inclusion. Attlee argued that although Indian 
representatives had taken part in Commonwealth meetings since 1918, 
the position had been altered by the Statute of Westminster. He 
said that the prospective meeting was for Prime Ministers and India 
lacked anyone with the authority to represent it. (Whether'Attlee 
was trying to justify the Indian's exclusion on the basis of the 
V 
Statute of Westminster or by the new designation of the meeting, or both, 
is not clear. The latter were more convincing grounds as India had 
sent representatives to the 1937 Conference, although the Secretary 
14. Amery to Attlee, 14th September 1943, D035/1472, WC60/2., 
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of State for India, the Marquess of Zetland, had headed the delegation. ) 
Churchill accepted the view that India could not participate on equal 
terms, but said that its representatives ought to be present for some 
discussions. He suggested that they should be invited to London to 
be on hand. This was agreed . 
15. 
Cranborne later raised the question 
of attendance again. Referring to the provision for Indian 
representatives to be present in London, he suggested that the same 
arrangement be adopted for the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. 
The Cabinet agreed that Sir Godfrey Huggins should be invited to 
London on the understanding, that he would be invited to some of the 
16" ., 
discussions only. When the D. O. informed the Dominion governments, Icing 
emphasised that the meeting was a special one for Prime Ministers, 
and although not objecting to the attendance of representatives of 
India and Southern^when issues of special interest to them were 
discussed, said 
I think that we should maintain a sharp distinction 
, between the character of the meeting-and a regular.. ,.. . 
Imperial Conference. 
He asked that no public mention should be made of the participation 
of either country. 
17 
The D. O. replied by explaining the extreme 
difficulties of preventing any publicity as the presence of those 
representatives would be well known, but assured King that the clear 
distinction would be drawn. 
18 
The War Cabinet decided on 20th January 1944 that a committee, 
under the chairmanship of Cranborne and consisting of E. Bevin, Minister 
of Labour and National Service, L. S. Amery, 0. Stanley (Colonial 
Secretary) and R. Law, with the power to co-opt others, should prepare 
the agenda and papers for the meeting. This "Committee on 
Preparations for the Meeting with Dominion Prime-Ministers" (hereafter, 
15. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, -22nd September 1943, CAB65/35, WM(43)130. 
16. War Cabinet Memorandum by Cranborne, 7th January 1944, and War Cabinet' 
Minutes of 20th January 1944, op. cit. 
17. Canadian Government to D. O., 2nd February 1944, D035/1203, WC60/4. 
18. D. O. to Canadian Government, 5th February 1944, ibid. 
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the D. P. M. Committee) first met on 15th February 1944. The agenda wau 
sent to the Dominions at the beginning of March, after approval by 
Churchill and was divided into four sections; the immediate war 
situation, the requirements of tke war against Japan, the post-war 
settlement, and the issues affecting co-operation within the 
Commonwealth. The covering telegram gave the U. K. 's opinion that 
the best use of the time available would be to concentrate on the wider 
issues of policy, and specified the main subjects which they thought 
would arise. 
19 
Although there was some reluctance to publicise the 
scope and objectives of the meeting, 
20 
the Dominion leaders were 
generally in agreement with the draft agenda, and they received 
confirmation, requested by Fraser, that it would not preclude anyone 
from raising other subjects. 
21 The Canadian External Affairs Department 
had been ready to correspond with the U. K. over details, but King, 
told Robertson, its Under-Secretary, not to question the agenda in any 
respect but to await the meetings, while in the meantime preparing 
material for all topics. 
22 
Thus, King made no objection to discussing 
Commonwealth co-operation. 
Having established the broad parameters, the D. P. M. Committee 
discussed in detail the preparations required by the U. K. Cranborne 
raised the question of political co-operation within the Commonwealth, 
and pointed to the divergent tendencies of Australia and Canada on 
the subject of central co-ordinating machinery. He rejected Bevin's 
suggestion that both trends be allowed to develop simultaneously, with 
the warning that it would be too dangerous to attempt to establish a 
formal organisation that was clearly unacceptable to Canada, and 
tantamount to forcing it into independent action, possibly towards a 
19. D. O. to four Dominion Governments, 5th March 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44)8. 
20. For example see Curtin to D. O., 13th March 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44)9. 
21. Fraser to D. O., 15th March 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44)10. 
22. See contents of File 'Correspondence with S. of S. for Dominion Affairs, 
March 1944', MG26, J I, Vol. 571. 
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closer relationship with the`U; S, A. iCranborne declared that.; the,, 
U. K. should"leave Curtin to-state his, proposals; 1"others would then 
respond; and the U. K. ' should' introduce its, own suggestions . when,,. 
they appeared likely to be-acceptable. He mentioned two proposals; 
a` formalisation of the'High Commissioners' meetings after the-war. 
and periodic meetings of Commonwealth Ministers' responsible for foreign ,.. 
affairs, ' promising to furnish the committee with.: a memorandum on the 
latter giiestion, 23 
The D, O; 'was the department principally concerned with-political 
c6-op'eration and provided =the ýconanittee with this material., -, However; 
the Dominion Intelligence Department (D. I. D. ) of the F. O. -had also 
been' considering the issue and produced its own. proposals. 
24, 
The F. O. 
was involved in preparations"for'the Prime*Ministers' Meeting in-respect 
of -particular issues and""the, 'pattern of inter-Commonwealth, consultations 
on foreign policy: K'""Under the second heading came Curtin's-proposals 
and'the F. '0', "s own programme. Discussing the role of the F. O. at 
the meeting, 'Sir B. Newton, 'the F. O. 's liaison officer with the Dominion 
High Co mnissioners, 'referred to that programme-'and commented that 
while it"might not'be `important enough to be brought, tothe attention 
of the P. M. s, 'unless-all'others, failed to gain acceptance, rthe proposals 
were of value because they would commit the Dominion governments less 
than high-level interchanges. ' He, hoped a , meeting of officials could 
be convened after the Prime Ministers' meeting to discuss them. Cadogan 
supported the F. O. 's plans, and also Cranborne's . proposed 
tactics: 
In the"likely event"of a divergence of view between certain 
Dominions on 'methods', we shall probably have to make some 
proposals ourselves, " not'of a far reaching'naturebut more 
in the form of improvement and development of existing 
machinery. S 
11 11 11 
., 
23. Minutes'of D. P. M. Committee, 15ti February 1944, CAB99/27,. DPM(44),; 
1st meeting. 
24. See chapter 3. 
25. Minute by Newton, 14th February 1944 and minute by Cadogan, 25th 
February 1944, F0371/42681, W2162/2145/68. 
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The'D. O. 's proposals for political co-operation appeared in the 
paper submitted to the D. P. M. Committee by Cranborne. Again he 
recommended the tactic of leaving the initiative to Curtin. Curtin 
was expected to propose the recognition of the Dominion High 
Commissioners and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs as 
a standing sub-committee of the 'Imperial Conference' and the establishment 
of a joint secretariat of the Conference. Cranborne identified Curtin's 
objectives as securing an effective voice in the framing of policy, 
while retaining the sovereignty of the Australian government, rather 
than pressing for a common policy. Canada's attitude, seen especially 
in relation to the reaction to Halifax's speech, was based on a desire 
to avoid any element of exclusiveness in Commonwealth action, and King 
had frequently expressed himself content with the existing arrangements 
for consultation. Cranborne explained that both Curtin and King 
wanted national control of policy, and influence in world affairs. 
The difference was that King did not think the best way to achieve this 
was by associating Canada more closely with the other Commonwealth 
members. King was opposed to a third Power grouping attempting to 
rival the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., preferring a wider association of 
like-minded states in which Canada might have an influence. This 
was a view inevitably shaped by Canaaa's proximity to the U. S. A. and 
the fact that the majority of Canadians were no longer of British descent. 
Cranborne`, noted that the New Zealand Government had not made any public 
statements on post-war issues, except in its agreement with Australia, 
but anticipated that it would side with the latter on the question of 
Commonwealth consultation, Smuts had already supported the thesis of 
a third power grouping, balancing the other two; he was expected to 
favour strengthening Commonwealth ties. As to the position of the 
U. K., Cranborne mentioned it had been careful to refrain from committing 
itself to either side in the controversy, content to indicate a willingness 
to consider changes with an open mind, provided they were unanimously 
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1 
approved. (However, many people in Canada had intepreted Halifax's 
speech as evidence of the U. K. 's support for Curtin's proposals. ) 
The compromise suggestions to be offered were those mentioned 
at the first meeting. Discussions between foreign affairs Ministers 
would be important because it was difficult for Prime Ministers to 
meet very frequently, and the best time for these was immediately prior 
to an equivalent meeting of the world organisation. Cranborne thought 
if the consultative nature of these talks was stressed, Canada might 
agree to them. (The fact that three Dominion Prime Ministers were 
currently also External Affairs Ministers was noted, but that situation 
was thought unlikely to persist. ) Formalising the London meetings 
between the Dominions Secretary and the High Commissioners was part 
of Curtin's proposals too, and open to objection. The Dominion 
Governments did not always appoint men of the highest calibre as 
High Commissioners. They tended to lose touch with their countries. 
ry 
Cranborne also thought King might object, but hoped that he would agree 
to a greater permanency for these meetings on perhaps a less formal 
basis. Commenting on Curtin's proposal for a secretariat he said 
This involves frankly setting up centralised machinery 
for the co-ordination of Empire-policy, It is, difficult 
to believe that any proposal on these lines would be 
acceptable to either. lair, Mackenzie King or to Canadian 
public opinion as a whole, in its present mood, and I am 
afraid that for us to support it would frighten the 
Canadians and do more harm than good. 
The most-the U. K. could suggest would be for each Dominion to appoint 
an official to their High Commissions in London with responsibility 
for keeping in contact with the F. O., the Cabinet Office and the Joint 
Planning Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. This would be open to 
fewer objections but would keep them in close touch with foreign and 
defence policy during its formulation. Australia already enjoyed 
such facilities, but the others had not chosen to utilise them. 
Cranborne thought it worth renewing the offer, for if it were not taken 
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up the U. K. would have shown its goodwill, while. at"that level °-, " "ý 
of collaboration uniformity was not essential. 
26 (This suggestion 
was, also contained in the F. O. ', s programme. ) 
Cranborne's memorandum was discussed at the third meeting of, the 
D. P. M. committee on 12th April. The principalydisagreeIent arose from 
Cranborne's interpretation of the secretariat's implications. '', - Amery 
disagreed that its functions would extend to co-ordinating policy, 
suggesting it would be no more than a post-office to facilitate the 
collation and exchange, of information, and the' preparation of agenda. 
Amery thought this would be more acceptable to King and hoped to 
persuade Smuts to influence the Canadian leader in its favour. , The 
committee agreed that Cranborne's memorandum should be revised to 
express Amery's"conception of the secretariat, and it was presented 
to the War Cabinet with this revision. 
27 
The functions of a secretariat 
cannot be, defined without reference to its attributed purpose. - One 
could either be established to co-ordinate policy, possibly with some 
executive functions, or merely to act as a central sorting office with 
responsibility for servicing Commonwealth conferences, as the 
Commonwealth Secretariat did after it was eventually established in 1965. 
In this respect neither Amery nor Cranbörne was wrong in his interpretation 
and the precise details of Curtin's proposals had to be awaited. It 
was perhaps unwise to give onlyýone view to the War Cabinet, and the 
more innocuous one at that, aas it, might lead its members to regard the 
Canadians, as unreasonable for not accepting such a, proposal. They 
would tend to assume that Canada had rejected a non-executive body, 
when Canadian opposition tD a secretariat stemmed from its fear that 
it might assume, or later receive, powers not originally assigned to it. 
26. `'Cranborne Memorandum "Co-operation in the British Commonwealth", 
7 April 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44)14. 
27. Minutes of Committee 12th April 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44) 3rd meeting; 
Cranborne memorandum "Co-operation in the British Commonwealth", 
18th April 1944, CAB66/49, WP(44)210. 
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At this same meeting of the 12th April, Greenway (Head of the D. I. D. ) 
urged the committee not to reject out of hand Curtin's proposals as 
impracticable simply because of likely Canadian opposition. He thought 
Australia and, New Zealand would press their ideas very strongly, that 
So. zth Africa would probably support them, and that the U. K. could 
at least be benevolently neutral. In the face of this, Canada might 
not wish to reject too much. 
28 As a prognostic of the various Dominion 
standpoints and of Canada's likely capitulation on this question, 
Greenway was to be proved wrong. The only other comment at the meeting 
concerned the choice of the two suggestions, with Law preferring the 
foreign Ministers' meetings, and whether the two were alternatives, - 
or mutually compatible. The memorandum for the War Cabinet-made it 
clear that they were complementary. 
In a F. O. minute Creenway declared that he could not see the 
objections to developing machinery for five-member co-operation even 
if all five would not join in and he thought Cranborne's fears as to 
Canada's reaction were exaggerated. He had doubts about the proposal 
to formalise the High Commissioners' meetings, principally because of 
his belief that the Dominion Governments had not learnt to place full 
confidence in, or give enough responsibility to, their representatives. 
Nor did he have a very high opinion of the existing arrangements. 
It is clearly unlikely that Mr. Bruce or Mr. Massey who 
are regarded with a somewhat jaundiced eye by their 
Govts: or Col. Reitz who appears to take little interest 
in his duties & none at all in foreign affairs: or Mr. 
Jordan, who is past praying for, would in present 
conditions add any weight to the Councils of the Empire. 
29 
Cadogan did not make any comment on these papers and although Greenway 
received support for his views from Jebb, (Head of the Economic and 
30 
Reconstruction Department) Newton did not share his criticisms, 
supporting both Cranborne's thesis and tactics. Similar divisions 
28. Third meeting of-DPM Committee, op. cit. 
29. Minute by Greenway, 11th April 1944, F0371/42682, W5507/2145/68. 
30. Minute by Jebb, 12th April 1944, ibid. - 
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in opinion within the F. O. had been evident in the previous six months when 
it- had been discussing Commonwealth collaboration in foreign affairs, 
with Newton tending to align himself with the, D. O. 's viewpoint and 
Greenway adopting a more aggressive view towards both the Dominions 
and the D. O. At this stage the F. O. was not sufficiently involved,..;, ' 
with key decisions on Commonwealth collaboration for these opinions to 
affect the pattern of collaboration. III---I;: - 
Newton added his support for Foreign Ministers' meetings, suggesting; 
that they should be held whenever there was an 'opportunity, not 'Just, 
annually, as-this would not, frighten the Canadians by rigid regularity, 
or waste opportunities. He thought-the High Commissioners' meetings, 
which he attended, could be made more effective and given greater scope, " 
and he dismissed criticisms of the selection of 11igh Commissioners or 
their lack of contact with their countries as unimportant; the former 
would improve with the elevation of-their status,, one idea he offered 
was for'the Minister of State, or if there were no, such post, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, to attend these meetings. However, he 
stressed"that whatever changes were made, their informal character 
should not be altered. Newton said he would be "pleased but very 
surprised" if a-secretariat was accepted, but agreed with the modifications 
to the memorandum. In the event of its not being accepted, he wanted 
to see more meetings between Ministers and officials and repeated his 
-suggestion that there shouldýbe a meeting of Commonwealth, officials 
after the end of the Prime Ministers' meeting todiscuss'these-issuesr ' 
31 
fully. 
Cranborne's memorandum was revised according to the recommendations 
of the committee, considered by the War, Cabinet on 27th,, Äpril, and ., 
approved. Apart from the altered interpretation. of the implications 
of a secretariat, the D. O. 's. plan to attempt some improvement in the. 
3 
31, Minute by Newton, 13th April 1944, ibid. 
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machinery of collaboration by supporting no Dominion view, but playing 
a neutral though positive role, carried the day. At this meeting 
Eden informed the Cabinet of the F. O. 's Progranune, (it was not prepared 
in time to be considered by the D. P. M. committee) and it was agreed 
that it should be communicated to the D. O. for Cranborne's consideration. 
32 
There was no inter-departmental discussion of the F. O. 's proposals 
before the meeting of Prime Ministers, which was due to open four days 
later. There was some complaint within the F. O. that the D. O. was holding 
up matters to stop consideration of its plans, but undoubtedly the D. O. 
was working under intense pressure. Full study of this question did 
not take place on the official level at the end of the meeting, but 
there were talks with the D. O. in June. 
33 The F. O. 's programme contained 
some interesting suggestions, but that office's discussions had covered 
many unrealistic proposals and the comments of some officials in this 
period and the frustration shown overfl the D. O. 's handling, indicated 
that many within the F. O. did not understand the attitudes of the 
Dominions as well as they might, and that some of its officials were 
willing to risk serious dissension at a meeting which was primarily 
designed to-further unity, and above all the appearance of unity. 
The U. K. War Cabinet had considered various memoranda on post-war 
schemes and specifically the proposed world organisation. The U. K. had 
taken part in'the Teheran talks and representatives were due to visit 
Washington in June for talks with the Americans. However, British 
policy had yet to be approved by the War Cabinet and the F. O. encountered 
some difficulties with Churchill who on the one hand complained at 
1% s.. = -- 
34 
&ving to spend time on such plans while running the war, and on the 
32" Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 27th April 1944, CAä65/42, WM(44)58. 33. See chapter 3. pp. 174-175. 34. At the end of 1942 Churchill had shown a reluctance to consider post- 
war plans and the Diary of Sir Charles Webster, (seconded to the F. O. 's Research Department, and closely involved in post-war planning) shows 
that on occasions this was still the case by April 1943. P. A. Reynolds 
E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster 
and the United Nations, 1939-1946 London, 1976), p. 29. 
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other had different ideas from the F. O., The subject was scheduled 
to be discussed at the Prime Ministers' meeting and the F. O. prepared 
a series of papers which Eden asked Churchill's permission to circulate 
to the other leaders, "not, as committing you or any of us, but simply 
as an official study" 
3S 
Sir E.. Bridges, Secretary to the Cabinet, 
had also sent Churchill a summary of she F. O. 's plans, in, an -attempt 
to assist Eden in gaining Churchill's permission. 
36 
The Prime Minister's 
differences with the. F. O. were principally over the formation and 
functions of regional councils, but his notion of the World Council was 
more exclusive in membership and more akin to an alliance of, the Four 
Major Powers. 
37 
_ 
Churchill agreed to-the presentation of the F. O.! s 
papers to the Dominion leaders and also tabled a separate memorandum 
of his own on regional councils. 
Commonwealth defence co-operation was one of the first matters to, 
be considered by the D. P. M. Committee. This was predominantly the 
preserve of the Chiefs of Staff,, but both Amery and Bevin had written 
to Cranborne on this topic. Amery was keen for the Commonwealth to 
decide 
, 
its objectives in terms of bases and strategic vantage points, 
arguing that the Americans and Russians. would have done so already., 
Discussions should revolve around regional commitments and the U. K. 
ought to have its policy, sufficiently advanced to place proposals 
before the Dominions. 
38 
, 
Bevin mentioned Halifax's reference in his 
Toronto speech, to the Commonwealth acting as a unit inýthe new organisation 
35. Minute by Eden'to Churchill, 4th May 1944; Pzem4,30/7. 
36. Summary of F. O. memorandum by Bridges, to Churchill, 1st May 1944, 
ibid. (On the 26th'April Webster noted in his diary a conversation 
with Bridges: the said we must go-softly with the P. M. re papers. 
He had a plot for Sec of State to handle him. They should ask for 
comments and later S of S (should) get P. M. to agree. " Reynolds 
and Hughes, op. cit., p. 31. .... ý, J' 37. Churchill's thinking seems to be rather fluid at this juncture as to 
precisely what arrangements he wanted, but on 28th April, Webster 
recorded a. conversation with Law who reported that Churchill did not 
want "any world organisation at all but continental Leagues of Nations 
and a Four Power Alliance. " Reynolds and Hughes, op. cit., p. 31. 
38. Amery to Cranborne, 25th January 1944, D035/1744, WG785 1. 
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and thought it should first form a defensive unit, general unity only 
being feasible if there existed a solid defensive unity for its self- 
preservation. This should be on a zonal system, and he predicted that 
many advantages would follow; less anti-British sentiment, better 
communications and trade, increased migration and facilities for 
joint troop training; and he denied that this would be prohibitively 
expensive, as a joint budget could be negotiated. 
39 
The D. O. hoped for an extension of defence co-operation. It 
acknowledged that the Dominions might not yet-be able to give a clear 
indication of their plans, bqt said the U. K. needed to know the areas 
of agreed co-operation, Dominion requirements from the U. K. and what 
they could offer in return. It anticipated that discussions would 
cover equipment, training, use of joint facilities, allocations of 
' , -" .. per,. 
production and co-operation in combined operations and types of warfare, 
and wanted the Prime Ministers to authorise their Staffs to hold 
t, w 
preliminary talks with U. K. Staffs. 
40 
The D. O. wrote to the three 
Service Ministers enclosing a note on Commonwealth defence and asking 
for their suggestions. 
41 
Defence collaboration was discussed at the second meeting of the 
D. P. M. Committee on 29th February which was attended by the Service 
Ministers. Bevin reiterated the points expressed in his paper and 
Cranborne agreed to furnish the Chiefs of Staff with details of the 
political, background to defence co-operation and the degree of collaboration 
which could be expected from the Dominions, to a. td them in their 
preparations of a memorandum on post-war defence and security. Law 
39. 
, 
Bevin to Cranborne, 1st February 1944, ibid. (Both Papers were 
reproduced as DPM(44)3, CAB99/27. 
40: - D. O. Minute drafted by Mr. Boyd Shannon, -27th January 1944, D035/1744, 
, 
WG785/1. 
41. Cranborne to A. V. Alexander, Sir J. Grigg and Sir A. Sinclair, 27th 
January 1944, ibid. 
. 
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informed the committee that the F. O. had requested an appreciation 
of U. S. military strategy from its Embassy in Washington, so discussions 
could be held in light of American plans. 
42 
Cranborne's minute to 
the Chiefs of Staff identified the U. K. 's aims as agreement in 
principle to continued liaison and co-operation and authority for 
Commonwealth-Staffs to pursue talks with the U. K. 
43 
The Vice Chiefs of Staff forwarded two memoranda to the D. P. M. 
Committee, one on the military aspects of the world security organisation 
and one on Commonwealth defence co-operation within the organisation. 
The former did not relate to the position of the Commonwealth, except 
in its assumption that the U. K. would be one of the four Powers 
, 
on the 
irfS 
world council. It did, however, note that if regional political 
councils were established, (and the Vice Chiefs identified difficulties 
in dividing up the world for security purposes) those councils should 
have military staffs attached to them. 
44 
In the second memorandum 
the Vice Chiefs noted that in the inter-war years the lack of any firm 
Dominion commitments had made joint plans impossible. In the post-war 
world the major Powers were expected to be predominant militarily and 
the need for the Commonwealth "to speak with a united voice and to 
throw its whole weight into the scale when vital issues were at stake" 
was stressed. It was a geographical reality that the Commonwealth would 
be involved in all regions and each member had to be able to rely on the 
political, and military resources of its partners when necessary. Close 
links had to be established if the Commonwealth was to take its place 
w. 
alongside the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. Again we see the basic U. K. 
thesis of the importance of equalling the power of the other two major 
states and its need for the support of its Commonwealth partners. 
42., Minutes of D. P. M. Meeting, 29th February 1944, CAB99/27, ýDPM(44) 2nd 
Meeting. See also minute by N. cButler (head of F. O. North American 
Department) proposing that a summary of U. S. intentions be sought, 
12th February 1944, F0271/42677, W2166/1534/68. 
43. Cranborne to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 3rd March 1944, D035/1744, WG785/1, 
44. Vice Chiefs of Staff memorandum, 7th April 1944, "Military Aspects 
of any Post-War Security Organisation"; CAB99/27, DPM(44)16. (Also 
COS(44)202(0). ) 
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This paper did relate Commonwealth defence to world defence and 
did 'not'' separate Commonwealth defence co-operation entirelyýfrom'" 
wider co-operative action with other Powers. The Vice Chiefs were 
convinced of the need for the Commonwealth'to bexstrong enough to 
deal on equal terms with the U. S: " and the U. S. S. R., and'to this end 
they wished the Dominions to recognise the association as a single 
major Power grouping in defence. ', They'urged that Dominion leaders 
be persuaded to accept'a responsibility for defence, even 'with'a 
slight loss of sovereignty, but admitted that it might be impossible 
because of the Dominions' insistence on their freedom of action. ' If' 
this were so, "the chances of arriving at an effective system of world 
security will be remote". 
The Vice Chiefs recognised that'closer defence collaboration'would 
also necessitate a great share for the Dominions in political decisions. 
Subject to those political considerations they recommended six methods 
for improving collaboration: a permanent secretariat (with one or 
more Standing Committees) attached to the Imperial Conference; periodic 
meetings of Ministers and Chiefs of'Staff; an extension to the system 
of interchanging military staffs; an expansion of training'in the 
principles of imperial defence; all organisation, equipment and"training 
to continue the same; and the industrial potential for waging war to be 
studied and co-ordinated. Three other subjects-were'also mentioned. 
They suggested that if a regional"system were setup, some de- 
centralisation of defence plans could'result, 'enabling theýDominions 
to play a major role in their areas. With regional military staffs 
reporting to those on the world council, this could allow them the voice 
in the framing of policy which they desired. Secondly, Bevin's 
proposal for U. K. troops to be trained in the Dominions was welcomed 
in principle. Finally, issues such as bases, which affected the 
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Commonwealth as a whole, should be discussed with Dominion officials 
and Ministers, and it was hoped to secure authority from the Prime 
Ministers to do so, and then frame a joint policy. 
45 
At the third 
meeting there was some discussion on the advisability of pursuing 
plans for co-ordinating Commonwealth defence before decisions had 
been taken internationally. Amery was anxious to make progress because 
of the probable delay in setting up the world organisation, especially 
as their own plans could be accommodated within that wider framework 
and form a solid contribution to them. Cranborne reminded the meeting 
ii 
of Canada's reluctance to be too closely identified with Commonwealth, 
as distinct from international, plans. However, he thought Canada 
F 
would be more willing to join in if the Commonwealth proposals were 
46 
framed with reference to their place in the world plan. The Vice 
1. I Chiefs of Staff memoranda were to form the basis of the U. K. delegation's 
brief in Washington on defence, but were not circulated as U. K. Policy 
statements to the Prime Ministers. 
47 
During the war the level of inter-Commonwealth communications had 
increased, as had Ministerial and official visits. This interchange 
of information, together with the various statements made by Dominion 
spokesmen in 1943, meant that the U. K. was reasonably well informed of 
each Dominion's policies towards post-war issues, insofar as these had 
been decided. Before the May Meeting of the leaders, MacDonald and 
Cross sent appreciations of the attitudes of King and Curtin. 
MacDonald's extensive memorandum was writte p by him not by his 
staff. It furnishes the best explanation of Canada's attitude to 
Imperial co-operation written by a servant of H. M. Government. He 
assessed King's position acutely: 
45. Vice Chiefs of Staff memorandum, 7th April 1944, "The Co-ordination 
of Defence Policy in the British Commonwealth in Relation to a 
World System of Security", CAB99/27, DPM(44)18. (Also COS(44)58. ) 
46. Minutes of D. P. M. Meeting, 12th April 1944, CAB99/27, DPM(44) 3rd 
Meeting. 
47. Note in F0271/42677, W5444/1534/68. 
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His influence is so paramount that his personal policy 
becomes the party's and the Government's policy. But 
like all statesmen who succeed in keeping a grip on office 
for many years, he, is only partly the original author of 
his policies and partly a'shrewd interpreter of the 
prevailing opinion of his follow countrymen. 
He summed up King's attitude to the Commonwealth as one of support 
for Canada's continued membership, provided it remained on the basis 
of full recognition for the sovereign rights of the Dominions. King 
advocated full co-operation and consultation, which he thought were 
being largely achieved, but he did allow some room for improvement 
if achieved by extending the existing "informal" methods. The creation 
of formal machinery would be vetoed by King as likely to result in 
a reduction of Dominion independence; because he was unconvinced 
that it would improve co-operation;, from an anxiety not to alienate 
French-Canadian opinion; and due to. his fear that it would lead to 
American suspicions of an unfriendly Commonwealth bloc. These last 
two determinants were unique to Canada, , which could explain 
its policy, 
differences with Australia and, New Zealand; and, inasmuch as South 
Africa had reservations about the extent of inter-Commonwealth co- 
operation, so too, did that country contain a substantial non-British 
population. MacDonald said that despite such negative factors, which 
inevitably affected its policy, Canadashould not be regarded as the 
'black sheep' of the Commonwealth., Instead, the U. K. ought to be all 
the more appreciative of Canadian statemen's success in maintaining 
that country's staunch and loyal support to, and significant co- 
operation., with, the association. 
MacDonald dwelt on the implications of the French-Canadian 
complication,, estimating. that except for a. minority who were openly 
antagonistic to the U. K.,. the majority's loyalty was increasing as a 
result of Canada's recent relationship with the U. K. and because of the 
latter's performance during the war. French-Canadians would nevertheless 
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put Canada first and the`Commonwealth second. Membership must-therefore 
not-seem. to prejudice Canada's growth as an independent nation: - 
MacDonald'did stress the explosive nature of the: Commonwealth, connection 
in Canadian politics, 'as. recent speeches had'demonstrated. -i.. He said 
many Canadians had been lukewarm to Curtin's; suggestions not-because 
of any caution as to the value of the association, ' but because they 
thought such proposals ran the risk of destroying national; unitycin 
Canada and with it membership; it was"preciselyFthat which they wanted 
to preserve. "- III 
-The despatch stated categorically-that the Canadian Government, 
collectively and individually, supported the Commonwealth rather than "' 
any'closer links-with-the U. S. A. But that was-not to deny`the'close 
geographical, economic and cultural links between the two, which 
required Canada to reconcile'itsýpolicies towards both. This was 
especially pertinent to foreign and defence policies where such harmony 
was crucial and helped to explain King's opposition to centralised 
Commonwealth machinery. Moreover, Canadians regarded it-as being 
in the U. K. 's interest, as. well as its own, for the U. S. to view 
Canada as an independent and free nation and thus take more notice""of 
its views. - A formalised structure with the Dominions acting as-, 
secondary states backing'up the U. K. would not strengthen such An 
impression. This was one of the'reasons for Canadian opposition to 
Halifax's', speech the previous January. 'Canadians had no desire to 
weaken the relationship, 'or the Commpnwealth's, in, fluence in world 
affairs. However, N 
They know that the Commonwealth's influence and power-will", 
be far greater if it is a true partnership of nations who 
are all undoubtedly free, and whose co-operation is clearly 
the result of a voluntary community of ideas. "`' 
Against the negative factors stood positive ones. These were 
given as long historical relationship; similar traditions; identical 
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political faith and institutions; blood relationship; military 
security; economic advantage; and above all loyalty to the same 
Crown. This last bond was one by which MacDonald set great store , 
and he said King did too. One of MacDonald's main suggestions for 
improving Commonwealth unity was for the King and Queen to spend more 
time in each Dominion, residing and executing their duties there for 
a period of months. 
48 
He thought King would agree to this although 
he had not raised it with him because "he attaches much importance 
to the Crown and is so personally devoted to the present King and 
Queen". MacDonald's other suggestions consisted of developing to 
the full the exchange of information by cable; the rigorous observation 
of the principle of prior consultation before policy decisions were 
taken; continuation of periodic Prime Ministers' meetings, combined 
with more frequent Ministerial meetirgs between two or more members 
on foreign and defence matters, to be supplemented by ones between 
t4 
officials. Finally, the High Commissioners' meetings with the Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs should be continued and developed. 
MacDonald mentioned the value he had found in these gatherings, as 
Secretary of State, and also King's initial reluctance to allow Massey 
to attend them. Despite this opposition, he had always insisted to 
the Canadian Prime Minister that they were informal and not publicised, 
and King had accepted this 'mechanism' during the war years as 
something', to be prized. MacDonald used this as an example of how 
to proceed in improving Commonwealth machinery, while avoiding the 
dangers of formalising the relationship. As to Curtin's proposal 
that the High Commissioners' meetings become a standing committee of 
48. MacDonald had stressed this point'in a memorandum written in February 
1943. See chapter 3, pp. 181-182. (It is worth noting that in March 
1939 before the King's visit to Canada, Lord Tweedsmuir was stressing 
to Chamberlain the importance of this and how it would bolster support 
for the U. K. and for the coming war. Tweedsmuir to Chamberlain, 
11th March 1939, Buchan Papers, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario. ) 
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the imperial Conference, MacDonald thought that, Curtin's objectives 
could be, as well achieved without making them formal, or raising the 
status of those representatives. . Although the difference, in theory 
was great,, -he doubted if it wouldlbe so in practice., Moreover, there 
was, no reason why Australia should not-attach more importance to the 
meetings-than others. might, and. at least. Canadian participation, would 
be secure:, 
" The-, fact is, that , if; we allow matters to develop in u ;. 
practice, without making challenging public speeches on 
the theory of Empire unity or, seeking abruptly. "to-create 
new formal machinery for achieving it, Canada will become 
an increasingly co-operative and useful partner, intthe 
Commonwealth. 49 
MacDonald's memorandum comprised an extremely thorough analysis of 
Canada's position. While none of his suggestions was startlingly 
original, except perhaps that the King should reside for a time in 
each Dominion, they did provide Cranborne and the U. K. Government with 
a valuable guide to King's position. It is possible to detect a view 
among less informed sources in the U. K. and some F. O. officials that 
Canada tended to be obstructive towards plans for improving co-operation 
from selfish or unworthy motives. The High Commissioner's memorandum 
gave Cranborne a useful 
, 
counter-balance., The circulation given. to 
this memorandum is-not known;. probably Cranborne showed or, described 
it-to Eden, a very close personal friend, and informed Churchill. -. - 
The-letter from Cross bore a slightly, different character. It 
enclosed a biographical, account -of, the ° Prime-Minister, and commented-°° 
on., his,. attitudeto-foreign affairs; a, subject about which'he was cless 
knowledgeable, than the other PrimeýMinisters, who were their owns-. 
ForeigneMinisters: 
-Cross emphasised Curtin's achievement, in persuading 
his party to reject its traditional, isolationism 0ý, and Judged -that he was 
gaining, in ability., and stature as his-term of office progressed. -. Despite 
a-lackof_experience, 
with the world outside Australia, Curtin's conviction 
49. MacDonald to Cranborne, 8th April 1944; D035/1489, WC75/35. 
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that it should remain in association with the U. K., rather than 
the U. S. A., was firm and Cross applauded his basic convictions, and ,, 
intentions. With regard to the Agreement with New. Zealand, he thought 
its proposals would be regarded as ideas for the Commonwealth pool, 
rather than as a rigid programme which had to be enacted. Immediately 
on his return to Australia Curtin was due to fight the final stages 
of a referendum campaign to permit the national government to assume 
temporary powers to enact post-war reconstruction measures. Cross 
told Cranborne of the Prime Minister's anxiety to return from London 
with the highest possible prestige to tip the balance in that campaign 
and that he was asuming an attitude of relative indifference to, the 
Prime Ministers' Meeting in order to protect himself against accusations, 
of failure. He had been saying that the subjects on the agenda could 
easily be discussed through, regular channels. Cross doubted if he 
would prove stubborn if that would result in his, appearing to have failed. 
The High Commissioner also thought that Curtin was apprehensive about,. 
the meeting, as he had never previously encountered 
anything as formidable as a collection of United Kingdom,. 
Ministers, still less a Churchill, a Roosevelt or a Smuts. 
In short, I think he has fears as to how he is going to 
show up in such company ... He felt long ago that Winston 
Churchill had not got a good opinion of him and, he was anxious 
to justify himself and to stand well in Churchill's regard. 
Cross added that Curtin had the very highest impression of Cranborne 
and obviously felt less intimidated by him. 
so 
Cross had failed to establish a close rapport with the Australian 
Government necessary to enable him to successfully fulfil his functions 
as, High Commissioner, and his relations with-Curtin were not close. 
His paper to Cranborne must be viewed-in. light of this. However, this 
does not mean that his summary of Curm)tin's attitude is inaccurate and 
it did at least show a marked difference from his communications of two 
50. Cross to Cranborne, 13th April 1944, Prem4,50/15. 
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years earlier. Two weeks earlier Cross had written to Eden about 
Curtin. This communication bore traces of his earlier frustrations 
with Curtin: "There is also a chance that his former little Australian 
mind may at moments reassert itself", but, as with his letter to 
Cranborne, Cross indicated that he was convinced of Australia's 
allegiance to the Commonwealth. 
I cannot guess quite how he will shape in London, but 
fundamentally he 11 a good man, reasonable, and wants 
to march with us. 
A summary of the prevailing conditions in each Dominion was drafted 
by the D. O. at the request of the King. These concentrated on the 
problems facing each and their contribution to the war effort, rather 
than their expected policies. They demonstrate his Majesty's eagerness 
to be informed about all his countries before meeting his Prime Ministers. 
The House of Commons was prepared for the forthcoming Meeting in a 
debate on Dominion Affairs two weeks beforehand. Cranborne sent 
Churchill a minute as to the attitude the Government should adopt, which 
bore close comparison to the strategy he outlined to the D. P. M. Committee. 
This debate was mainly for the purpose of allowing the members to 
express. their views on the Commonwealth; for the Government's part 
we shall be wise not to commit ourselves in advance of the 
Prime Ministers' meeting to advocating any particular 
suggestions or proposals but to maintain the line that 
while we welcome any suggestions the next step must be 
informal discussion round the table with the Dominion 
Ministers. 
The broad policy of the U. K. was to maintain the closest possible co- 
operation in pursuit of the common ideals for which they all stood. 
The Government should firmly reject any suggestion that it was for them 
or any other member to force upon others any particular policy, and 
in response to suggestions that the U. K. should take the lead in 
pressing the Dominions into closer co-operation, the Government should 
say that nothing would be more deplorable than the impression that the 
U. K. was trying to dictate how Commonwealth affairs should be managed. 
51. Cross to Eden, 30th March 1944, Avon Papers F0954/4, Dom44/4A. ý 
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n 
"Discussion round the' table between equals is the proper method 
ryfor dealing with Empire problems. "' 'Criticisms of pre-war defence 
6ö=o'rdina'tion were to be countered by the' justifiable reliance the 
"' U. K. 1 had placed on the' Dominion's participation in war, and in-, -, 
foreign affairs' any comment on lack of consultation could be firmly 
refuted, In anticipation of the Prime Ministers' meeting Cranborne 
was most 'anxious for' the Government +t o say nothing in Parliament which 
would prejudice the forthcoming discussions. Without' a seat in the 
Commons himself, on this occasion the Prime Minister was to act as 
spokesman, (on other occas. ons the Parliamentary Secretary usually 
did so. )52 
_, ý. 
t 
The Hay 1944 meeting lacked trappings of past Imperial gatherings) 
,, 
and proved a more workmanlike meeting. King wrote in his diary during 
the meeting that the U. K. Ministers "all seemed much quieter and more 
subdued" than when he was last in London, in 1941, "very intent on 
the questions before them". 
53 
Certainly this meeting was important 
to the U. K. The proceedings were scheduled to last only two weeks 
and there was a limit to what could be achieved in that time. The 
U. K. Government chiefly, sought general agreement in principle for 
continued close co-operation, and the authority to initiate discussions 
which would secure it. Cranborne had clearly chosen the U. K. 's role 
as one of peacemaker and healer of any dissension between the Dominions, 
and while it had its own ideas on what it would like to see achieved 
in the sphere of co-operation, the'U. K. 's first,. task was to ensure 
that,, the basic unity of the association emerged unimpaired. The 
Commonwealth 
could not easily move faster than its most reluctant member 
wished, unless the odd man out were the U. K. 
The Prime Ministers' meeting opened on 1st May, and after the initial 
speeches the next three sessions were devoted to discussions of the war 
52. Minute 
Cranborne to Churchill, enclosing notes for House of Commons deb ate, 20th April 1944, D0121/10A; "Hansard House of Commons Debates, 
53. 
Mäth & 21st April 1944, Vol. 399, Cols. 390-486 & 297-586. 
kenzie Kin Record Vol. I, p. 672. 
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-situation. The meeting was as much, about the, war as the 
future, , 
and these reviews gave the other leaders an opportunity to hear 
, Churchill. and the Chiefs of Staff give. a 
full description of the 
military situation. 
, considered separately. 
by King. 
The prosecution of the war against Japan was 
Curtin's part in this discussion was remarked 
Curtin did not spare anyone's feelings in the way in which 
he spoke out. I confess I admired his straightforward 
direct statement. I, equally admire Churchill's re3sýraint .. #: 
in listening to the presentation as Curtin made it. 
(This refers to Curtin's insistence on Australian participation in high 
level policy decisions. ) The subsequent two meetings were taken up 
with Eden's review of foreign affairs. The discussions at the end of 
his comments revealed virtual unanimity on basic foreign policy 
objectives and approval of the U. K. 's 'approach to foreign affairs 
throughout the war, ' and its communi. cation of this information to them. 
After meetings on economic and colonial policy, th 
; the Prime Ministers 
met on 9th May to discuss' the post-war settlement. The F. O. 's paper 
on various aspects of post-war organisation was distributed to the 
Prime Ministers with the explanation that it did not represent official 
policy, but was a draft which could be used as a basis for the Washington 
talks. The Prime Ministers, not unnaturally, demonstrated a reluctance 
to comment on a paper they'had not had time to study and, asked for the 
chance to give their official views after consultations with their own 
governments. 
. The U. K. Government agreed that there was; time 
for this. 
However,, the leaders of the, Dominions did make-some important comments, -. 
especially at-the second meeting. 
Discussions divided into three broad areas; the membership, size- 
and functions 
of the world council; the Commonwealth's representation 
on it; and the role of regional councils within a world organisation. 
54. Ibidýs 
p. 699. 
(7) 
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The-F. O. 's-plans proposed a, world council of the. Great". Powers and a 
number- of. other states, although thel were vague-. as to how these were 
to be chosen. Churchill's paper,, whJich was mainly concerned with.. 
regional councils, suggested a world council of only the four major 
Powers, the rest of the nations being represented through the bodies. 
in their regvon. 
55 
Opening the meeting of the 9th May, Eden stressed 
the need for 'a-compact world council with sufficient force behind it to 
make. it work.. effectively, and noted the importance of. its possessing the 
confidence of: the other nations. , At the second meeting, Churchill also 
emphasised the=need for a small council, but his idea was, for one which 
consisted of the Four Major Powers, plus-one member from each of the 
three regional councils and in an attempt to make this more palatable, 
he: limited the, -council's functions to the keeping of the peace. - It 
should not interfere with the internal affairs of any nation or, ,. _ -. 
derogate from°any, state's sovereignty, except to stop the outbreak 
of aggression. 
56 
This idea took; the form of a , Great Power, 
Alliance, 
rather than a? pyramidical world organisation. In-a subsequent minute 
to Eden he"commented that the, Supreme Council. was"not "to rule nations" 
but only to "stop them tearing each other to pieces", and his objection 
to any domestic interference isclear. 
We-should certa: 
to an economic, 
by, say Russia, 
China. 57 
He named the British 
lnly not be prepared ourselves to submit 
financial and monetary system laid down 
or the United States with her : f22Lot- vote »: 
Commonwealth as the third Great Power. 
Smuts and Curtin both agreed with the necessity of placing responsibilil 
for action firmly in the hands 0f the three major powers, with Curtin 
55. " Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, 8th May 1944, "Future-World'0rganisatiol 
PMM(44)4, CAB99/28; memorandum by Churchill, 8th May 1944, "The Post- 
war World'Settlement", PMM(44)5, MG26, 'J 4, 'Vo1: "323, File F. 3409, 
pp. C222585-C222587. 
56. ' Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 9th May 1944"& 11'th'May 1944, 
_., 
CAB99/28, 
, 
PMM(44) 9th-and-12th meetings,., .. 57. Minute Churchill., to, Eden, 
_, 
25th May 1944, Prem4,30/17. (The words 
underlined, were written in by Churchill. ) 
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t 
commenting that a large body would merely become a debating chamber. 
King spoke of the danger that the council might be represented as a 
body determined to dictate to other nations, adding that it was easy 
for misunderstandings to arise over that and the other nations must 
not, be presented with a scheme which seemed to-take away their rights 
and their sovereignty. In a paper read out to the meeting on the 
11th May, King agreed with the F. O. 's memorandum in its provisions of 
a world council and a General Assembly of nations, and accepted the 
principle that pi4er and responsibility had to correspond. Thus the 
major Powers would have the right to permanent seats on the world council 
because they would have the major responsibility for world security. 
However, he also stressed that the same principle should apply to all 
nations and to all. international bodies, and that the difference 
between, say, Canada and Panama should be recognised to the same extent 
between Canada and the U. S. S. R. 
58 
King clearly did not want too exclusive 
an international, organisation, but one which allowed all states to 
participate according to their capacity. It is not clear from the 
minutes of the meeting whether Smuts and Curtin were carunenting on 
Eden's memorandum or Churchill's, but from their previous statements 
it is inconceivable that however openly they, were prepared to recognise 
the predominant position of the major powers, they would not also wish 
the smaller Powers to have some say in the direction of the post-war 
organisation. 
Everyone assumed that the U. K. would have a Beat on the world 
council. But would the U. K. represent only itself? While Eden and 
Cranborne doubted if the Dominions would allow the U. K. to speak on 
their behalf, Churchill had referred to the British Commonwealth as 
a Power on the council. 'King specifically posed the question; would 
the U. K. or the Commonwealth be a member of that body? Churchill 
58. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 9th May 1944 & 11th May 1944, 
op. cit.; Memorandum by King annexed to minutes of 12th meeting, 
11th May 1944, CAB99/28, PMM/44) 12th meeting. 
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reacted ambiguously with the comment that it would be very serious 
if they could not be united when grave issues arose. 
59 
At the 
subsequent meeting this was discussed more fully. In his paper King 
stated that the Commonwealth was not a unitary state and because the 
world council would be an executive body, capable of prompt and single- 
minded action, it would be impossible for the U. K. to discharge its 
duty if it had to simultaneously act on the instructions of all member 
governments. He reminded the meeting that the Commonwealth had 
decided in 1926 against acting as a single unit, and he asked how 
other nations could be expected to accept the Dominions as sometimes 
independent: and sömetimes formally part of a Great-Power"grouping. 
Through its association with the"Dominions, "and because of the reputation 
of. the Commonwealth, the U. K. 's prestige stood high. The Commonwealth 
was recognised as being a like-minded group but not one which was bound 
by selfish motives, and nothing should be done which might revive 
old; suspicions that this was the case., As to theU. K. '. s individual 
status, King declared that its strength had always lain in its "alliance 
potential" and that remained the--position. He was confident that 
the-position of the Dominions would be safeguarded by close consultations 
with the U. K. He had no fear that the U. K. would not give due 
consideration to. their views, because it needed their support. 
60 
After the first meeting N. Robertson, Head of the Canadian External 
Affairs Department, had spoken to Sir Charles Webster,,, seconded to 
the F. O. Research Department, and expressed his Government's. alarm 
at these attempts to have a Commonwealth, rather than a U. K., representative 
on. the council. He, asked, whether the. U. K. was, "so, uncertain of being,: 
59. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 9th May 1944, op. cit. 600One' Canadian official, Mr. -J: W. Holmes, has described the-memorandum read by King as a "succinct outline of the approach to the Commonwealth in a new post-war setting which was being developed in Ottawa". Holmes also remembers how King almost declined to answer the Curtin thesis on closer collaboration and that it was himself and N. ' Robertson who persuaded him that the Canadian viewpoint had to be presented and drafted ;' a paper which he read out virtually unaltered. J. W. Holmes, Shaping thepeaCe: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Vol. Is 
P' ``ýy" Konversation between author and Holmes, November 1979. ) 
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a Great Power" that the Commonwealth had to aid it in this way. 
61 
Churchill predicted that Dominion representation at the council 
would give rise to other claims, for 2xample from the sixteen states 
W 
of the U. S. S. R. He then cautioned the others that the U. K. acting 
on its own would not carry the same weight as it would speaking for 
them all, adding that important action would only be taken after 
consultations with the Dominions and that crises of war gave warning 
of their arrival. He admitted that occasionally one Dominion might want 
to disassociate itself, but thought this could be accommodated 
Might it not 'be better that we should on occasion announce 
that there are certain nations in the Commonwealth who 
wished to stand aside, rather than that we should forgo 
for ever the advantage of our composite strength? 
Curtin also emphasised the advantages of the U. K. 's being able to speak 
for the Dominions. If it could not its effectiveness would be less; 
which was surely not the meeting's desire? 
62 
Despite these pleas 
by Churchill and Curtin, Fraser and Smuts supported the views of the 
Canadian Prime Minister. Before the meeting the Canadian delegation 
knew that Smuts opposed auy centralising machinery, and Fraser's press 
conference of 5th May indicated that he would not try to, push through 
any extreme proposals. 
63 
In a statement at the meeting which was 
largely reminiscent of King, Fraser said there was much to be said 
for making no changes. 
Could we, in fact, better the existing arrangements in 
practice? The United Kingdom, -thanks to its closest 
liaison with the Dominions, was in a position to interpret 
their minds, and to use its judgment with tILat knowledge 
as a background. Could that be improved upon? 
Fraser agreed with Churchill that Dominion claims for a seat on the council 
would lead to counter requests; however, this issue should be adjusted. 
61. Reynolds and Hughes, op. cit., p. 35. 62. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 11th May 1944, CAB99/28, 
PMM(44) 12th Meeting. 
63. Robertson to Wrong (Canadian External Affairs Department), 6th May 1944, 
MG26, J I. Vol. 366, p. 316906. 
between themselves and could not "wisely be embodied in a new 
constitution or formula". Smuts concurred, recognising the 
constitutional and parliamentary complications that would arise from 
any joint representation. He said that under King's scheme the U. K. 
would be the member, in alliance with the rest of the Commonwealth. 
It would be responsible for putting forward views consonant with those 
of the Commonwealth, but unhampered by the need for formal consultation 
on particular issues and able to act decisively with the knowledge that 
it was speaking inn its own capacity and not as the mouthpiece of the 
association. Thishe, agreed with, croviding close consultation, 
continued. 
64 
King might have been surprised at the support he received 
from Fraser, but from a talk with Smuts on 5th May, he was sure, of 
the South African Prime Minister's view. King had remarked to Smuts 
on the similarity of their views, and the latter had predicted that 
Churchill would be on the back of them in talking of "Imperial Unity 
and damn nonsense of the kind". 
65 
The proposed regional councils attracted much debate. The F. O. 's 
memorandum emphasised the primacy of the world council, but gave, a role 
to other bodies 
Just as there are special functional organisations, so 
there may be regional associations for various purposes when 
there is obvious advantage to be obtained by limitation of. 
the sphere of action. Such regional associations might come 
into existence for security, for economic co-operation,. for 
the promotion of welfare in colonial territories or for other 
purposes. It is, however, essential that they should not 
conflict with the other world-wide organisation but rather 
assist it to carry out its purpose. 66 lu 
Churchill proposed that the Four Power world council should create as 
quickly as possible three regional councils for Asia, Europe and the 
Americas. These councils would include the major powers involved in 
the region as well as those states situated there. They would provide 
64. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 11th May 1944, op. cit. 
65. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. I, p. 672. 
66. Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, 8th May 1944, "Future World Organisation 
CAB99/28, PMM(44)4. 
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the method by which additional members could be appointed to the 
world council. The councils would be responnnible for improving 
the prosperity and harmony of the area, with a prime duty toi 
prevent the vanquished from rearming. At the first sign of trouble, 
the regional councils would inform the world council aid act according 
to its instructions. Churchill added that from the European, council 
he hoped a United States of Europe might develop. Only thus could 
that continent, recover. 
67 
Curtin questioned the Prime Minister about the Asian council, and 
whether it would include Pacific territories as well as Asian? In 
general terms he supported the idea and pointed to the Dominions'_ 
concern for areas in which they were often in a better positions to 
advise the U. K. than its'own officials. Churchill expressed no hard. rý r 
and fast view as to composition. If Curtin felt some enthusiasm for 
regional councils, Fraser was more hesitant. At the meeting of the 9th 
May he said such bodies would divide the world's security. lie objected 
to the Asian council as outlined, on the grounds that it was merely 
it miniature of the world council and still dominated by the major powers. 
He doubted that in an interdependent world many issues could be so 
confined, and expressed his reservations about any multiplicity of. 
68 
bodies. In a paper read at the following meeting, Fraser; expressed 
strong objection to the regional councils' providing the forum for. 
election to the world council, preferring that this be done through the 
Assembly. He declared that there was "no such dcree of, community of 
interest and sentiment" among'the Asian and Pacific nations as to allow, 
New Zealand to be suitably represented by one of them. _ 
He also 
rejected any interpretation of the nationality clause as prohibiting 
a Dominion from serving on the council. Returning to the worldwide 
67. Memorandum by Churchill, 8th May 1944, "The Post-War Settlement", -t. '. 
MG26, J 4, Vol. 323, File F. 3409, p. C. 222585-C. 222587. 
68. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting of 9th May 1944, CAB99/28, PMM(44) 
9th Meeting. 
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aspect of security, he said that although Churchill had recognised 
the universal jurisdiction of the world council, the implication that 
the regional associations were the real foundation of order and peace 
could hardly fail to result in a weakening of the solidarity 
between the Members of the Organisation as a whole, and a 
tendency on the part of those outside a Region to withhold 
their help from those inside. Such an arrangement might 
very well provide the basis for the United States and others 
to leave Europe to manage its own affairs and to decline to 
become involved in the case of trouble until too late to 
avert; a major catastrophe. 
If there were to be any regional bodies, Fraser wished them to have specific 
functions under the, authority of the world organisation, to which every 
state would have the right öf appeal. Local defence arrangements'-were 
permissible, but the division of security-into regions was considered 
too dangerous. 69 This as an almost identical point of view to the F. O. 's. 
Churchill's principal concern was to see a European council 
formed; here he had the support of Smuts who was anxious, to see'all 
three major powers represented on that council, and also thought"it 
should include North African and Middle Eastern states. He-agreed'that 
it, would stabilise the continent. However, Smuts, while liking the 
U. K. -Prime, Minister's emphasis on Europe, (he himself had concentrated 
on; that continent in his speech'in November) 
70 
preferred the F. O: 's 
emphasis of the primacy of the world council and the essentially secondary 
Position of any other bodies. 
71 
Churchill explained to the meeting 
that his concern for Europe was based on his belief that Russia was likely 
to favour satellite states, of a communist character, and that in order 
to retain the individual identities of the smaller nations, there should 
be a body on which all, plus the U. S. A., would be represented. He 
added that he wanted Europe to be able to handle its affairs 
69. Memorandum by Fraser, 11th May 1944, CAB99/28, PMM(44) 12th Meeting, Anne--3 ,_ "vr LLulg II 70.. See chapter 4, pp. 212ff. 71. Minutes Of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 9th May 1944, op. cit. 
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without the need for States from South and Central America 
of Siam, or China, which were unfamiliar with the nature 
and complexities of these problems to be associated with 
their solution. 
72 
The Canadian attitude was sijnilar to New Zealand's, with emphasis 
placed on the indivisibility of world security. Like New Zealand it 
agreed with local defence plans, as geography dictated, (it had its own 
defence arrangements with the U. S. ) but these should not be exclusive 
and the world organisation had to remain predominant. King also warned 
of the perils of continental isolationism. Churchill had talked about 
his regional schemes a few days before the meeting to King who had 
reacted sharply to his suggestion that Canada might represent the U. K. 
on the American council. Churchill had responded with the right of 
the U. K. to take a seat by virtue of its West Indian possessions, but 
the minutes do not record his mentioning this aspect to the meetings. 
73 
The F. O. disagreed with Churchill's conception - hence the two 
papers - and at the meetings Eden raised some questions. Like many 
of the others he was worried at the possible dominance of the regional 
bodies, that the U. S. A. would use the plan as a mean of extracting 
itself from world problems, and he was worried about Russian suspicions 
n 
that the European council was directed against themselves. Attlee 
was hesitant about the European plan, without the U. S. A., as he saw 
the two major powers attracting other states around them, which could 
lead to a clash of systems, while the U. S. A. adopted a distinterested 
attitude, concentrating its attention on the Pacific. 
74 
Cranborne 
also opposed the regional scheme and sent Churchill a minute after the 
second meeting explaining his views. He said he had not wanted to 
express his doubts in the presence of the other Prime Ministers, but. 
that he had grave fears about the plan. Under it the Dominions would 
be concentrating on issues affecting their particular area, and Canada's 
72. Minutes by Prime Ministers' Meeting, 11th May 1944, op. cit. 
73. Mackenzie King Record Vol. I, p. 675. 
74. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 11th May 1944, op. cit. 
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only approach to the world council would be through. the U. S. A., which 
could only strengthen that relationship. Previously under the 
Leagueof Nations all the Commonwealth governments had belonged to 
the Assembly. One Dominion had a seat on the council. This had 
encouraged close inter-Commonwealth consultations at Geneva and they 
had usually kept in step with each other. Cranborne did not think this 
would be possible under a regional scheme, as the Dominions would not 
be present at the meetings of the central council. By its emphasis 
on the geographical diversity of the Commonwealth and its members' 
varying interests, rather than those held in common, the plan contained 
"possible seeds of Imperial disruption". 
75 
After hearing at the meeting the various objections to his conception 
of regional councils, Churchill agreed to withdraw his paper. He said 
it had served to stimulate discussion, but could now be re-stated in 
a more mature form. Summing up-he suggested that the F. O. 's papers 
should also be revised "from the point of view of emphasis, and re-cast 
to show the alternative solutions to particular problems and be drawn 
in more non-committal terms". 
76 
One official recorded Law's impression 
that Churchill was "much taken aback at the universal opposition to his 
views" and "hard hit" at the preference for the F. O. 's proposals. 
77 
The minutes of the discussion indicate well enough that the consensus 
of the Dominion Prime Ministers went against Churchill's ideas on 
regional councils. Eden certainly believed this and wrote in his 
diary on the 11th May, 
75 -Minute Cranborne'to Churchill, 11th May, 1944, Prem4,30/7. ' 76. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting of 11th May 1944, op. cit., '(Churchill's 
paper was withdrawn and the Cabinet Office asked for 
all copies to be returned. It is listed among the papers discussed the the meeting, but is not available in the U. K. Cabinet Records. However, the Canadians had taken one or more copies and although Robertson requested that the copy sent to Ottawa be returned, a copy does survive in the Canadian archives. MG26, J 4, Vol. 232, 
77. 
File Po 0222585- C222587. ) 
Hughes, op. cit., p. 34'&'35. 
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In morning a very good meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers. - 
They all took my line and not W's about the future world 
set-up., This was very helpful, in particular they we g 
nervous of regional councils and for the same reasons. 
However, in his suggestions for revising the F. O. plans so that the 
alternatives could be shown, Churchill was ambiguous and possibly using 
this as a way to retain some of his idea. 
The revision of the F. O. Papers posed a problem. The two officials 
primarily concerned with these plans, Jebb and Webster, first re-drafted 
them with the minimum of concession to Churchill's regional plans; 
but were then told by two of the secretaries to the Meeting, Sir E. 
Bridges and Sir G. Laithwaite, that the Dominion Prime Ministers had 
not rejected Churchill's conception of a four Power council with the 
sole responsibility of keeping peace and that the re-draft. was,, inadequate. 
Jebb and, Webster disagreed with this intepretation of the minutes. of the 
meeting, but had been told to change the memorandum further. This 
they did, making alterations which were innocuous: '! to,, suit P. M. taking 
care to do no harm". Eden and Cadogan were, both upset at this turn of 
events, with Cadogan threatening to., refuse, to go to the Washington-talks,. -, 
with the changed papers as his brief. However,, they both agreed. that 
the substance had been retained. 
79 These papers were circulated in,,.., 
their second revised form to the Dominion Prime Ministers and produced; 
a sharp response from Fraser. . He said 
he. would, have, found, it. acceptablet 
although not representative of the tenor of the meeting,. if both 
proposals had been included with the objections to the regional councils 
also stated; as it was they were re-stated with 
greater 
emphasis., He 
repeated his objections to the scheme and warned that if it-were brought, 
before a general conference, or publicly discussed, theNew Zealand ,, 
Government would have to air its objections. 
80 A copy of this letter 
81 
was sent to the other Prime Ministers and King wrote agreeing with Fraser. 
78. The Eden Memoirs Vol. II, The Reckoning, (London, 1965), p. 443 
79. Reynolds and Hughes, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
80., Fraser to Eden, 18th May 1944, Prem4,30/7. ' 
81. King to Eden, May 1944, MG26, J I, Vol. 371. 
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Cadogan was delighted ät Fraser's complaint, noting in'his diary, 
This is all to the good - we may frighten the P. M. off 
his stupid 'line. 82 'v, '4 
Eden spoke to Churchill, ' suggesting the confusion had arisen because the`-"ol 
minutes; of the meeting`did note"represent very'exactly"the"sense of, 'the 
meeting. ý''Churchi114re teräted'to'Eden that he"wanted the memorandum 
to point toi the different alternatives without committing the U. K. ', but"ý 
on the substance of the' issue he said ' the 'only aspect: hes'täas'°pressing- for 
was US. ' involvement ins Europeý"and for' that coritinent''to have"its own' 
council. The next day heminüted to Cranborne ' `' "ý " 
Yes, Ifeel" 'that'theidea of Regional Leagues' isýfull" r` 
of dangers. I hope however to rescue "The United States 
of Europe" from the midst of them. 83 
On 24th May Churchill spoke in the House of Cottmnons about the post-war 
organisation and to Webster's relief, did not'air all his divergent 
notions; the final, re-draft of the memorandum only included the 
possibility of a United Nations commission for Europe which could lead 
to Churchill's plan for ay United States of Europe. 
84 
,,.,, -Inter-Commonwealth co-operation was not discussed as a separate subject. 
Some aspects had arisen in the course^of discussions on the. post-war 
arrangements and others in discussing defence co-operation. The timing 
of. this latter meeting was rather unusual, occurring on the penultimate 
day of. the Meeting and after the draft declaration on the proceedings 
had. been discussed. King's worst suspicions were aroused when after 
discussing, the declaration Cranborne proceeded to introduce the subject 
of inter-Commonwealth defence co-operation and read a 
, 
paper containing 
various suggestions. King recorded that "everything that 
. 
they (theU. K. ) 
had been trying for years was jammed into this statement! '. He went on 
to record-in his diary 
82. D. N. Dilks-ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Gadogan, 1938-1945 (London, '. 
1971)'entry for 19th May 1944, p. 630. 
83. Minutes by Churchill to Eden and Cranborne, 21st & 22nd May 1944, Prem4, a 
30/7. 
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it really amounted to high pressure of the worst kind 
in trying to shove this kind of thing through at the 
last moment ... after we had come to an agre93ent on a 
statement which covered the whole proceedings. 
King's suspicions of Imperialist machinations were fully revived and he 
reflected on Canada's possible fate if he had not been present to forestall 
such plots. The scheduling of this meeting is not explained and was 
perhaps due simply to the great pressure of time. However, if anyone 
had cause to be dissatisfied it was Curtin, who had come to London with 
a memorandum on this subject which seemed to be relegated to an after- 
thought. Perhaps as this was recognised to be one of the most contentious 
issues, it was decided to leave it until the end. Moreover, neither 
Churchill nor Smuts attended the meeting. Hankey recorded that Curtin 
was "so hurt that he did not bother to develop his full case on his 
proposals", commenting himself: 
That is how thg present Government fosters the loyalty 
of the Empire : 
Churchill later wrote to Curtin to apologise for his absence. 
87 
The meeting began with Cranborne suggesting various ways in which the 
Commonwealth might improve its collaboration, stressing the-political-fi"<<! 
consultations necessary if the Dominions were to participate in'defence 
commitments. It is rather surprising that he opened the discussions, 
in view of the strategy he had outlined before the meetings opened; 
but this was possibly because the talks of the previous two weeks had 
indicated', sufficiently the respective positions of. the Dominions for 
him to feel more secure. His proposals were all based upon the paper 
put forward by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff. 
-King was atýhis most negative in replying to these proposals. 
He thanked the Secretary of State for his suggestions and declined to 
85. Mackenzie King Record Vol. I, pp. 686-687. 
86. S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets Vol. 3 (London, 1974), p. 592. 
(Curtin had told Cross that he was rather in awe of Churchill, whom 
he had described as 'formidable'. By the end of the first week of 
the meeting Curtin told Hankey that he had refused an invitation to 
spend a day at Chequers because "I do not care to sit in an armchair 
and listen to one man"', ibid., p. 591. 
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comment without first consulting his colleagues, adding that in any 
case he did not consider the issues raised to be 'Capable' of decision 
until after the war was over. Curtin, not surprisingly, was more 
forthcoming. He had prepared his own paper for the meeting which he 
proceeded to read out. His first proposal was for the U. K. Prime 
Minister to attend a meeting of the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs and the High Commissioners once a month to bring them up to date 
on matters and hear of Dominion policies and problems. He suggested 
this as an alternative to the Australian representative attending 
War Cabinet meetings, but reserved the right of Australia's representative 
to attend in particular situations. He repeated his suigestions of the 
previous January for more frequent meetings of Prime Ministers, for 
these to be supplemented by meetings between 
other Ministers and 
officials (in London and other capitals), and 6 place 
the 
meetings of 
the Dominion Secretary of State and the High Commissioners'on aormal 
basis. On the most controversial issue of a secretariat'to the Imperial 
conference Curtin tried to avoid using that term, because it had created 
misunderstandings;, but"urged that with so much co-operation 
established 
"'between members,, the time, had. come. to place it under some central, 
direction.,.,; He, proposed , that"a small-, committee,. should, study the,, 
alternatives, Curtin identified three-levels of, defence;: --national, 
Commonwealth and world,.: with the effectiveness. of each,. having a bearing 
"on° the-others. He pledged-Australia's, support'towards.. increased, defence 
, co-operation with: the rest-of-the Commonwealth ands-other-allied nations. 
Having, doubts, about the formation>of. an effective world security. 
organisation, -he, stressed the need for the first,. two levels of-defence 
to "be "built up. ... .. 
Fraser had. alsoprepared a paper on; defence-cooperation, "-"but did-, 
--not 
read it to the meeting. Its thesis was that without prejudice to 
the world organisation, the Commonwealth should co-operate closely in 
288 
defence. He wanted to see the Committee, of imperial Defence concentrate 
more on Commonwealth, rather than Empire, defence, and the Dominions 
to have a closer relationship with it, as well as similar,,, committees in 
each Dominion co-ordinated with London. Fraser again endorsed, the 
value of local defence arrangements, but again without prejudice to 
"J 
the necessary wider co-ordination. 
The minutes of the meeting do not record Cranborne's mentioning 
his proposal for meetings between Foreign Ministers, although it is possible 
that he mentioned this privately to the Prime Ministers and received 
little encouragement for the idea. The one suggestion accepted by 
everyone was that the British Prime Minister should hold monthly meetings 
with his Secretary of State and the Dominion High Commissioners. Curtin 
told the meeting that he had already mentioned this to Churchill who 
would undertake this if the meeting agreed to it. The only definite 
result was therefore that the daily meetings be continued, and supplemented 
once a month by this extra gathering. 
88 As to the other suggestions 
they were rejected. As Garner says, 
The meeting dismissed the proposals under the polite formula 
of remitting them for further study. 89 
This might seem a rather harsh comment, inasmuch as one'of the objectives 
of, the U. K. was to gain authority, for further study of detailed issues; 
but neither King nor Fraser had given support to'Lord Cranborne's 
suggestions. The Dominions would consider the various proposals and 
whether, a small technical-committee should beset up to examine 
them 
further. -There was no authority given to start 
such detailed discussions. 
90 
The meeting's proceedings-were summarised for, Churchill who wrote to 
Curtin, apologising for his, absence from the meeting, and confirming the new 
arrangement. for a monthly meeting. The one aspect which did cause some 
88. Minutes of Prime Ministers'' Meeting, 15th May 1944, CAB99/28, PMM(44) 
14th Meeting. 
89. Rt. Hon Lord Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-1968 (London, 1978) 
p. 266. 
90. Minutes of Prime' Ministers' Meeting, 15th May 1944, 'op. cit. "- 
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dispute was whether this signalled the end of Bruce's attendance 
at the War Cabinet. 
91 
The other discussions between the Prime Ministers covered wide 
r 
fields. One was devoted to economic and monetary policy, and was 
described by the P. O. as a full exchange of views which as expected 
had not resulted in any immediate decisions. The Canadian delegation 
described it as "inconclusive and not very satisfactory". In talks 
on Colonial policy the Prime Ministers agreed to the U. K. proposal 
for Colonial Regional Commissions, and there was no disucssion of the 
Dominions' taking over responsibilities. In the session on post-war 
shipping and aviation there was a general discussion of the principles, 
and. little dissension. Migration was also disucssed and it was agreed 
that this should be referred to officials for them to work out 'practical 
arrangements. 
92 
U. K. expectations of how the discussions would proceed on the subject 
of foreign and defence co-operation were but partially fulfilled. 
Cranborne had expected Smuts and Fraser to favour proposals to increase 
co-operation; and although neither was quite as firm as King in resisting 
some measures and insisting on consulting his colleagues, neither` showed 
much enthusiasm. Fraser had indicated in his press conference that 
he was unlikely to stand out for any specific proposals. While 
demonstrating his firmness over issues which he strongly disagreed with, 
such as the regional scheme of Churchill, he had no desire to proceed 
without full agreement of the association. The Y. K. had possibly been 
led astray by New Zealand's seeming concurrence with the Australian 
viewpoint at Canberra, the previous January, although then Batterbee 
had indicated a difference between the two Dominions' attitudes. It 
does seem that away from Canberra, the New Zealand delegation was able 
91. See chapter 2, p. 98. 
92. F. O. Report of Prime Ministers' Meeting, circulated to F. O. 
Representatives abroad, 12th June 1944, F0371/42674, W9280/1534/68; 
Canadian delegations' report on meeting, MG26, J 4, Vol. 322, File 
F. 340, p. C222292-C222296. 
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to stand up for itself better. 
93Smuts held a slightly ambiguous 
position, and his. attitude was not , always, correctly predicted as a.. 
consequence. He was highly. respected in the U. K. and frequently taken 
into 
. 
Churchill's closest confiden`ce, _, which meant,, 
he was regarded in 
a dual capacity, that of wise elder statesman, and as Prime Minister 
of a Dominion which also contained a sizeable opposition, to'the Commonwealth. 
Thus, when discussions, came down, to, practical. measures which would. affect 
the. 
_independence or 
international status of the Dominions, Smuts had 
to stop thinking disinterestedly of, international politics, and speak 
on behalf of South Africa with the knowledge of what would and would not 
be acceptable to that country. To combine the role of international 
statesman and national Prime Minister, safeguarding the best interests 
of the world and of that particular country would demand perfection. 
Smuts' role at Commonwealth meetings is more easily understood if one 
accepts the ambiguity of his position. 
Curtin's attitude during the May meeting accorded well with the D. O. 's 
predictions. Possibly because of the impending referendum, as Cross 
suggested, or due to other factors, he was not as insistent in his 
demands as the F. O. had expected. Without failing to impress upon his 
fellow P. M. 's the importance he attached to close consultation, and 
without fear of standing up to Churchill, his general demeanour was 
moderate and reasonable. He probably worried the other leaders at his 
press conference of 5th May when, asked if he would go ahead with his 
proposal, for a secretariat if one member, opposed, he seemed to indicate 
that he would; but when pressed further he agreed that there had to be 
94 
a consensus before any changes were made. Although Curtin mentioned 
several times during the discussions items agreed to, or statements made, 
at the Canberra conference with New Zealand, there was no recorded 
discussion of the conference as`a piece of Commonwealth 'machinery'. r` "' 
93. Fraser's press conference, 5th May 1944, D035/1204, W60/34. 
94. Curtin's press conference, 4th May 1944, ibid. 
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However, several spokesmen did refer to t 
of different Ministers and officials and 
and not necessarily five power, meetings 
accepted method of consultation, even if 
he need to have meetings 
the practice of more frequent, 
seemed to have become an 
some felt more enthusiastic 
than-others. 
King's policy during the meeting vindicated MacDonald's predictions. 
One Canadian historian, and former member of the Canadian delegation has 
commented that 
As was often the case King was less forceful on such issues 
(as Commonwealth co-operation) in London than in Ottawa and 
had to be99rodded by Norman. Robertson to state his case at 
meetings. 
This had probably always been true in King's case, - but it was possibly 
also because he was aware that the U. K. Government knew his position' 
and that the D. O., at least, would not push him to commit himself. 
He had spoken to Cranborne on April 28th, and explained that 'with'an 
election in the offing, he could agree to nothing that looked like a 
commitment in advance of a decision by the Canadian Parliament. "' On the 
1st and 2nd May they had further talks in which King told him of his 
doubts about creating new machinery. The Canadian delegation were 
sure enough of the D. O. 's attitude to be able to tell Ottawa on 6th May' 
that the department was opposed to centralising machinery. 
96 
Obviously 
rather surprised at Cranborne's list of suggestions at the meeting on 
defence co-operation, King explained to the meeting 
It was essential that he`should be able to return to Canadä} 
without having committed his Government in a ny way upon 
these questions. 97 
The declaration signed by all five Prime Ministers announced the 
95. Holmes, o . cit., p. 419. 96. Mackenzie King r, ecord Vol. I, pp. 663'& 668; Robert to Wrong, 6th 
May 1944, MG26 -J I, Vol. 366, p. 316906. `97. Minutes of Prime Ministers' Meeting, 15th May 1944, CAB99/28, PMM(44) 
14th Meeting. 
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success of the talks and the basic unity between them in their determination 
to fight the war-to its finish, in the principles which governed their 
foreign policies, and their desire to see a world security organisation 
established. The Declaration ended with the statement 
In a world torn by strife, we have met here in unity. 
That unity finds its strength, not in any formal bond but 
in the hidden springs from which human actions flows. We 
rejoice in our inheritance of loyalties and ideals, and 
proclaim our sense of kinship to one another. Our system 
of free association had enabled us, each and all, to claim 
a full share of the common burden .... We believe that 
when victory is won and peace returns, this same free 
association, this inherent unity of purpose, will make us able 
to do further service to mankind. 98 
This passage could hardly offend anyone, and was designed to impress the 
supporters and detractors of the Commonwealth by its emphasis on the 
loyalty and unity of the association. There was no hint of exclusiveness 
which might alarm the U. S. or the U. S. S. R., but a willingness to serve 
the cause of peace. Nor is there any doubt of British satisfaction with 
the meeting. There had been no clash between Prime Ministers, or 
serious disagreements with the U. K. The discussions had enabled the 
leaders to discover each other's views on a variety of issues and had 
brought forth some surprises; for example Fraser's support of King over 
creating new machinery. Personal contact was also improved. The F. O. 's 
opinion of King rose. A paper from that office described him as "most 
helpful, friendly and enthusiastic". Describing the meeting as a 
whole to its representatives, the F. O. said 
Although few, if any, hard-and-fast decisions were, taken 
the meetings were successful beyond our hopes. Discussions 
were compleýgly frank and took place in a strikingly friendly 
atmosphere. 
98. Declaration of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 16th May 1944, CAB99/28, 
PMM(44)9. 
99. F. O. Circular to Representatives abroad, 12th June 1944, op. cit. 
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Whether the subjects discussed at the meeting would be taken further, 
and the Commonwealth's methods of consultation would advance, remained 
to be seen. The U. K. had not moved, perhaps, as far as it would 
have wished; but as one F. O. official wrote 
If the Conference had achieved less it would have been a 
failure, but if it had accomplished more it might have 
been a disaster. 100 
.., - n. 
.,,. ý 
, -; 
100. Minute by Campbell, (D. I. D. ), 16th June 1944, F0371/42682, 
W8985/2145/68. 
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Chapter Six 
,. The Commonwealth on the International Stage, 1944-46 
By the end of the war the U. K. had declined in power, relatively 
in terms of other Powers, and absolutely in terms of its wealth and 
resources. The Dominions, on the other hand, had all increased in 
power and risen in the hierarchy of states. The Commonwealth members 
were more nearly equal than before, although disparities still existed 
between them. One major difference between the members lay in other 
countries' perception of their positions, for, despite its undoubted 
decline, the U. K., because bf its massive war effort and its historic 
place in world affairs, was still considered a Great Power and continued 
to participate in high level-counsels with the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. 
The U. K. 's membership of this elite, combined with the increase in the 
power of the Dominions, meant that the Commonwealth as a group was a 
potentially powerful association. 
On the whole the Dominions had accepted the Great Powers' direction 
of the war, or at least were not prepared to cause a rift or jeopardise 
the war effort by attempting to alter it. There was however a strong 
determination on their part to ensure that they did have a voice in 
the peace-making and in the direction of affairs after the war. Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand were all displeased with the phrasing of 
the Draft Instrument of Surrender for Germany, of June 1944, which 
was made in the name of the Big Three with no reference to the other 
states, such as themselves, 4hich had been fighting for up to five 
1 
years. 
Despite the eagerness of the Dominions and other small Powers to 
contribute to international affairs, the Great Powers were reluctant 
to allow others to participate in their discussions and would not forego 
1. D. O. Confidential Print on Armistice Planning, D0114/104. 
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the practice of separate consultations before the views of other'Powers 
were sought. '"The"major`Powers`were conscious'of their own strengths, 
their inevitable'involvement inlany threat to peace, 'and of the 
necessity of reaching agreement amongst 'themselves if peace was, to 
be"secured. r - It wouldeseem that the 'lessons''of the inter-war years i"W; 
which'häd'shown the-dangers if"some'of'the Great Powers abstained; 
weie'excluided fröin'the organisation of'world affairs, had been learnt. 
Eden and Churchill both frequently mentioned 'the danger to peace if, '' 
'the U. S. S. R, split from the'United Nations. ' As the, -major'three Powers 
began-to disagree more often about the arrangements for the`post-war 
'organisation and the'peace treaties, the need to reach some consensus, 
often involving-significant compromises, was; greater; and once points 
`had'been traded'to"obtain agreement-it became(-far more difficult'for 
other countries toralter the compromise: ' The Yalta agreement"on the 
Great Power veto was a compromise worked out between the three states, 
without' reference to'any'other Powers, and during discussions on Germany 
and`Poland. ` 'When'it was referred to"the rest of the world at San'. 
Francisco no alteration was' possible`'despite the almost. universal 
objections' of the smaller states. 
2 
One"'problem for the Commonwealth lay in the fact that the U: K. at 
times thought and acted as:: a`Great Power rather than as a member of the 
Commonwealth. ' Its membership of'the Great Power elite sometimes clashed 
with the 'aspiration of the other Commonwealth members. Dominion 
objections were not directly related to their pogitions within the 
hierarchy of states. , For example, New, Zealand, the smallest'Dominion, 
opposed vigorously the'Great Powers' exclusiveness. Often Australia 
and Canada, as the two strongest Dominions, waged the battle on specific 
issues where they thought they, and others, had the right to be consulted. 
2. For details or the Yalta agreement, see E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, (London, 1962), p. 488ff. 
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Indeed, Canada produced a coherent theoretical framework of the 
place ofinedium-sized powers in the decision-making bodies. Canada 
had begun its attempts to gain representation during the war in 
connection with the various combined allied boards established in 1942 
to co-ordinate the war effort. These covered food production, munitions, 
raw materials, and shipping, and were mostly situated in Washington. 
Canada, amajor producer and provider of food, munitions and other 
products, and applied for membership of several of these Boards. Even 
at such an early stage of the war it was apparent that the U. K. and 
the U. S, A, did not want other states associated with the executive 
councils of the war effort. They resisted Canadian demands. In 
the Spring of 1942 as the U. K. and U. S. A. were establishing the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Canada requested 
membership of this body too. Its efforts to gain a seat on these 
Boards and U. N. R. R. A. represented Canada's most positive effort to 
achieve high-level representation during the war and reflected its 
substantial financial and industrial war effort which give it a right 
to such representation. Canada was permitted membership of the Combined 
Production and Resources Board, allowed to attend meetings of the 
Washington Munitions Assignment Board when Canadian issues were being 
discussed, 
and given representation on the Commodities Committee of 
the Combined Food Board. The compromise, worked out over U. N. R. R. A. 
gave it the chairmanship of the supplies committee. 
3 
In its efforts 
to persuade both the U. S. and the U. K. to allow it membership of these 
bodies, the Canadian Department of External Affairs developed the 
functional 
theory' as justification for its requests. According to 
this theory, 
nations best qualified by their resources and experience 
3. See J 
Gove * L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie Kin 
The 
rnment 1939-1945, (Toronto, 1975), pp. 295-321; J. W. Holmes, 
Vol 
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to make a constructive contribution to the solution of problems', ' 
should be given responsibility to do so, even if-they would not' 
qualify for other responsibilities. 
4 
The other Dominions did not 
request membership of the Combined Boards, although they were closely 
co-ordinated with the U. K. side of these bodies. 
5 
At the Civil Aviation Conference in November 1944 the Canadian 
delegation assumed a prominent role, not through any special designation, 
but because it was able, to use a unique set "of circumstances to its'own 
advantage. The U. S. S. R. did not attend at Chicago and there was a 
major divergence-of view between the U. K. and the U. S. A., particularly 
over the "fifth freedom" concerning the right to pick-up'and- disembark 
passengers anywhere en route. Canada, which had some sympathy"with the 
U. S. `position and had worked extensively to produce a draft convention 
which took into account the prejudices of both Powers, stepped'in and 
acted as mediator between the two, eventually producing a partial 
compromise. It was a good example of the functional idea in practice. 
The Canadians had a vital interest in civil aviation, particularly 
American and British plans, '"and had done-a great'deal of preparatory 
work before the conference. Thus, they were able to coax the two 
Great Powers towards an'agreement, producing alternative plans and 
demonstrating their competence in the subject. 
6 
The value of'' 
Canada's contribution can be seen from the remarks made by the U. S. 
Chairman of the conference, Adolf Berle, in his closing statement: 
let me also pay tribute with particular affection 
to the Delegation of Canada, which tirelessly worked 
to reconcile the different points of view. 7 '''ý 
4. For discussions of the 'Functional Theory' see J. Eayrs, in Defence of 
Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, Vol. III (Toronto, 1972),. pp. 161-162; 
Holmes, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
5. Rt. Hon Lord Garner, The Commonwealth office, 1925-1968 (London, 1978) 
pp. 225-228. 
6. Report by Shannon on the'Chicago Conference, D035/1236, A341/5/65. 
7. Holmes, op. cit., p. 66. 
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The absence of the U. S. S. R. and other Powers provided Canada with a 
chance that was not repeated at most later meetings. In this respect 
it was probably more frustrating for Canada to be as another 'small' 
state on subsequent occasions, than for some of the others. However, 
it had not only gained valuable experience in international affairs, 
but also the respect of other nations by its role, despite some 
jealousy on the part of the other Dominions. 
8 
The Canadian Government 
continued to put forward its functional idea as the guiding principle 
for international representation, but found itself increasingly 
blocked by the Great Powers. 
From the publication of the proposals drawn up by the major'Powers 
at Dumbarton Oaks, until after the end of the 1946 session of the 
United Nations (U. N. ), the Dominions together with other'small nations . 
attempted to reduce the immense powers allotted to the designated 
permanent members of the Security Council, and also attempted to 
introduce a graduated scale of nations within the U. N. in place of 
the twofold distinction between the Great Powers and the rest. In 
their efforts to moderate the powers of the permanent members of the 
Security' Council the Dominions were not specifically attacking the, 
U. K. 's membership of that group, or suggesting that it was the principal 
culprit in wishing to reserve such power to the group. As a member 
of the Great Power elite, however, the U. K. did clash with its Commonwealth 
colleagues over this matter. 
The veto was seen by the Dominions as possib. 1y the worst example 
of the Great Powers' determination to monopolise power. They opposed 
it in two respects. At Yalta the three major Powers had reached a 
compromise formula on the application of the veto which was incorporated 
into the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This specified that a permanent 
8. Report by Shannon on the relations between Commonwealth Delegates 
at the Chicago Conference, D035/1236, A341/5/65. 
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member could veto action suggested by the Security Council to settle 
a dispute, provided a party to a dispute abstained from voting. In 
procedural matters a majority vote of the whole Council was sufficient. 
9 
The problem with this formula la; in its ambiguity. Did it mean that 
a permanent member could veto consideration and discussion of a dispute 
when it was itself not a party to it? Or was this to be considered 
a procedural matter, and thus exempt from the veto? 
At the Commonwealth meeting in London of April 1945, called to 
enable members to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks proposals before the main 
conference met, this issue was prominent. All the Dominions, with 
the exception of New Zealand, were prepared to accept the veto in the 
case of enforcement action, although they did not welcome it: Hume 
Wrong, Canada's representative referred to his Government's reluctant 
acceptance, and Evatt declared that while he supposed no one liked 
the principle of the veto, his Government were "inclined to accept it" 
as the price for preserving the existing partnership between the three 
major Powers. 
10 Smuts accepted the veto for enforcement action on 
the grounds that it was an essential feature of the Crimea agreement. 
11 
For New Zealand, Fraser vociferously opposed the veto in all its forms. 
He said that it meant that a Great Power which threatened the peace 
could not be stopped, and argued, 
surely it was a negation of any attempt to prevent 
aggression if, while small Powers could be easily 
suppressed, those big states which entered u on 
aggressive policies could get off scot-free. 
Y2 
which, in essence, was a perfectly correct interpretation of the veto. 
If the Great Powers could not agree and one or more embarked on an 
aggressive policy, nothing short of war was going to prevent it; but 
that was the reality of the post-war world. At a further meeting Fraser 
9. U. S. compromise of the use of the veto see Woodward, op. cit., pp. 462 & 
10. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 9th April 1945, BCM(45) 6th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting; 6th April 1945, BCM(45) 4th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
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told his colleagues that while he realised that Russia's attitude had 
led, to the, Yalta formula,, which was an inevitable compromise, New 
t 
Zealand-would stand, on", the principle and vote against it. 
13 
The London meeting discussed` whether or not the Yalta formula 
could be interpreted to allow _the 
veto to be used to stop consideration 
of a dispute, and whether this should be opposed. All four Dominions 
disagreed with such an i nterpretatior, with New Zealand identifying 
it as'a measure which would 'stultify the purpose of the Organisation". 
Although I Smuts said that South Africa would accept' it if the "Big Three" 
thought it essential, both Canada and Australia vigorously opposed 
such an application. 
14" Discussion of this aspect was curtailed because 
the U. K. 'did not disagree with its fellow members. Eden, explaining 
the Yalta compromise, said that originally he and Churchill had had 
reservations because it "was' open to strong objection as putting the' 
Great Powers above the"law", but that after some consideration they 
had accepted it as a formula based on "realism". 
(It) would enable the new World Organisation, if set up, ' 
to discuss any political topic germane to the issue put 
before it, brought to its notice by any Power, and no 
Great Power would be able to prevent such a discussion 
taking place. It would be open equally to the Organisation 
to make recommendations and to give advice. The question 15 
of a veto would arise only when we passed to physical action. 
During discussion on this point Eden"repeated that he interpreted the 
formula as meaning that discussiön'cöuld'take place, '` 
irrespective of the wishes'of a Great Power party to 
a dispute, while enforcement action was not in fact l6 practicable without unanimity-among the Great w 
Powers. 
Churchill emphasised to his Dominion colleagues the importance of the 
U. S. S. R. 's remaining within the U. N. " I He'explained how he had tried'to 
13. Minutes of'British-Commonwealth Meeting, 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
14. Ibid; 
15. Minutes' of, British Commonwealth Meeting, 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
16. ` Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, meeting, CAB99/30. 
9th-April -1945, ýBCM(45) 6th 
6th April 1945, 'BCM(45) 4th 
9th. Apri1 1945, BCM(45) 6th,, 
1 11 
f` ,. 
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reassure Stalin at Yalta that to permit a dispute to be heard would 
not result in the U. S. S. R. being "forced into a difficult position" 
by telling him that while the British would allow the Chinese, to 
present their case for the return of Hong Kong, 
if it came to action contrary to, our interests, we 
should not hesitate to use our veto. 17 
While this does not correspond to Churchill's earlier statement that 
the U. K. supported Roosevelt's proposal that the Great Powers should 
be subjected to the "will of the lesser", 
18 
it does illustrate that 
the U. K. was willing to see the use of the veto restricted to enforcement 
action, and interpreted the Yalta formula in that way. Discussion of 
this aspect of the veto was concluded after Sir W. Malkin (F. O. Legal 
Adviser) had told the meeting that he thought such an interpretation 
would stand up. He argued that as any member of the U. N. could bring 
a dispute to the attention of the Security Council, such action would 
be argued that it was a procedural matter and not subject to the veto. 
He and Eden reassured Evatt that the purpose of the Yalta formula had 
been to ensure that sanctions could not be imposed upon a Great Power, 
and that there was no reason to interpret it as conferring a right of 
veto upon mere consideration of a dispute. 
19 
The second application of the veto to which the Dominions objected, 
that of amendments to the Charter, evoked less agreement between the 
members. Australia, Canada and New Zealand firmly opposed the extension 
of the veto to Charter amendments. Evatt argued that the existence of 
a veto for the Great Powers was "so obnoxious" that unless there was 
some reasonable chance that this could be amended some nations might 
not accept the Charter. Hume Wrong also rejected the application of 
20 
the veto in this matter, and Fraser concurred with their statements. 
17. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 6th April 1945, BCM(45) 4th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 9th April 1945, BCM(45) 6th 
meeting, CAB99/30. . 
20. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 10th April 1945, BCM(45) 8th 
meeting, CAB90/30. 
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The obvious difficulty was Lhat Inasmuch as Evatt was right in'assuming 
that the smaller nations would, -be reluctant 
to sign a Charter which 
permitted the Great Powers to veto any reduction in their powers, 
so would the Great Powers thecnselves be reluctant to agree to the 
other nations' right to limit their powers. 'Cranborne pointed this 
out, saying that the chance of the veto being voted away 
'" would be wholly unpalatable to Russia. 
21 
It might be assumed that the U. K. would not be happy with this possibility, 
or with the chance that the composition of the permanent membership 
of the Security Council might be changed and the U. K. itself relegated 
to the ranks of the lesser powers. 
Australia did not think that it should be too easy for the Charter 
to be amended, and Evatt suggested that a special three-quarters 
majority of the Assembly should be required as well as a majority of 
the Security Council. Canada proposed a system of two-thirds majority 
in the Assembly over two years so that in the intervening period the 
proposals could be ratified by national parliaments. Canada did warn 
against the difficulty of the U. S. A. Senate's delaying or blocking 
proceedings. Smuts did not mention the use of the veto in this context, 
but did advocate some provision for amending the Charter after five 
years, and recognised that ratification by the U. S. Senate could present 
problems. All the Dominion delegates agreed that after a specified 
time, from'five to ten years, there should be some provision for amending 
the Charter. Cranborne said that the U. K. Cabinet had not discussed 
this issue, but thought that the balance of considerations was in 
favour of some means to amend it. However, in light of the likely 
objections from the U. S. S. R., he suggested there should be no attempt 
at this before a general review of the Charter. 
22 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
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At the San Francisco Conference the Dominions continued their 
efforts to restrict the Great Powers$ veto on these two issues. In 
conjunction with other "small" countries they challenged the Great 
powers' authority to apply the veto in any case other than the 
application of sanctions. The issue of vetoing discussion or 
consideration of a dispute dragged on into the beginning of June, 
with the U. S. S. R. standing firmly against any concession. An 
additional issue raised at the conference was the "hidden veto" where if 
one Great Power abstained, this had the same effect as voting against 
a proposal. 
23 
On the 5th June Cockram wrote a memorandum for Cranborne 
in which he discussed the veto issue. In this he suggested that while 
Canada was standing firm in its opposition to the veto on anything 
except enforcement action, Australia might agree to accept the veto in 
the case of a discussion of a dispute 
provided the Great Powers indicated in a separate prot col 29 
those occasions on which they would not use the veto. 
Cockram also expected New Zealand to moderate its London position, 
trading the veto for a concession on the subject of an untrammelled 
conference,. within a specified period to amend the Charter. Shortly 
afterwards, at a meeting of Commonwealth delegates which seems to 
have been characterised by a general despondency as to whether a 
charter would indeed be signed, Smuts had announced that the only 
solution was to leave it to "Yalta to interpret Yalta"; it must 
be left to the three major Powers to reach a compromise which should 
then_be accepted. 
25 
The Great Powers did hold mäny private sessions 
to debate, this issue, and the suggestion of a protocol in which the 
Powers would agree to limit their veto was under consideration. 
At the same time the question of the application of the veto to 
amendments to the Charter was also being considered, and for some 
countries concessions on one aspect could be traded for concessions on 
239- D. N. Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cado an 1938-1945, 
London, 1971), p. 750 (editor's footnote). 
24. Memorandum by Cockram to Cranborne, 5th June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
25. Cockram to Stephenson, 16th June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
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another: " As Cockram'told Stephenson on 5th June, while all four 
Dominions were in favour of an untrammelled conference after a 
specified period, and opposed the veto, New Zealand might accept the 
latter in favour of the former, or even drop its insistence on a 
conference in the belief that the pressure of world opinion would 
force a change. It was also suggested that Australia might give up 
its pressure for a conference rather than force a breach with the 
U. S. S. R., while Canada might be persuaded by the U. S. A. to end its 
opposition. In the case of South Africa, Cockram thought that it 
was possible that Smuts would drop his opposition if agreement between 
the Great Powers could be secured on other matters. The U. K. 's 
26 
policy was set out in a letter of Cockram to Stephenson. He noted 
that the U. S; A; strongly opposed an untrammelled conference, as 
was the U. S. S. R., and explained that as the U. K. was committed to 
sponsoring the proposal, it could not support any amendment altering 
it. Because there was a chance of persuading the U. S. S. R. to concede 
on the issue of vetoing discussions, and little likelihood of the 
U. S. A. or the U. S. S. R. agreeing to abandon their veto on amending 
the Charter, the'U. K. 's'policy was to continue to press for the former 
while not insisting on an untrammelled conference. 
27 
From Webster's diary"it appears-that after a meeting with the 
Dominion-representatives on 30th May, Halifax and Cadogan had agreed f, 
to press for a revision'of the Charter after a specified term, and 
telegraphed London to this effect. Webster had protested vigorously 
to Cadogan, and later Halifax, that, to do this would be too harmful 
for the U. K. 's relations'with the U. S. S. R. and both agreed to send a 
supplementary despatch to London pointing out his objections and 
advising a more cautious approach. Webster thought such a course 
would have 
26. Note to Secretary oftState, 5th June 1945, ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
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caused the greatest suspicion in the mind of the Soviet 
Union, & have thrown confusion into the ranks of the 
United States Delegation. 28 
U. K. policy was modified to that outlined byCockram, with the Dominions 
receiving no positive support from the U. K. for an open conference. 
The situation at San Francisco had reached a crisis in early June, 
as is illustrated by Cockram's statement that "it was an amazing relief" 
to hear on 13th that the U. S. S. R. delegation had been authorised by 
Moscow to give way on the question of vetoing discussion and consideration 
of a dispute. 
29 A protocol was signed by the Great Powers in which 
they undertook to limit their application of the veto. This was gained 
at the expense of any alteration to the veto in the case of amendments 
to the Charter. The U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. stood firm on this 
4- c. -. issue and the U. K. concentrated its efforts on the use of the veto in 
other issues. In a later letter to Stephenson, ' Cockram described how 
strongly all the Dominions had felt about the calling of an untrammelled 
conference, but added that all of them'had realised that the U. S. S. R. and 
the U. S. A. would not concede on the issue, and had not expected the 
U. K. to fight on their behalf. 
30 
No major clash occurred between the U. K. and a Dominion over either 
aspect of the veto issue. In the main the U. S. S. R. was regarded as the 
principal opponent, that the U. K. credited with assisting the Dominions 
in achieving the intepretative statement limiting the application of the 
veto. 
31 
', However, Canada, Australia and New Zealand did not support 
the powers extended to the major states and, inasmuchas the U. K. was 
a Great Power, these Dominions opposed its privileged position. South 
Africa, or perhaps more accurately Smuts, was more tolerant of the Great 
Powers' reserving such rights to themselves and was more concerned with 
Vp, 
_ 
the capacity of the U. S. A. and the U. K. both to resist the U. S. S. R. and 
28. P. A. Reynolds and E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles 
Kingsley Webster and the'United Nations, 1939-1946, (London; 1976), 
pp. 64-65. 
-"' 29. Cockram to Stephenson, 16thýJune 1945, D035/1884, '°WR208/261: 
30. Cockram to Stephenson, 23rd June 1945, 'ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
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keep it within the U. N. The confirmation of the position of the 
permanent members of the Security Council at San Francisco, which was 
incorporated into the Charter, meant that there would always exist an 
issue on which members of the British Commonwealth would be in 
disagreement, and on which the U. K. -might be forced to take the side 
of one of its~Creat Power partners, rather than one or all of its 
Commonwealth partners. This was inherent in the U. K. 's dual position, 
but created a potentially divisive situation. 
The effectiveness of the interpretative statement signed by the 
N 
Great Powers as a compromise solution on the application of the veto to 
anything but enforcement action, soon proved wholly illusory. In the 
first year at the U. N. the veto was used frequently by the U. S. S. R. 
and in the eyes of the Western world unjustifiably, negating the spirit 
of Yalta and the interpretative statement of San Francisco. The 
Dominion to react most positively to Russia's actions was Australia, 
which tabled a motion to be discussed at the final session of the U. N. 
General Assembly in the last three months of 1946. It was possibly 
Australia's membership of the Security Council, and its experience at 
first hand of Russia's use of the veto, which prompted that government 
to attempt to alter the application'of it. The motion put forward by 
Australia called for a review of the application of the veto article, 
t 17 
but the Australian neglected either to discuss the matter with the U. K. 
first, or even inform it that it was putting forward such a motion. 
(The General Election in Australia did delay the proceedings, but, 
possibly due to the arguments between the two countries within the 
Council, and the slightly strained relations between the two Governments, 
the U. K. had no prior warning of the Australian motion. ) When the'U. K. 
did eventually manage to elicit some reply to its enquiries as to how 
far the Australian Government would press for a change in the Charter 
the Australian reply mentioned its motion "of which we assume you are aware'' 
307 
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32 
in very vague terms without answering the. question directly.. 
_The principal 
fear of the U. K. was expressed by F. O., and D. O. 
officials. Mr. P. H. Gore-Booth of the Reconstruction Department, of 
the F. O. wrote, in a letter to Shannon of the D. O., 
it would be most unfortunate if Dr. Evatt's persistence 
forced us to take a Big Five line more o3lnly than we 
should do had he left the subject alone. 
In a suggested additional paragraph to the. F. O. memorandum on this 
question, Shannon expanded on this: 
Our own position is complicated by the fact., that it is 
Australia who has put one of the. items on the agenda. 
Both on general grounds and because Australia is at 
present at loggerheads with Russia. in the Security 
Council and at the Paris Conference, we ought. to avoid 
getting inSZ a position of siding with Russia against 
. 
Australia. 4. 
The U. K. 's policy on the veto's. application was, contained within the, 
rest of the memorandum. Discounting the practicabilityof amending 
the Charter, it put forward two alternatives; either. a new interpretative 
document should. be drawn up limiting the application of the veto, and 
agreed to by the Five, or some Rules of Procedure be introduced which 
defined a dispute and the method of-submitting cases in, writing. The 
first was thought impracticable and ineffective. if. achieved. The 
second embodied a proposal which the Cabinet had, already approved, 
but which had not been publicly put forward. The-implication was 
that this had been due to the known opposition of, the U. S. A., and the 
memorandum recommended that renewed efforts were made to overcome U. S. 
opposition. 
35 
,,, ý, 
Before the Commonwealth delegations left for New York the D. O. 
telegraphed to the Dominions explaining in broad terms the U. K. 's policy 
towards the veto. The D. O. had impressed upon the F. O. the importance 
of discussions with the Dominions, especially Australia, before U. K. 
policy was finalised sind-discussed with foreign countries, despite the 
32. Australian Government to D. O., 22nd October 1946, D035/2047, WR362/1. 
33. Gore-Booth to Shannon, 12th September 1946, ibid. 
34. Shannon's additional paragraph, no data, ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
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lack of courtesy shown by Australia in its handling of the matter. 
36 
When the delegations arrived in New York considerable divergencies 
of view became clear, especially between Australia and the U. K. In 
its telegram to the Dominions the`U. K. condemned the U. S. S. R. 's use 
IV 
of the veto over the previous year, but stated that it thought any 
amendment of the Charter was impossible; the agreement of all the 
permanent members would not be forthcoming. Moreover, the U. S'. A. 
attached high importance to the veto, and would not forego its use. 
The telegram added that 
it is by no means certain that United Kingdom Government 
should, forgo right of veto. Circumstances might arise 
in which a majority on Security Council voted in favour 
,. of a, course which appeared detrimental to interests of 37 
United Kingdom or other members of British Commonwealth. 
The telegram put forward the two suggestions in'the F. O. memorandum, 
again favouring the second Rules of Procedure, but without mentioning 
the earlier decision of Cabinet, or the U. S. A. 's opposition to it. 
its U. K. did consider if it could volunteer to restrict ts awn 
application of the veto to chapter seven of the Charter, enforcement 
action, whether or not the other four Powers agreed. On this subject 
Sir Charles Dixon, Assistant Under Secretary at the D. O., noted that 
the U. K. might well want to retain the freedom to use the veto under 
chapter six, which concerned pacific settlement of disputes, particularly 
article 36 (I) which authorised the Council power to recommend appropriate 
procedures, or methods of adjustment at any stage of a dispute. The 
result of this was that 
the danger arises that if the Australians persist in the 
line set out in, their telegram we may find ourselves forced 
to vote against them and with Russia, a state of affairs 
which would obviously be better avoided. 38 
The Australian reply_to U. K. enquiries had intimated that it would 
36. Shannon to Gore-Booth, 17th September 1946; minute by Shannon, 7th 
October 1946, ibid. 
37. D. O. to four Dominion Governments, 15th October 1946, ibid. 
38. ' Minute by Dixon, ' 25th October 1946, ibid. ' 
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press for a vote on restricting the application of the veto to chapter 
seven of the Charter. The two U. K. proposals were dismissed as not 
going far enough to meet the case. 
39 At New York the Australian 
delegation was committed to this line of policy, but Cadogan (now 
British representative at the U. N. ) was authorised to show, that 
delegation the full U. K. brief and try and persuade them of the 
advantages of the U. K. proposal. Meanwhile the D. O. telegraphed to 
the Australian Government stressing that the U. K. wanted to avoid"_ 
siding openly with the Russians against the smaller powers. It was 
explained that it was impossible for the U. K. to repudiate the, terms 
of the statement by the sponsoring Powers at San Francisco, but that 
the U. K. proposal had a chance of success without requiring any 
amendment to the Charter. It ended with the wish that U. K. -Australian 
differences should be kept to the minimum. 
40 
At, the October-December session of the General Assembly the 
British Commonwealth delegations met frequently, with the question of 
the veto figuring prominently in the discussions. The, other three. 
Dominions, while agreeing with Australia's condemnation, -of 
the veto, 
did not agree with its aggressive tactics. St. Laurent, the head of 
Canada's delegation, made it clear that his country, , 
did not want to 
see a breach between the General Assembly and the Security Council. 
He was agreeable to the Great Powers' trying to reach a new joint 
statement`, which could then be accepted by the Assembly. Such, an 
agreed statement w 
might appear less an attack on the veto and a, division 
between the great and small powers than one pasZyd by 
the Assembly in the teeth of Soviet opposition. 
At a further meeting of 8th November 1946, St. Laurent said that while 
the debate in the Assembly had demonstrated the desire for a new 
39. Australian Government to D. O., 22nd October 1946, ibid. 
40. D. O. to Australian Government, 28th October 1946, ibid. 
41. Minutes of Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives 
in New 
York, 5th November 1946, D035/1892, WR208/5/29. 
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resolution from the Great Powers, it would be unforunate if the 
appearance were given of the smaller powers trying to wrest away 
from the Big Five something which they had been given in the Charter. 
On the other hand, he thought confidence would be restored if an 
agreement between the Assembly and the Council could be reached. 
Smuts supported the Canadian view, saying that the indiscriminate use 
of the veto had badly shaken the confidence of the world in the U. N.; 
but he urged his Commonwealth colleagues to be constructive, commenting 
that the Australian resolution would achieve nothing. At the meeting' 
on the 8th November, Smuts suggested that the major Powers be permitted 
to debate the matter. Otherwise the U. S. S. R. would suspect the 
43 
what Assembly of being mobilised against them. This 
;? 
wa13 s 
precisely+t 
the Australians were attempting to do. At a meeting of the 18th 
A rr 
November, the lion. N. J. Makin, a member of the Australian government, 
said that his country had been working to obtain an "expression of 
opinion from the Assembly which would clarify the position of the 
majority and register resentment at the abuse of the veto". Recognising 
that the Great Powers only rarely fulfilled the wishes of the majority' 
of nations, Makin suggested that 
the more the views of the great majority of the Assembly 
were. disregarded by Russia the more apparent; it would be 
to the world that Russia was taking on an indefensible 
attitude. It was also important that this fact should 
be realised as widely as_possible. 44 ., 1. -. 
The New Zealand delegation were willing to fall in with the Canadian 
and South, African proposals,: favoured by. the U. K... and. allow the Great 
Powers time to try and agree on a new statement, although pessimistic. as 
to the outcome. 
It, was agreed in the General Assembly, ' after` a" strong- speech by 
42. Minutes of Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives in New"York, 
8th November 1946, ibid. 
43. Minutes of Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives in New York, 
5th November 1946 & 8th November 1946, ibid. 
44'. Minutes of Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives in New York, 
18th November 1946, D035/2048, WR208/5/"29. 
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theCanadinn delegate, 
45 
that proceedingu, of the Assembly be postponed, 
while the Great Powers tried to, reach agreement. The U. K. submitted 
a memorandum to the other permanent members of the Security Council, 
which contained suggestions for further Rules of Procedure and a 
formula for defining a dispute. It also proposed that the abstention 
of a Great Power should not have the effect of a veto. 
46 
The Dominions 
accepted the U. K. paper; although Australia said that it did not go 
far enough, and that the Assembly resolution would still be tabled. 
47 
The U. K. paper, was accepted by all the Great Powers except the U. S. S. R. 
and after no agreement had been reached by the permanent members the 
matter went back to the General Assembly. 
, 
Before a meeting of Commonwealth representatives on 25th November, 
Cockram prepared a note for the Foreign Secretary which recapitulated 
the attitudes of the Dominions. The wish of the Australian. delegation 
to submit its resolution to the Assembly was noted, as were the 
difficulties for the U. K. in supporting it. If, as was anticipated, 
the other permanent members would not agree to restrict the use of the 
veto, Cockram suggested that the U. K. could not agree to do so itself. 
There would be no gain, in denying itself rights which other Powers were 
using. However, 
if the Assembly passes a request, and Australia and the 
other Dominions vote for it, would there not be the risk 
that, every time that we are obliged to use our veto ' Otherwise than under Chapter'VII, our enemies will see in 
our action a diver nce of policy between the United Kingdom 
and the Dominions? 
Further discussions were held with the Australian``delegati'on on 26th 
Noveniber 
when Hasluck told the British that he had the most "categorical 
instructions" to press a-'resolution to the vote, and that Australia 
45. Note by Shannon and Cockram, no date, D035/2048, WR362/6. 46. Memorandum to representatives of U. S. A., U. S. S. R., France and China. 
Annex to II to report of British Commonwealth meeting of 18th November 
47.1946, D035/2048, WR208/5/29. Minutes of Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives in New York, 
8th November 1946, D035/1892, WR208/5/29. 48' Cockram note for Foreign Secretary, 25th November 1946, D035/2048, WR362/6. 
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would be reluctant to amend its resolution. , Cadogan explained to him 
that the U. K. could not supporta motion calling on members, to<restrict 
the use of the veto to enforcement action under Chapter VII. In the 
final sessions of the Assembly a milder version of the Australian 
resolution which, while not actually criticising the past use of the 
veto, did request the permanent members to consult with each other 
with a view to reducing the application of the veto, and recommended 
that the Security Council should adopt practices and procedures to 
assist in reducing its use, was adopted. The U: K. supported this, 
as. did the - other-"Dominions. 
49 
The refusal ofIthe U. S. S. R; to make any concessions on the'use 
of the veto and the hesitation of-many nations, including' three of. 
the Dominions, to isolate publicly. the Soviet Union on this issue 
meant that there`waslno open conflict within the Commonwealth. As 
long as the U. S. S. R. - took an intransigent stance the U. K. and the 
other Great Powers could express sympathy for the complaints of the 
lesser Powers, and be secure, in the knowledge that-no changes would be 
made. The U. K. did consider whether the veto would be limited to 
enforcement action under Chapter VII, and if the other four had agreed, 
it is likely that it too would have consented. However, the F. O. had 
already stated that it would be reluctant to draw the line so severely. 
The U. K. 's worst fears did not materialise; it did not have to support 
the U. S. S. R. against the Dominions, nor vote against the Australian 
resolution ; but there was no disguising the fact'-of Commonwealth` 
disarray on this important issue. As a member of the GreatýPower elite, 
the U. K. possessed powers which all the Dominions thought excessive' and 
wrong in principle. 
49. Note by Shannon and Cockram, no date, ibid. 
312 
The Dominions opposed one other aspect of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals; the lack of power conferred upon the General Assembly. 
This was consistent with their opposition to the immense powers., 
allocated to the Security Council, especially the Great Powers. 
At the April 1945 meeting of Commonwealth representatives, the 
Dominions-all-recommended a widening of the authority of the General 
Assembly, with°New Zealand appearing as its strongest supporter. 
At the fifth meeting, Fraser said that a "serious defect" of the, 
proposals lay in the division of power between the two bodies, with 
the smaller Powers not possessing an adequate voice. To tell them, 
"theirs not to-reason why, theirs but to do and die" was not good 
enough. 
50-, 
During detailed discussion of the powers of the Assembly, -: _ 
at-the eighth-meeting on 10th April, Fraser announced that his. country-- 
wanted the Assembly to possess the widest possible powers in-all matters 
not specifically reserved to the Security Council and perhaps some 
which were; that it should have the right to recommend action even when 
the Council was considering an issue; that it should be primarily 
responsible for achieving international co-operation in economic and 
social matters; - and, except in cases of extreme emergency, have the 
authority to confirm or reject decisions-of the Council for enforcement 
5lp 
action. 
-I° The other-three Dominions supported additional: powers°of the, 
General 
Assembly, ', although none was as strong in its demands as New Zealand. 
Australia accepted that the Assembly should not have the authority to 
interfere in a dispute once it had been taken up by the Security Council, 
and was happy to keep the imposition of sanctions as a responsibility 
52 
of the Council. Canada, concerned about sanctions for another reason, 
believed that the Assembly should be able to discuss any question of 
50. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 6th April 1945, BCM(45) 5th 
meeting, CAi99/30. 
51. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 10th April 1945, BCM(45) 8th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
52. See pages 318-320. 
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international relations, the main body ' responsible for economic'and 
social co-operation, and capable of discussing a matter even if the 
Security Council was debating it. For South Africa, Smuts thought 
that as the Organisation's'sovereign body, the Assembly should"p'ossess 
full powers under the Charter except those expressly reserved for the 
Security Council. 
53 ci 
At the San Francisco Conference, it was acknowledged that the 
Assembly did possess the right'to discuss any aspect of international' 
affairs and make recommendations, except when the Security Council was 
considering the matter. 
54 
This had always been the U: `K. interpretation 
of'the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and it'had not supported the New 
Zealand notion that the Assembly should be' Iallowed to make recommendations 
when'the Security Council was debating an issue. The U. K. delegation 
ss 
summed 'up the conference's decisions on the Assembly with'the words 
In matters of power the General Assembly has really no 
larger role assi gned to it than it had in the Dumbarton 
'Oaks proposals. 5° 
The Great Powers' success in retaining their considerable power 'of the 
veto and the primacy of the Security Council-fn an issue which endangered 
the peace, meant that the Assembly was in many respects confirmed in 
the secondary role to which Fraser had objected in London. While its 
powers seemed widely drawn in international crises 'the Security Council 
would possess the decisive authority, and within that Council the Great 
Powers who determine the important issues. The history of the Assembly 
in the first years of the'United Nations did`tendto conform to Fraser's 
53. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 10th April 1945, BCM(45) 8th 
meeting, CAB99/30. See also Wellington Resolution of 6th November 1944 
by Australia and New Zealand quoted in Annex A. of memorandum on 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals, 29th March 1945, BCM(45)4, CAB99/30. 
54. Article 10 and 12 of United Nations Charter, J. A. S. Grenville, The 
Major International Treaties 1914-1973, (London, 1974), p. 247ff. 
55. U. K. Delegation, San Francicso, to F. O., 23rd June 1945, D035/1884, 
WR208/261; Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 10th April 1945, 
BCM(45) 8th meeting, CAB99/30. 
56. U. K. Delegation, San Francisco, to F. O., 23rd'June 1945, D035/1884, 
WR208/261. 
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description of the fate, of the small powers: "Theirs not to reason 
why, theirs but to do and die. "57 
In addition to objecting to Lhe, powers which the major countries 
had reserved for themselves, some of the Dominions opposed the twofold 
distinction which was central,. to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which recognised 
only the division between the permanent members of the Security Council 
and the rest. No priority,. was suggested for any. other 'middle' category 
of Powers in the election. of,, temporary members to the Security Council 
or any of the other United Nations bodies. The two Dominions 
which particularly objected. to this, stark division were Canada and 
Australia. As the two most powerful, lDominions, which 
felt entitled to 
be. consulted on many important issues, both wanted due recognition to 
be accorded to middle-ranking states, and disliked the tendency of the 
major countries to put them on a par with the smallest. The U. K. .,, _ 
understood and supported the views of, the, Dominions on this point., not 
least because it was to its own advantage to, see Canada and Australia 
elected to positions of responsibility. However, as Cranborne was to 0 
explain , to them, this view encountered opposition, from the U. S. and 
the U. S. S. R. 
The Canadians had been, expressing the importance., of distinguishing 
between 'middle' and; 'small' Powers for, some time; it was the basis of 
the functionalist theory. that states capable of making a contribution 
should be adequately recognised. In January 1945 the Canadian Government 
sent the four major Powers a memorandum embodying this theory, which 
urged the four to devise a way to associate states of the calibre of 
Canada. with the work of, the Security Council more effectively. 
58 At 
the April 1945 Commonwealth discussions in London, . before, the San, 
Francisco 
conference, Massey insisted that Canada's attitude was not a question of 
57. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 6th April--1945, BCM(45) 5th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
58. J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: "Norman A. Robertson and Canadian 
Statecraft, 1929-1968, (1981), 149. 
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"prestige or status", rather 
if recognition were given to the contribution which 
such States could make, popular support for the World 
Organisation would be proportionately greater in these 
communities. He did not see how the view could be 
accepted that there should be parity between the Dominions 
and like States on the one hand, and countries like the 59 
smaller South American Republics and Liberia on the other. 
The Canadian delegation pressed for a separate category of middle Powers 
to be recognised as most suitable for election to U. N. Councils, although 
it did not think that a system of weighted voting would be acceptable 
in elections to the Security Council. Consistently with its policy the 
year before, the Canadian delegation did not want any regional criteria 
to be decisive in elections. They conceded its relevance in some 
instances, but pointed out how difficult it would be for the Commonwealth. 
Of course this was especially so for Canada, sharing a continent with 
the U. S. A. and the Latin American nations. 
60 
Evatt agreed with Massey's view and stressed the contribution made 
by all the Dominions in the two great wars and the need to ensure that 
Dominions and similar states became entitled to seats. Unlike Massey, 
Evatt was in favour of representation on a regional basis, and thought 
it posed no special problems for the Commonwealth. This was entirely 
consistent with Australia's efforts to play a dominant role in the 
Far East. Support for 'middle Power' recognition was also forthcoming 
from New Zealand and South Africa. Fraser suggested the Commonwealth 
should be, entitled to periodic representation, and added that he had 
no fundamental objection to election on a regionaa basis, although he 
recognised that there were problems for Canada. South Africa, while 
not assuming a-special position for itself, said that it considered 
the situation unfair to countries such as Canada. However, Smuts 
thought that the best solution would be to defer the question for a 
time and then review it. Smuts tied this question closely with the 
59. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 9th April 1945, BCM(45) 6th 
meeting, CAB99/30. 
60. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meetings, 9th and 10th AFri1 1945, 
BCM(45) 6th & 7th meetings, CAB99/30. 
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amendment of the Charter, for he recognised that there were States 
which would grow, -and others whose aberrations wouldrbe forgotten, 
and thought that changes would have to be made in the selection of. 
States recognised as-permanent members of the Security Council. 
In due course (revision would) be nece sary and a place 
could then be found for rising Powers. 
°l 
Smuts did not consider that issue important enough to delay the 
establishment of the Council, provided that it was made quite clear 
that the arrangements made were not permanent. The Great Powers' 
success in retaining the right to veto any amendment to the Charter 
effectively meant that it was impossible to reduce the status of a 
permanent member of the Security Council unless it volunteered such 
action. 
Attlee, for the U. K. delegation; supported regional representation 
and thought that this would provide the Commonwealth with an adequate 
voice, the only problem lying in the probable opposition of the South 
American powers. " After further discussions in London by the committee 
of officials, it was accepted that continental-representation was - 
difficult'to use as a single criterion for it would not necessarily 
result in the election of responsible Powers, would-not enhance 
the prospects of middle powers, ' and'would not°-be likedby Europeans~S- 
or South Americans since it would probably result in under-representation 
for those continents. The suggestion that one member of the Commonwealth 
be allocated a seat*was rejected by the committee as allowing the 
principle of representation by political groups, and because it'would 
never allow for more than one member of the Commonwealth to secure a 
temporary seat. The meeting agreed that due' consideration should be 
given'to the potential contribution of the candidate State, while not-'- 
overlooking the need to have the different regions' represented` in some 
61. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 9th April 1945, BCM(45) 6th 
meeting, CAB90/30. 
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capacity. 
62 
T-,, «,: ", + 
The Dominions all supported the. policy of providing adequate 
recognition for the middle powers. 
the Dominions disagreed with the U. K. 
This was not an issue in which 
Various difficulties arose in 
making any further distinction between countries, most: of which the 
Dominions appreciated, and they knew the other Great Powers had'no`, °' 
reason to want any further categorisation. In the main their allies 
tended to be smaller countries; the middle Powers were generally 
independent of any of the permanent'members and lacked-, their direct -- 
support, or the power to force a-compromise. At the April 1945 meeting 
Cranborne--informed the Dominions that at Dumbarton 0aksrtheýU. K. Delegation 
had pressed for provision that in the elections'to the` Security, Council, 
'due regard (should be paid) to the contribution of the 
members of the Organisation towards the maintenance of 
international peace and security and towards the other, 
purposes of the Organisation'. This proposal had been,,, 
strongly opposed b the United States and Russia and had 
had to be dropped. 
°3. 
Thus, although the U. K. supported the Dominions, it could do little 
to help them secure their point. -'In the end it'had to rest'on the' 
individual judgment of"all members to elect Isuitable"countries on'"' 
the'basis of their qualifications, rather than for purely political 
reasons. The division of the world into'blocs immediately after the 
war'did not aid such a course. 
ý: ýý ýý. 
, adequate protection for the rights In pursuit of its aim to secure, 
of the middle-ranking Powers, Canada took issue with the-implication 
in the'Dumbarton Oaks proposals that enforcement sanctions should be 
automatically accepted by all members of the U. N. 'once agreed upon by 
the Security Council. This issue was closely tied to the election of 
states to the non-permanent seats on that Council. If the middle powers 
were certain of representation, then they would automatically. be included 
62. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meetings, 9th & 10th Apri1.1945, 
IBCM(45) 6th & 7th meetings, CAB90/30. 
63. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 9th April 1945, BCM(45) 6th 
meeting, CAB90/30. 
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in the decision to take enforcement action. 'However, if they were not 
allotted seats, but, by virtue of their strength, were likely to be 
asked to contribute forces for U. N. enforcement action, provision had 
to be made for associating them with such decisions. Hume Wrong 
suggested three ways in which this could be done; through consultation 
with the General Assembly, by inviting the participating states to hold 
temporary membership of the Council, or through a special approach by 
the Council to a country whose help was required. 
64 
On this issue 
Canada was supported to some extent by both South Africa and New Zealand. 
Smuts stressed how the'use of military forces was a national commitment 
which needed to be verified by the national Parliament and doubted the 
willingness of states to accept open-ended commitments for the use of 
their troops. 
In his view therefore, the responsibility for furnishing 
the armed forces necessary to take enforcement action must 
be placed on members of the Security Council alone in the 
first instance .... He did not think that other countries 
could be obliged to act unless they concurred in the decision 
or had been consulted about it. 
65 
The New Zealand Delegation agreed with the Canadian thesis that countries 
which had no voice in the decision to implement sanctions could not be 
expected to contribute troops automatically. Its solution was in 
keeping with New Zealand's general conception of the organisation; that 
the General Assembly should be the principal body. It advocated 
reference, of such an issue to the General Assembly, where every state 
would have a voice, dismissing the argument that any great delay was 
likely to occur. If on rare occasions rapid action was needed, the 
Security Council could always act immediately themselves. It noted 
that consulting the Assembly introduced an element of doubt, but 
without such reference it foresaw 
the lamentable process of pledge-breaking, which had bee96 
a feature of the decade before the war, beginning again. 
64. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 10th April 1945, BCM(45) 10th 
meeting CAB90/30. 
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The - other' Dominion which frequently championed the cause of'middle 
and'lesser ranking states and might have been expected to'suppört 
Canada on this issue, "Australia, sided resolutely with'the'U. K. and" 
the 'Great Power' point Of view. Evatt'announced that while he`could 
sympathise with the Canadian position, Australia considered the 
obligation on'all members to impose sanctions-so central to, the"main 
purpose of, the U. N., "the' universality' sö fundamental, 'that' anything '' 
less would "cut at'the root of the whole"orgänisation". 
67' 
The 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals provided for special agreements between 
individual' states and ' the' Organisation, to plan`the nature and extent 
of military"assistance"a country would be able to contribute, Tand 
Evatt tried to minimise the actual consequences of the universal 
commitment to support sanctions by stressing this. For the U. K. 
Cadogan told the Commonwealth representatives that in`örder to 
alleviate the difficulties' mentioned by the three Dominions `the"U: K 
had managed to insert two' paragraphs which called for a'nation'-not 
represented"on the`Military Staff Cömmittee'to-'be invited'-'to assöciate 
itself with the work of'that committee when ii was being asked'to 
participate, and that a nation which-encountered'speciäl economic 
problems on account'of a decision-of the Security Council to implement 
68 
economic sanctions be allowed to consult'the Cöüncil concerning these. 
All the same, the'U. K. was uneasy about' Wrong's recommendations. 
Cranborne`, emphasised that the paramount considerationwas the preservation 
of peace, and anything which made action less cer. ain"was bound to 
endanger this: 
It was necessary that'an aggressor should know at the very 
start that, if he embarked on aggression, he would find 
himself faced, immediately and automatically, with'the"ý 
embattled might, both military and economic, of the other 
nations of the world'. '. . He''feared that the 
Canadian 
proposal would have the effect of clogging the machinery 
and diminishing its deterrent effect. 9 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid. r, 
69. Ibid. 
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Discussion proceeded no further at the London meeting. ` Cranborne 
concluded the session by promising that the U. K., would, carefully consider 
the points made in the discussions, and. suggesting: that. now each member 
was clear about the attitudes of the others, they could think over the 
issue again. At San Francisco Canada managed, with the support of 
others, to achieve its objective in substance. As the U. K. Delegation 
reported to the F. O., the concession represented a.. "considerable. change 
in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals" 
70 
and effectively gave Canada its 
second proposal., --. 
Article 44 stated: 
When the Security Council had decided, to use force it 
shall, before calling tipon a Member not represented on 
it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations 
assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the 
Member so, desires, to participate in the decisions of the 
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents 
of that Member's. armed forces. 71 
This question of associating nations with the application of sanctions 
had several dimensions, As Canada, South Africa and, New Zealand each 
conceded, one reason for their opposition to the original proposal had, 
been that it eroded the national sovereignty of the countries not 
represented on the Security Council. However, for Canada it was also 
a question of preserving the rights of the middle powers in-the face 
of the power possessed, by the permanent members. But as we have. seen, 
Australia, which consistently supported the cause of,, the. lesser-nations 
and campaigned against the powers, -reserved to the 
Great Powers in 
matters such as the veto,, opposed its partners on this; question. For 
its government the deterrent of automatic collective action was of 
greater importance than national sovereignty or the protection of the 
rights of nations not members of the Security Council. It would be 
wrong-to accuse Canada of. trying to avoid using its troops to maintain 
peace; that was not the motive then and its record since 1945 is one 
of the more impressive. But it did have, Canadian. public opinion to 
70. U. K. Deleagtion, San Francisco, to F. O., 23rdJune"1945 D035/1884, 
WR208/261. 
71. Article 44 of United Nations Charter, op. cit. 
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take into, account and King also equated the originalrproposal, with 
the, League's Covenant, the abortive attempt at sanctions and his own 
earlier efforts to ensure that Canada was not automatically committed. 
72 
The discussions-on-this question. illustrate the complexities of 
Commonwealth policies and show that on'questions affecting status the 
Dominions were not solidly grouped against the U. K. Most subjects 
interacted with others and-for some, concessions on one-would-minimise` 
opposition to another. This had the advantage at San Francisco and. 
elsewhere of showing that the Commonwealth did. not follow a singles;. 
policy;. -, that ,a seat 
for a, Dominion did not amount to an extra vote,,, ., r , r 
for the U. K. The, -Commonwealth discussions prior"to San Francisco,, ri 
gave the members a chance to hear in full each other's policies and 
almost certainly assisted-in preventing too many public clashes at 
San Francisco or at later U. N. meetings. In the main, while continuing 
to object in principle to the authority given to the permanent members 
of the Security Council, the Dominions had little quarrel with the U. K. 's 
own use of its powers and appreciated the need for the U. K. to pay regard 
to Great Power unanimity. 
At the meeting of 6th April, Fraser asked Churchill whether the 
Sponsoring Powers expected the lesser countries to accept the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals as they stood. In reply, Churchill assured Fraser that 
there was no question of attempting to avoid discussion. 
Amendments suggested by the smaller Powers would, of,, 
course, receive the utmost consideration. But the 
overwhelming advantages of keeping Russian (sic) 
in the fold must not be overlooked. 73 
At a later meeting, Evatt asked whether the U. K. was committed to the 
Yalta formula "in the sense that they would be bound to oppose any 
amendment of it at San Francisco. " To this Australian attempt to 
clarify the situation on the veto, Cadogan replied that the U. K. had 
72. Granatstein, Man of Influence, op. cit. , p. 149. " 
(For details of Canadian 
policy at the League of Nations, see P. Wigley, Canada and the 
Transition to Commonwealth: British Canadian Relations 1917-1926, 
(Cambridge, 1977T, pp. 235-238. 
73. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting, 6th April 1945, BCM(45) 4th 
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approved the formula as, a suitable compromise, -but that, it formed,. - 
like, the'rest of. the Dumbarton Oaks proposals', ! 'merely a basis for 
discussion! '. - 
r -ý .ýrýn 
If, `it turned out at San Francisco that' therewas' strong' 
feeling against the Yalta formula, it might be possible 
for the United Kingdom Delegation: to consider their "' 
position further and perhaps to accept some modification 
of it, 14 
Evatt expressed °surprise; at°Cadogan's reply, saying that his Government 
was under the impression that'-the U. K. was'llalmost' irrevocably committed 
to the Yalta formula";, Evatt's scepticism, which was shared by the 
other-Dominions, did not prevent-them from attempting to achieve changes, 
with-limited, success. 
with the statement 
The U. K., -Delegation's report to the'F. O. began 
ý.., 
It can be said that all the'essentials of the`Dumbartow` 
Oaks proposals remain. 75 
So, although some important concessions were won - on the veto, on 
sanction enforcement, on trusteeship, and with the elevation of the 
Social and Economic Council - the primacy of the Great Powers remained 
intact. 
The pattern of Great Powers conducting exclusive discussions 
continued after San Francisco with all its attendant problems for the 
remaining countries, including the Dominions. Immediately after the 
end of the U, N. conference, there was a three Power meeting'at'Potsdam 
which discussed the peace treaties for Germany; Poland and Japan. At 
Potsdam the three agreed to'establish a Council of Foreign Ministers 
in London, which'was empowered to prepare the draft peace treaties. 
Under the provisions'of the Potsdam' conference "Other members will be 
invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under 
discussion "; 6 which left the nature and extent of such involvement 
uncertain. 
r 
74. Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting,, 
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meeting, CAB90/30. 
75. U. K. Delegation, San Francisco, to F. O,., ' 23rd June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
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All the Dominions were eager to"secure a measure of representation , 
on this Council for three reasons. First,., that their contribution to 
the war effort justified it; second, 'that each-had vital interests 
involved in some aspects of the peace arrangements which they wanted 
to safeguard, and third; because they realised that it would be difficult 
to alter any arrangements which were agreed upon by the Council. The 
New Zealand- Government was°quick to question the scope of the Council's 
powers, ' In a telegram of 13th August 1945, it asked to what extent 
the Council would formulate policy and take decisions, and commented 
that from the U. K. 's message describing its task as one of fomulating 
the treaties; it seemed to have authority beyond reviewing, the relevant 
problems 'for. 'submission to a conference of the belligerent nations. 
This'did not accord with New Zealand's view that the belligerent nations 
should all have a voice in the treaties while those nations like 
the Dominions which had made such a great contribution should not---be 
treated in the same manner as those whose belligerency had been ! nominal,. 
77 
The Canadian Prime Minister 'did not limit himself to dissatisfaction 
with the arrangements for the-Council of Foreign Ministers, but attacked 
the basis upon which international-affairs was being conducted: 
I felt at'the°San Francisco Conference that the-preliminary 
settlement between the Great Powers in private meetings of 
matters of general concern before the Conference at--times 
unnecessarily tried the patience of all the more responsible 
smaller countries., We, have been concerned lest-the Council 
of Foreign Ministers should continue the war-time pattern 
through the framing of the peace settlement and into the 
United Nations organisation. It would, for example, be 
Particularly unfortunate in our-view if the operations of the - 
Council of Foreign Ministers, composed as it is of 
representativesý'of states with permanent seats-on the Security--{ 
Council, were to lead to a system whereby the permanent 
Members virtually settled in advance between themselves all important matters coming before the Security Council. 
78 
Australia 
also pressed the U. K. for participation in the Council's 
discussions, 
and Evattstressed to Bevin, its right to do'so on the 
basis of its war effort, as well as its direct interest intmany of--the 
77. New Zealand Government to D. O., 13th August 1945, D035/2014, WR334/3. ý8" Canadian Government to D. O., 28th August 1945, ibid. 
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, detailed subjects. 
79 
Smuts, like King and Fraser, was fully aware 
that ! 'the decisions of the Council may be difficult to ' change' thereafter 
and may, thus determine the Peace Treaty. and'finalisettlement. "80 At 
one of the meetings of Commonwealth representatives-held at the beginning 
of,. the Council's deliberations, the Foreign Secretary was questioned 
; on the exploratory nature of the talks. In reply'Bevin confirmed " 
the fears that if they could not influence the Council at that stage, 
few changes could be gained afterwards. He said. 
the Council'would take no final decisions, but it was to 
be expected that the final settlement would not differ 
materially from the agreed recommendation of the Council. 
81 
which was a most apt description of the by now usual method of reaching 
any agreement in international affairs, although this was to be, short- 
lived.. 
The U. K. encountered difficulties in securing admittance; for"the 
Dominions. In the Council the U. K. opposed the admission'of some 
states unless the Dominions were also allowed representation. ,, By the 
13th September Bevin was reporting to the meeting of Commonwealth 
representatives, that the Council had still failed. to agree on additional 
representation. Bevin assured the Dominions that he would not permit 
any other country to be admitted. unless the Dominions were, and 
suggested that as it was clear that no-one would be allowed admittance 
during the present session, the best way forward was to proceed with 
the draft treaties without consulting anyone, as the public would not 
stomach a breakdown on what looked like a procedural matter. Nicholls 
stressed that South Africa would'stand with the other Dominions on the 
right to be heard, and Evatt said that the problem of associating' 
countries with-the work of the Council would continue'to arise'with°` 
ri 
79. Evatt to Bevin, 11th September 1945, D035/2019, WR334/37; note of. 
meeting 12th September 1945, D035/2018, WR334/19. 
80. Nicholls to Attlee, (enclosing message from Smuts) 29th August 1945, 
D035/2014, WR334/3. 
81. Minutes of meeting of Commonwealth representatives, 18th September 1945, 
D035/2019, WR334/37. 
325 
every peace treaty unless it was settled then, once and for all. 
lie insisted that a new approach was necessary; the, Great Power 
principle had been tolerable`in war-time, but: was not for peace-time. 
82 
Reacting to these statements from-Dominion representatives, ' Bevin 
reassured them that the U. K. supported the Dominions and commented' 
that it was a game of "power politics". 
83 
Some concession was gained 
when the Dominions were permitted representation at the meeting of 
17th September on the Italian-Yugoslavian frontier. However, ' Evatt 
complained that the association was inadequate as it involved "no 
discussion, no consultation and no exchange of views". 
84 
By this 
time the relations between the Great Powers had deteriorated 
sufficiently for the question of Dominion representation to become' 
irrelevant. The Council broke up on 2nd October. " The following day 
Bevin met with the Dominion representatives and declared that he was 
glad that proceedings had broken down. In a remarkable'statement about 
the conduct of negotiations between the major powers he told the 
Dominions he had 
never relished taking over the "Big Three"-idea: of his 
predecessor at Potsdam. Moreover, in the course of the 
Conference world-wide revolt against this narrow conception"" 
had manifested itself. The late general election was, 
in fact, a manifestation of the same tendency, in that it 
was a revolt against the "big one". It had obviously 
become impossible to continue'on that basis. ... To the end 
M. Molotov had expected to get everything agreed by the 
"Big Three" behind the scenes. Mr. Bevin had always refused " 
to meet the Big Three "en trois", and had insisted on seeing 
them separately. "' Now all that business was past and we 
should be able to make a clean start next time on a healthier 
basis. 85 1,, 
If the Foreign Secretary was really so optimistic about the widening 
of consultations in therfuture, he was to be disappointed. 'The practice 
of the "Big Three" and later the "Big Two" holding exclusive discussions 
was destined 'to stay. ` In a'departmental minute Boyd Shannon anticipated 
82. Minutes of meeting of Commonwealth representatives, 13th September 1945, 
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that with the breakdown of the Council, the likelihood was a reversion 
to a system of ad hoc Three Power meetings with occasional U. N. 
conferences. He thought Dominions' reactions to this would vary, 
anticipating Canadian concern at the growing conflict between Russia 
and the U. S. A., while Smuts' suspicions of Russia would receive added 
stimulus. He thought that the Labour Governments' of Australia and 
New Zealand would be perplexed at the U. K. 's failure to agree with the 
Soviet Union, and expected Evatt, for one, to welcome the breakdown of 
a system which had given France and China a privileged position in 
;ý 86 i 1I the counsels of the Great Powers. Sir John Stephenson, Assistant 
Under Secretary at the D. O., agreed that, from a Dominion point of 
view, if there had to be a small inner body, the more selective the 
better. He thought that all the Dominions would prefer a three Power 
to a five Power grouping, as they hoped the former would encourage 
the creation of a larger intermediate body of 15-20 countries on which 
they would be represented. 
87 
At the meeting of 13th September, while Dominion participation 
was still under discussion, Addison had asked the representatives to 
t. 
do what they could to prevent harmful publicity, and commented that 
they must surely recognise that the U. K. was doing its best. 
88 
In 
the main the Dominions did think that the U. K. was doing all it could 
on their behalf. Before the Council met, the New Zealand government 
had expressed confidence that the U. K. would always use its influence 
to ensure that co-operation between the Great Powers would not weaken 
the general co-operation of all nations. King, in a telegram to 
89 
Attlee, had prefaced his criticisms of the Great Powers' private 
consultations with the comment 
86. Minute by Shannon, 2nd October 1945, D035/2020, WR334/40. 
87. Minute by Stephenson, 3rd October 1945, ibid. 
88. Minutes of meeting of Commonwealth representatives, 13th September 1945, D035/2017, WR334/17. 
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You and we are confronted' with a? situation which, 
I imagine, is not much liked by either of us. 90 
The Australian government caused some slight embarrassment to the U. K. 
by making a direct request to Washington concerning its right to 
participate in the Council's proceedings, and the D. O. was very conscious 
of the importance of not giving Evatt a pretext for alleging either 
that the U. K. had not supported Australia's request, or that it had 
been laggard in doing so. 
91 
Contentious press reports followed, 
and Evatt implied that the U. K. had 'lied' in its statements. He 
also described his visit to London as a 2nd diplomatic "fight" he had 
won, when he was of course going at the invitation of the U. K. The 
U. K. High Commissioner in Wellington, Sir Patrick Duff, reporting on 
these instances, said that while Fraser had deprecated Evatt's 
behaviour, referring to it as "unjustifiable", he feared that New 
Zealand's confidence inthe U. K. might have been weakened. 
92 Evatt's 
action should perhaps be viewed as another example of his lack of 
diplomatic tact, and attempts to enhance his own reputation, rather 
than a sign of lack of confidence in the U. K. At the London discussions 
Evatt was persistent in his attempts to gain admittance to the 
discussions, but not antagonistic to the U. K. In a private letter 
to Bevin, Evatt said that 'he appreciated Bevin's "active help in 
this vital matter" and went on to make the unusual request that if 
Australia'was not allowed early representation at'the-Council's meetings, 
he should be associated ' with the U; K: delegation as a special consultant 
93 
so that he could gain'-first-hand knowledge of-these important meetings. 
Su: ch a request was a departure.. from recent Commonwealth practice, , 
although Australia had been less'insistent-than, others', ýsuch, as Canada, 
on the preservation of the niceties of Commonwealth co-operation. The 
reason for"the request probably lay in-the aggressive display made by 
Evatt before he 1eft'Australia, which made him reluctant to return, 
90. King to Attlee, - 28th August 1945, ibid. 
91. Minute by Shannon to Stephenson, ' 24th August-1945, i-ibid., 
92. Duff to D. O., 31st August 1945, ibid. 
93. Evatt to Bevin, 11th September 1945, D035/2019, WR334/37. 
328 
without-even entering one of the main meetings. The U. K. did not 
invite Evatt to associate himself with its delegation. 
, A, conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three major Powers 
was called by Byrnes for December 1945 under the Yalta provisions and 
, held. "in Moscow. There it was agreed that a full peace conference 
should be convened in Paris, tnot later than 1st May 1946, by which 
time the Council of Foreign Ministers would have agreed the text'of 
five draft treaties. In fact it was not until July 1946 that the 
Powers met in Paris,. and the great Powers had not reached full agreement 
on the treaties. There was, however, some measure of accord and the 
three major Powers were pledged tosponsor these provisions at Paris; 
which made it impossible for them to support any Dominion amendments. 
The D. O., mindful of the consistent Dominion criticism of 
exclusive arrangements, learned with displeasure of. Bevin's commitment 
to support the clauses of the draft treaties. In the. words, of one 
D. O. official, the U. K. was placed in the San Francisco position again, 
which as-the D. O. had emphasised, to the F. O., it was-anxious to avoid. 
Admittedly the U. K. would be morally bound even if it had not undertaken 
a specific pledge, 
but we are no longer in a position to give any support to 
amendments desired by the Dominions Delegations in the 
Conference proceedings, except in the secret conclave of 
the Four Powers. 94 
The D. U. made two suggestions; either there should be a , change in the 
Rule of Procedure to amend the requirement for two-thirds majority, 
or an alteration in the timing, so that stages two and three could be 
taken' simultaneously. The latter would allow the U. K. support' the 
Dominions, as the sponsorship did not apply to stage three, the ' 
final drafting procedures. The D. O. thought that the major Powers 
were not comrnittcd to the draft procedures, and knew that Bevin opposed 
them, while Byrnes had reserved to his delegation the right to support 
94. Note on position of Four Powers at Paris Conference, 24th July 1946, 
D035/1213, WR207/7/28. 
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a"responsible amendment of the Rules. The effect of the two-thirds 
majority was that with the four Powers voting together, and the Soviet 
satellite 'states supporting the U. S. S. R., amendments would fail to gain 
the requisite majority. So the D. O. realised that the chance of 
achieving an abandonment of the two-thirds majority was uncertain, and 
that it- was vital that the U. K. should secure negotiations by the 
Council 'f Ministers on the final drafts. The office anticipated that 
it would receive strong support from the U. S. A. on this point, but 
to achieve it the U. K. would have to embark on difficult procedures at 
the beginning of the conference "and without pressure, the Foreign 
Office may be reluctant to undertake them". The position of the D. O. 
was worsened by the fact that Bevin agreed to sponsorship on 8th July 
1946, while the Dominion Governments had been told only a week earlier 
that the U. K. assumed it would not be debarred from supporting amendments 
at the peace conference. The D. O. had no doubt how the Dominions 
would receive the news: 
.ý 
It is, however, perfectly clear that the Dominions will 
have the strongest objections to the rubber stamp procedure 
at present proposed, and it is highly desirable that we should 
not start off the conference with tension between the United 
Kingdom and the Dominion Delegations, which seems to be 
inevitable, if at the Conference our membership of the Big 
Four Club has to take formal precedence over our obligations 
to other British Commonwealth Delegations. 95 
The D. O. accepted that Bevin's acceptance of Great Power sponsorship 
was a final concession necessary to obtain a peace conference at all, 
but it strongly urged that the attempt be made to persuade the U. S. S. R. 
to synchronise stages two and three,, and a Commonwealth campaign at 
Paris to achieve this would at least have the advantage of uniting the 
various delegations in a common enterprise at the start of the meeting. 
Lord Addison wrote to Bevin advising him of the, difficult position with 
the Dominions and asking him to support a Dominion motion to eliminate 
the requirement for a two-thirds majority, and attempt to synchronise 
95. Ibid. 
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stages two and three. In any event, Addison stressed the need to 
have a meeting with the principal Dominion delegates where the position, 
and alternatives, could be fully explained. 
The Peace Conference met in Taris in July 1946 and although the 
D. O. 's predictions of Dominion attitudes were largely correct, its 
worst fears were not'realised. The delegations did discuss the 
voting procedures'and the U. K. must have been pleasantly surprised by 
Russia's concession that amendments passed by a bare majority would 
be considered by the Great Powers, as well as those with the prescribed 
two-thirds majority. King recorded in his diary that he advised a 
meeting of Commonwealth representatives that on important matters a 
two-thirds majority was all right, as against a bare one, "in that I 
doubted if the Big Four would pay any attention to a bare majority". 
King also recorded that Evatt monopolised the whole meeting in a manner 
"which was distinctly rude and unpleasant", and it seems clear that 
Evatt was-protesting hard at the way the major Powers had taken matters 
into their'own hands. King took Evatt to task for his outbursts, 
stressing the importance of making sure the conference succeeded; 
protesting, if they liked, against the extent to which we 
had been circumscribed and not making certain things 
precedents but at all costs keeping Russia in the Conference, 
not allowing her to bring forward fresh difficulties 9gh 
time'-fresh difficulties were raised by our own people. 
Perhaps not . surprisingly,, King gives the reader an impression of the 
wise and moderate elder statesman who appreciated the worldly ways of 
the powerful, - concerned that the conference should meet and that the 
U. S. S. R. should not renege on the few concessions extracted fromýit. 
This latter, aspect was also emphasised by Attlee, who thanked King for 
his helpful comment. 
On the issue of the timing of the Great Powers' consideration of 
96. Mackenzie King Record Vol. III, p. 290 
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amendments, King records that it was Brooke Claxton, the number two in 
the Canadian delegation, who suggested that the Four should consider 
recommendations as the conference went along, rather than waiting 
until the end. He commented: "That seemed to impress the British 
97 
and they are going to try and have it followed". Inasmuch as this 
s, 
was one of the D. O. 's own proposals for enabling the U. K. to support 
Dominion amendments, it is not surprising that the U. K. supported the 
move. Moreover, it is possible that British officials had discreetly 
suggested this to their Canadian colleagues so that it could be put 
forward as a Canadian request. (Brooke Claxton was one of the less 
British-orientated of the Canadian Government and there is irony in 
this if he was prompted to voice a U. K. proposal. ) At the first 
plenary session of the Conference King made this suggestion and the 
Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers did meet periodically during the 
conference to discuss the proposals. 
The Canadian delegation played a modest role at Paris. King ' 
personally found the atmosphere disturbing and the procedural wrangling 
distasteful. He delegated most of the work to Claxton and when he 
returned to Ottawa at the end of August Claxton took over completely. 
Although the Canadians worked hard, they were under instructions. to 
keep a very low profile. King described Canada's role at the conference 
as-one of a commentator, and General Pope, Head of Canada! s military 
mission to Berlin, was told "that at no time and in no circumstances 
should I express a view in the Commission". 
98 
The Paris Peace{- 
Conference was the last great occasion when King represented Canada as 
Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs. In September-1946 
Louis St. Laurent took over the latter office. He succeeded'King 
as Prime Minister in 1948. Under St. Laurent Canadian foreign policy 
97. Ibid., pp. 290-291. 
98. Lt. Gen. M. A. Pope, 'Soldiers and Politicians' (Toronto, 1962), p. 312. 
cited in Ba yrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. in, op. cit., p. 182. 
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was more adventurous and initiating than, under King's leadership. 
99 
This was partly due to the personalities of the two men, but also 
the, result of Canada's being in a 'position by 1947/8 to ; perform a 
more positive part and this was . largely due to the cautious, tentative 
King. 
The part played by Australia at Paris was, infinitely more energetic, 
but"not more effective, than Canada, 's. The Australians, and primarily 
Evatt, formed the most active, delegation, submitting-70 resolutions 
compared with-Canada's 1;. but, most, of theformer's were defeated, 
some by a, -vote of 20: 1. One Canadian recalled that Evatt 
"jarred, 
the sensitivities of many" -, and commented 
Few can be more successfully abrasive than a determined 100, Australian and Evatt was' a past master in giving offence. 
The Peace Conference lasted until October 1946; by then 53 recommendations 
for changes in the draft treaties had been approved by a two-thirds 
majority and 41 by a simple majority. These all went forward to the 
November meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, but 
in all important clauses, the draft treaties remained intact where 
final agreement could be reached between the major Powers. 
The Far Easter 
Australian efforts 
for Japan's defeat 
of Pacific Powers, 
rn peace settlement was dominated by the U. S. A. 
to gain a voice in wartime strategy and the plans 
failed and the U. S. gave no support for a conference 
proposed by Australia and New Zealand at the January 
1944 Canberra conference. America's experience of San Francisco and 
other inter-allied consultations up to 1945 resulted in a greater 
determination to dominate post-war planning in the Pacific. Russia 
provided the principal reason, Following the latter's actions in 
99.. 
_ Dale C. Thomson,, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto, 1967),. 
especially pp. 202-204; J. F. Hilliker, 'No Bread at the Peace Table: Canada and the Eüropean, Peace Settlement, 1943-1947', 
100. 
Canadian Historical Review, 1980, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 69-86. 
EE 
Heeney ed., The Memoirs of A. D., P. 'Heene , 
(Toronto, ' 1972) P. 87; 
ayrs, op. cit., p. 181. (For further impressions of Evatt at the Paris Conference 
and the San Francisco Conference, see chapter 7pp. 374-377. 
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Germany and Eastern Europe and Stalin's virtual repudiation of the 
Yalta agreements, the U. S. wanted to limit Russian penetration 
eastwards, and avert American-Russian tensions in another region. 
The predominance of U. S. troops in the Pacific campaigns, especially 
their deployment in the offensives against Japan, as opposed to the 
'mopping up' exercises, meant that the U. S. was in a very good position 
to dictate terms. A Far Easter Advisory Commission was established 
in Washington, soon superceded by the Far Eastern Commission, which had 
greater powers. All Commonwealth countries, barring South Africa, 
were represented on this and the U. K., Australia, New Zealand and India 
also' had a joint representative on the Allied Council in Tokyo; but 
none of these bodies was very effective in reducing U. S. control 
of Far Eastern policy. The U. K. was content to allow this domination, 
not wanting to antagonise the U. S. and hoping to gain reciprocal support 
for its policies in more crucial areas for the U. K., such as the Middle 
East. 101 
The potential incompatibility of the U. K. 's association with the 
Great Power elite and its membership of the British Commonwealth, was 
recognised by the U. K. and it was anxious to avoid having to make a 
direct choice between the two. On occasions, the Commonwealth cause 
had to be abandoned. The U. K. 's commitment to Great Power solidarity 
and the importance it attached to keeping the U. S. S. R. within the U. N. 
in those early years, meant that on some issues such as the veto, 
the U. K. could vote with the Soviet Union, against a Dominion. Although 
the Great powers did reserve large powers to themselves, and operated 
under exclusive arrangements, relations between the U. K. and the Dominions 
remained generally good in 1945 and 1946. 
It' is probably true that in. some instances the U. K. hid behind the 
101. R. J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australia-American Relations and the 
Pacific War, (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 181-202. (For more details 
on the Allied Council and the U. K. 's policy of not antagonising 
the U. S., see chapter 7. ) 
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cloak of American or Russian opposition to any alteration in the 
conduct of negotiations, expressing sympathy for the Dominion 
viewpoint, while in fact valuing the existing arrangements. Certainly 
the U. S. S. R. 's often implacable opposition to a broadening of 
discussions suited both the U. S. A. and the U. K. in their dealings 
with the smaller Powers. But on many issues the U. K. did give strong 
support to the Dominions as the latter were provided with a considerable 
amount of documentation passing between the Great Powers. (such as 
the papers at the London Council of Foreign Ministers) 
102 
the. Dominions 
could verify U. K. statements against their actions. Moreover, on 
occasions when the U. K. could not support the Dominions, either a 
compromise was worked out, or the Dominions appreciated the reasons 
for the U. K. 's policy and a major breakdown in relations was avoided. 
After 1946 the question of Great Power exclusivity was to some extent 
abated by the increasing hostility between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. 
and U. K. Smuts had always been deeply suspicious of Russia's intentions, 
King was quickly forced into an anti-Soviet stance with the Gouzenko 
revelations, and after an initially pro-Russian policy, Australia 
adopted a vehemently anti-Russian position. New Zealand did not 
have any hesitation in condemning Soviet actions, and supporting the 
western Powers. Thus, by the late 1940s the Dominions were resigned 
to the politics of the Cold War where the Great Powers, especially the 
Big Two, 'still reigned supreme, but not in the same way as at Yalta, 
San Francisco, Postdam or Paris. w 
n 
102. See chapter 7, p. 359. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Practicalities of Commonwealth International Relations, 
1944-1946. 
.., The meetings to 
discuss the peace treaties and the establishment 
of the United Nations had seen some disagreement between Commonwealth 
countries, ýbut on the whole the full expression of these divergencies 
occurred during inter-Commonwealth discussions. Unanimity on policy 
was an ideal to be aimed for, rather than a likely occurrence. A 
crucial factor in both reducing differences and making the Commonwealth 
an-effective group was the co-operation and consultation practised 
before, and during international meetings. The League of Nations had 
seen the birth of international Commonwealth collaboration. All 
member, countries had held a seat in the League Assembly and the U. K., 
plus one Dominion consistently sat on the League Council. At Geneva 
the Commonwealth had begun the habit of joint meetings. As the 
series of conferences began at the end of the Second World War, the 
-Commonwealth continued to-hold meetings, but of a slightly different 
, variety and initially with some hesitation. Several factors affected 
these gatherings: the extent to which the Dominions were determined 
. to assert their individual identities, as opposed to their 
Commonwealth 
membership; the Dominions' aversion to being seen to act as a bloc 
fand thus to risk the hostility of other nations, especially the U. S. 
A.; 
and-the personalities. 
..... After the third conference of the U. N. R. R. A., ` held at Montreal in 
October 1944, the F. O. were shown a copy of a report from the South 
African Minister at Washington on the conference. He described how 
the-U. K., the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. had dominated the proceedings, 
; settling matters behind the scenes; and he also criticised the U. K. 
's 
supply of information to the Dominions. However, he acknowledged the 
difficulties and reminded his Government that the consultations of Geneva 
336 
Jays no longer continued: 
It 
It is wisely thought, with the U. S. A. so strongly in the 
picture now, that such group meetings during conferences 
would lead to unfortunate suspicions;, and the Americans 
are particularly sensitive gn this point. 
" 
In September 1943 Fraser had cautioned Attlee about convening a meeting 
2 
of Prime Ministers in case it antagonised the U. S. A. In May 1943, 
`at the Food and Agricultural Conference at Hot Springs, the Australian, 
New Zealand'and South African delegations had shown a disinclination 
for joint talks, The Australians explained that amidst such general 
agreement group meetings, 'were unnecessary and tended to"give the wrong 
-impression to foreign 'states about the Commonwealth. The F. 0. official 
present'at the conference'1explained it'in terms of the Dominions' 
eagerness to retain their freedom of action and demonstrate their 
independence and Sir Basil'Newton was told by the D. O. that all the 
Dominions were anxious to'avoid collective action änd consultation, 
but-that they-did want direct "discussions' with the U. K. This hostility 
to joint meetings was also' attributed bi'the Deputy Under Secretary at 
the D. O. to a desire'to'ässert and enjoy theirdindependence. 
3 In 
relation to the-Montreal conference it was noted that at the previous 
meetings at Atlantic City and Hot Sp, ings the practice'of having no 
regular Commonwealth meetings was followed, but'it was thought that 
the Dominions' aversion to them"sprang less from a fear of upsetting 
the U. S. A. than from their own reluctance to appear to act as a bloc. 
The F. O. minutes mentioned that S. Holme, ' of the High Commission in 
Ottawa, thought that the'time for such Commonwealth meetings had passed. 
4 
In fact, Commonwealth discussions took place at all three 
1. Report by Dr. Gie (South African Minister to Washington) to External 
Affairs Secretary, Pretoria, 13th. October 1944, F0371/42668, 
W17101/188/68. 
2. Fraser to Attlee, 11th September 1943, War Cabinet Memorandum of 17th 
September 1943, CAB66/41, WP(43)404. 
3, Minutes by P. Grey (Private Secretary to Law) 21st June 1943, and 
Newton, 2nd July 1943, F0371/36607, W11982/188/68. 
4. Unidentified minute, 17th November 1943, F0371/42668, W17101/188/68. 
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ýv ýaý 
conferences. However, these consultations held elements-of tension, 
and, hesitation. The fact that F. O. officials were responsible-for 
collaboration with the Dominions at Hot Springs and Montreal, could 
provide a, partial explanation, because they were-less experienced 
in, Commonwealth affairs. However, Mr., P. s; Grey, who was-at.,, the Hot 
Springsconference, was a firm believer. in Commonwealth co-operation 
and, supported the. D. O. in the face ofd some F. O.. , It. was 
5 
perhaps inevitable that the Dominions would stress their newly found..,, 
freedom, and, be anxious not to appear lackeys of the U. K. Problems 
over the forms of consultation did not, according to Grey, detract 
6 
from, the generally good relations between Conmonwealthrcountries, 
but if the Commonwealth was to function well internationally, all, 
the U. K.. representatives would have to learn, how. to conductýsuch. talks 
differently,. without offending the sensibilities of. the Dominions. 
L I. 
Conversely, the Dominions would have to. decide, whether. to reject; thel 
benefit of joint disucssions for -thetsake of appearing-wholly independent, 
or try, toýcombine such. participation`with a credible national. standpoint. 
The International Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods, in July 
1944, provided the Commonwealth, and: especially. the U. K., with some, 
interesting lessons in joint consultation. - Mr. A. W. Snelling, Principal 
in the D. O., was a member of. the U. K. delegation and wrote. a comprehensive 
report 
. 
on , the conference. It 
began:, 
;-,,; 
.,, _%%, 
This Conference has,,, I think, -done much to demonstrate 
that the countries of the British Commonwealth by no means 
always. speak with one voice and that the Dominions certainly, 
cannot be relied upon to dance to the tune which London calls. 
He even expected some Dominions to criticise the U. K. for not ensuring 
fewer public arguments between the members. Preliminary discussions 
5. Minute by Grey, 21st June 1943. 
F0371/36607, W11982/188/68. 
6. Ibid. , 
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were held with Dominion delegations at Atlantic City and at Bretton 
Woods (the Canadian, Australian and Indian delegations were consulted 
first at Atlantic City) and full meetings with them were possible 
at: the beginning. of the conference. In addition Snelling records 
many-private-meetings between the U. K., especially in the person of 
Keynes, and individual delegations. The problem of fitting in 
Commonwealth talks once a conference was fully launched recurred 
often. - At. Bretton Woods it proved impossible to hold any once the 
question of quotas came up for discussion, but New Zealand was said to 
Th 
be the only one to show any interest in them. 
Snelling-noted that there were remarkably few public clashes on 
major questions, "-and where they occurred they arose from .! 
'fundamental 
divergencies of interest" which he judged no amount of private talks 
would have reconciled. The U. K. 's relations with individual Dominion 
delegations did vary, their success being in his view directly related 
to the,, quality of the Dominions' representatives. Thus, the fullest 
co-operation had been achieved with the Canadians, with whom disagreements 
had only occurred on technical issues "about which two or more views 
could legitimately be held", the poorest with New. Zealand which had 
fielded a weak delegation. 
7 Snelling did suggest that at technical 
conferences-the Head of the Delegation should not be the chief expert, 
as this had proved too onerous a task for one man, and meant he could 
not hold the consultations which were desired. He stated that in any 
event Commonwealth co-operation was difficult whe, the conference time- 
table was grossly overloaded, which meant the Dominion delegates had 
to rely on chance meetings, or interviews booked a long way ahead. In 
a note of optimism he commented that such meetings were more fruitful 
the better the delegates., knew-each other: 
7. For further details of individual delegations, see pp. 372-380. 
.. ý,. ý.. "w. 
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luckily there are now a number of regular Dominion 
conferenciers whom a good many U. K. officials have met, 
so it is to be hoped that each successive gathering will 
be more successful from this point of view. 8 
I I- 
He suggested that the D. O. representative concerned with Commonwealth 
liaison should not be committed to secretarial tasks as well, as 
these impinged on the former. 
At the International Aviation Conference of November 1944 in Chicago, 
disagreement between the U. S. and the U. K., and strict instructions 
from London to the U. K. delegation, created difficulties for Commonwealth 
consultations. The members of the Commonwealth arrived in Chicago in 
broad agreement on aviation policy, having met in October 1943 in 
London and October 1944 in Montreal to discuss it. At Chicago 
differences between U. S. and-U. K. policy soon became apparent, 
especially over the "fifth freedom" concerning the right to pick-up 
r9 
and disembark passengers anywhere on route. Agreement looked remote. 
Canada adopted the role of mediator, eventually producing a partial 
compromise. While these three powers held separate talks the U. K. 
kept the other Dominions informed of their progress. The Canadian 
delegation did not attend any of these Commonwealth meetings, but 
Shannon noted that as the Canadians disagreed with aspects of the U. K. 
policy "their presence might have been embarrassing". He also thought 
that some of the Canadian delegates were opposed to Commonwealth 
meetings. 
9 
Cranborne had not been aware, and was displeased at 
hearing, that the U. K. was primarily responsible for the absence of 
the Canadians. He regretted this as he thought 
such meetings should 
not merely impart information, but also 
8. Report by Snelling on Bretton Woods Conference, 31st July 1944, 
D035/1216, WR254/1/40. 
9. Minute by Shannon, 5th June 1945, and report by Shannon 'Relations 
between the United Kingdom and the other British Commonwealth Delegations' 
at Chicago, D035/1236, A341/5/65. 
340 
to concert a United Empire policy. For that purpose, 
it was important that the Canadians shd be present, 
and I feel, that, by our action in excluding them, we, 
have given them a genuine grievance. 10 
r .. 
Shannon was generally cirtical of the U. K. delegation's imperfect 
co-operation with the Dominions, and commented 
if-consultation is to be more than a formality, they 
(the Dominions) expect some account to be taken of their 
views, and at least an explanation of the"reasons, when 
their views are rejected. The mere 'apse dixit', even 
of. the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is not enough. 
ll 
f- - Whereas-the U. K. may have thought that Commonwealth solidarity 
was even more important when it was in opposition to the U. S., (and 
it certainly resented the closeness between the Canadian and U. S. 
delegations) the Dominions all disliked having to side with the, U. K. 
against the U. S., and as the-U. K. objections to U. S. 'policy did not, 
win the-inner conviction of any Dominion they found it difficult, - 
to give the U. K. unqualified support,, at least in private conversations. 
Shannon-added at the end of his-summary of the conference that the 
outstanding feature was the strong desire of the Dominions and'India 
for "mutual , agreement and co-operation" between the countries of the 
British Commonwealth and the United-States. 
12 A further aspect which . 
complicated Commonwealth relations was the order given or the 
conviction-held, byýLord Swinton, 'the Head of the U. K. delegation, 
to keep, strictly to his brief and alter the policy only on direct 
instructions from London. This resulted in sometimes swift-and 
unexpected-changes in U. K. policy which caught the Dominions by surprise, 
and at times publicly espousing a different point of view, which they 
thought-was the U. K. 's position. 
Cranborne minuted: 
n 
10. Minute by Cranborne, 14th January 1945, ibid. 
11. Report by Shannon on Commonwealth relations at the Chicago conference, 
op. cit.; ibid. 
12. Summary by Shannon of Chicago conference, undated, ibid. 
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One gets the impression that it was unfortunate that Ld. 
, 
Swinton was not given a freer hand. He felt that, he was 
tied by his instructions from London, & we in London 
were unaware of many of the detailed facts of the constantly 
changing position ... We should bear this in mind for future international, & inter-imperial conferences, held 
outside this country. 13 
The Chicago Conference was unlikely to have furthered the U. K. 's relations 
with the Dominions, as Machtig noted on 9th January, 
14 but an irrevocable 
break with the U. S. A. was avoided and the U. K. at least seemed to learn 
from the experience some of the problems involved in post-war co- 
operation, and did so before the first major conference at San 
Francisco was convened. 
In August and October 1944 the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R. and the U. K. 
had met at Dumbarton Oaks, with China replacing the U. S. S. R. for the 
latter meeting, to produce a set of proposals for the future world 
organisationP The governments of the Commonwealth corresponded by 
telegram and through their representatives on these proposals, and 
prior to the conference in San Francisco where all the United Nations 
could discuss them, the Dominions were invited to send delegations to 
a meeting in London. The representatives who arrived in London in 
April 1945 were of varied rank. It was not a Prime Ministers' meeting, 
although all had been invited. Fraser and Smuts did attend but Curtin 
sent his deputy Forde, and his External Affairs Minister, Evatt. 
Massey led the Canadian delegation, but Hume Wrong, of the External 
16 
Affairs Department, tended to dominate the discussions for Canada. 
Although quite substantial differences between the members of the 
Commonwealth arose during the discussions, the meeting was judged a 
success in terms of the fullness of the talks, the willingness of the 
13. Minute by Cranborne, 14th January'1945, ibid. 
14. Minute-by Machtig, 9th January'-1945, ibid. 
15. For arrangements for the 1945 meeting see D035/1479, WC60/35, and 
Prem4,31/6. 
16. For list of delegations to the May 1945 meeting, seeCAB99/30, 
"List ofVisiting Delegations". 
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delegates to listen to alternative viewpoints, and the ` generally friendly, 
atmosphere. No-one suggested that the Commonwealth should be jointly 
tied to a common policy on all issues; the meeting was designed to 
l7 
minimise differences by prior discussion, not to force a consensus. - 
"4, 
Recognition of divergent opinions formed an important part of Commonwealth 
discussions as it allowed the members to reassess their policies-and 
if necessary prepare for public disunity. A member light`then abstain, 
rather than vote against 
Ja 
proposal which it knew was supported by 
the others, or explain why the Commonwealth had been'unable to agree 
on a particular policy. 
The U. K. sent a strong delegation to San Francisco. Eden records 
his determination to make sure of this, and his request to Churchill 
that it should include both Attlee and Cranborne. In addition there 
was Halifax, the U. K. Ambassador in Washington`, junior Ministers from 
all parties and top officials, including the PUS of "the F. O., Cadogan. 
In ä minute to Churchill, Eden requested Cranborne'partly because he 
knew the issues well, but'also because he would be"able t"o'assist'Eden 
in collaborating with the strongly represented Dominions. 
18 
Cranborne's 
absence from London required other arrangementsto'be"made at the''D. O. ' 
andwhe stressed to Churchill that while his PUS and±Parliamentary " 
Secretary, Machtigand"Emrys-Evans, could cope with the`day to day 
running of the department, a replacement was required specifically to 
represent the Office in the Cabinet, to chair the meetings with the 
High Commissioners, and be available for consultation if any critical 
matter arose. He recommended that Mr. Law, Minister of State at the 
F. O. should deputise for him as he would be attending the Cabinet für 
Eden's absence, and knew the foreign issues well. Perhaps Law's 
17. At San Francisco Evatt did complain, at one point that policies agreed 
to in London. were not being followed, but the U. K. denied that any 
common policies had been agreed to. See p. 351. 
18. Minute by Eden to Churchill, 8th March'1945, Prem4,31/7. See also 
The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning (London, 1965), p. 528. 
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persistently perceptive interest in the Commonwealth was another 
factor in Cranborne's choice. 
19 
Eden and Attlee could not stay at the conference for its duration; 
as senior Ministers their presence was missed in London and Churchill's 
decision to'call an election in June added urgency to their early 
departure. Cranborne, however, did remain at San Francisco. Eden, 
in a telegram of 30th April cominente2 favourably on Cranborne's' work 
with the Commonwealth delegations'and advised Churchill to appoint 
him as number two in the delegation to Lord Halifax when he and Attlee 
left, -'rather than asking Smuts to lead'it. Eden thought Smuts would 
refuse anyway on principle, and because he was fully occupied. 
with the chairmanship of one of the commissions. Later, Halifax 
also spoke highly of Cranborne's work at the conference:? 
C 
To assist 
Cranborne with inter=Commonwealth' co-operation Mr. B. Cockram, the 
'D. O. 's representative-at Washington, was-`assigned to San Francisco 
and Cranborne's'Private Secretary, Mr. 'Clark, also attended. The 
'flexible and practical arrangements for\Commonwealth discussions worked 
'well on the, whole. 
The Commonwealth partners held meetings between Heads of Delegations 
and their senior officials. The Dominions were represented by top- 
level teams, much the same as those which had visited London at'the 
beginning of the month, with the addition of King and other leading 
Canadians`. " (King could only stay in San Francisco until the 14th 
gay 
because of the Canadian General Election, but he did return for the 
closing ceremony. ) Cockram, reporting to the D. O. of the early 
discussions with the Dominions, described the relations with the Dominions 
as "admirable": 
19. Cränborne minute to Churchill, 16th April 1945, D0121/10A, No. 112. 
20. Eden to Churchill, 9th May 1945; Churchill to Eden, no date, 
Halifax to Churchill, 27th May 1945, Prem4,31/7. 
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C) 
there is every' indication that a's a result of, the talks in 
London all'of them are doing their very best to be as helpful 
and co-operative as possible. 21 
In addition to these gatherings, there, were informal talks between 
delegates and officials in committees whenever, advisable, and, separate 
talks every other day between Cockram and leading. Dominion officials. 
These consisted of Robertson, Wrong, Pearson and Escott Reid-(Canadian 
Delegation); Watt and Bailey (Australia).; 
- 
McIntosh (New Zealand), 
and Forsyth, Smut and Jordan (South Africa)., Finally, Cranborne, -,;. i.,. 
Cockram and Clark gave a number of dinners to Dominion personnel to, 
promote harmonious personal contact. To keep the delegations in touch 
with communications outside San Francisco, the additional arrangement. 
of sending the Dominions category ! D! trtelegrams, 
(read out to the High 
Commissioners in London) was organised. They appreciated this. 
22 
When the Dominions submitted their amendments to the Charter, Cockram 
and his colleagues decided that it was necessary, "if there was to be 
any degree of co-operation", for them to be classified and then sifted 
by the officials to judge which needed to be considered by the Heads 
of Delegations. It became apparent when trying to arrange, meetings of 
senior officials that the pressure of committee work was making ,,, -,, - 
Commonwealth consultation difficult. In the event they had. to. meet. 
bi-laterally, having failed to find a_time convenient for. all. 
3- 2 
Conferences of such size easily became bogged, down in bureaucratic 
procedure; Delegates worked under pressure, being required-in their 
countries. Moreover, the schedules did not_aliQy for extensive meetings 
between particular groups of delegates, although the, practice did become 
more common. It was perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Cockram 
informed Sir John Stephenson, Deputy, Under Secretary at the D. O., that-... 
21. Cockram to Machtig, 28th April 1945,0035/1884, WR208/261. 
22. Ibid., 'and Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, ibid. 
23. Cockram to Stephenson, 15th May 1945, ibid. 
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arrangements (for consulting the Dominions) had begun to, 
creak badly under the strain of the-three'or four conference 
--'committees a day to which nearly all the Dominion delegates 
and officials were exposed, and which left them little or 
'-no time to consult with the other members of their own 24 
delegations, let alone the other Commonwealth delegations. 
He said that he had tried to overhaul and tighten-up the arrangements, 
in consultation with his fellow officials. Commonwealth delegates on 
committees were reminded that they could suggest joint meetings at'any 
time, and that they should keep their opposite numbers informed of 
their plans. Dominion delegates were empowered to take the initiative 
in calling for Heads of Delegation meetings. The result of'these'new 
arrangements was reported to be good, with the leaders of the delegations 
meeting about every other day, and close co-operation occurring in the 
committees. As for discussions between the Commonwealth officials, 
Cockram told his colleagues that he would be available in his office 
at certain hours for them to meet and exchange information.,.,, He told 
Stephenson that 
somewhat to my surprise, knowing how little, time; they, 
had, the plan of Dominion officia13 calling on me in 
the morning has worked admirably. 
For the U. K., Cockram was complementing Cranborne's efforts, with the 
leaders of the delegations by expending considerable time. and. energy 
at the-official level, and his success-is demonstrated by the. co-operativeness 
of the other delegations. . Nor was co-operation merely a. matter. _of 
the 
U. K. 'holding bi-lateral or-multi-lateral talks with the Dominions. King's 
diary records meetings between him and other Dominion leaders, without 
the British, and John W. Holmes remembers that at all meetings after 
the war the, contact between officials from the Dominions was frequent 
and extensive. 
26 
Australia provided one exception to otherwise successful collaboration 
24. Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Mackenzie King Record Vol. II, pp. 385-386; author's interview with 
Professor Holmes, 15th November 1979. 
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among the Commonwealth countries. As at London, its delegation was 
headed by Forde, the deputy Prime Minister, and Evatt, Minister for 
External Affairs, with Forde the nominal leader. From the official 
minutes of the London meeting it is difficult to gauge the tenor, 
as opposed to the substance, of the talks. Australia strongly 
supported the U. K. on some aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, 
and opposed it on others - in this it resembled the other Dominions. 
The crucial factor was Evatt's personality. Despite his obvious 
abilities, 'he was an abrasive and domineering character. Before the 
London meeting Cockram had written to the F. O. predicting the attitude 
of the Dominion delegations; on Australia's he wrote that it was 
likely to be disunited and split by personal ambitions, predominantly 
because of Evatt, 
Dr. Evatt's tendency to suspicion of things British may lead 
him to take an unco-operative attitude on others, and much 
will depend on the relations established in London with 
Mr. Forde. 27 
and from San Francisco Cockram was to report many difficulties in 
dealing with him. 
n 
Forde's initial speech indicated that Australia would act 
circumspectly, on matters where Australia differed with the U. K., but 
Evatt's own actions soon proved otherwise. On 15th May Cockram 
reported that Evatt was the "biggest thorn in the flesh" of all the 
Commonwealth countries' through 
t 
. ti 
27. Cockram to Jebb (F. 0. ), 20th March 1945, D035/1891, WR208/2/28. 
(The Counsellor at the Australian Legation, Mr. A. Watt, who was 
a member of the Australian delegation to San Francisco presumed 
that Forde was sent to act as a brake on Evatt. He says that 
although Forde gave the opening speech, it was drafted under 
Evatt's supervision and thereafter "Evatt simply ran the show", 
and represented Australia on all the important committees. A. Watt, 
Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt, (London, 1972), p. 62. 
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his attempts to deal with all questions himself, to 
consider that Australia is being let down if he does 
not obtain immediate and unquestioning support for 
every suggestion which he makes, whether it be dictated 
by the genuine interests of Australia, the platform 
of the Australian Labour Pa. ty, or the prestige of one 
of its representatives at San Francisco, 28 
and his tactlessness, which appeared to most people as' rudeness; On 
the 2nd JuneACockran reported further difficulties with"kvatt"väs'he 
became disgruntled when most'of the inordinate number of amendments 
he tabled were dismissed. He managed to antagonise almost all the 
other delegations. 'On one day he had first'set the` Great Powers'"'` 
against him, then upset Belgium and the Netherlands, followed by'the" 
Arab States, the Jews and the Latin American countries. 
29 
A serious problem which had arisen by'the'first week in"June-was 
Evatt's opposition to`his officials' attending joint Commonwealth talks. 
Cockram explained that the arrangement whereby he was available`to see 
officials in his office would help Australian officials, as they could 
attend "without the suggestion of attending a meeting". The'split 
within the delegation becomes more a'ýparent'with hi's comment 'that Forde 
and the'unofficial+a'dvisers continued tobe c'o-operative and friendly, 
as were all but a -few officials. The letter'of 2nd June also records 
an apology from Cockram'for losing his temp rand arguingwithEvatt, 
although there i; s`little'indication of any genuine remorse from Cockram; 
30 
Two weeks later Evatt`was described by him'as ' 
playing his'own hand throughout, -'without paying ` an Y 
more heed to the success of the Conference as a whole 31 z-e 'than he has to the interests of the British., Ccmmonwealth. 
The U. K. delegation's' telegram to the F. O. reported on the conference 
and relations with the'Dominions again highlighted the divisions within 
the Australian team and Evatt's own behaviour, describing him-as-hasty"" 
28. Cockram to Machtig, 28th April 1945 and to Stephenson, 
D035/1884, WR208/261. 
29. Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Cockram to Stephenson, 16th June'1945, ibid. 
15th May 1945, 
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and suspicious", demanding full support from other delegations''but 
feeling under little obligation to reciprocate. 
32 
Cadogan's personal 
opinion of Evatt was that he was "the most frightful man in the world", 
who made long tiresome speeches, advocated the wrong thing "with a 
view to being inconvenient and offensive" to the U. K. while advancing 
his own cause. But he added that by then, the end of May, everyone 
hated him and consequently his stock had fallen to the point where " '" 
33 
he mattered much less. 
Certainly Evatt had provoked other delegations too. An early attack 
on the Pan American States for their attitude to Chapultepec had aroused 
the fierce opposition of all the American countries and led to a State 
Department comment that while Evatt headed Australian foreign affairs 
there was no chance that the U. S. would support it'for membership of 
the Security Council. This led Cockram to describe Evatt as the 
"generally mast disliked man at the Conference", who had lost most of 
the respect still held for him among his Commonwealth colleagues; 
which he thought a shame since Evatt did possess great-ability and a 
At diligence which could have made him an invaluable colleague. 
3k 
one point Truman spoke to Forde about Evatt's behaviour, -stressing toi; - 
him the need for good American-Australian relations which were not 
being facilitated by Evatt's behaviour. 
35 
Robertson failed to control his anger after receiving a note from 
Evatt at the end of a vote in a committee, in which Evatt asked how 
King would like to hear in the Canadian press that Canada had just voted 
against full employment. - This led-Robertson to remark that while 
he had often known Commonwealth collaboration, he had never previously 
32. U. K. Delegation to F. O. Pt. II, 23rd June 1945, ibid. 
33. D. N. Dilks ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 
(London, 1971) entry for 23rd May 
, 
1945, p. 745. 
34. Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
35. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VI, No. 486. 
(C. Thorne suggests that Australia's failure to gain access to 
high-level councils through its wooing of the U. S. A. in 1941-43, 
led Evatt to adopt a blustering approach to the U. S. C. Thorne, 
Allies of a Kind: U. S.. Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-1945, 
(London, 1978), p. 712. 
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experienced Commonwealth blackmai1.36 (King's antipathy towards. 
Evatt can be seen from his relief that Evatt had decided not to 
visit Canada at the end of the Coiference. 
37) However, " others 
considered Evatt's role at San Flancisco impressive. Pearson 
described him as 'the public defenderrand belligerent champion of 
the smaller states and said his refusal to compromise made him'the 
hero of many delegations from the smaller states, 
38 
and Holmes comments 
that "the redoubtable Herbert Evatt hollered his way to some considerable 
influence", 39 
Some Australia rs`had'reservations about Evatt's tactics. The U. K. 
High Commission in Canberra reported a`feeling that the'role of leading 
the small states had not gained for Australia as much as might'be"ti 
imagined, and that his method of negotiating had possibly left an' 
40 
unfavourable impression' which could rebound upon Australia later. 
The U. K. delegation lamented that the Dominions were sometimes 
too ready to. register opinions at' variance with those of the U. K., and 
give other powers the impression of disunity within the organisation. 
However, it was understood that'the Dominions wished to demonstrate that 
they were not mere ciphers of the U. K. Snelling1s report from Bretton 
Woods had seized upon this feature, 
41 and Cockram from San Francisco 
said that all the Dominions had at times registered votes in the 
opposite sense to the U. K., either because they felt their decision to 
be right,. or to make their independence known. In his view such votes 
had not mattered and there was 
36. Cockramto Stephenson, 2nd June 1945,0035/1884, WR208/261. 
37. Mackenzie Kin Record Vol. II, p. 431. 
38. L. B. Pearson, Memoirs 1897-1948: Through Diplomacy'to Politics 
(London, 1973), p. 277. 39. J. W. Holmes, The Shaping of the Peace: Canada and the search for 
world order. 1943-1957 Vol. I, p. 44. 40. Monthly Report from the U. K. High Commission, Canberra, 11th July 1945, 
D035/1119, G579/49. 
41. Report by Snelling on`Bretton Woods Conference, 31st July 1944, D035/1216, WR254/1/40. (see p. 337. ) 
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a lot to be said for thereasoning`of the Dominion'delegations, 
particularly at a Conference in the United States where the 
suspicions are strongest. 
Interestingly Cockram records that during the conference he only once 
had to exert strong pressure. This was'an occasion where New Zealand 
had tabled an amendment for all members to resist aggression against 
one member, and there had been a real danger that the Sponsoring Powers 
would be defeated over it. ° Guessing that 'Australia would support it, 
and sensing that the others might, Cockram'spoke to Canada, South 
I- I 
Africa and India, and, persuaded them. The result, with the amendment 
just failing to attain the 2/3rds majority needed, indicates his success. 
42 
As the conference progressed, most of the Dominions became more 
amenable to co-operation with the U. K. ''McIntosh (New Zealand) and 
Forsyth (South'Africa) told Cockram that'as the Dominions had proved 
their freedom of action, and the conference was reaching its vital 
stages, they would use their acquired reputation for independence to 
support unified Commonwealth action. Canadian and Australian officials 
apparently concurred,, although the-latter were worried' about their 
ability to take part. in- joint talks. ' After one evening at.. the,,., 
conference when Evatt in, particular was dissentingstrongly, Halifax 
called all the leaders of the delegations together and "uttered, some, 
43 
reproaches". He conceded the Dominions' desire to demonstrate their, 
independence, but warned against the appearance, of disunity,, - and asked -== - 
them to appreciate the problems of the U. K.; which if it, were to retain 
its place with the U. S. S. R. and U. S. A., and exercise. influence. with them, 
needed the. Commonwealth. 
44, 
With regard to Halifax's worries about disunity,, Smuts thought they 
had done a great public service by dispelling the illusion that. the 
Commonwealth would mean six votes for the U. K. He rested content with 
the knowledge that while it was uncomfortable' for friends to disagree, - 
42. Cockram to Stephenson, 16th June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
43. U. K. Delegation to F. O., 23rd June 1945, pt. II, ibid. 
44. Minutes of meeting between Commonwealth representatives, 18th June 
1945, ibid. 
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they were united on major issues. Evatt was less happy, and accused 
the U. K. of being the cause of the disunity by its failure to carry 
out the conclusions reached at the London meeting. He maintained 
that this had occurred on seven or eight separate issues, and while 
appreciating the problems of Great Power solidarity, 'felt'that some' 
officials had adhered to this too slavishly. Cranborne pointed out 
to Evatt that no conclusions had been reached'at London', -that-it had 
been a meeting for the exchange and explanation of views, and that at 
San Francisco-the U. K. had tried to keeprpominion views in mind. The 
British were possibly surprised to hear a Dominion delegate asserting 
the existence of a common policy, _and 
the, Canadians no doubt alarmed. 
Where 
, 
Evatt annoyed the U. K. -most was 
in repeating at a press 
conference during the last week of the conference, the allegation 
that the U. K. had departed{from agreed conclusions. Cockram's only 
comment on this episode was to quote from Mrs. Trollope's "Domestic 
Manners of the Americans" thus, 
The veracity of newspaper statements is perhaps, nowhere 
quite unimpeachable, but if I am not greatly'mistaken, there 
are more direct falsehoods circulated by the American 
newspapers than by all the others in the world, and the one. 
great and never-failing source of these voluminous works 
of imagination is England and the English. 45 
Halifax reported that his admonition had a temporarily good effect, 
but that the meeting also provoked' criticisms about the U. K. delegation. 
Fraser complained about the attitude and behaviour of some members 
of the U. K. delegation, specifically Mr. D. Foot and Mr'Mabane, 
parliamentary delegates, and Professor Webster, 'who had been seconded 
to the F. O. He described Foot and Mabane as treating the remarks of 
Dominion-representatives "with lofty-superiority even when they were 
not engaged in a ceaseless campaign to defeat them". * He added that,, 
none of the three had ever attempted to consult Dominion colleagues 
during the committee sessions, and considered that Professor Webster 
45. Cockram to Stephenson, 23rd June 1945', ibid. 
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should never. be allowed to represent the U. K. internationally again. 
He' assured the meeting that these criticisms did not, apply to the 
D. O. officials, and paid tribute to the care with which Halifax and 
Cranborne had heeded the interests of the Dominions. Evatt joined 
in the tribute to the latter two, but commented that the F. O. " officials 
'too'often appeared to think that'the Dominion delegations 
should be seen but not heard. 46 
Support for the U. K. came from N. Robertson of Canada, who, while,, 
. 
admitting that some unpleasant incidents could have, been avoided, said 
that he had found co-operation on the official level excellent and 
reminded Fraser of the U. K. 's handicap with. so few of its officials 
remaining, and their need to consult with the other Great Powers, as 
well as the Commonwealth. Hume Wrong supported him with the comment 
that the practice of submitting. every, question-to the Great Powers for 
clearance had put an intolerable strain on the U. K., and had undoubtedly 
hampered complete Commonwealth agreement. 
The report of this meeting, which was attended on the U. K., side 
only by Halifax, Cranborne, Cockram and 
. 
Clark, was sent to the D. O. 
by Cockram with the comment 
for obvious reasons it. ought not to go to the Foreign, Office. 
47 
A month later the D. O. received a letter from StephenHolmes, of the 
British High Commission in Ottawa, referring to the report of the_ 
meeting and Cockram's letter. Holmes informed Stephenson that the 
High Commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald, believed the matter should be 
brought to the attention of the F. O. 
46. Minutes of meeting between Commonwealth representatives, 18th June 1945, ibid. (For further comments by Evatt about Webster, see P. Hasluck, Diplomatic'Witness" Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941-1947, 
(Melbourne, 1980), p. 26; Dingle Foot's only criticisms of Evatt 
was that he could not delegate and kept other delegations waiting for him äs a consequence. See article by Foot in the Canberra Ti_, 11th July 1970. Quoted in Watt, op. cit., p. 64. ) 47. Cockram to Stephenson, 23rd June 1945, D035 1884,, WR208/261. ý. c 
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Hefelt, and feels, 'it particularly, important,, from the, 
point of view of the future co-operation between the 
--members of the Commonwealth at Conferences Sand elsewhere, that the opinions expressed - by Mr. Fraser in particular - 
regarding the uneven quality of. the United Kingdom 48 
delegation should be heeded and the lessons learnt. 
Holmes added that he personally tended to agree with Fraser as to the 
unsuitabilitz of Professor Webster in a delegation which had to maintain 
close contact with the Dominions, while not disputing Webster's qualities 
and qualifications. The matter does not appear to have been taken up 
with the F. O., or at least not officially. Stephenson minuted that 
as Webster had left the F. O. for good, and Foot and Mabane had lost 
their seats in Parliament, he did not feel in the circumstances it 
right to raise ill feeling by broaching the matter with the F. O. No 
further action is recorded. 
49 
The criticisms of Professor Webster are perhaps not too difficult 
to understand; at least from the ctyle in which he wrote up his own 
diary it is easy to imagine that he possessed a measure of confidence, 
even arrogance, which the Dominions officials and Ministers baulked at 
in the British. However, it is also clear from his diary that Webster 
appreciated better than some U. K. personnel the need for the Great 
Powers to make concessions to the Dominions and other small Powers 
and warned his colleagues of the risk to the successful establishment 
cP 
of the U. N. if Canada and Brazil did not accept the proposals put forward 
by the Four. As for Evatt, like many Webster recognised his ability 
while reacting violently against his personality: 
He was the ablest of the statesmen of the smaller powers - 
and a really malignant man. He, obviously hates us,.. .,,. This egot Wical and ambitious Australian has overplayed 
his hand. 
a 
{ 
48. -S. Holmes to . Stephenson, 21st July 1945, . ibid. ?,,,, .: ý-. .,, 49. Minute by Stephenson, 1st August 1945, ibid. (In fact Webster was 
kept on at the F. O., as. special adviser. to the Minister of State and 
in January 1946 participated in discussions with Dominion officials 
about the election to the Security Council. Sei'D035/1887, WR208/325. ) 
50. P. A. Reynolds and E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles 
Kingsley Webster and the United Nations 1939-1946, (London, 1976), 
pp. 40,51 & 72. 
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:. " Cockram's; original letter to Stephenson was seen'by the High` 
Commission in Ottawa because he kept that office informed of the' 
developments at San Francisco, and copied to it some of his letters 
to the D. O., It is not clear whether or, not-he did the same in 
the case of the other High Commissions, but it seems that he did not. 
The proximity of Canada and the important role of the Canadian 
delegation may have been the reason for this extensive supply of 
information. Canadian journalists were also given preferential 
treatment. Cockram informed the D. O. that Marett (D. O. Information 
Office in Canada) had continued to keep in close touch with the 
Canadian press, and had also received a request from Australian journalists 
asking for guidance and information, as they got little from their own 
representatives. Cockram referred to it as an occasion for "helping, 
but also for caution". Marett did provide the journalists with 
information, but Cockram comments that by giving them only factual 
information, and avoiding regular meetings, they had kept them on 
the same footing as the American press and hoped to avoid any criticism 
from the Australian delegation. The explanation for this uneven 
treatment of the Dominion press seems to lie in Marett's position. 
While the U. S. was served by the British Information Service, the 
Dominions each had their tiwn Information Officer. Marett was posted 
in Canada, but had gone to the San Francisco conference, presumably 
to assist the Canadian journalists, and had no official brief with 
regard to the other delegations, 
51 
With the United Nations established in June 1945, the major issue 
to conclude was that of the peace treaties with the Axis Powers. It 
was agreed at the Potsdam Conference, of July-August 1945, that a 
Council of the Foreign Ministers of the five., Creat Powers should be.. -_"-- 
51. For details of the D. O. 's press and information division, see Rt. Hon. 
Lord Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-1968 (London, 1978), 
pp. 169-170. 
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established to prepare the ground work for the treaties. The Potadnm 
Protocol also specified that in addition to the five, who would 
participate with those treaties referring to the countries with whom 
they had signed surrender terms, * 
Other Members will be invited to participate when matters 
directly concerning them are under discussion. 52 
It was under this rather'loosely worded clause that the Dominions hoped 
to gain' representation at'the meetings'of the Foreign Ministers. 
The U. K. '-'anticipated opposition from the U. S. S. R. ' and the U. S. A. to 
Dominion attendance, and the D. O. was worried that if the U. K. pushed 
too'härd for wide ranging Dominion participation, "the result might 
be none. The Secretary of State'for Dominion Affairs met with the 
Secretaries of State for India and the Foreign Affairs to discuss 
the question of participation'aid als'3 consultation with theýDominions 
over`'the 'terms"of'the treaties: I'l In a'letter to Bevin,, Addison 
referred'to the problem of getting Prime Ministers to visit London 
för talks. "Following so'soon after the-San Francisco Conference he 
doubted if Smuts'or Fraser'could"leave'their`countries, 'or if Chifley, 
having`been in power -onlyýafew weeks, would leave Australia. With 
the Canadian Parliament due to'meet shortly, he'did not think it likely 
thät'King-would attend. "' 'At the'meeting on 21st-August, 'Bevin stressed 
'hi's desire to getwthe support"of the Dominions for U. K. proposals, 
''although he'realised that-there'were some divergencies of view. While 
making 'a"geIneral, point'about improving consultation, he commented 
that` if the Dominions wantedýto enjoy the advantages of-belonging to 
t he 'Commonwealth' they had to fall in line with the general policy of the 
U. K. '' He wanted to speak with 'the whole moral support. of the Commonwealth 
behind him. " He suggested that the U. K. should either raise the issue 
with them as a matter of,, constitutional procedure - the desirability of 
52. For the'Potsdam Conference, see E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy 
in the Second World War, (London, 1962), pp. 540-573. 
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closer co-ordination ofýpolicy - or by telling the Prime Ministers , 
of particular problems which affected the vital interests of the' 
Commonwealth. Addison preferred the second course, pointing out 
that as a matter of, "course the Dominions would be informed of current 
problems and, the U. K.! s views; The Cabinet agreed that existing 
machinery was inadequate to ensure that the U. K. could speak at the 
Council with"ttie full'support of the Dominions, and discussed 'whom it 
should invite for consultations. Addison noted that if they asked for 
high-ranking delegates Australia would probably send Evatt, which he 
did not think would be--desirable. 
53' 
Ministers agreed that the Dominion 
Prime Ministers should be told that the U. K. would try to ensure some 
Dominion attendance at-the Council when matters directly concerning 
them were discussed, that they would be sent U. K. proposals for the 
treaties and that the U. K. was anxious to present a united Commonwealth 
front at the Council. The Prime Ministers would therefore be asked 
either to give their High Commissioners special powers to commit their 
governments, or send special representatives to London so that a common 
policy could be pursued at the Council. 
54 
- The Dominions, especially Australia, pressed hard for full 
participation at the Council. The D. O. felt it unwise to ask for too 
much on their behalf, and Addison told Bevin that a F. O. draft on this 
matter was not specific enough on the subject of issues directly 
concerning the Dominions; he thought it wiser to ask the minimum the 
Dominions considered necessary, so as not to prejudice their chances 
of participating altogether. The D. O. thought that the minimum would 
be for Australia, and if possible New Zealand and Canada, to join the 
53. In a letter to Bevin of 17th August 1945, Addison wrote that he thought 
"in the present circumstances" Evatt's presence in London would "not 
really help matters". Addison to Bevin, D035/2013, WR332/2. 
54. ' Minutes of meeting between Bevin, Addison and Pethick Lawrence at 
F. O., 21st August 1945, D035/2014, WR334/3. 
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deliberations, on the Japanese treaty, and Far Eastern matters, generally; 
for South Africa to participate when the Italian colonies were discussed; 
for any Dominion, to be called when a topic of direct'. interest', was under 
consideration. An example of., the latter was given as Canadian, 
Australian and New Zealand participating in the Italian peace settlement, 
the-former country because of. its contribution to the'Italian war, the 
. latter two because of'their interest in the sea route through-the -- 
Mediterranean. 
55 
:,, - -0n -25th August a , telegram was sent from Attlee" to the: other-Prime 
Ministers in which the importance to the Commonwealth of the issues 
to+be discussed was, -stressed: 
"I am anxious therefore that"there should be the-fullest and, 
most effective consultation between us in the hope that on 
all major issues at any rate we may succeed in establishing- 
an identical point of view. 56 
The necessity for this was underlinec-, by his prediction that the Russians 
would prove to be harbouring expansionist notions, and that the U. S. A. 
would not always resist them strongly enough. The right of the Dominions 
to be included in the Council's deliberations was repeated and 
Attlee promised that the U. K. would press strongly for this, but could 
not do so until the Council met. The leaders were told of the U. K. 's 
desire to extend consultations, and asked either to come to London 
themselves, or send representatives who could speak on their behalf. 
The Dominions, eager to gain some measure of representation at the 
Council, 
S7all 
agreed to discussions with the U. K., although the status 
of the representatives varied. King replied explaining that neither 
he nor any of his colleagues could leave Canada with the Parliamentary 
session about to start. He again expressed his satisfaction with the 
55. Addison to'Bevin, 21st August. 1945; and minutes"by Stephenson, 15th 
& 16th August 1945, D035/2013, WR334/2. 
56. Attlee to four Dominion Prime Ministers, 25th August 1945, D035/2014, 
WR334/3. . 57. See chapter, 6, p. 323ff. 
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existing channels of communication, and added that neither he, nor 
any other delegate could speak on behalf of Canada without consultation 
with the Cabinet. . If Canada was to 
be allowed representation on 
the`Council, King promised tosend someone suitable; otherwise it was 
left to the, Official Secretary at Canada House, Mr. FrederickýHudd, 
to consult with the U. K. Government. 
58 
' Smuts replied that he could, 
not attend himself and that 'it would be difficult to spare a Minister. 
He decided to shelve the matter for-the moment until they knew, if - 
South-Africa would be allowed representation, but in the intervening 
period the High Commissioner, Mr. Heaton Nicholls, would be kept fully 
informed-of South Africa's. attitude. 
59 Fraser likewise could not 
leave New Zealand. In the event the Acting High Commissioner in 
London, Mr. R. M. Campbell, took part in the discussions in London. 
60 
The exception to this official level of representation was Australia, 
which, as Addison had feared, sent Evatt. " While there was support: for 
the Dominion desire to gain entry to the Council, the U. K. must have 
joined-in Fraser's deprecation of Evätt's description of his visit to: 
London as a second diplomatic "fight" he had won, when, as_Fraser 
observed, he had been invited by the U. K. 
61 
As the opening'of the Council's session approached and the. level 
of Dominion representation in London was established, Addison and Bevin 
decided that information to the Dominions about the Council's activities 
should take the form of an initial meeting with the Dominion representatives 
to outline the procedure by which the U. K. delegation hoped to attain 
Dominion involvement, the despatch of daily telegrams to the Dominion 
Governments and daily meetings with the Dominion, representatives. 
62 
Addison agreed to show the Dominion representatives all the Council. - 
58. King to Addison, 28th August 1945, D035/2014, WR334/3. 
59. Nicholls to Attlee, 29th August 1945, ibid. 
60. Duff to D. O., 31st August 1945, ibid. 
61. Australian Government to D. O., 27th August 1945,; Duff to D. 00', -'31st 
August 1945, ibid. 
62. Report of meeting between Bevin and Addision, 7th September 1945, 
D035/2019, WR334/37. 
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papers, but stressed the vital importance of discretion. '" (When °= 
Addislon raised the matter with Bevin, the latter replied'that he 
did not want to be officially consulted; Addison should'use his own 
judgment. )63 Meetings at theD. O. between Dominion representatives, 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and D. O. and F. O. officials, 
were convened between 10th September and 3rd October 1945, by which time 
the Council had broken up in disagreement. In December 1945 Byrnes 
proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Yalta provision for 
periodic meetings. This took place in Moscow where attendance was 
restricted to the Ministers. of the Three Major Powers and the'Dominions 
had to rely on the existing channels of communication between C, onwealth 
Governments for information. 
The Paris Peace Conference which was supposed to settle the Peace 
Treaties with Italy and the minor European Powers did not meet until 
July. Prior to this the U. K. invited Dominion Prime Ministers to 
London to discuss the Paris proposals, and Commonwealth defence liaison. 
King was unable to leave Canada before 19th May because of Parliamentary 
and Provincial discussions and by that time Chifley had returned to 
Australia, although Evatt did remain in London. 'Fraser was-unable. 
to attend but sent his deputy, Nash. Smuts attended. The London 
discussions were rather different from those of 1945 inasmuch as 
there were more discussions between two or three nations and fewer 
sessions of all delegates. Nor was this just because-of King's late 
arrival; Australia and New Zealand were more interested inidefence 
liaison with the U. K. than were South Africa or'Canada. Some talks- 
were therefore confined to these two countries and'the-U. K. 
King liked the arrangements for the 1946 meeting, preferring. the 
more informal, discursive style. It would be untrue to say that in 
" 63. Meeting of Commonwealth represg1tatives, 13th September 1945, and 
rest of file, D035/2017, WR334/17. 
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1946 the British were not trying to reach agreement between all the. 
members, or that in the past they had been demanding a common policy 
on all issues. King, for one, seemed to have accepted. the fact that, 
the U. K. was no longer illicitly trying to push through centralist, 
schemes. Ile records in his Diary that at one meeting he had said 
how good the conference was because it enabled them to receive 
information which they could pass on to their colleagues and other. 
states and also make representations to the U. K. and have "British 
policy take them into account". 
64 
Perhaps one reason why King seemed to feel more at ease in 1946 
was the change in Government in the U. K. On hearing of Labour's 
victory at the election of July 1945, King wrote in his Diary, 
To me it is a relief also in that at Imperial Conferences, ",,,, ,.. I know I will not have to be bucking centralized Imperialism 
again. 65 
King knew many of the leading members of the Labour Government, - either 
through their membership of Churchill's National Government, or through 
personal contacts over the years. The Liberal Party in Canada stood 
nearer to the British Labour Party than to the Conservative. However, - 
the principal reason for King's satisfaction at the change of Government 
lay in his undying, though vastly exaggerated, opinion that all Tories 
were deep down old-style imperialists. There was in fact very little 
difference in the attitude of the two parties towards the Commonwealth, 
except in'Hrelation to India. The Labour Government too wanted close 
collaboration with the other Commonwealth members-v because it was 
recognised as a necessary for the U. K., not for any particular ideological 
reasons. Bevin's comments to Addison and Pethick Lawrence (India 
Secretary), 'before the 1945 London Council of Ministers - that he wanted 
the-'support of the Dominions and they should provide it if they were to 
64. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. III, p. 227. 
65. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. II, p. 446. 
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enjoy the advantages of the Commonwealth 
66- 
reflected Eden's awareness 
in 1943-45 of the U. K. 's need for the Dominions and was, if anything, 
less tolerant'of the Dominions' freedom of action than some' Conservative 
Ministers had been. ""Although B d'vin never quite phrased this sentiment 
in the same terms when addressing the'Dominions, in some respects the 
Labour Government could be tougher with Australia and New Zealand 
precisely because it was a 'Labour' Government as were theirs, and 
also with=Canada because it was no longer possible for the Canadians" 
to view U. K. actions as 'a Tory imperialist plot. King apparently' 
had a particular liking for Attlee and found him easier to do'business 
with than Churchill. He had known Addison for some time, and was 
said to have found him a 'homey' character. 
67 
Their correspondence 
indicates`a'relaxed, friendly relationship. '"'`' 
Smuts was the one ' Commonwealth leader who regretted the change of 
government. " He described the election result asa "political debacle", 
greater than that of 1906, and was pessimistic about the consequences 
in foreign affairs. ` There 
the hand of'Churchill was most visible and his 'influence ' 
in the world enormous. No one can predict what the absence 
of his dominating position and prestige may have on British 
policy and British influence. It may be far reaching. 
68 
He thought the new Labour Government would be no check on the "wild career" 
of the U. S. S. R. By August 1945 he was expressing his disappointment 
with the results of the Potsdam Conference (which discussed the future 
of Germany) and attributed this to the absence of Churchill. 
69 
In 
September 1947, Smuts was depressed about the internal situation in 
the U. K. and the state of world affairs. He thought Churchill's 
loss had made the U. K. leaderless, a fact which had rebounded on the 
Commonwealth, Europe and the world. 
70 
Smuts was not sympathetic to 
Labour's domestic policies and had been a close friend of Churchill 
66.. See p. 355. 
67. Author's interview with Professor J. W. Holmes, 15th November 1979. 
68. Smuts to M. C, Gillett, 29th July 1945, Smuts Papers Vol. VI, No. 675. 
69. Woodward, op. cit. pp. 540-573; Smuts to M. C. Gillet, 10th August 1945, 
Smuts Papers Vol. VI, No. 676. 
70. Smuts to D. Moore, 3rd September 1947, Smuts Papers Vol. VII, No. 760. 
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and many of his Cabinet. However, it does seem that he was blaming 
the Attlee government for a situation which was inescapable, whoever 
had won the 1945 election. 
The delay between the London and Paris meetings made difficulties 
for some of the Dominions. 
71 Nash (New Zealand) protested that'they 
should not have been brougtt together until they knew the date of the 
Conference and King noted that he was satisfied at having delayed his, 
arrival in London. As it was he could travel back to Canada and go on 
to Paris in July, but Nash returned to New Zealand and Fraser told the 
ý''"`' U. K. High Commissioner that as he and Nash had spent so much time't' 
abroad that they could not go to Paris. Instead he sent the Attorney 
General, Mr. Mason, and the ex-High Commissioner to the U. K., 'Jordan. 
72 
Smuts and Evatt led the delegations of the other two Dominions. At 
Paris the Commonwealth followed its usual practice of holding, meetings 
between the Heads of Delegations, and between officials, as\well as 
other bi-lateral talks and social engagements.. 
73 If the Paris-Conference 
failed to settle all aspects of the Peace Treaties and brought into 
relief the schism between the U. S. A. and the U. K. on the one hand and 
the U. S. S. R. on the other, it was satisfactory from the point of view 
of inter-Commonwealth consultation; although once again Evatt bombarded 
the conference with amendments, most of which were defeated, adding 
thereby to his reputation for forceful, but undiplomatic behaviour. 
74 
The German settlement was left almost exclusively to the Great Powers, 
(except China). In October 1943 at the Moscow Conference nference a European 
Advisory Commission had been established to make recommendations for' 
the termination of hostilities, terms of surrender and occupation of 
Germany; and at 'Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in July-August 1945, 
the Great Powers discussed in greater detail Germany's future. By the 
71. Mackenzie Ki 
72. Duff to Machtcord Vol. III, p. 225. 
73. Mackenzie Ki 
i8,26th July 1946, D035/1213, WR207/7/40. 
74. Holmes Record Vol. III, Ch. 9. 
' 'pit., p. 114. 
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end of August the Allied Council of Germany had been established with 
representatives of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., the U. K. and France. 
75 
The absence of any effective Dominion participation in the workings 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers resulted in their having virtually 
no influence over the future of Germany, although they occupied a 
privileged position inasmuch as they were kept well informed by the 
U. K. of developments. 
The Far Eastern settlement produced an interesting experiment in 
Commonwealth collaboration. In October 1943 the U. S. agreed to the 
establishunent of a Far Eastern Commission with the task of formulating 
policy to fulfil the Japanese surrender terms. This replaced the Far 
Eastern Advisory Commission and although this new Washington body was 
responsible for formulating policy on Japan, the interpretation of 
its decisions and their translation to McArthur remained exclusively 
the perogative of the U. S. A. 
76 
There was also an Allied Council 
established in Tokyo to advise the Supreme Commander, and while the 
two commissions contained representatives from Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. wanted to restrict the Council 
to the four major Powers (excluding France), which meant no room for 
any Dominion representation. Eventually the U. S., aware of Australia's 
demands for representation, suggested that the British Commonwealth 
should be allotted one seat, rather than the U. K. This raised again 
the question of corporate representation which had been rejected in 
connection with the U. N., and is an interesting reflection on the 
U. S. A. 's understanding of the Commonwealth. 
Canadian reaction to this was predictable. In a memorandum to 
King, Hume Wrong enclosed a draft telegram to Massey on the U. S. proposal, 
noting that on his own initiative Pearson had already voiced Canadian 
75. Woodward, op. cit., pp. 450-452,480-481,492-493,540-542. ' 
76. R. J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australia-American Relations and the 
Pacific War (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 198-200. 
'_Fý' 
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objections in Washington and advised that the Government should record 
its opposition at once. King noted on the file "I am wholly opposed". 
Massey delivered Wrong's telegram to Addison. It called the proposal 
"misleading, conveying an inaccurate impression of the British 
Commonwealth relationships". Any joint representation must be 
specified by name to avoid giving the impression that the association 
as a whole was being represented. Bevin, in Moscow, thereupon 
77 
opposed the American proposal and put forward an alternative form of 
phrasing which was duly accepted. 
78 
Canada's principal concern, Massey 
explained, was that to have one Commonwealth representative would 
prejudice Dominion chances of individual representation in the future, 
as the U. S. S. R. was thought likely to invoke the occasion as a precedent. 
79 
On 8th January Addison replied to Massey's letters, explaining Bevin's 
actions in Moscow and the reasons for joint representation - Australia's 
eagerness to participate and the subsequent requests from India and 
New Zealand to also be part of the mission. Addison thought it unlikely 
that the incident would be used as a precedent for Canadian or 
Australian representation on a wider body, and pointed to acceptance 
of the new phraseology suggested by Bevin. 
80 
Massey had proposed in 
his second letter that the U. K. send a formal protest to the U. S. A. 
about its suggestion. Officials in the D. O. minuted that this could 
not be done without approaching the other Dominions, and doubted its 
advisability. They observed that the Canadian government could 
express its view to the U. S. directly, even when not informed directly 
from Washington, and that the U. S. 's proposal owed a great deal to 
Evatt's insistence and would therefore be difficult to object to. 
81 
Massey was told by Addison that the U. K. did not feel it could lodge 
77. Memorandum by Wrong to King, 7th December 1945, enclosing telegram. 
MG26 J 4, Vol. 237, File 2346, pp. C159847-C159848; Massey to Addison 
10th December 1945, D035/2037, WR335/51. 
78. Minute by J. M. C. James (Assist. Principal) 31st December 1945, ibid. 
79. Massey to Addison, 27th December 1945, ibid. 
80. Addison to Massey, 8th January 1946, ibid. 
81. Minutes by James & Shannon, 31st February 1945, ibid. 
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k, 
a protest, but was assured, with the F. O. 's concurrence, that the 
correspondence would-be sent to Halifax in Washington in case ai 
similar . situation arose, again. 
South Africa, had no desire to be. represented, on, the Far Eastern 
Commission-or the Tokyo Council and made no comment, on the arrangements. 
New Zealand's attitude underwent, a, change. In November 1945 it had 
telegraphed the U. K., mentioning the idea of setting up, a Council. 
and saying that}if, it was established Australia ought to be included 
and that the Commonwealth should not be treated as a unit. 
82 However, 
by January 1946, New Zealand requested that it be, represented by the 
joint-delegate too. ti*tý... F: F' 
It was agreed that Australia. would provide the., joint representative 
on the Allied Council, which was to be the first time a Dominion had 
acted on behalf, of. the U. K.; a reflection of the elevation of the, 
Dominions, the 
, more, equal character of 
Commonwealth relations and-the 
important, place Australia was to occupy in the defence of. the, Pacific. 
However, the U. K. was not, enthusiastic about the Australian Government. 's 
choice, for the. appointment. - Evatt nominated Mr. Macmahon Ball, 
previously Australia's representative in Indonesia, but he was not...,,., 
to the liking of Addison or Bevin. Bevin wrote to Addison expressing 
his doubts about-Ball's suitability, primarily because he had., not 
sufficient rank or diplomatic experience, and said, all heýhad, heard 
about Ball made him dubious, of his capacity to represent, the four 
governments.. He added that this was a new experiment for the, Commonwealth, 
and one which-he wanted to succeed, which made. it. all the more. -important- 
that the right individual should be chosen. 
83 
The Permanent Under- 
Secretary, at the D. O., Sir Eric Machtig, concurred with. Bevin's 
to 
84 
opinion and advised Addison that Ball would be a "very poor choice. 
Addison then suggested to Mr. Beasley, the new Australian High 
82. New Zealand Government to D. O., 9th November 1945, ibid. 
83. Bevin to Addison, 26th January 1944, D035/2038, WR335 34. 
84. Minute by Machtig to Addison, 26th January 1946, ibid. 
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Commissioner, that Mr. Keith Officer would be more acceptable to 
the U. K. (Officer had been stationed in London in the 1930s, before 
being posted to the U. S. A., and was popular with practically all U. K. 
personnel concerned with the Dominions -a fact which tended to reduce 
his value in Evatt's eyes. ) Beasley undertook to mention the idea 
to Evatt, and later told Addison it had been rejected., The Dominions 
Secretary asked Attlee to telegraph to Chifley, saying that as it was 
a"joint appointment the U. K. was entitled to insist that its interests 
were entrusted to someone in whom it had confidence. The draft 
acknowledged that Ball was experienced in Pacific affairs, but stated 
that-the U. K. attached great importance to the post and considered a 
wide knowledge of the world and diplomatic experience essential. 
85 
Attlee hesitated, because he thoughtC'this might make Evatt even more 
stubborn; and suggested that he wrote a personal note to Evatt. 
86 
Addision disagreed, because he thoughtthe D. O. had done all it couldA 
through Beasley and the only chance lay in a personal appeal to the 
Australian Prime Minister. He did not want to make a precedent of an 
appeal to Evatt as it might embarrass Chifley and make Evatt even more 
difficult to deal with in the future. The draft was altered to read 
that Attlee hoped neither Chifley or Evatt would mind his direct approach. 
87 
The telegram was sent but produced no change in the appointment. "'' 
The appointment of Ball did not prove a success; whether this 
was primatily due to Ball or to Evatt is uncertain. Ball received 
his instructions from Evatt, who was responsible for co-ordinating policy 
with the other three countries. 
88 
By April 1946 the U. K. heard that 
85. Minute Addison to Attlee, 6th February 1946, enclosing draft telegram, 
D0121/10C. 
86. Minute by Attlee to Addison, 6th February 1946, D035/2038, WR335/54. 
87. Minute by Addison to Attlee, 7th February 1946, `D0121/lOC; Attlee'to, 
Chifley, 15th February 1946, D035/2038, WR335/54. (MacArthur's 
reaction to the appointment of Ball was similar to the U. K. 's, 
according to the U. K. Liaison Mission in Japan, see telegram to 
F. O., 27th February 1946, ibid. ) 
88. 'Instructions to Ball' Noten D035/2039, WR335/64. 
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Ball wasattempting to'act as mediator between the U. S. A. and the 
U. S. S, R, and was critical of MacArthur. The British government felt 
" disturbed at 'this, for it did not want to antagonise the U. S. A. over 
Japan' and did 'not consider that Ball should mediate. It expressed 
this`viewto Evatt, explaining that' U. K. -'U. S. collaboration was so 
important the U. K. ' was not prepared to be committed to a policy of 
mediation in the Far East which'could'fail and might cause friction 
with' the U. S. A. "` Evatt "reassured the' U. K. that the Australian government 
'-did not approve and had"`privately warned Ball of the dangers of mediation. 
89 
However, Evatt apparently told Ballfwhen he was'first appointed to 
"take adistinct ly Australianline, even if it annoyed MacArthur and 
his'staff". 90 ý Whether Evatt gave counter-orders after the U. K. 's 
protest'is unclear, but! 'it has been suggested, that, his behaviour towards 
Ball was just one example of Evatt's, disloyalty to, his staff, and that 
Evatt's visit to Tokyo in July 
, 
1947. when. he publicly praised MacArthur's 
efforts was a repudiation of Ball who had, been acting under his 
instructions. 91 Throughout 1946 and 1947 relations between Ball and 
MacArthur deteriorated to the grave dissatisfaction of the U. K. and, 
especially the F. O. Which, the D. O. thought, had never been entirely 
happy about the representation of British interests.. by an. Australian. 
92 
The U. S. A. determined from the beginning not to allow, the allied-Powers 
much of a voice in the Japanese settlement, mainly because it, wanted 
to exclude the U. S. S. R.. from this region. Thus, the importance of, _, 
this experiment in representation derived not so-much from its effect 
89. D. 0. to Australian Government, 16th April 1946, -'and'rest of file, D035/2041, WR335/75; see also D035/2040, WR335/70 and D035/2044, 
;,. WR335/ 1° 90. K. T 
107. 
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on policy but from its example as ,a mode of,. Commonwealth collaboration. 
In this context the U. K. regarded it as an episode never repeated. 
Ball himself described the work of the Council as "on balance a 
failure and at times a fiasco". 
93 
At the 1946 and 1947 sessions of the United Nations the, Commonwealth 
representatives continued the practice of meeting, together,, to discuss 
policy, and exchange views.., >Cadogan, who had at times shown-. impatience 
with, the Dominions generally, commented favourably on Commonwealth 
meetings after he went to the U. N., as the U. K. 's chief representative.,. 
LIn-contrast to the discussions with the U. S. S. R., which Cadogan found 
wearisome, in the Commonwealth meetings he encountered a,, welcome and 
different atmosphere. 
;. Respect, and goodwill prevailed; serious arguments were 
heeded even when agreement could not be reached. 94 
The Commonwealth countries' precise status and function as a group of 
nations within a wider organisation were mainly established by trial 
and error, with the Dominions wanting both to make their mark and to 
co-operate with their partners for the greater benefit of all. The 
internal relations of the Commonwealth and its general position as a 
recognised grouping were predictably challenged by the elections to 
the Security Council. The Charter had provided for six non-permanent 
members of the Council to be chosen with regard to their potential 
contribution and their geographical position, 
9S 
a qualification which, 
owed its origin to the Dominions, especially Canada. All were potential 
candidates, particularly Canada and Australia. 
The F. O. and D. O. thought that Canada had the stronger claim to 
a seat, especially in light of its participation in the atomic discussions, 
but also knew that Australia would put itself forward, and that the other 
Dominions thought they should all support the latter even if it-were not 
93. Bell, op. cit.,, p. 202. 
94. Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, op. cit.,, -p. 787. 95. U. -N. Charter chapter 5, Article . 
23, clause 1. 
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successful. 
96 
. On, 21st December", 1945 D. O., and F. O. officials met with 
Dominion officials to discuss the. candidutures. The U. K. 's 
representatives read out its full list, which mentioned Canada and 
notýAustralia, and explained that theythought Canada, as the senior 
Dominion,, could make an important contribution to peace. When the 
other Dominions raised' Australia's candidacy, including Massey who 
said Canada, would welcome Australia also on the Council,, Addison, said 
he thought it impossible-that. two Dominions would be elected, adding 
that: even`if they were it would leave them ineligible fora time afterwards, 
which could create a gap in Commonwealth representation. He suggested 
that, Australia withdrew and put. itself up next time when it could receive 
the-support of'all. 
97 
Australia had no intention of, standing'down,, - 
' 
as can'be seen from, an aide memoire from Evatt to Bevin which the High 
Commissioner delivered on'-9th January.; It stressed -Australia'sý, a, =i 
contribution and geographical, position, +and said Evatt would welcome the 
U. K. 's support. 
98 
The other Dominions were divided over this. issue,, 
with Fraser stating that New Zealand would not oppose Canada or stand 
itself, but felt bound-to, support. Australia, as a Pacific nation..,., - 
South African and Indian, officials were concerned that if both stood, 
neither would get in, 'and an; F. O. official explained how difficult it 
would be for the'U. K. to back both. 
9 
-. In-the elections there was a 
9 
tie between the two-Dominions, ý, resulting in , Canada's standing 
down 
and allowing Australia-to go-through. 
, There was'no-doubt as"to the claims of both , #nd; 
the U. K. -wanted 
to continue--, as far as possible the Geneva practice. of: having"one-Dominion 
on the Council, ', -- It=was- probably correct,. to -assume in . 1946 , that the: , 
other nations especially the Latin American and Soviet. groupings, 
96. Minutes by Shannon, 19th November'and 12th December 1945, 'D035/1887, 
WR208/325. 
97. Minutes of meeting at'D. O. ', 21st December 1945, 'ibid. ' 
98. Aide memoire from Evatt to Bevin, -9th. January_1946, 
ibid. (The D. O. 
did not like Evatt approaching the F. O. directly, see notes in file. ) 
99. Minutes of meeting at D. O., 9th January 1946, ibid. 
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would . not' permit more than two Commonwealth members to sit 
on the 
Security Council'simultnneously, and to support both Dominions'-would 
mean the withholding of support from another country'it favoured; 
Presented`with'a, choice between Canada and Australia the U. K. ' was 
always likely to'prefer the former, not'so much because of its'greaterr 
potential; ' although the atomic discussions did perhaps give ii'an 
edge,, but because`of Australia's performance'at past international 
meetings, 'and the respective calibre of the officials. This is 'not 
specifically`stated'as`a reason for 'preferring'Canada, 'but`it'is'; 
perhaps not-too fanciful to, assume that Australia was to some extent 
paying the-price7of Evatt's behaviour over the'previous'years. Nor, '-' 
as we shall see; were relations between the two countries"otthe Security 
Council always smooth. ` In'March'1946 Cockram reported that Fraser 
had 'told him that had he'known the quality of officials which Australia 
would send to the Council he would not have voted for-it. 
100. 
Election difficulties were renevid in late 1946 with the news that 
India`was-seeking election to the Security Council when one of the 
original one year seats became vacant. '(These had`been established " 
to ensure mid-tern re-election to the Council. ) The D: O. repeated" 
the-view that it would"be-impossible to'have two members of the Commonwealth 
on, the Security Council, and had reservations about` supporting India. 
That would be'to throw away a vote. It would mean forfeiting any 
prospect of attaining 'an agreed list with the U. S. A., which they "needed 
to get New Zealand voted on to the Economic and Social Council, and 
would weaken the case for a solid Commonwealth front in the-future. 
The"D. O. was also'concerned about Canada'"s position. "After Australia" 
had been elected the U. K. had given its promise of support to Canada 
when'the former's term of office was over, and an intervening attempt 
byti'``± 
101 
India, if backed by the U. K., could prejudice solid support for Canada. 
100. Cockram to Stephenson, 28th March 1946, D035/2000, 'WR261/9. "' 
101. Minute by Shannon, 25th September 1946., D035/2001, WR261/25. 
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s 
The U. K. 's response to India's application was affected by India's 
position within the Commonwealth and its uncertain future. Thus 
the India Office were very keen to give the fullest support to its 
wishes, while the D. O. was more concerned about the interests of the 
Dominions. 
102 After protracted discussions within the U. K. government 
it was agreed that the, U. K. should support India in the 1947 election 
but that if it did not win a seat it would fulfil its commitment to 
support Canada in 1948, when Australia relinquished its seat. India 
did not secure election in 1947, and in 1948 Canada took up Australia's 
vacated seat on the Security, Council. 
Such incidents illustrate the inherent problems for the Commonwealth 
when its members were devoting as much effort to demonstration of their 
international standing as to furthering the interests of the group. 
Rivalry between members was not new, especially between Canada and 
Australia, and would continue. But it did not threaten the unity 
of the association, and was in the main restricted to inter-Commonwealth 
discussions. The elections of the first few years also show the 
problems the Commonwealth was to incur from other nations' perception 
of them as a definite grouping. Initially the Dominions had not'been 
keen to continue the Geneva pattern of one member holding a rotating 
Commonwealth seat on the Council. C4nada, for one, had ambitions 
to hold a seat more than once a decade, ýand*both Australia and India 
were confident of their right to play a substantial role in the maintenance 
of peace. 
103 However, it became clear that withtithe U. K. holding a 
permanent seat, the other nations would not allow more than one Dominion 
to be elected. With the growth of regional voting patterns at the U. N., 
geography and political alliances became recognised `criteria for- 
choosing candidates, and the Dominions did not easily fit into geographical 
102. Unidentified minute, 25th September 1946 and Pethick-Lawrence to 
Addison, 10th October 1946, ibid. 
103. Holmes, op. cit., pp. 265-268, for discussion of Canadian ambitions re. 
the Security Council. 
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regions, or become spokesmen for them. Thus although Canada was 
an American country it was outside the pan American Union and the 
organisation of American States established in 1948, and representation 
was accorded to Central and Southern American states. Nor did 
Australia or New Zealand, as countries of western population and 
culture, win the sponsorship of Asian and Pacific nations. The 
Commonwealth was a , geographical oddity, but was regarded as. -an: 
interest group, and had to accept that this perception of, itself would 
be. reflected at elections. 
I 
In his report on Commonwealth co-operation at Bretton Woods, 
Snelling concluded that 
the closeness of the co-operation with individual Dominion 
Delegations, and their satisfaction at the attitude of the 
U. K. representatives towards them, tends to vary directly 
with the quality of the Dominion personnel concerned. 104 
While this statement absolves the U. K. from any blame in failures to 
co-operate and relies on the subjective judgment of U. K. representatives 
as to the ability of others, it provides one explanation for the variable 
closeness and success of Commonwealth co-operation. 
The fullest collaboration existed between the U. K. and Canada, 
and throughout the series of conferences the calibre and performance 
of the latter's representatives, especially of its officials, were 
praised. At Bretton Woods the Canadian delegation was said to have 
contained some of the most competent technicians, and earned the praise 
of all delegates. Snelling described the occasion as having again 
demonstrated that Canada was fully aware of the responsibilities of 
its new status as an "almost-Great Power", and proved that it possessed 
fi 
the officials with the "breadth of vision and intellectual development" 
105 
capable of enacting that role. , Recognition of 
Canada's position 
104. Snelling's Report of Bretton Woods, 31st July 1944, D035/1216, 
WR254/1/40. 
105. Ibid. 
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and capabilities was reflected in its appointment as chairman of the 
supplies committee of U. N. R. R. A., with the right to sit on the Council 
whenever that subject was under discussion, which was almost always, 
and its hosting the third meeting of 'the Council in Montreal, in October 
-- 
1944,106 At the Chicago Conference Canada played an important mediating 
role, which led Adolf Berle, the U. S. Chairman, to give special mention 
to it in his closing remarks. Co-operation with the U. K. worked less well 
at Chicago, despite the presence of a capable delegation and thorough 
preparation. ' This conference led to certain frustration on the part 
107 
of some Canadian officials when on later occasions they were unable 
to enact the same role, not because they were incapable, but because 
they were squeezed out by the Great Powers' dominance which had been 
absent on that occasion. Canada's performance at the meeting also 
aroused a degree of jealousy from the other Dominions, especially 
Australia, and this reflected a subdued but persistent rivalry between 
the two, internationally and within the association, 
108 
U. K. -Canadian co-operation flourished at San Francisco. Cockram 
frequently reported the helpfulness and co-operation of the Canadian 
delegation and recounted its active role on the preparatory committees, 
explaining that by limiting its amendments to those which were practicable, 
and by preparing the ground with other delegations well beforehand, it 
had usually achievedits ends. 
109 
The U. K. Delegations's report referred 
to the Canadian Delegation as one of the "strongest and ablest" teams 
at the conference, one which had a genuine concern for the welfare of 
the organisation and had worked closely with the U. K. 
110 
Pearson records 
that the delegation, under the strong and positive direction of St. Laurent 
and with the tacit, if sceptical, acquiescence of King, played a more 
106. Pearson, Memoirs 1897-1948, op. cit., pp. 250-255; Holmes,, op. cit., 
pp. 33-44. 
107. See chapter 6, pp. 297-98; Holmes, op. cit., p. 66. 
108. Report by Shannon "Relations between the United Kingdom and the other 
British Commonwealth Delegations" at Chicago, D035/1236, A341/6/65. 
109. Cockram to Stephenson, 28th June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
110. U. K. Delegation to F. O., 23rd June 1945, ibid. 
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dynamic role at San Francisco than at other-international conferences; 
because the Canadian Parliament and government, were prepared to accept 
commitments for peace and security. 
lll In the first few years of 
peace Britons and Canadians worked, closely together-. in friendship 
and, more importantly, mutual , 
trust., On the Canadian side. one official 
recalls that collaboration with the., British from Chicago onwards was 
very close, despite some policy differences,. and, that, it was then that 
the residual Canadian fear of British centralist schemes was finally 
laid to rest. 
112 
To a certain, extent the, U. K. 's relations with Australia were 
determined by the behaviour of Evatt. Ne dominated Australian foreign 
policy, _and 
frequently led his, delegation at conferences.,,, Even,, when. he did n, 
the representatives received strict instructions, and enjoyed little... -;. 
leeway in negotiations. This was so at Bretton Woods and caused 
difficulties for the Australians and other delegations. On that. occasion 
it was not until the very last, minute that the Australian representatives 
were permitted, to sign the Final Act, despite the, fact it was not binding 
upon governments. This , reprieve, apparently 
led some. delegates, to 
quote from Luke 15: 7, 
there will be greater joy in heaven over one sinner who 
repents than over ninety-nine righteous people who do not 
need to repent. 113 
Some clashes of personality between the Australians and British occurred. 
At Bretton Woods Snelling reported that Professor Keynes and Mr. Melville 
had not got on well, although he. personally found Melville and the 
other Australian representatives "extremely co-operative". 
114 
11 
At San Francisco relations with Evatt tended, to be stormy., öt, 
The U. K. did not always appreciate 
, 
the, forthrightness of many Australians, 
and it took Cockram some time, and a little courage, to learn. that. on 
111. ` L. B. Pearson, 'Forty Years On: Reflections on our Foreign Policy', 
International Journal, 1967, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 357-363. 
112. Author's interview with Professor J. W. Holmes, 15th November 197.9. 
113. Snelling's report of Bretton Woods, 31st July 1944, D035/1216, 
WR254/1/40. 
114. Ibid. 
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the whole Evalt respected and took notice of outspokenness, rather 
the more normal British habit of subtle understatement and polite 
fencing. Cockram, referring to an occasion at San Francisco when 
he answered Evatt back, explained that he was not so worried as he 
might have been about his slip in decorum, as "experience had shown 
that rudeness equal to his own was a card which it sometimes paid to 
play"". 
115 
On the whole he and Eden had followed three principles in 
their dealings with Evatt; to keep to courses of procedure already 
agreed with other Commonwealth delegations; to reject the notion that 
Evatt had the right of appeal to the Head of the U. K. delegation in 
matters that were being dealt with by Cranborne; to agree , to any 
reasonable suggestion by Evatt which did not contravene the first two, 
and give the maximum assistance to the Australian delegation on, points 
of real difficulty. 
116 
Evatt's tactics of bluster and forcefulness 
paid off inasmuch as he secured meetings with the leading delegates 
of other nations, especially the U. S , and these were often arranged 
by the U. K. Cockram's letters record occasions when Halifax agreed 
to take him along to meetings with Stettinius. Nor did Evatt fail 
to appreciate the efforts of the U. K. in this respect. Despite the 
obvious difficulties in Anglo-Australian co-operation at San Francisco, 
real, collaboration did take place and the two did not drift far apart 
from each other. 
At the U. N. sessions of 1946 the Australian delegates continued 
to be hamstrung by strict instructions from Canbej ra, which allowed 
virtually no flexibility in changing conditions and frequently made- 
Australian policy out of date and wholly inadequate. 
117 
The principal 
representatives, Hodgson and Hasluck, were both friendly and forthcoming 
115. Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
116. Cockram to Stephenson, 15th May 1945, ibid. 
117. Cockram to Shannon, 28th March 1946, D035 2000, WR261/9; Cockram 
to Stephenson, 26th November 1946, D035/2048, WR362/6. 
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with Cockram, (once again the D. O. representative on the U. K. delegation) 
explaining to him the problems entailed by their narrow briet, and 
Evatt's opposition to their attending private meetings of the executive 
118 
committee of the Security Council, unless they were purely procedural. 
At the October session of the U. N. Cockram had a protracted discussion 
with Mr. Alan Watt of the Australian External Affairs Department. Watt 
explained how Evatt attempted to direct Australian policy from wherever 
he was, Paris, Canberra or London, which resulted in hasty decisions 
coloured by a personal reaction to events. Watt judged that Australian 
policy had been essentially. correct at San Francisco, where it had been 
based on a principle which had the support of many other countries. He 
thought, however, that matters had gone wrong in May-June 1946 at the 
. Security Council when, over the Spanish question, Evatt initiated a 
policy doomed to failure. Then again at Paris Evatt continued on the 
wrong course by submitting too many amendments leaving himself open 
to the charge of wasting time, and then compounding the error by returning 
to Canberra just when his proposals needed his skill in committee if 
they were to have any chance of being adopted. Watt considered the 
Paris conference a major failure for Australia. He was concerned 
that in addition to antagonising the U. S. S. R., Evatt had also managed 
to upset the U. S. A, especially over Pacific issues and through the 
appointment of Macmahon Ball to the Tokyo Council, and the U. K. through 
his tactlessness. Watt also told Cockram of the problems being 
undergone by the External Affairs Department which was badly organised, 
with inadequate training, and deeply divided between a number of Evatt's 
own favourite officials, and the career officials of previous 
,! C 
administrations. 
119 
118. Cockram to Machtig, 2nd & 4th April 1946, D035/2000, WR261/9. 
119. Account of Cockram's conversation with Mr. A. -Watt, October, 1946, 
D035/1893, WR208/5/39. (A very,. similar view of Evatt is given in 
Watt's memoirs op. cit., pp. 48-50. Watt served in the Australian 
Department of External Affairs from 1937-1962. After serving as 
Secretary in that department 1950-54 he was posted to South East Asia, 
1954-56, Japan, 1956-59 and West Germany, 1959-62. ) 
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It is clearthat Mr. Watt was a professional diplomat of the 
latter category, which is no doubt why he spoke, in this vein to 
Cockram. The division among Australian officials had important 
effects on Australian policy, add or. relations with the U. K. On 
the whole the U. K. personnel found relations easier with those officials 
who were not part of Evatt's personal entourage. This did not ease 
relations with Evatt. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
reason why Austraalia insisted on appointing Macmahon Ball to Tokyo 
was because first, he was Evatt's own candidate, and secondly, the 
U. K. 's own choice, Keith Officer,, was an experienced diplomat who had 
spent some time in London, and was known to be approved by the U. K. 
That approval may well have sealed his fate in Evatt's eyes. 
Relations with Canada and Australia followed very different 
patterns. British respect for Canada's representatives was generally 
higher than for Australia's, and co-operation easier, although Australia 
was often more willing to extend the field of'collaboration to include, 
for instance, Commonwealth defence. Whatever the problems of co- 
operation with these two'Dominions, they were the most important for 
the U. K. as they were the largest, most active 'and internationally 
most important: South Africa and New Zealand did not aspire to such 
prominence in these years. 
The U. K. 's collaboration with'New Zealand ran smoothly onmost 
occasions. New Zealand lacked the capacity and resources of personnel 
of the two senior Döminions and sometimes, either through the weakness 
of its representatives or the idealism of its policies, clashed with 
the U. K. At Bretton Woods, for instance, Snelling reported that co- 
operation could have been much better, but that the New Zealand delegation 
was very weak. It was headed by Mr. W. Nash, who had often represented 
his country in the absence of Fraser; according to Snelling, however, 
he had deteriorated and was "unexpectedly difficult to handle", often 
378 
intervening embarrassingly, and failing through vanity to establish 
close relations with the leaders of the U. K. delegation. 
120 
New 
Zealand had been forging closer contacts with Australia, as represented 
in'the dual agreement of 1944, and bi-lateral talks following that. 
But'New Zealand had always been the junior partner, and while wanting 
to support Australia's demands for a greater voice in the Pacific, 
was slowly becoming disenchanted with its domineering attitude', { 
especially Evatt's. Cockram reported from San Francisco that Fraser 
+ 
was becoming more immune to Evatt's "poison" on the subject of 
trusteeship, and more willing to listen to the U. K. 's viewpoint". ' 
121 
At the first session of the U. N. in 1946, two New Zealand officials 
complained to Cockram of Australia's performance, told him'that they 
had advised their Government to dissociate itself from them, and 
pointed out that 
at best, the Australia idea of a joint policy had been' 
slavish adherance from New Zealand coupled with the 
right of Australia to ignore New Zealand's views whenever' 
these differed from her own. 122 
New Zealand officials, while not as highly regarded as those of Canada, 
or some of Australia's, generally worked well with their U. K. colleagues. 
There was a certain variety of personality amongst New Zealand officials - 
Berendson tended to be full of "fire and fury" while McIntosh exerted 
a more moderating influence 
123 
but the verdict of the U. K. delegation 
at San Francisco on the performance of the New Zealanders was that 
they had been friendly 
although Mr. Fraser has, occasionally, been carried away by his 
feelings, and his interventions in debate have not (repeat not) 
-always been judicious. 124 
120. Snelling's report of Bretton Woods, 31st July 1944, D035/1216, W254/1/40. 
121. Cockram to Stephenson, 16th Jurp 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
122. Cockram to Shannon, 11th April 1946, D035/2000, WR201/9. 
123. Cockram to Shannon, 23rd June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
124. U. K. Delegation to F. O., 23rd June 1945, ibid. (Cadogan commented 
on Fraser in his diary, noting that he was almost as tiresome as 
Evatt, "but mainly from silliness: he's rather a dear old thing 
really, and at heart quite friendly", Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, op. cit., 
p. 745. ) 
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This tended to be the pattern , ofý 
U. K. -New Zealand relations, -reasonably 
friendly and easy co-operation, unsettled occasionally by a, crusade by 
New, Zealand or a particular policy, or a misunderstanding with the U. K. 
over a point of technicality, but nothing to endanger the fundamental 
close relationship between the-two. ' ""1ý, ' ,f'I, 
To a very great extent. relations between the U. K. and South Africa 
during=this period amounted to the close relations between Smuts, "and. 
senior, U. K. Ministers, especially Churchill. U. K. Ministers and senior 
officials all had the greatest respect for him, and many D. O. officials 
had been brought up-on the legend ofýthis Dominion leader who had 
-participated at Versailles, - gained the confidence, of many leading 
British' statesmen, and was now to help re-shape the world again: at,, w 
San Francisco and Paris. But-in addition to-the, pre-eminence'of 
Smuts in Anglo-South African, relations, his country had many competent 
officials, and co-operation at this level expanded successfully in 
the immediate, post-war -years. - At San Francisco, which smutsattended 
and chaired one of the preparatory commissions, Cockram described him 
"as a "tower-. of strength", andithe. cpelegntion! s report noted that he 
had , ý3 
4r r, -, - 7-ý ýI-,, '! 
I 
in countless waystboth in public and-private been 
consistently helpful. 125 
4j 
X14 ý fý31 d', 
At Bretton Woods South Africa was said to have sent a "good team", 
and relations with them had been excellent. This was no doubt helped 
by the fact that at the monetary conference South Africa had no need 
for its quota, with its own very large gold reserves, and thus had no 
axe to grind. 
126 At San Francisco the South Africans were described 
by Cockram as helpful and co-operative throughout, and as a delegation, 
they won the support and respect of many by their restrained attitude. 
127 
125. U. K. Delegation to F. 0,, 23rd June f1945, 'D035/1884, W268/261. ' 
126. Snelling's Report of Bretton Woods, 31st July 1944, -D035/1216, - 
W254/1/40. 
127. Cockram to Stephenson, 16th June 1945, D035/1884, WR208/261. 
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Cockram recounts many consultations with the-leading South African 
officials, notably Forsyth, Smit-and Jordan, 'which indicatea 
comfortable and mutually beneficial dialogue, but there is also an 
indication that these officials relied to some extent on the, U. K. 's 
influence over Smuts, not always being able to convince him"of the 
right course themselves. For instance, Forsyth was worried at the 
beginning of June'that-Smuts was thinking. of-returning-home, satisfied 
with the progress which was-being made.. -Heýtol&Cockram this, and oaf 
explained how they had purposely cut down on the number of their 
amendments in order to build up the goodwill of-other-nations and- 
C) 
reserve the prestige of Smuts for a,: crisis. " If he left", at that point 
it would all be wasted. The U. K. might help him in'dissuading Smuts 
from leading? 
128 Cockram discussed the-matter: ýwith Halifax; '-who 
agreed to help but by then the'veto issue had arisen, and-Smuts seemed 
to have changed his mind. ý. ; 
To some extent co-operation and. consultation between delegations 
came down to personalities, and the degree to which they accorded or. 
clashed. Some. individuals were highly regarded by the British, such 
as Pearson,, Robertson and Holmes for Canada, Bruce and Officer for -* 
Australia, -or Forsyth for South Africa. To. some extent these individuals 
were held out in contrast to others, but while the P. O. --was slower than 
the D. O. to appreciate Dominion personnel, the British generally tended- 
to make generous allowance-for the-comparative newness of External 
Affairs departments, and the Dominions'-lack of"egperience in world 
affairs. Inevitably national-stereotypes were formed, and expectations 
about the general character or competency of a member's diplomats 
based upon them. Thus a-forthright, blustering Australian aroused 
no surprise, but a Canadian with-such characteristics would have done. 
In the autumn of 1945 Cockram prepared a memorandum for the D. O. 
128. Cockram to Stephenson, 2nd June 1945, ibid. 
381 
on the relationship of the Dominions to the Five Great Powers. H In 
this paper=Cockram looked at Commonwealth relations in light of the 
war, the'recenttexperiences of San Francisco and Potsdam, and in the 
context of'the Great Powers. He considered why Australia and New 
Zealand had made-more complaints about lack of consultation; especially 
since King had always been "the protagonist of the Dominions in their 
efforts to control their own foreign policy and to have a say in any 
decisions which may effect them" and Smuts was not a man to keep quiet 
if'South Africa's rights were being adversely affected. Cockram 
concluded that personal and political factors were the cause of this; 
King and Smuts were politicians of great experience accustomed to 
take-a wide view of the world, and confident that U. K. governments 
tried to keep the interests of all members of the Commonwealth 
constantly in mind. He thought that both men appreciated how finely 
balanced world peace was, and were careful not to act in such a manner 
as to upset this. If they had complaints, they could be relied upon 
to use discreet, confidential channels to make their representations. 
129 
By contrast, Cockram described Fraser and Evatt as "newcomers, ' 
to the international'scene", men who had previously spent their careers 
in the isolation'of the South West Pacific politics, ' who were ready to 
believe that other'governments failed to pay enough regard to'their 
problems» He thought this resulted in "hasty and ill-judged actions". 
On the personal' side, Evatt's ambition within Australian politics led 
him to'pose, as the champion of Australian interests, while , his' suspicion 
of'everyone led him to see neglect of Australia, 'or personal affronts, 
where 'none 'had occurred. Fraser he judged to be "more balanced" with' 
a"'wider vision", but a natural crusader with the tendency to champion 
before he had seen all the evidence. These factors led both men'to 
129. Memorandum by Cockram, August/September (?? ) 1945, D035/1890, 
WR208/544. (For fuller details of this- memorandum, see chapter 
8, pp. 387ff. ) 
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be apt to be "quick and trenchant". Political factors were identified 
as affecting the judgments of both men, especially Fraser. Thus, his 
passionate belief in the rights of the common man and the virtues of 
democracy had affected his attitude to the U. K. 's policy towards 
Greece, Poland and Belgium. Evatt's appreciation of, the-native 
people of Asia's desire to be rid-of their old masters led him'to 
crusade for better conditions in-these territories in order that a new 
attack from Asia could be resisted. Cockram thought that both men's 
attitude to the U. K. Government had altered since the national Government 
had ended, despite their respect for Churchill, Eden and Cranborne. 
He anticipated that with the election of the Labour Government, relations 
would be much improved. In the case of Australia, and Evatt, this 
was more likely to be realised by action 
calculated to impress on him that the new Government in 
the United Kingdom both knows what it wants to'do and 
is not ready to be bounced out of its course once this 
has been decided. Otherwise he might tend'to regard 
any concessions made to Australia not only as vindication 
of his own criticisms of former Governments'but as the 
occasion for further demands. 130 
We have seen how, to a very considerable extent, the Dominions 
were in wartime prepared to accept the primacy of the U. K., and later 
three Great Powers, in the formation of military strategy. There 
was often a fine distinction between issues which related to the 
conduct of the war and those which affected the future shape of the 
world. It was also becoming more apparent that the U. S. A. and the 
U. S. S. R. would dominate the post-war world, with4he U. K. acting as 
a junior partner. This tended to increase the practice of exclusive 
Great Power meetings and, with the growing divergencies between Soviet_ 
and American policy, such. meetings brcame more important, in order to 
reach some consensus on proposals tobe put before the lesser powers., 
This exclusiveness and dissension made open discussion of the issues 
130. Ibid. 
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difficult'; and had its effect on the amount of information imparted 
to the''Dominions. `", ",, I '' -1 
On occasions the . Dominions had pressed' the U. K. 'for more' information. 
Durin-&"the'Casablanca conference, of January 1943, the Dominions, who had 
been- warned'of the meeting" and' än' impending c'oinniunique, were duly'sent` ` 
the agreed statement of the-proceedings, but Attlee' realised that 
this 
was insufficient, and wrote to-Churchill saying 
'7''have received indications that' there will be' considerable` 
resentment among Dominion Prime Ministers at their being 
kept'so much in the dark. This has-been inevitable so far, 
but their feelings could now be assuaged if we could give 
them a somewhat fuller account . '. . 
I really attach great importance to this from the point 
of view of'avoiding friction with the Dominion Prime Ministers 
and retaining their fullest co-operation. 
131 
Attlee's assessment was correct, for two days after he wrote to Churchill 
he received a request from the Canadian Government for further details. 
Churchill agreed to a fuller message being sent to the Dominions, with 
q 
extra details on the Pacific discussions being sent to Australia and New 
Zealand. It is also clear from the correspondence that Churchill had 
132 
already sent additional information, in a personal letter, to Smuts. 
On many occasions the Dominions were kept informed of U. K. policy 
and Great Power discussions by use of'the two main channels of communication, 
the inter-governmental telegrams and the meetings with the Dominion High 
Commissioners in London. For instance the Dominions were sent various 
telegrams about the arrangements for the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers, 
in October 1943, and prior to the meeting Mr. Strang (the F. O. ) and then 
Eden, attended the High Commissioners' meetings at the D. O. and outlined 
to them the policy which the U. K. would be putting forward. In this 
131. Attlee to Churchill, 26th January 1943, D035/1512, WF207/10. 
132. For further examples of the personal correspondence between Smuts and 
Churchill, see chapter 2, p. 108. ' 133. D. O. 's information to Dominions re arrangements for Moscow meeting, 
see D035/1525, WF223/1. (messages of 18th-30th October 1943. ) Minutes 
of High Commissioners meetings with Dominions Secretary, see D0121/13. 
(For High Commissioners' briefings re Casablanca Conference, 28th 
January 1943 & 2nd February 1943, D0121/13. ) 
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instance Bruce used his attendance at some U. K. Cabinet meetings to 
urge that all the Dominions be kept informed of the course of the 
meeting. This was agreed to, and a selection of telegrams sent. 
134 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were sent in full to the Dominions 
and a meeting in London arranged to discuss them before the United Nations 
met at San Francisco. 
135 
The principal Great Power conference afters,. 
Dumbarton Oaks was held at Yalta in February 1945. .. At the end of 
January the Dominion High Commissioners and their Governments were 
told of, the prospective meeting,, and the ban on information until after 
its' conclusion. They were warned that: the agenda which had been sent, 
and'the'supplementaryýquestions which the U. K. wanted to-, raise, should 
be kept secret. Twenty-seven further telegrams were sent between 6th 
and 20th February detailing the progress of the discussions, the 
difficulties over the communique, and theloutstanding, problems. 
D. O. minute also -noted that, the, cable giving the ,f ull text of the 
A. 
communique had been despatched with arrangements made to; ensure that 
it would arrive before any press information could.. This was particularly 
important as the 1943 Cairo communique had almost simultaneously arrived 
with press announcements, causing embarrassment and, annoyance to the. 
Dominion Governments. Earlier in the war the-news. of. the withdrawal 
from, Dakar had not been transmitted to the Dominions. in advance, of..., 
136 
press notices, which had. also. caused irritation. (Vd i 
Despite the number of telegrams sent to the Dominions, there were 
aspects of the Yalta discussions of which they weave not informed, asiYing 
discovered when'he passed-on to the U. K. information receivedby the 
Canadian' Ambassador at Chungking. This concerned the conditions, the,,,..,, ý, 
U. S. SýR. was demanding as a condition to-its entry into the, war. against 
134. Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 4th October 1943, CAB64/36, WM(43)134. 
135. During the Dumbarton Oaks meeting, Cadogan met the Dominion --.. 
representatives stationed in Washington to give them details of the 
discussions. See Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, op. cit., pp. 659-664. 
136. Telegrams from U. K. to Dominion Governments, 6th-20th February 1945, 
D035/1506, WF207/1/3; minute by J. M. F. (? ) to Machtig,. 12th February 
1946, ibid. 
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Japan, and embraced territorial and commercial rights. In essence it 
was the agreement worked out between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. 
(Churchill signed the agreement but did not take part in the negotiations. ) 
The Dominions had been told nothing of this. King's initiative in 
drawing the U. K. 's attention to its Ambassador's report led to'Churchill's 
explaining the agreement to all the Dominion Prime Ministers. However, 
Cadogan noted that-he had had some difficulty in persuading the Prime 
Minister to do this. 
137 
This secret Yalta agreement was to cause 
the D. O. some consternation at the beginning of 1946 when the U. S. 
publicly referred to the terms, for officials could find no reference 
to the D. O. 's or the'Dominions' having been informed. The D. O. 
anticipated furious telegrams complaining at the lack of consultation 
and Addison agreed that a letter of protest should be sent to the F. O. 
There was relief, and no doubt some embarrassment, when the relevant' 
file was unearthed and it was realised that the Dominion Prime Ministers 
had been told. The letter to the F. O. was recovered and'the Dominion 
Governments were sent a , full copy of the Yalta agreement; prior to press 
releases, to supplement information sent in the previous July. 
138 
On the whole the Dominion Governments were-kept fairly well informed 
of U. K. policy and its discussions with the U. S. A. and the'U. S. S. R. On 
occasions there were delays, sometimes the fault of the U. K. and sometimes 
not, and the Dominions were certainly not told everything. ' Whether 
the absence of information was due solely to security considerations 
is not clear, except that on occasions the Dominions were given highly 
secret information. During the Dumbarton Oaks meeting Cadogan, who 
met the Dominion representatives periodically, "Told them (the Dominions) 
the truth, under seal of secrecy", and during the. 1945 London Council 
of Ministers the Dominion representatives were shown the papers under 
137. King to Churchill, 27th June 1945; Churchill to Dominion Prime 
Ministers, 5th July 1945; Minute by Machtig, 14th July 1945, 
D035/1602, WF312/33. 
138. Minutes by J. M. F. (? ) 30th January 1946, Stephenson, 1st February 1946, 
Machtag, 1st February 1946, letter to F. O., 1st February 1946, ibid. 
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discussion with a similar warning. 
13 9 
It seems that, at least on 
this second occasion, the other Great Powers were not aware of such 
consultation, büt"it is`nötýclear hoiöften the U. K. withheld 
information I on the insistence of the U. S. A. or the U. S. S. R. ' 'The 
D. O. consistently' tried ' to ensure that the Dominions were'not forgotten 
and was not -afraid `to challenge the F. O. "fit thought' it" had' fallen 
down in its task of commünicating'to the D. O. important Information. 
The mistake 'in its filing system, which led`to'the precipitate letter 
to the F. O. over the 'secret Yalta agreement', does at least illustrate' 
the'D. O. 's awareness of the Dominions' requirements' and its own 'efforts 
to meet them'*-" But the U. K. was in a difficult position because"-it 
did not want to lose the confidence of the other Powers by passing` on 
too much information, nor did it want to löse`thie goodwill of the' 
Dominions`by revealing too little. Sucti questions of'informätionfor 
policy were , generally 'decided one the' merits. ' Moreover, while 'the"'7 
Dominions had some right to complain at any absence of införmatiöný" 
they 'were nevertheless extremely well informed by comparison with other 
states of comparable size, and had the opportunity to make comments 
to the U. K. on prospective policy'and t hus'the oppöriunityto influence 
one of'the Great'Powers directly. Afterthe'war, the British government 
had to ask itself how far it would allow the Dominions to comment upon 
its foreign policies and itself take' heed of their°opini' ns, ` 
w 
.. 
ý, 
_. ,... 
1 
,4 
139. Dilks, op. cit., p, 664; see page 17. ` (During the` Fötsdam"9 
Conference the-Dominions were sent-60-70 telegrams-explaining- 
U. K. policy and the progress of the discussions. See D035/1508, 
WF207/l/6. ) Y =. . 
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Chapter Eight 
Inter-Commonwealth Collaboration, 1946-1947 
ý ý- 
Before the war the U. K. had welcomed, and sometimes sought, the 
backing of the Dominions; from 1943 onwards this support was increasingly 
seen as a necessary ingredient of British influence. In July 1945 
Sir 0. Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary at the F. O. and shortly to 
take over from Cadogan as Permanent Under-Secretary, wrote a memorandum 
entitled "Stocktaking After V. E. Day". In this paper Sargent considered 
the U. K. 's position in the world and its relations with the other two 
Great Powers. He concluded that the U. K. had to base its foreign 
policy on co-operation with the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., but that to 
strengthen its position vis-a-vis the other two, it needed to enrol 
the Dominions (plus France'and the smaller western European nations) 
as collaborators with the U. K. in the tripartite system. The U. K. 
would be the leader and spokesman for this'group of nations and thus 
be able to maintain its prestige and status. 
' This-memorandum was- 
endorsed by Cadogan and shown to Eden, who minuted "I think this is an 
excellent' paper" and sent it to Churchill for his information. 
2 it 
was also shown privately by Sargent to Cranborne and obviously given 
some distribution within the D. O. as Cockram wrote a memorandum in 
response to it. 
Cockram's paper "Relationship of the Dominions to'Big Five Politics" 
took'up Sargent's point about enrolling the support of the Dominions 
for U. K. foreign policy and made some interesting, observations'about 
the likely future course of Commonwealth relations. He had no 
hesitation in anticipating, the Dominions' full integration in world 
affairs. ; They appreciated the indivisibility of world peace and this, 
combined with their experience of the war, would mean that all would take 
1. Memorandum by Sargent, 11th July 1945, F0371/50912, U5471/5471/70. 
2. Minutes by Cadogan and Eden, ibid. 
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a much closer interest in international; problems and show a greater 
readiness to express their views. Cockram thought the San Francisco 
Conference had provided a valuable lesson. Rather than complaining 
that they were not allowed sufficient freedom to express their policies. 
the Dominions had asserted that the U. K. had not supported Dominion 
revisions often enough. The conference had been characterised by 
energetic efforts to secure the support of all British Commonwealth 
delegations, but particularly the U. K., for individual amendments. 
Evatt had even criticised the U. K. for changing its policy_ since. the 
preliminary meeting of delegations. Cockram concluded, 
it is likely therefore that the Dominions will express 
their views on many more international questions, and 
more fully, than they have done in the past, that they, 
will be anxious to obtain United Kingdom support for 
these views, and that they will resent anything, which., c, 
can be considered as backslidinc by the United Kingdom 
from conclusions jointly reached with the, Dominions,,,, 
either at conferences or by correspondence. 3 
Cöckram'identified as the main danger to future Commonwealth relations 
the fact that 
some of the Dominions at present are living in'the 
period of the, Statute of., Westminster, and that-they . t. have not yet brought themselves to realise that the 
world has changed fundamentally in the past fifteen ,. _ years`. 
He thought the Dominions had to choose between continuing to emphasise 
their"independence and, with the possible exception of Canada, sinking 
'into obscurity, or recognising that only as part of the Commonwealth 
could they expect to exert some influence in the world. The choice 
was theirs; but 
if ý theychoose the latter then they must be' prepared to render 
more than lipservice to the unity of the British commonwealth,,.,, 
and be as vocal when necessary in their support` of'the United Kingdom via a via the United States or the U. S. S. R. as they were before the war free of their'criticism. They must practise a 
restraint which will come with difficulty to some of them, for, like Hassan, they must ever 'keep the tongue of propriety in the 
cheek of discretion'. 4 
s" Memorandum by Cockram August 1945, D035/1890, WR208/544. 4. Ibid. (There is a-close similarity, between this comment and Bevin's S- tement about Commonwealth collaboration immediately prior to the 1945 Council of Foreign Ministers. See chapter 7, p. 355. ) 
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Cockram was not wholly pessimistic for the future, believing that the 
very able Canadian, delegation had played such a role at San Francisco 
"with conspicuous success". 
The experience of the years 1944 and 1945 had perhaps 'facilitated 
the chances that the Dominions would adopt a more positive attitude 
towards the Commonwealth. Their position had altered; they, were 
countries of greater power and status; but their increased involvement 
in international affairs, the dominance of the Great Powers and the 
relative decline of the U. K., had made their positions less comfortable. 
The politics of the post-war world were, fiercer. and for ., the 
first, time 
. 
the Dominions were, closely involved. As membership, of, the U. N. 
increased and international affairs became even lessEuro-centric, 
their positions were not made any easier. But had. this not been so, 
if the Dominions had been allowed to play the kind of, role craved by 
.ýW 
Evatt and to a lesser extent the Canadians, and international affairs 
had been less problematic, the temptation to forsake the confines of 
the Commonwealth might have been stronger., As it; was, the U. K. proved 
to be. a reasonably valiant and honest supporter of Dominion causes 
-and they recognised that they would not receive, the like;. from any,, 
other Great Power 
.. The 1944 Commonwealth Prime , Ministers', Meeting 
had_, rejected they ,,, 
notion of"centralising the machinery for Commonwealth. collaboration and 
. -left it virtually unchanged and the 1946, Prime Ministers' Meeting did 
the same. The. meeting of April-May, 1946 characterised the developing 
equalityyof. the association and the more-businesslike nature, of 
Commonweath gatherings. A. Canadian, diplomat., has described.,, it, as, "very 
functionalist,,,, the result being "consultation, not navel gazing". 
Comparatively little time was spent. - 
discussing machinery and.,, 
according to Canada House's report to Ottawa the reason "was the 
remarkable degree of agreement" among the representatives of the 
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Commonwealths The official communique declared that the existing 
methods had "proved their worth": - ,. 
they are flexible and can be. used to meet a variety of 
situations and needs, both those where the responsibility 
is on one member alone, and where the responsibility may 
have to be shared ... While all are willing to consider 
and adopt practical proposals for developing the existing, 
system, it is agreed that the methods now practised are 
preferable to any rigid centralised machinery. In their, 
view such centralised machinery would not facilitate, and 
might'even hamper, the combination of autonomy and unity 
which is characteristic of the British Commonwealth and 
is one of their greatest achievements. 6 , ,;, 4 
But if the machinery changed little at the end of the war, the positions 
c, 
of the Dominions and the U. K. did. With the Dominions taking a. greater 
interest in international affairs, the quality and range of information 
sent to their Governments and shown to! their High' Commissioners was 
reconsidered. ' The association of the, Dominions with aspects of U. K. 
policy, either in the sense of expressing agreement with the U. K. 's 
actions, or being able to make effective comments on U. K. policy, was 
another difficult issue and one complicated by the fact that, their. views 
were by no means identical. - If, as'Sargent and,, others had indicated,, 
the U. K: wanted the Dominions to take, a more positive, -attitude, to. 
Commonwealth collaboration, the-U. K. also had to ensure, that it- 
. was-receptive to Dominion contributions, and not, only, on the occasions when 
it needed their support. In 1946 and 1947 three. aspects: of U. K.. foreign 
policy illustrated that the U. K. still had decisions to, take, and lessons 
to learn, about Commonwealth collaboration,.. '-, :. 
In the spring of 1946 the U. K. -was re-negotiating, 
its treaty with 
Egypt; particularly the provisions for stationing British troops and 
maintaining bases there. This treaty was central, to the_U. K. 's defence 
Policy, but also affected the Commonwealth because. of the close relationship 
S" J. W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace:, -Canada and the search for-world order 1943-1957, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1979), p. 153. 6. Extract from Final Communique of the 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting, 23rd May 1946, P. N. S. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, (Oxford, 1953), Vol. 1, pp. 595-596. 
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between U. K. and Commonwealth defence. According to the provisions 
laid down for consultation the'Dominions were kept informed of U. K. 
-, policy towards Egypt, but in April 1946 the F. O. suggested that the 
Dominions should be more closely associated with U. K. actions. Sargent 
wrote to Machtig telling him that the F. O. wanted the Dominions to accede 
to, the revised treaty, or at least publicly express' their support for 
the new. policy and demonstrate their interest in the Middle East, in 
order to indicate plainly to the Egyptian Government that the U. K. 
had the backing of the whole Commonwealth.? Mactitig doubted whether 
the Dominions would be willing to take such action ands intimated to 
Sargent that Canada, for one, was extremely unlikely to do so., He 
suggested that Sargent raised the matter with the Prime Ministers while 
they were in London, and before King arrived. 
a (King was scheduled to 
arrive later than the other representatives because of Parliamentary 
commitments in Canada. )"'"'"' 
This suggestion was immediately taken up and'the Ministers of New 
Zealand and Australia were given details'of the U. K. 's policy and its 
method of approach towards the Egyptians. Neither Smuts nor King 
had 
arrived in London at this juncture, but Australia and New Zealand were 
traditionally the Dominions most interested in the Middle East and the 
9 
most likely to give some public support for U. K. policy. After 
giving this information to the two Ministers, Evatt and Nash, which 
was supplementary to telegrams already sent to Dominion capitals,, the 
F. O. persisted in its desire to seek from the Dominions some positive 
support, In a memorandum to Bevin, officials reminded the Foreign 
Secretary of a resolution introduced by Eden, and since endorsed by 
Attlee's government, which stated that the U. K. should play a more, 
prominent role in the Middle East and consult with the Dominions in order 
7. Sargent to Machtig, +9th April 1946; DO35/1206, WF271/29. 
8. Machtig to Sargent, - 25th April 1946, ibid. 
1 , 
9. Meeting of Prime Ministers, 25th April 1946, PMM(46)'4th'meeting, 
D035/1534, WF271/37. 
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to gain their support. In his paper of April 1945 Eden had suggested 
that 
Solidarity with the Dominions on this issue would 
strengthen our position vis-a-vis the United States 
and their practical assistance - were they disposed 
to afford it - would lessen the strain on our resources ... 
which would be imposed by our assuming sole responsibility 
for security in the Middle Eastern area. 
61 
Bevan was told that there had been no consultation with the Dominions, 
apart from their being'kept informed of U. K. policy and the objectives 
desired from the'revision of thetreaty', 'with Egypt. ', The paper stated- 
that after discussions with the D. O. it had been'agreed that it was 
doubtful if any Dominion would accept a direct commitment in the Middle 
East, and that Dominion accession to the revised treaty would tend to 
complicate the issue without any corresponding advantage. However, 
it might be extremely useful, and possibly even 
decisive, if all or some of the Dominion Governments 
felt disposed to indicate quite plainly to the 
Egyptian Government that they approved, and supported, 
the policy which the British negotiators were 
following and to make clear their interest ... in 
the security of the Middle East. 
Bevin was told that Dominion Governments knew of the basis upon which'-" 
the U. K. was conducting negotiations, and it was suggested that'Smuts, 
Evatt and Nash should be consulted. about giving positive support to the 
U. K. 
10 
The next day Smuts, who had just arrived in London, `raised 
the subject himself. - He had been informed earlier of the details, and 
was alarmed at U. K. policy, particularly that'the announcement of the 
withdrawal of British troops would not be made simultaneously'with one 
regarding facilities tobe granted to`the'British in Egypt. 
11, 
''Discussions had progressed no further when Attlee spoke in'the 
House of Commons on the government's plan to revise the treaty. The 
10. Memorandum, unsigned, to Bevin on consultation with Australia, South 
Africa and New Zealand on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, at the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting, 27th April 1946, D025/1206, WWF271/29. 
11. Meeting of Prime Ministers, 28th May 1946, P}fM(46) 6th meeting. 
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Opposition questioned hint as to the attitude of the rest of the Conunonweslth, 
and Attlee replied that the Uoinlnions agreed that the U. K. 's policy was 
the best approach to the Egyptian government. Eden queried this' . --° 
statement and specifically asked if the Dominions had agreedfwith`' 
"the timing, method and wording" of the submission. `Attlee confirmed 
that they had. Churchill questioned the Prime Minister still further 
and asked whether the Dominions had been consulted, or'whether the-, 
decision had been taken by the U. K. and the Dominions merely informed 
of it. Attlee replied "of course they were consulted'before the decision" 
but he assured the House that he was not trying to "shelter, myself by, 
putting responsibility on'others. I am saying they were fully consulted". 
12 
It is perhaps rather'surprising that a British Prime Minister, who'had 
himself held the office of Dominions Secretary, should allow himself to 
be cornered into making such comments about Commonwealth'consultation "' 
in Parliament. Information on`the U. K. 's policy had been-transmitted 
to the Dominion Governments. and further details had been'outlined'to the 
threevisiting Commonwealth representatives. ' But Smuts had'expressed 
his opposition to U. K. policy and King, had been, absent'from the'London 
talks and had'given no indication to the U. K. `that he concurred with'-°'-` 
its policy. 
The day after his, House'of*Commons statement Attlee met the three 
Dominion Ministers residing in London. -He, explained the events in 
parliament, recalling that two weeks earlierrhe, had outlined U. K. policy 
towards Egypt. to'Evatt'and Nash and their acquiesgence to the approach. 
Attlee announced thatýhe'had been anxiousrin the debate not=to-commit '"r= 
the Dominions and now wanted to make it clear-that'the U. K. "took-, fu11 '--'" 
responsibility for: the decision. 
1, 
. To say privately to-Dominion Ministers 
that the U. K. did not regard them as committed to its Egyptian policy, 
12. Attlee's statement"in the House of'Commons, 7th May 1946, Hansard House 
of Commons. Debates,, Vol. 422, Cols. 858-859. 
13. Meeting of Prime` Ministers, 8th May 1946, PMM(46) 14th-, meeting, F0371/65574 
W5543/5543/68. 
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and to admit' impicitly that he made a mistake in saying so much in 
Parliament, hardly sufficed. A public statement could only be retracted 
by a second public announcement correcting any wrong impression that 
had been given about the nature and extent of Commonwealth consultation. 
Smuts was very unhappy with Attlee's action. The morning after 
the statement he wrote to Attlee repeating his reservations about U. K. 
policy and its implications for Commonwealth communications, and reminded 
the Prime Minister that this had been his consistent attitude and 
that he, had not agreed with U. K. plans. He said that Attlee's comments 
were likely to be misunderstood both in the U. K. and in South Africa, 
and asked-for the issue to be set straight. 
14 
Smuts also wrote to 
Addison, enclosing a copy of the lett-4r to Attlee, and asked for the 
former's help in rectifying the situation, saying that he refused to 
d, l5 go on record as having agreed to a policy which he had strongly oppose 
At the meeting of British and Dominion Ministers Smuts expressed some 
sympathy with the awkward position in which Attlee had been placed, 
and-said that he did not think British Ministers should be questioned 
on the views of the Dominions, as those country's representatives had 
no voice in Parliament and were bound to be placed in a difficult position. 
He repeated that he expected to be questioned closely about the issue 
when-he returned to South Africa. Although 
: Dominion Ministers were certainly informed of what-was 
in mind, he did not think it would be right to say that 
they"were consulted in such a way as to associate them 
with the decision. The decision was clearly that of 
the, U. K. -Government. 14 
Smuts added that it would be helpful if some general statement could be 
issued about the nature and purpose of Commonwealth consultation-in order 
to-reduce the'risk of misunderstanding on the present issue and in the 
16. 
future. 
14. Smuts to Attlee, 8th May 1946, D035/1534, W271/37. 
15. Smuts to Addison, 8th May 1946, ibid. 
16. Prime Ministers' meeting, 8th May 1946, PMM(46) 14th meeting, F0371/65574, 
W5543/5543/68. 
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Evatt also questioned the Prime Minister's statement. He noted 
that at the meeting of 25th April the issue had been presented to them 
as a U. K. decision on policy, which they had accepted Fon the grounds 
that it was an issue which lay within the jurisdiction of that Government. 
He also warned Attlee that Dominion representatives would be questioned 
by their Parliaments and press. Widening the subject, Evatt suggested 
that Commonwealth communications could be categorised into 'three 
classes: first, when a Dominion was merely informed of action the U. K. 
was proposing to"take; second, when'it was consulted before'a decision 
was made; and third, when assent was necessary because the Dominions 
would share the responsibility for the policy. The U. K. 's plans'for - 
revising the Egyptian treaty should be placed into the' first category 
as an issue of which the Dominions had been informed; -büt'they had not 
been consulted and least of all had they assented to the course of action, 
because it was a matter within the U. K. 's'sphere'of responsibility. 
17 
A week later in a broadcast Evatt'returned to the. theme of Commonwealth 
co-operation, repeating his three classifications. 
18 
The New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, W. Nash, agreed with his 
colleagues that the U. K. could not say that the Dominions had shared 
in the decision. He agreed that they had been kept fully informed, 
and that personally he had had no doubt that the U. K. was following 
the only course open to. it, although he said Smuts' comments had prompted 
some mis 19 ' givings. The- following dax Nash reported to his Prime Minister. 
He recounted the sequence of telegrams to Wellington and'the two 
discussions he had had in London. " Nash told Fraser that following 
these conversations he thought the U. K. was following the only policy' 
possible, "but we were not called upon either to agree or disagree". 
17. Ibid. 
18. Broadcast'for 
the B. B. C. by Evatt, 10th May 1946. See Dr. H. V. Evatt, Australia in World Affairs - speeches and articles, pp. 188-9. nCpvrted in The Times, 16th May 1946. See also D035/1534, W271/37. 19. Meeting of Prime Ministers, 8th May 1946, op. cit. 
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He described the events in the U. K. House of Commons and the subsequent 
discussions with U. K. Ministers. Nash reported that the other Dominion 
Ministers had been satisfied with Attlee's remark'that the policy was 
the responsibility of the U. K. and that this would be clearly stated, 
adding-"but to me 'it does contain certain elements"of concern". He 
explained that despite the'fact that this matter lay within the purview 
of the U. K., the course-of action contemplated could involve New Zealand 
in difficulties-and-possibly even' war. ' Contemplating'a'"solution to 
this situation, Nash'acknowledgedithat a joint' Cabinet' or joint Secretariat 
on foreign policy and defence', and the acceptance of joint responsibility 
for the execution of decisions, were unäcceptable to-the other members. 
At the London 'discussiöns the most that could be`agreed üpon'was full 
-consultation with a'view to reaching agreement whenever practicable. 
He suggested that on Pacific issues the U. K. increasingly took into 
consideration' the views ' of' Australia and New Zealand, but that on 
European or Middle Eastern'issues, 'and especially where`serious commitments 
were involved, the bias of the U. K. decisions "will obviously be their 
'own-position'and responsibilities". 
It' may not now, be the time to `rais'e the subject but I. 
feel that there is no'major question of foreign policy 
or action that is the exclusive responsibility of, the 
-U. K. The U. K. may under certain circumstances have the 
final word, but we ceniiot as I see it, say that on any 
question we have no responsibility, and if we have 
responsibility our voice must be heard and taken note of, 
and as a corollary we must, if we tender advice or281ews 
that we desire accepted, share the responsibility. 
iýraý'"ý 
This view 'of' one Minister', albeit *a senior' and' influential one, 
reflected the basic' attitude'of'the New Zealand Government. It was 
in keeping'with a greater responsibility and awareness of the' need for 
cohesive force. New Zealand had 'the Commonwealth to'act'äs i moire' 
generally been less'protective'aboü't' Its ýindependence-than Australia 
or Canada"not afraid todisagree with'the U. K. when'it differed with 
20" Nash to Fraser, 9th May 1946,, D035/1534, W271/37. - 
" 
', "- 
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its policy, but not so ready to stand on its dignity. it had generally 
favoured Curtin's plans for improving` Commonwealth` collaboration, 
v 
including the establishment of a Secretariat, which had foundered at 
the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting. New Zealand alone would have 
little' capacity to influence the course of Commonwealth co-operation 
but Nash's statement illustrates its willingness to take an active 
interest in Commonwealth and U. K. policy, to tender advice when'asked 
and appreciate the unitary nature of the post-war world'and the 
inevitable influence of one country's policies on other. 
In'the face of the Dominion Ministers' reactions to his statements, 
and the request of Smuts to make some announcement countering the 
erroneous impression which he had'given abolit" the process''of Commonwealth 
consultation over the Egyptian Treaty,, Attlee spoke for a second time 
in the House of Commons immediately after his meeting with the Dominion 
representatives. He announced that he was anxious. to ensure that there 
had been no misunderstanding about the, nature of consultations with the 
.qr. 
Dominions, and told his colleagues 
It is our practice and our duty as members of the British 
Commonwealth to keep other members of the Commonwealth 
fully and continuously informed of all matters which we 
are called upon to decide, but may affect Commonwealth 
interests. The object is to give them, an opportunity of 
expressing their views in confidence, if they so desire. 
These views are taken fully into account, but the decision 
must be ours and the other Governments are not asked and 
would not wish, to share the responsibility for it. 21 
He added that this course had been followed for the Egyptian Treaty 
and his statement that the Dominions had "agreed" to the method of 
approach in that instance had probably given the wrong impression. They 
had been given full information and been given the chance to discuss the 
issue, but had not been asked to express agreement with the U. K. 's 
policy; they realised that it was a matter for the U. K. to decide in 
light of the conditions and the statements by their advisors. 
21. Attlee's statement to the House of Commons, 8th May 1946, liansard 
v House of Commons Debates, Vol. 422, Cols. 1069-1070. 
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The one Dominion Prime Minister who had not arrived in London, 
or sent a deputising Minister, was King. The Canadian Government 
had received telegrams about the Egyptian Treaty, but no consultations 
had been held. King was predictably disturbed by the news of Attlee's 
statement in the House on 7th May which he 
press reports or messages from London, but 
first heard of, not through 
from a question from the 
Progressive Conservatives in the Canadian Parliament. ', King replied 
that he had not seen any such report but assured Parliament that it 
could not have referred to Canada as "We had not been asked for, 
nor given advice". He continues in his Diary 
It irritates me beyond words to see the British try to 
'bring all the self-governing' nations into one bag, ý as 
it were, labelled 'The Dominions' as if we had a common 
.I 
policy on everything and -seeking to make us the screen for their own inadequacies and the reason for their 
`policies. 22 
King spent. a long time, drafting a, letter, -. to Attlee, which he -referred to, 
as being'ýI. rather more "emphatic" than he-would have liked to. someone who, 
had his own. problems and was a true friend, "and when it-was not, 
Attlee 
who was writing the"letters'or controlling the situation. But, 
Iý: am . certainly; not going to have Canada made. a_, puppet of any official in the Dominions (Office) or any other 
official of the British Government, 23 ,.. 
Quite what King meant, by Attlee not controlling the situation is unclear, 
but the letter does not seem to have, been sent because the next day, King, 
found-to, his, "great,, 
-surprise! ':, telegrams from the U. K. which were of.. a 
"wholly., satisfying and realistic character'!, Finaking clear. that ; the 
"'Dominions'-were 
asserting their position along the lines that I have 
been striving for right, along. "24 . This andthe,; subsequent statement ,. 3. ý 
by Attlee made any official px testý, by King unnecessary. . His attitude 
is interesting for three reasons. The-D. O.,, was.. quite right in its., 
advice to the F. O. not to approach King for Canada's public -support for 
22. Mackenzie Kin Record Vol. 3, Mackentiý , p. 220. 
24. Ibid. Kin Record Vol. 3, p. 221. 
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ud 
the Egyptian Treaty, as is revealed by King's distaste for U. K. 
tf i 
attempts to use the Dominions as a screen or an excuse for its own 
policies. King made it clear that he did not object to the U. K. 's 
consulting other Dominions about policy, or their giving advice or 
approval; that was an issue for each Government to decide; it was 
the use of the. blanket term 'Dominions' which was objectionable. 
Finally, he felt surprised that the other Dominions did not agree to 
the policy, and more importantly, were objecting to the U. K. statement, 
a fact which obviously pleased him in that he was receiving support 
for his view on consultations. 
Attlee's statements and the reactions from the Dominions led the 
F. O. and the D. O. to review the machinery for keeping the others informed 
of policy. Mr. Coverely-Price of the D. I. D. drafted, a new circular 
for distribution within the F. O. outlining the purposes and procedures 
of Commonwealth consultation to replace the previous one of June 1945.25 
At the same time Boyd Shannon of the D. O. also wrote a paper on this 
subject. He recorded that the Dominions had been kept informed of 
most stages of U. K. policy, except the decision to offer, the total 
evacuation of troops and the decision to announce this publicly,,,, 
although the Ministers visiting London, had had a chance to comment 
on the announcement. He, thought the procedure followed until that 
point had been satisfactory, but he 
noted 
that it was wrong for views 
expressedýin such consultations to be disclosed. The frank,, exchange`of 
views between Governments would, he thought, be sgriously. hampered if. 
consultations had to be conducted on the assumption that the views 
expressed would later be published. Dominions' sensitivity over the 
independence of. their policies and the readiness of some sections of 
opinion within each Dominion to challenge Governments on this issue, 
25, See Office Circular No. 41, '7th"'June 1945, F0371/50373, W10798/10798/68. 
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made the point even more important. Shannon also criticised the 
Opposition's behaviour in the matter. 
Any attempt to make the question of consultation with 
other Governments of the British Commonwealth -a 
practice to which His Majesty's Government are committed, 
whichever the. party-in office - into a party political 
issue, is to be deplored. 
Referring to the general machinery for consultation Shannon noted that 
this had been discussed with Dominion Ministers and confirmed as being 
satisfactory. 
The F. O. Circular, which was sent to Shannon for the D, O. 's approval, 
did not differ radically from previous ones but did emphasise the 
need to raise at the earliest possible stage any issue which required 
consultation with other members. Commenting on an early draft of the 
circular Shannon wrote, 
The whole Foreign Office attitude to the subject appeared 
to me to ignore_the. responsibilities of the Dominions 
Secretary and the Dominions Office in the matter. 
However, a few changes he suggested had been accepted. He said the 
circular was not expressed as the D. O. would have phrased it, but 
that there was only limited scope for "intervening on a matter of 
Foreign Office domestic procedure". As for the distribution of the 
document he noted his initial objection to the circular's distribution 
abroad, which he did not press because F. O. representatives were likely 
to see it when on leave, and because it was to the D. O. 's advantage 
on general, grounds that all F. O. officials should be aware of the need 
to consider whether an issue ought to be discussed with the'Dominions. 
27 
The F. O. circular was despatched on'June 27th 1946 and echoed Evatt's 
statements categorising the different2degrees of Commonwealth collaboration 
although four separate categories were outlined: 1) when they were 
kept informed of policy so that they could express their views if they 
wished; 2) when they were invited to express their attitude; 3) when 
the U. K. actively sought their agreement to a course of action; 
4) when 
26. Paper by Shannon, 23rd June 1946, D035/1534, W271/37. 
27. Minute by Shannon, 5th July 1946, D035/1205, WF203/1/25. 
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their co-operation was required for joint action. The circular 
stressed the responsibility of each F. O. department to raise the 
question of consultation with the D. I. D. or the D. O. They were also 
reminded that Dominion Governments "dislike being expected to express 
their views on a matter which may affect their interests, at a stage 
when it is too late for them to give adequate consideration to it, 
28 
and to formulate effectively any comments they may wish to make. 
The blunder of Chanak in 1922 was not quite repeated in 1946, but. 
the U. K. Government did not endear itself to any of the Dominions by 
its clumsy attempt to commit them to a U. K. foreign policy initiative. 
The 1946 episode took rather more the form of a blunder than an 
Imperialistic plot. The F. O. did suggest public support from all 
the Dominions for". U. K. policy, "or possibly-direct. association, but 
seemed to take the advice of, -the D. O. as to-the -impossibility of this 
and limited its aim to some public statement from Australia and New 
Zealand, and possibly South Africa, for U. K. policy. Simultaneously 
with this, Attlee allowed himself to be out-manoeuvred in Parliament 
by taunts from the Opposition that he lacked the support of the rest 
of the Commonwealth for a policy which they clearly opposed. It 
was perhaps advantageous that the Labour Government should be reminded 
fairly early its term of office that it could not treat the Dominions 
with such casualness. These events also served to remind officials 
in the P. O., who had increasing contacts with the Dominions, of the 
same point. The following year the U. K. had to, reconsider its attitude 
to Commonwealth collaboration from a rather different standpoint; the 
extent to which it was willing to divulge information and its 
preparedness to postpone decisions until the Dominions had time to 
comment. If the U. K. wanted Commonwealth support for its foreign 
policy, should it not be willing to submit all aspects of that policy 
28. - F. O. Circular No. '079,27th-June 1946 (W6313/266/68) D035/1205,, ' 
WF203/1/25. 
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to the scrutiny of the Dominions, or could it retain a genuinely 
independent policy on issues which were of no direct concern to the 
other member countries? 
In January 1947 Lord Addison wrote to Bevin about the re-negotiation 
of the U. K. 's treaties with the U. S. S. R. and the French, reminding him 
of the importance of carrying the Dcninions with the U. K. He 
suggested that the U. K. inform the other members of its intentions 
vis-a-vis the U. S. S. R. when it began the talks, giving them time to 
comment if they wished, and that it sent information of any changes 
desired by Moscow. He added that as the French Treaty was not just 
an extension of existing arrangements 
I feel strongly that we ought to show our proposals to 
the Dominions, and give them a chance to comment, 
before showing them to the French. It would be very 
difficult to modify our, proposals, once the French had . 
seen them. 29 
Bevin reassured Addison that the Dominions would be consulted over the 
revision of the Russian Treaty. He sent Addison copies of all messages 
exchanged with the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A.. to date over the revision 
of the Treaty, so the Dominions could be kept abreast of the position, 
but did not think that the U. K. 's enquiry to Stalin as to changes 
should be held up for their replies. He told the Dominions Secretary 
that a draft treaty had been prepared with the French along the lines 
of the proposed Russian Treaty and that it was awaiting the comments 
of otherX. K. departments before being given"to the Ambassador as a 
basis for. the negotiations. He expected the draft to be amended in 
many respects, and described, it as"by no means a final one'. ' He said it 
was not to be shown to the U. K. Cabinet yet and he thought the time to do 
that, and show it to the Dominions, would come after some progress had 
been made. If the Dominions had a draft which was continually altered, 
29. Addison to Bevin, 31st January 1947, F0371/65580, W1011/1011/68. (In 
April 1942 the Dominions had not wanted to be associated with the 
Anglo-Russian Treaty, D. N. Dilks ed.; The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, 1938-1945, (London, 1971), entry 21st April 1942, p. 448. 
403 
misunderstandingsmight follow, and that it was sufficient to indicate 
30 
to them the kind of treaty the U. K. wanted. Addison agreed with 
Bevin's suggestions in both cases, providing the D. O. was shown a copy 
31 
of the draft for the French Treaty. 
The process of keeping the Dominions adequately in touch did not 
work altogether smoothly, despite the"D. O. reminder. Various telegrams 
about the French negotiations were despatched in February 1947 - summaries 
of the different drafts32 - but the discussions with the French came 
to a swift conclusion, with the French Government pressing for an 
immediate release of the terms of the agreement. Consequently, copies 
of the Treaty were sent to the Dominions only after it had been agreed 
upon by both sides and about twenty-four hours before it was due to be 
published, allowing no time for any comment. The Australian Government 
protested at the lack of opportunity to express its 'opinion* considering 
it a breach of the consultation procedures. 
33 
-Addison responded by 
explaining the peculiar difficulties encountered on that occasion,,:, and, 
said that the U. K. would continue to try and keep the Dominions informed 
and, where possible, with time to comment, 
34 However, he was clearly 
not pleased with the F. O. 's handling of the matter. 3 When Addison 
had been told of the early announcement he had telephoned Bevin'warning. , 
of his apprehensions about the Dominions. He wrote again on 5th March 
telling Bevin of the complaint he had received and commenting that 
30. Bevan to Addison, 8th February 1947, ibid. 31. Addison to Bevan, 11th February 1947, ibid. . 32. Minutes by Mrs A. S. Halford (Private Secretary to Sargent) and Sargent, 10th April 1947 & 22nd April 1947 for the information despatched to the Dominion Governments, F0371/65580, W2552/1011/68. 33. Beasley to Addison, (conveying a message from Evatt) 3rd March 1947, F0371/65580, W1941/1011/68. According to the Canadian High Commissioner's 
report to his Government, Beasley blamed the F. 0;, r for the lack 
of information and was suspicious of the F. O. holding back information 
R He credited Addison with sincere intentions. Robertson to Sty Laurent, 8th March 1947, MG26, J 1, Vol. 429, File: Robertson Feb--April 1947, pp. 389881-389882. 34. 
ibidson 
t to Beasley, (enclosing a message for Evatt), 5th March 1947, . 
0 
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while the U. K. was not constitutionally required to consult the 
Dominions, the treaty being a subject of U. K. foreign policy, he 
had stressed the importance of giving them an opportunity to comment 
on such an important issue. Addison said that he appreciated the 
difficulties, but asked Bevin to ensure that 
A,, "i r '-1' i- 
:i r'<1 ''f. SkTäiýi 1"c 
on issues of the first political importance, which are 
likely-to be of interest, to Dominion Governments on 
general grounds, we do afford them a real opportunity 
to let us have their: comments, if they so desire', at 
the earliest stages of our consideration of the matter. 
If we keep them informed not merely of our conclusions 
when reached, but of the ideas we have in prospect, and 
,. the way in: which our-minds are moving, any comments they 
may have to make will be most useful, and we shall not 
be exposed to the charge that we are merely keeping to 
the letter of the arrangements for Commonwealth co-operation. 
As you knaa I have urged this before. 
35 -. 
Bevin replied that while he, agreed that-theýDominions-should 
generally begiven a chance to"reply, he `did'not think, that-on issues 
where no constitutional obligation existed to consult with them, " 
matters should be held up especially, for them, 'as-the Australian'': 
complaint had seemed to imply. - He repeated the peculiar circumstances 
of"the French Treaty,. and warned that the same thing could happen in 
the case, of, the Treaty with the U. S. S. R.;. adding that he thought "it' 
would: be unreasonable-to expect us, when we'had reached the point of 
clinching (the treaty) to wait for the comments fromýthenm" (the Dominions). 
Bevin also reminded Addison that no{other Dominion had complained at- 
the procedures and suggested the incident was an example of Evatt's- 
propensity to make trouble. 
36- 
It-appears from the F. O:., files that 
the Head of-the Western Department,,. -Mr'. F. R. , Hoyer-Mi11ar, 1had advised 
his colleagues of the-necessity of sending the'complete text'to the 
Dominions immediately--after the Cabinet had approved of it`andýallowing'-°' 
them. ten days to reply. 
37 
But partly because of. the unexpected early` 
35. Addison'to Begin; 5th March 1947, ' F0371/65580, W2304/1011/68. 
36. Minute by Sir P. J.. Dixon (Principal Private Secretary to Foreign 
Secretary), 20th March 1947, and letter Bevin to. Addison, 20th March 
1947, - ibid. 
37. Minute by F. R. Hoyer=Millar, 21st March 1947, referring to his 
earlier, minute of 22nd January 1947, ibid. 
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signing and announcement, the Dominions were not sent the text until 
four days before it was due to be signed, and were then told that 
only twenty-four hours would elapse before its publication. The 
most startling aspect of the F. CI. 's attitude, before and after the 
Australian complaint, was its reluctance to send the Dominions an 
actual text of the proposed treaty, and its unwillingness to consider 
that it might revise its proposals in light of comments from the 
Dominions. It was of course a matter of U. K. policy, and it was 
quite reasonable for the U. K. to expect no comment from the, Dominions. 
However, Addison's original suggestion that the Dominions be shown 
a full text of the U. K. 's proposed plans before they were shown to the 
French was never seriously considered by the F. O. 
Bevin did ask Sargent to review the machinery-for Commonwealth 
. r.,,. . 
consultation to see if any organisation change could improve the system. 
Officials considered the procedure, as laid down in the circular- of 
June 1946, and reported that nothing was faulty with the basic system; 
the key to improved success was to get the machinery in motion at 
the earliest possible moment if it was an issue in which the Dominions 
had to be'informed or consulted. The D. I. D. suggested that the circular 
be sent`, round departments again`as a reminder that the responsibility 
for raising an issue with the other Commonwealth members lay with them. 
38 
To some extent this avoided the real problem. It was generally agreed, 
at least by the British, that the information sent to the Dominions 
had been satisfactory until the French insistence on. immediate 
publication. What was lacking was the necessary detail in terms of 
a full text (or texts) to enable them to see the extent of the U. K. 's 
proposals land avoid the problem of rushing one through once it-had been 
agreed, days or hours before publication. However, the F. O. continued 
to take solace from the fact that none of the other Dominions had 
38. Minutes by Mrs. Hamilton (American Information Department), lst April 
1947, Mr. Finch, (Commonwealth Liaison Department), 1st April 1947, 
Halford, 10th April 1947, and Sargent to Bevin, 22nd April 1947, 
-1? 0371/65580, W2552/1011/68. 
", 
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complained. 
9 
Not only had the other Dominions not complained, H 
at the High Commissioners' meeting of 8th March, in the presence'of 
Sir Orme'Sargent and Mr. Mayhew, the Canadiän HightCömmissioner said 
that Beasley's criticisms implied ä conception of U. K, policy which 
did not apply to Canada. Canada conceded'the U. K. 's right to have 
its own foreign policy, in'the same way as Canada did, and althöugh 
it wished to keep its fellow members informed, it did not consider 
that each country'had to secure the"'cons ent of the others before 
deciding on its policy. He said his Prime Minister was appreciative 
of the information he received through the usual channels. 
40 
The D. O. was disturbed by the' situation and Machtig'wrote 
Sargent questioning whether the U. K. 's machinery was as efficient 
as it could be. He pointed out1 that it was a prime objective 'of 'tie 
Government to keep in the closest` contact with the Dominions on major 
foreign policy questions. He said that the D. O., "without accepting 
the 
validity of Evatt's`complaints, hought it might'býe possible on 
important issues to involve the Dominions earlier. Admitting that 
in the two treatie's at issue the Dominions were not directly concerned, 
for they were"-not being asked to undertake obligations themselves, he 
said they clearly had an'interest in such policy'' 
since, if as we hope, they are and will remain closely 
associated withus,. they must be affected by the important 
obligations which we undertake. It is therefore, we 
suggest, of vital importance that every care should be 
taken to see that they are given a real opportunity of 
offering any comments or views, not merely at the last 
stages of the negotiations but in the early stages while it is still ossible to ive proper weiht to any comments tý may have to offer. 41 
This was perhaps as frank and stern a letter as passed between-'the two 
offices for some tine'. It was fully in accord with Addison's letter 
of 31st January which had been to some extent ignored'bythe F. O., and 
1740. '"Robertson to Pearson, 8th March 1947, MG26, J I, Vol. 429, File: Robertson Feb--April 1947, pp. 389881-389882. 41. Machtig to Sargent, 11th April 1947, F0371/65580, W2803/1011/68. 
31. /yt% raf AC 41,, ,2 /F7 n, -at 4&4'1::,, 6"'16o-j 
f7/t7 
# 
/6 'd 
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demonstrated a real problem within the U. K. 's handling 'of Commonwealth 
relations; whereas the'D. O. was the department responsible'for'those 
relations, the F: O. -. was%solely responsible for-judging the amount of 
information disclosed,, and the timing-of"it, ''subject to direct 
instructions from the Prime Minister 6r-Cabinet. Machtig was informed 
that no-change in, the machinery was contemplated", but that the circular 
was to be re-distributed. 
42 g- 
After the protests over the French Treaty, and`in light of 
Addison's first letter, the F. O. reconsidered the position of'the 
Dominions in relation to the Russian, negotiations. At the beginning 
of March, when the U. K. was about to commence talks, it was suggested 
that the Dominions should be sent a full draft. '' However a Northern 
Department official, Mr. A. E. Lambert, minuted that if'this were done 
every verbal amendment which was introduced would also have to be 
sent to them which would be "tiresome" -)for all concerned. lie also 
thought that the Dominions ought not to be told that the U. S. S. R. was 
being offered similar measuresiof consultation in'the event of renewed 
German aggression , as, had been negotiated with the French. 
43 Another 
official, -Mr. Matthews, argued in favour of sending the Dominions 
more information. He rioted the Dominions' tendency in the past to 
take. offence if the,. U. K. appeared'-to withhold information, ` and the 
recent complaint from Evatt. Without agreeing with this protest, 
and admitting that Evatt probably üsed'the incident as an excuse for 
criticism, he warned his colleagues of the importance of not providing 
him with such opportunities, which "he never scruples to use in public". 
He suggested that Bevin's arguments against closer consultation' were in 
fact-less important than the risk'of exposing the U. K. to criticism 
from the Dominions, whether ill-founded or not. Matthews thought 
42. Sargent to Machtig, 21st April. 1947, ibid. 
43. Minute by Lambert, 4th March 1947, F0371/65580, W2462/1011/68. 
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that, the risk of misunderstanding might be greater if they told the 
0 
others nothing,, than, if they, weresent full information. fromwhich 
, the. U. K. might departrlater.,., He advised 
delaying 
, nofurtherin 
sending 
the, Dominions a telegram,. unless*Bevin was expected, to make major 
revisions, to the plans., He. added that,. the U. K. Is talks with the, 
U. S.. over the treaty. had, gone. so far that this was likely, to'be, 
misconstrued by the Australians. unless they were, informed immediately. 
44 
The Office decided that. anycommunication should await the return of 
Bevin from his, discussions with General Marshall., Delay, while the 
. 
Foreign Secretary 
.. returned,. to , 
approve the draft, and for the Cabinet 
to agree on the proposals was not unreasonable or surprising, but, 
. when the Cabinet. approved, the draft on 18th March, nearly two weeks 
later, the Dominions were, still sent only a general summary of the U. K. 's 
proposals,,. excluding information about, the provisions for German 
aggression. 
45 
.. Pressure from the D. O. continued. On the 25th March Addison 
contacted the F. O. again,., expressing his worry that nothing more far- 
reaching had been given. to_the Dominions. After the criticisms of 
the Anglo-French Treaty it was essential for them to receive all 
_material. possible, and he suggested that only the text would crystallise 
their ideas., 
; Officials thought. it impossible to communicate an actual 
text. but, "At the, pressing, request of the Dominions Office" another' . 
telegram. was drafted which, in the eyes of the F. O., would not "do 
any harm". This One did contain details of the proposed articles 
to counter German aggression, which_had been omitted previously* 
46 
The., discussions 
over Comnonwealth consultation in the case of the 
44. Minute by Matthews 6th March '1947, ibid. 45. Minutes by R. Mý A. Hankey'(Head of Northern Department); 6th, & 11th March 1947, C. " F. A. Warner (Assistant Under Secretary), 13th March 1947, and Lambert`, 19th March 1947, Cabinet Conclusionsof 
46: Minutes bh 
1947, CM(47) 29th meeting, ibid. Y Hankey, 25th March-1947, -F0 ß%b5580, W2463/1011/68. 
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Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian-Treaties Allustrate'a clear difference 
of-opinion between the D. O. and the F. O. Constitutionally the U. K. 
was not obliged to do more than inform the' Dominions of its` actions 
M 
before they became public knowledge, ' and, in that respect it acted 
quite' correctly in both- instances. ' However, it terms of the `future, 
success, of, Commonwealth collaboration the D. O. was concerned that ' , '; 
the U. K., should not give the 'impression that it was only abiding by 
the ! "letter of the arrangements for Commonwealth consultation! '. ' " 
If one contrasts the actions of'the, F. O. in the, revision of the 
Egyptian Treaty with-its actions during the revision of the Russian 
and French Treaties, a significant divergence appears. '" In'the`one 
instance it wasAeen. to enlist the -greatest" possible-, support from'the 
Dominions when it felt that, the U. K. 's; policy' needed such backing; 
in the other it was reluctant to furnish full' information before the 
treaties had been negotiated. , in both'` cases 'the"issueIwas a''matter' 
of U. K. -policy with 'similar obligations' resulting ` in terms of' 
consultation, but-the degree-of-consultation which took''place was 
very-different. The D. O. followed afar more consistent line. In 
the, former case, it'warned the F. 0 against 'asking`*th e Dominions"a for 
an unrealistic amount of support, which{-they were likely to refuse 
outright. In the second it continually, urgedthe F. O. 'to`be more 
forthcoming in providing the Dominions with information about U. K. policy. 
Perhaps &theý real danger-, for the- U. K. lay' in' pursuing 'neither 'of these "'' 
attitudes; it encouraged the Dominions to take, aninterest'in`policy 
and-express their views, while refusing to give them full information. 
Such- inconsistency 
was likely to lead notonly"to`confusion; ±but-to 
severe dissatisfaction- and work against mutually 'beneficial collaboration 
with the U. K, It is true that the different attitudes of 'the' D'ominions 
towards collaboration made life very difficult for the U. K. and it was 
predictably Australia who made the protests about the Anglo-Russian 
410 
Treaty.. But whereas there were genuine problems in pursuing actual 
consultations towards joint policy, there should have been, no difficulty 
about furnishing all the Dominions with sufficient information and 
allowing them to comment upon it if they wished; if Canada did not 
want to express an opinion, well and good, butAustralia orýNew Zealand 
could be given-the opportunity. However, and perhaps not unnaturally, 
the F. O. did not welcome the need to notify the Dominions of every step 
of its policy, or-wait-for their views. It was one thing to co- 
ordinate policies on'issues of general international concern, such 
as the U. N. Charter, and another to have its bi-lateral relations with 
other. states vetted. 
At the end of the war the U. K. also considered two important 
aspects of inter-Commonwealth representation; the supply of information 
to the Dominion High Commissioners, and their status and title. The 
first was a substantial part of the machinery for Commonwealth' 
collaboration and-the second was not merely an issue about which the 
Dominions held strong feelings, but one which reflected the particular 
nature of the Commonwealth association and distinguished it from 
relations between foreign states. With the Dominions all taking 
more initiatives, in world affairs,. the D. O. was all the more anxious.,, 
not to allow the distinctiveness of the association to be undermined 
by discarding nomenclature and customs which exemplified the differences. 
S. 
Re-consideration of the-telegrams shown to Dominion High Commissioners 
in London was prompted at-the end of 1946 after a, -complaint from: the, 
Australian High Commissioner  Rt. Hon. Jack Beasley. 
Under the 
system practised in the latter stages of the war-and, the early months 
of peace, a separate category of telegrams, the 'D' series,,, containing 
the more important despatches from Foreign Missions and those despatched 
} 
.ýý, 
ýý 
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from the F. O. itself, were selected by the D. I. D. of the F. O. and, 
when approved by the D. O., sent to Dominion Governments and shown 
to the High Commissioners in London. The other document regularly 
received was the 'Weekly Political Intelligence Summary' but the 
High Commissioners also saw background information on issues which 
were of interest but not suitable to be sent directly to Dominion 
capitals. The only exception to this distribution of information 
had been the Australian High Commissioner, Mr. Bruce, who, because 
of his exceptional status as Australia's accredited representative 
to the U. K. War Cabinet, received F. O. telegrams of Cabinet distribution 
in his room in the Cabinet Office. Bruce's replacement was another 
former politician, Jack Beasley, originally sent to London in January 
1946 as Resident Minister, but who, after representing Australia at 
the Paris Peace Conference, returned to London as High Commissioner. 
During the first months of Beasley's tenure in London, as a Minister 
of the Crown, he received Cabinet Distribution telegrams as Bruce 
had done. After his assumption of the office of High Commissioner, 
. 'ý ;- 
this was discontinued and, like his colleagues, he received the 'D' 
series. In November 1946 Beasley complained to the D. O. and the F. O. 
that he was no longer receiving the same amount of information and 
asked for renewed access to Cabinet telegrams. 
The U. K. was mindful of the difficulties it had incurred in the 
past with' Australia, and had already had experience of Beasley's abrasive 
character. The Minister of State at the F. O., Ilr. McNeil, described 
him in a minute as "one of our most difficult customers", and in a 
letter to Attlee as "a tricky customer", while Garner recalls that 
Beasley "struck a new note of aggressiveness". 
47 
The D. O. thought 
that because the Australian High Commissioner had received the Cabinet 
47. Minute by McNeil, 6th December 1947 and letter McNeil to Attlee, 
31st December 1946, F0371/65577, W761/25/68. °Rt; Hon. Lord Garner, - 
'The Commonwealth Office, 1925-19681, p. 299. 
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distribution telegrams' until he returned from Paris that distribution 
ought to be resumed, despite the normal practice of giving all iligh 
Commissioners the same information. " 11öwever, the D. O. did 'want'" tö 4' 
ensure that 'such' telegrams wouldbe carefully screened so that` nothing 
unsuitable was sent, such as criticisms of Australian pöli'cy. 
4$ 
Mr. Matthews, of the D. I. D., pointed to two problems in acceding 
to this advice. First, " it woüld'probably be impossible to treat' 
Beasley 'in a different way from the others and there was no justification 
for'so doing; 'secondly, -that the screening would be difficult because 
of'the many telegrams which, as an official rather than a Minister of 
the Crown', Beasley should not be' allowed' to see and 'the lack of staff 
to do the work. 'It 'was pointed out"'that either'Beasley would receive 
many less telegrams, which'he would notice'and complain of, or would` 
have access eo secret material not available to other Dominion 
representatives. Matthews was unhappy ab'oüt'abandoning the established 
tradition that information to*the Dominions needed special presentation, 
n 
as embodied in the 'D' series. If a'change was necessary, he 
suggested ''two alternatives, either the creation of 'an entirely new 
series' for all HighICommissioners with "an attractive title" such 
as 'Cabinet'" and High Cömnlissioners' which contained more "innocuous 
material" than the existing Cabinet series, or the down-grading of 
the 'General' series and the inclusion of material from other'-series 
and the creation of a separate series to cover the real Cabinet 
telegrams. 
49 
To extract telegrams from various series might'lead 
to complications, with embarrassing references to despatches which 
had not been included. 50 The Minister`of State ruled that a change 
had *to be made, and that a -'new series based on the 'General' distribution, 
48. F. E. Cucmning.. Bruce (Dominions Secretary's Private Secretary) to J. ý'V. Robb (McNeil 's Private Secretary, 4th December 1946, F0371/65577,. W761/25/68. 
49. Minute by Matthews, 5th December 191: 6, `ibid. 50. Minute by Sir D. Scott (Deputy Under Secretary at F. O. ) 6th December 1946, ibid. 
413 
but containing other material, should be begun. 
51 
Considerable discussion took place over the administrative 
arrangements and various F.. O. departments. pleaded lack of manpower to 
cope with the problem. (The Communications, Department was especially 
concerned-at the prospect of losing half. its secretarial, staff once 
the Government abolished the Employment Control Order, which it was 
expected to; do at the beginning of 1947. )52 The Minister of State 
submitted the proposed alterations to Attlee at the, end of December 
1946, recommending the expansion of: the 'General' series, adding that 
the Australian High Commission staff should be encouraged to visit the 
53 D. I. D. and, other F. O. Departments to discuss foreign affairs. Attlee, 
after consultations, with the D. O. and Cabinet Office, agreed to McNeil's 
proposal but warned him that the increased distribution needed careful 
monitoring on security grounds. 
54 
McNeil duly informed Beasley of the 
new arrangements,., leaving it, to. Lord Addison to mention the invitation to 
his High Commission, staff to visit the F. O. more often. 
55 
Initially. 
there were some problems with the-new arrangements due to, the organisation 
of-the Australian staff in London. The Australian Liaison officer, who 
was responsible, to the Department. of, External Affairs, had offices in the 
U. K. 
-Cabinet Offices, and received material forthe High Commissioner. 
But there was a division. of authority, as , 
the High Commissioner and his 
staff were the responsibility of, the Prime Minister's Department in 
Canberra. ' Relations between the twodepartments, and, the two offices 
in London, were not always cordial and the Liaisog Officer did not pass 
on the additional information at first, which, led the Australian High 
Commission to complain that no more telegrams were being received. After 
some tactful comments by the F. O., the issue was sorted out. 
51. Minute by McNeil, 6th December, 1946, ibid. (Still referred to as the 'D' series. ) 
52. See Minutes by Matthews, 10th, 14th & 16th'December 1946, and by Mr. Dunlop, 10th, 12th & 16th December 19469 ibid. 53. McNeil to Attlee, 31st December 1946, ibid. 54. Attlee to McNeil, 13th January 1947, F0371/65577, W762/25/68. 55. McNeil to Beasley, 15th January 1947, ibid. See Minutes by Matthews, '5th March 1947, F0371165577, W1320/25/68. 
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Addison informed the F. O. that he would not raise the matter 
at that time because Beasley had made no further complaints, and 
he did not think it timely for the U. K. to revive the subject. lle 
said it would be helpful if the F. O. could include as many telegrams 
as possible of the old 'General' series in the new circulation to 
the Dominiont and added 
The Dominions office have no reason to believe that 
either the Australians or the other Dominion representatives 
in London are in general dissatisfied with the adequacy 
of the existing arrangements on-Foreign Affairs, but we 
might have the possibilities explored in the first place 
between officials with a view to their putting up to us 
some agreed recommendations. 56 
The D. O. seemed reluctant to sanction an increase in the direct contact 
between F. O. officials and Dominion staff, although they continued to 
encourage the transmission of the maximum of information. The reason 
for this attitude seems to lie in the determination of the D. O. to retain 
responsibility for Commonwealth relations and remain the principal channel 
between the Dominions and the U. K. It knew that members of the F. O. 's 
staff wished that Office to take over the U. K. 's relations with the 
Dominions in the sphere of foreign affairs, 
57 
and was anxious to preserve 
its own authority. This,:. )was said not merely because of the D. O. 's 
natural anxiety to preserve their own positions, but because the office 
was convinced that Commonwealth relations were distinctively different 
from the U. K. 's relations with other countries, and that it was essential 
to have a separate Minister in the Cabinet responsible for them. 
58 In 
December 1947 an F. O. minute pointed out that with the acquisition of 
a second room for the D. I. D., it would be much easier for Dominion 
representatives to peruse papers without dislocating the work of the 
department. It was thought that this might make them more eager to come`, 
and redress the hitherto 
uneven practice of the High Commissions. The 
56.. Addison to McNeil 
F0371/65577, W762/, 21-53/ 
February 1947, 
57. See chapter 3 
/25/ 68. 
58. Garner, 22 .c i' 
PP* 157-159. 
" 13P- 300-301. 
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Australians' were 'said to visit quite often', - (possibly' because' of 
invitations' since the-previous December) but the South Africans rarely, ' 
did. 
59 
The Australian' High Commission re-opened the question of access'to 
telegrains'in'November 1947. ' Mr. Heydon, the Australian"Liaison Officer, 
requested that his High Commissioner'be allowed to see more telegrams 
arguing that with the enäing of the Weekly Political' Intelligence 
Summary a gap' had been created. The cancellation of the Summary was 
60 
connected with the independence of India, but this request was regarded 
by Mr. Finch, the D. I. D. official he approached, as a`further attempt by 
Mr. Bea'sley'tö gain access to Cabinet telegrams. '' However, ''he noted 
that the Australians' wishes would be substantially met when the F. O. 
altered its distribution of telegrams -in an attempt"t to economise. -, -'The 
1 1, Office planned to combine the new 'D' series with some 'Cabinet, ' material 
in'a series called"Political' (internally), "while the: remaining: t'Cabinet' 
61 
telegrams would be`inclüded in the 'Diplomatic' series. '° Thus the 
Dominions "D' series would incorporate more Cabinet telegramsýthan- 
before. Although the stimulus for this'last change'in telegram ` 
distribution''came from *domestic 'factors, the' pattern from the end, of 
the war was`-'one- of increasing the supply of U. K. intelligence. and 
information to Dominion Governments and Dominion High Commissioners, 
despite the'"p'röblems 'of -consultation as demonstrated by the revision'' 
of the Egyptian, French and Russian treaties. ''" 
At the end of the war, with the Dominions conscious of their new, 
positions internationally, there was some disssatisfaction. with the 
status of, -their representatives in the U. K. and with the-titles-employed- 
59, Minutes by, Finch, 28th November 1947 and 2nd, Dec ember 1947, F0371/65577, 
W8389/25/68. 
60. See chapter 9, p. 439. 
61. Minutes by Finch, 2nd December 1947, F0371/65577, W8389/25/68. 
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within the association. Conunonwealth representatives had traditionally 
been styled 'High. Commissioners', rather than 'Ministers' or 'Ambassadors', 
62 
and ranked in order of precedence after Secretaries of State under, the 
rank of Baron, -and visiting 
Ministers of the Crown, which was below 
not only foreign Ambassadors, but foreign Ministers Plenipotentiary and 
r, 
Envoys. 
63 
The principal reason why the U. K. originally insisted upon, 
and wanted to retain, this separate title was because the title 'Ambassador' 
was applied to representatives of a foreign sovereign 
whereas all members of the Commonwealth have the same 
sovereign. 
and if the relationship between the members of the Commonwealth was 
to be in any sense different from that, obtaining between 
two foreign countries, their respective representatives 
could not well hold diplomatic titles. 64 
There had been some opposition to this distinction between foreign and 
Commonwealth representatives, notably by South Africa in 1928,65 but 
the only major departure from this practice had been made by the U. K. 
in 1939 when it appointed Sir John Maffey to Eire. On this occasion, , 
immediately, after the war had begun,, de Valera, asked that. Maffey be 
called "Ambassador". The U. K. refused, but agreed to 'Representative' 
"as, a colourless compromise" to avoid the deadlock. This was not 
regarded by_the D. O. as a precedent for discontinuing the title 'High 
Commissioner' 66 
, 
In February, 1944 the issue was raised again with articles in two 
French Canadian newspapers, l'Action Catholique and Le Devoir. At, that 
62. This dated from 1880 and the elevation of Canada's representative to the U. K. See D. O. memorandum "Representation of One British Commonwealth Country in the Territory_of Another". December 1946, D035/1270, G564/1. 63: The ranking precedence had been laid down in 1930 (for the Dominions) 
see above document and discussion in D. O., 17th December 1946, ibid. 64; Wiseman (Assistant Secretary, D. O. ) to Garner on the status of Commonwealth representatives, 25th February 1944, D035/1116, G551/1. 65. For South Africa's opposition, see Minute by Sir J. Stephenson recalling this, 2nd February 1945, D035/1228, WX101/90. Also Mr. Louw's question 
in the South African Parliament on the issue, D035/654, K97/2. 66. See letter Machtig to M. MacDonald and Batterbee, 8th February-, 1945, 
and Minute by Stephenson, 2nd February 1945, D035/1228, WX101/90. - 
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time several Canadian legations abroad were being elevated to the rank 
of Embassies and these newpapers strongly advocated that Commonwealth 
representatives should also be styled 'Ambassador' because 'High 
Commissioner' suggested a country "under colonial tutelage". 
67 
This 
was an exaggerated interpretation of the position, but indicates 
the kind of pressure exerted by some sections of French Canadian opinion. 
The D. O. did not want the matter to be raised again and stressed to the 
High Commission in Ottawa that Commonwealth relations should remain on 
a different footing from those between foreign countries. The F. O. 
agreed that the fallacy in the argument for change lay in the fact that 
the King would have to appoint ambassadors accredited to himself; but as 
one official of the D. I. D. observed, there were sections of opinion in 
the other three Dominions which favoured a change in the title and status 
4High 
Commissioners. 
68 
of 
The Government of Eire was responsible for resurrecting the issue 
in February 1945 when it requested that the New Zealand representative 
be styled 'Commonwealth Minister'. The D. O. tried to forestall a change 
by saying that there could be no alteration without consultation and 
agreement between all members. 
69 
The change was not agreed to, but it 
became clear that the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin, Key, 
rey, also 
wanted a change. Cranborne was sensitive to these complaints and 
realised that the old title 'High Commissioner' was becoming unpopular, 
seemed "out of datea "' relic' of the Colonial period, a badge of inferiority, 
etc. "; he accepted the likelihood of a change. 
70 
More serious discussion 
was demanded in November 1946 whenthe Canadian Government raised with 
67. See, press reports of December 1945 and telegram from"U. K. High 
Commissioner in Canada to D. O., 13th February 1944, D035/1116, G551/l. 
68. Wiseman to Garner, 24th February 1944, Minutes by Wiseman-and Machtig, 
18th & 23rd February 1944, ibid. Minutes by Campbell, 13th March 1944, 
Dunbar, 23rd March. 1944 and Newton, 17th March 1944, F0371/42666, 
W3186/80/68. 
69. Minute by Stephenson, 2nd February 1945,, and letter Machtig to MacDonald 
and Batterbee, 8th February 1945, D035/1228, WX101/90. 
70. Maffey to Stephenson, 29th Janu" y 1945, and Minute by Cranborne, 7th 
February 1945, ibid. 
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the U. K. the po's'sibility of clinnging the title of its High Commisi; loner 
in Dublin'to 'representative', which would bring it Iin line'with the 
U. K.. 's. It'also reported that the Eire Government`had asked Australia 
to alter the title of its represt! utative. There was no immediate 
alteration, as the Canadians were persuaded to delay action pending 
discussions, and the Australian Government rejected Eire's suggestion 
that its representative be called Minister Plenipotentiary. 
71 
The U. K. 
was notpressed to hold discussions. King; when announcing the 
72 
new Canadian appointments on 7th November`1946 told a press conference 
that the question was to be reviewed. The following day the U. K. High 
Commissioner informed his Government' that Canada had requested informal 
talks'in London"to be preceded by an exchange of views' with the High 
73 
Commission. At the same time Evar told the U. K. High Commissioner 
in Canberra that he was attracted to the'idea of'calling )' Commonwealth 
representative 'Ministers'. 
74 
The D. O. sent the High Commission in Ottawa guidance"for its preliminary 
talks. 
75 
In London an inter-departmental meeting of officials considered 
a memorandum drawn up by the D. O. on inter-Commonwealth representation. 
This paper noted a'suggestion that the 'Commonwealth representatives 
should continue to be treated as a separate group but rank equally with 
Ambassadors, and the idea of ranking a visiting Minister equally, with his 
71, - See U. K. High Commissioner: Canada - D. O.,, 1-November 1946, D. O. - U. K. 
High Commissioner Canada, 2nd November 1946, and U. K. High Commissioner 
, Canada, - D. O. - 2nd November 1946, D035/1270, G564/1, -, 
72. D. O. - U. K. High Commissioner Canada, 2nd November 1946, ibid. 
73. See U. K. High Commissioner Canada, - D. O., 1s. t, November; 1946,2nd November 
1946,7th November 1946 and 8th November 1946, ibid. 
74, U. K. High; Commissioner Australia - D. O. -, "6th November, 1946, ibid. (The High Commissioner thought the Australian Department of External Affairs 
would like the change as it could enable them to: take responsibility for 
the post which was still under the Prime Ministers Department. ) 
75., TD. O. - U. K. High Commissioner Canada,, 19th November.. 1946, ibid. Discussionf 
were held in Ottawa on 27th January 1947 between all Dominion High 
Commissiöners and Canadian officials, -and there were further discussions 
on 21st March 1947. However, by the tim -second meeting was convened 
the Canadians had heard t hat Evatt had 
'rthat 
the matter was so 
important that it required a meeting between Prime Ministers. Later 
the Canadians heard that this was an attempt by Evatt to stop the Ottawa 
talks. No further meetings were held in Ottawa on this issue. 'See 
Memorandum on "High Commissioners: Title and Status" prepared for the 
1347 London discussions 10th October 1947, MG26, J 4, Vol. 237, File 
2 52, pp. C160350-C1603k. 
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High Commissioner to avoid embarrassment on that score. A suggestion 
by Stephenson that High Commissioners should rank with, but separately 
from, Foreign Ministers Plenipotentiary (which would place them below 
Ambassadors but above all but tt four most senior Cabinet Ministers, 
was accepted. It was agreed that the title should remain unchanged, 
but that if this were impossible, acceptable alternatives would be 
'Resident Minister', 'Resident Minister and High Commissioner', 
'Commissioner of State' or 'Representative'. 
76 
Inter-Commonwealth representation was placed in the wider context 
of i nter-Commonwealth relations in May 1947 when the Prime Minister, 
Attlee suggested to his senior Ministers a review of "the existing 
status and inter-relationship" of the British Commonwealth and Empire 
in light of the recent changes. He noted that the Dominions disliked 
the term 'Dominion status' and that it was not attractive to India, 
Burma or Ceylon. He pointed to the anomaly of the High Commissioners' 
status, especially as the Dominions sent their own ambassadors to many 
foreign states. Attlee thought the position needed reconsideration 
and added 
The critical position in Ij9ia, Burma and Ceylon 
makes this an urgent need. 
He indicated the seriousness with which he viewed the matter with the 
comment that there was not time for lengthy consideration by constitutional 
lawyers. A political decision by the Cabinet was required, and then 
discussion with the Dominions, without the need for the "lengthy 
formalities of an Imperial Conference". A meet eng of Ministers on 9th 
June considered Attlee's minute and a memorandum prepared by the D. O. 
on the existing structure of the Commonwealth. It decided to set up 
a Ministerial Committee', consisting of the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
76. D. O. Memorandum for inter-departmental committee, "Reception of one 
British Commonwealth country in the territory of another", December 
1946, D035/1270, G564/1, and Meeting of officials 17th December 1946, 
minutes, ibid. 
77. Minute by Attlee, 14th May 1947, No. M221/47, F0371/65588, W4785/4414/68. 
(Attlee's review covered wider aspects than the position of High 
Commissioners. Other aspects are discussed later. ) 
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Secretary, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and the Lord''''` 
Chancellor, to consider the 'futurestructure 'of' 'the Cominonwealth, °'`with 
78 o" a committee 'of officials to assist it. 
At the first` meeting of the officials , on `4th'oJuly 1947, Stephenson 
put forward proposals radically different from 'those he'hid suggested 
seven months! earlier. ' He told his colleagues that Dominion High 
Commissioners thought it "derogatory and inconvenient" to'be' ranked 
below ambassadors, and of the informal' Canadian suýstion'that they should 
become ambas'sadors''and rank accordingly: He informed the 'meeting of 
Addison's wish that High Commissioners be given the highest possible'` 
status, "preferably above that of the representatives of foreign states", 
while being kept as a separate group with their traditional ranking 
inter se according to seniority of the country, not' the date of`other 
appointment. The majority of the comnüttee`agreed'to this ideä'and 
the 'subsequent proposal that the top seven Office's öf State ýb'e''alte'red 
in'precedence so they ranked above Ambassadors and High"Commissioners, 
and that'visi'ting Dominion Ministers should rank beiow`these offices 
but above Ambassadors and High Commissioners, toensuretheirPprecedence 
over theirown representatives. AgreementYwas not unanimous with 
Gwatkin 'registering the F. O. 's opinion that High Commissioners shouldýý'ý ° 
not rank above foreign ambassadors; nor should the seven highest 
Offices of Stäte. 79 An interim report circulated on 10th July noting 
the majority's view and, the objection of'Gwätkin. The F. O. 's alternative, 
proposal - that ambassadors retain their position, with the High 
Commissioners elevated'to a rank behind the highest seven 0if ices 
80 
was included. 
78. Minutes of a meeting of Ministers, 9th June 1947, Gen/86/ 2nd meeting, 
F0371/65588,,, W4939/4414/68. 
79. Minutes of, meeting of official committee, CR(0)(47) st meeting, 4th July 1947. (The seven Highest offices were: Archibishop of Canterbury, Lord Nigh, Chancellor, Prime Minister, Archbishop, of York,, Lord, President 
of the Council, Speaker of the House of Commons and the' Lord Privy Seal. ) 80. Draft Interim Report of Cabinet official committee on Commonwealth Relations, 10th July 1947, CR(0)(47)1,, F0371/65589, W6873/4414/68. 
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The F. O. was not itself united to this question. There were those, 
such as Mr. R. Dunbar, Head of the Treaty Department, who were content 
to see the High Commissioners on an equal footing with Ambassadors, 
if a concession had to be granted, rid did not, object to a single list 
of representatives. Dunbar thought it might be healthy for a, lligh 
81 Commissioner to be Doyen of an enlarged diplomatic,. body. . Some would 
not agree even to this. M. Cheke, ii. M. Vice Marshal of the Diplomatic 
Corps,, stressed the historic position, of foreign representatives laid 
down at the Congress of Vienna. He noted the important difference 
between foreign representatives and the British High Commissioners, who 
represented one part of a family of nations, and said it was in harmony 
with "time-honoured principles of courtesy" to allow foreign guests to 
go in front of 'family'. He anticipated any change in the order of 
precedence causing discourtesy and outrage to the Diplomatic community, 
and opposed the idea of High Cor. missioners' ranking with ambassadors 
because they were in "a different category". 
82 Cheke was supported 
by Sir John Monck who emphasised the fact that ambassadors were the .-,; 
personal representatives of their Sovereigns, or Heads of State, and 
that courtesy demanded preference to be given to them over all but the, 
Sovereign. Monck would accept the High Commissioners after the ambassadors, 
before the seven High Offices, and agreed with their being kept, as a ,i 
separate group. He added 
If the Foreign Office are not prepared to stand up,. for the foreign Ambassadors and support their claim, no one else will 83 
Monck also protested against any incorporation of the High Commissioners 
with the Diplomatic Corps and thought it would be deeply resented by 
the latter. 84 The analogy of the family was frequently used in the 
81. Minute by Dunbar, 10th July 1947, F0371/65589, W6873/4414/68. 82. Minute by M. Cheke, 9th June 1947, ibid. 83. Minute by Monck, 10th July 1947, ibid. 84. Minutes by Sargent, 21st July 1947; M. Cheke, 24th July 1947 and Monck, 28th July 1947, ibid. 
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Commonwealth connection, for instance by Gwatkin who wrote of relatives 
residing in the house of the immediate family and giving way to 
distinguished guests. 
85 
At the second meeting of officials, little progress was made as the 
m ajority on the committee favoured altering the order of precedence to 
place the seven High offices above both Ambassadors and High Commissioners 
and ranking those two as equal, but parallel, groups. The F. O. 
registered its objection to the demotion of Ambassadors. 
86 
Sticking' 
to its position that the High Commissioners should be promoted, but 
the ambassadors retained in their traditional place, Gwatkin suggested 
that this could create little real grievance for the former as the 
Foreign Corps had its own entree on Court occasions, while at public 
dinners the two were traditionally 'interleaved'. 
87 
This official 
'protest' to the secretary of the committee, making it clear that it 
could not agree to the majority view, was made after a meeting at the 
F. O. to decide whether it could accept the committee's recommendations. 
88 
The F. O. 's objection was noted in the committee's report, and the matter 
was scheduled to go to the Cabinet. Before any ministerial discussion 
the Foreign Secretary was briefed on the subject, and told that if the 
89 4 
F. O. did not support the ambassadors' position, no one else would. 
At a meeting of Ministers on 19th November 1947 the subject arose 
while another matter was under discussion. They agreed that the High 
Commissioners should be promoted to a. rank below that of the seven Highest 
Offices, but that the position of Ambassadors should remain the same. 
85. Minute by Gwatkin, 22nd July 1947, ibid. 
86. Minutes of meeting of officials 8th August 1947, CR(0)(47), 2nd meeting, 
F0371/65589, W6876/4414/68. 
87. Minute by Cwatkin, 8th August 1947, and letter to Wilson (Ca. Offices) 
18th August 1947, F0371/65589, W6876/4414/68. 
88. Minute by Gwatkin, 12th August 1947, and note by Gwatkin 18th August_ 
1947, ibid. 
89. Report of status and title of High Commissioners in London, 24th September 
1947, CR(47)5, F0371/65589, W6872/4414/68. Minute by Gwatkin, 30th, 
September 1947, F0371/65589, W7230/4414/68.,.. Meeting between officials 
and Secretary of State, 19th November 1947, and Minutes by Finch, 4th & 
8th December 1947, F0371/65589, W8052/4414/68. 
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However, this was not a meeting of the full cabinet, or the committee 
on Commonwealth Relations. The F. O. tried to ascertain whether this 
decision was final, but were told by the Prime Minister's Office that 
Attlee preferred the matter to be placed on the agenda of a formal 
meeting, particularly as the Prime Minister had had subsequent talks 
pith King, and felt that his views should be taken into consideration. 
90 
The issue was not decided by the Cabinet until May of the following 
year, when the Foreign Secretary withdrew his objections to the foreign 
ambassadors' and High Commissioners' being given equal ranking (in 
separate groups) behind the seven highest offices of state. 
Even then, discussion was not entirely over because the U. K. had 
at the outset agreed to discuss the question with the Dominions; and 
wanted their agreement,, and similar arrangements in all Commonwealth 
capitals. In July 1947 the U. K. High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir A. 
Clutterbuck, when shown a copy of the Interim Report, had said that 
the Canadians were pressing for the title and rank of ambassador, 
with the superior status the more important issue. 
91 
On 4th 
August 1948 the four Dominions were all sent the proposals, including 
the idea that High Commissioners be addressed as 'His Excellency', be 
appointed by the King (although not with formal letters of credence) and 
told that visiting Dominion Ministers would be given precedence equal 
to, their opposite numbers in the U. K. 
92 The replies of the Dominions 
90. Meeting of Ministers, 19th November 1947, note by Finch, 8th December 1947. 
McAlpine (Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary) to Cumming- 
Bruce (CRO) 2nd December 1947, Note from P. MY's Office to McAlpine, 
, 
3rd December 1947, F0371/65589, W8052/4414/68. 
91. U. K. High Commissioner Canada - C. R. P., 29th July 1947, F0371/65589, 
W6874/4414/68. The Canadian memorandum for the London discussions of 
November 1947, drafted in October, suggests the Canadian attitude should 
be to favour the eventual adoption of the title of ambassador, but not 
`press for any immediate change, anticipating that the U. K. would become 
more unsatisfactory if India left the Commonwealth, and its Ambassador 
ranked above the representatives of the Commonwealth, and its memorandum 
confirms the U. K. High Commission view that Canada would be satisfied 
with Commonwealth and foreign representatives ranking equally according 
to their date of taking office. Memorandum on "High Commissioners; 
Title and Status" prepared for the November 1947 London discussions, 
10th October 1947, MG26, J 4, Vol. 237, File 2352, pp. C160353-C160354. 
92. Telegram to four Dominions, 4th August l948, see Cabinet memorandum by 
Wý889%2+5$j614th September 1948, CR(48)7, Annex 1, F0371/70201, 
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, were not entirely 
favourable. New Zealand, Australia and Canada all 
objected to the proposal that visiting Ministers should only rank 
equivalently with their opposite numbers in the U. K. as that would 
place them below their country's representatives on many occasions. 
New Zealand and Australia were thinking especially of the frequency 
with which Nash and Evatt visited as Deputy, or Acting Prime Minister, 
and the rank which ought to be accorded to them. Some objection was 
also raised to the idea that the two groups of representatives would 
be kept separate; the practical difficulties of 'interleaving', 
whether, a High Commissioner would be 'Doyen' and whether this was not 
making too great a distinction between foreign and Commonwealth 
representatives. 
93 
In light of these Dominion reservations to the U. K. proposals, 
modifications were put forward. The Dominions Secretary still wanted 
to keep the High Commissioners as a separate group, but was willing to 
see them ranking, for purposes of precedence only, with foreign 
ambassadors. On inter-Commonwealth occasions the traditional ranking 
according to the seniority of the country was to be kept. To meet the 
objections to the ranking of visiting Ministers, it was proposed that 
they be accorded ad hoc ranking, which in practice would be above that 
of their own representative. This was accepted by the U. K. Cabinet 
and proposed to the Dominion Prime Ministers at a meeting in London 
on 13th October 1948.94 It was submitted to a committee of Commonwealth 
officials who reported on 18th October. The majgxity of the committee 
decided that High Commissioners should rank with ambassadors and that 
the practical application of this principle should be left to member 
93. See telegrams from New Zealand Government 7th August 1948, U. K. High 
Commissioner New Zealand, 7th August 1948, U. K. High Commissioner 
Australia, 18th August 1948, Australian Govt., 20th August 1948, 
F0371/70201, W4619/2458/68, and memorandum by S/S C. R. O., 24th September 
1948, op. cit. 
94. Cabinet memorandum by S/S C. R. O., 24th September 1948, op. cit., and 
note by Attlee for meeting of Prime Ministers, 13th October 1948, re 
status of High Commissioners, F0371/70201, W6244/2458/68. 
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states.. Itýproposed that the separation of the, two-groups should 
be ended, and 'agreed that there were arguments for a high Conunissioner 
as 'Doyen' of the Corps. It-, recommended that ambassadors and ugh 
Commissioners should take precedence according to the date of their 
appointment and that seniority of countries should be abandone&as 
a basis for precedence of High Commissioners inter se. The British 
suggestion about the rank of visiting Ministers was accepted, as was the 
style of, a High Commissioner - 'His Excellency'. - It was not-recommended 
that they should be. accredited by-the King, but only, that some, form 
of credentials should be considered. On the subject of the title, 
which the U. K. had recommended should stay the same as there did, not 
seem a suitable alternative, the committee stated, 
There. is strong objection to 'High Commissioner'. If - it is to be changed the general sense was in favour of95 
'Ambassador' despite the arguments against that style. 
The F. O. onlyhad two real objections 'to this report, that a High- 
Commissioner could be made 'Doyen' of the Diplomatic Corps, and that 
the High Commissioners should be, called Ambassadors. They, had, no 
objection to the amalgamation-of the two groups and the change in the 
order of precedence, conceding that those' responsible for Dominion affairs, 
should comment on'that. It thought credentials. unnecessary; Gazetting 
the first interview with the King, or his representative, would be 
sufficient. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers agreed to raise the 
96 
status of'ýHigh Commissioners. to that of , ambassadors, - and combine, "the .: 
two in one Diplomatic Cörps. International'agregment was obtained for 
this. In_the U. K. the question of 'seniority was solved by interleaving 
High Cömmissioners with foreign ambassadors and the'U. K. 'did not allow 
a High Commissioner to become Doyen if the-most senior representative. ' 
95. Recommendations of committee of officials-appointed to consider the 
status of High Commissioners, 18th October 1948, F0371/70201, 
W6244/2458/68. 
96. Minute by Sir N. Charles (Assistant Under-Secretary at F. O. superintending 
CLF), 19th October 1948, ibid. 
425 
(This situation existed until '1973, when the Jamaican High Commissioner, 
Sir L. Lindo, became Doyen. ) The one alteration to the report of the 
committee of experts concerned the title of High Commissioners, which 
had caused thesubject to be first raised. It was decided in 1948 
to retain 'High Commissioner'. 
97 Garner'*recounts that supporters of 
'ambassador' had never been more than a minority, but it does seem that 
very many Ministers and officials on the Dominion side favoured such 
a change', and that it was the insistence of the U. K. which prevented it. 
98 
One further change in Commonwealth terminology had taken place in 
July 1947; the name of the Office and Minister in the U. K. responsible 
for Dominion affairs. At the time when Attlee opened up the general 
discussion of the Commonwealth relationship the D. O. was considering 
this change. In the spring of 1947 it separated from the C. O., and in' 
the summer it was due to take over the functions of the Information Office. 
Moreover the D. O. had been aware that the Dominions disliked the terms 
"Dominion status" and "Dominion office" and would welcome a change. 
Addison said that a change had been under consideration, and that the 
alternatives "Commonwealth Relations" or "Commonwealth Affairs" Office 
had been suggested. It was agreed that the Dominions should be consulted. 
99 
The D. O. sent a telegram to the four Prime Ministers saying. that it 
thought the existing titles were not "entirely appropriate" and tended 
to present a misleading impression of the relationship between the U. K. 
and the other members. It mentioned the proposed alternatives as being 
97. During the 1948 Prime Ministers meeting, Kin' had come down in favour of the term High Commissioner, rather than Ambassador because, the latter, he wrote in his diary, indicated "further separation from the Commonwealth". It is likely that the discussions about India and the future of the Commonwealth association had made King more eager to 
stress the ties of Commonwealth. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, p. '417. 98. See Garner, o . cit., p. 316. 99. Minutes of meeting of Ministers, 9th June 1947, Gen/, 186/2nd meeting, F0371/655881 W4939/4414/68. In 1943 Newton thought the name of the Office should be changed because the' Dominions disliked it, F0371/42674, W1116/1103/68. 
-"ý. ý. -, 
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more accurate descriptionsof the functions of the Office. The telegram 
added that it would also make it easier to include relations with India, 
Burma and Ceylon within the functions of the Office if such a change 
were made. 
100 
- This was perhaps 
aa surprising comment as Lord Addison 
had been keen to contact the Dominions quickly 
to avoid. giving the impression that the-proposed change 
of nomenclature is put forward solely from considerations 
related to Indian and Asiatic affairs. 101 
Encouraging replies came back. Australia's leader though the idea 
contained merit, but suggested that it might require other changes=' 
(possibly a reference to the title of High Commissioners), and proposed 
that it should be discussed together with other questions at the meeting 
of Prime Ministers in the autumn of 1947. The other three Prime 
Ministers favoured a change. Fraser preferred "Commonwealth Affairs", 
Smuts and King "Commonwealth Relations". Smuts thought "Affairs" 
smacked too much of administration, while King, careful to insist that 
it was entirely a matter for the U. K. to decide but appreciating its-, 
courtesy in asking him, thought "Relations" indicated more adequately 
the nature of the Office. 
102 
The title of the Dominions office was 
altered on 3rd July 1947 to the "Commonwealth Relations Office" and its 
political head was known as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations. t; 
Attlee's minute of July 1947, which had stimulated a full: review of 
inter-Commonwealth relations, had noted that the Dominions, ' particularly- 
South Africa and Canada, disliked the term "Dominion status".. In: 
April 1944, in a telegram on collaboration with the Dominions, 'Halifax 
had suggested the U. K. stopped using the term 'Dominion status', as rcýn. 
100. Telegram to Prime Ministers of four Dominions, 12th June 1947, 
F0371/6580, W4414/4414/68. 
101. Minute from Cumming-Bruce to Sir P. J. Dixon, 8th June`1947, asking 
for F. O. approval for the draft, ibid. 
102. Replies from the four Dominion Governments, ýNew Zealand - D. O., 
14th June 1947, Australia - D. O., 16th June 1947, -South 
Africa, -, 4 
D. O., 17th June 1947, and Canada - D. O., 23rd June 1947, F0371/65580, 
W4414/4414/68. '' ` 
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it was interpreted as implying a difference in status. 
103 
The 
continued use of the term "Dominion" had also beenrraised during the 
debates of the India Independence Bill, on 14th July 1947, by a 
Conservative M. P., Mr. Geoffrey Nicholson. He question. the continued 
suitability of the term and noted the paradox of changing., the title 
of the Secretary of State responsible for Commonwealth Relations from 
'Dominions Secretary', and yet still using the term 'Dominion' in 
, i. 
relation to India. He suggested a revision of the Statute of Westminster 
in light of. the change in the use of the word 'Dominion' which he. thought 
subject to several misconceptions. Attlee agreed, and said it might 
be necessary in the future to consider a different term, admitting 
that the word was "not always popular in other, Commonwealth countries". 
He said it was a matter to take up with the other members. 
104 
Lord_ 
Addison's reply to Attlee's minute enclosed a A. O. memorandum which 
took up this point. The D. O. acknowledged that the terms 'Dominion' 
and 'Dominion status, ' were not acceptable to general opinion,. mentioning 
South Africa and Canada specifically. The memorandum said that the, 
terms were regarded as "disguising the equality and independence" of, - 
those, countries and that there was particular objection to. any 
classification "which, puts the United Kingdom on, the one hand and : the =.. 
other countries in a group on the other". 
105 
With. the change in the-. K 
name of the Office, the term 'Dominion' was gradually phased out, 
especially as India did not accept 'Dominion status'., - A U. K. memorandum 
of October 1948 noted that certain terms were outmoded and should not 
continue to be used officially; these included, 'Dominion', 'Dominion ,., 
Government' and, 'Dominion status'... it also noted that although no formal 
change was recommended, _it. would be useful to 
drop the term 'British' 
1, 
103, Halifax to Eden, ' l4th`April 1944, ' F0371/42674', W6456`/l103/68. 
-104. Hansard House of Commons Debates Vol.. 440, Cola. 40-41. & 44-45. 
See J. W. Holmes report on the U. K. House ofiCommons-debates on 
the India Independence Bill, 1st August 1947, MC26, J I, Vol. 429. 
File: Roberton May-December 1947,. pp. 390133 and 390148. ' 105. D. O., Memorandum entitled "The Structure of-the British Commonwealth" 
enclosed in Addison's minute to Attlee of. 19th May 1947, D0121/10C, ' 
No. 73. 
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to describe the 'Commonwealth of Nations 
106 
The alteration in the name of the D. O. to C. R. O. also led to a 
change in the F. Ö. From July 3rd 1947 the Dominions Intelligence 
1 
Department was changed to the Commonwealth Liaison Department (C. L. D. )07 
(This change caused some early confusion because of Whitehall's 
partiality for using initials rather than full names, and some papers 
went astray, usually straight to the C. R. O. rather than to the C. L. D. 
But it could not be called the Commonwealth Intelligence Department 
108' 
(C. I. D. ) as this was thought likely to have caused even greater confusion! ) 
The status of High Commissioners complicated by the intricate 
protocol procedures in the U. K., was an issue of some significance. 
The F. O., anxious to prevent any alterations which might antagonise 
foreign states, emphasised the 'family' character of the Commonwealth. 
The F. O. sometimes ignored the special nature of the relationship, 
tending to regard the Dominions as merely other allies, potentially 
useful, but not worth the cossetting which it thought the C. R. O. gave 
them. From the point of view of the C. R. O. the central issue was to 
retain the distinctiveness of the Commonwealth relationship, upon which 
its own future rested too. If High Commissioners were restyled 
'Ambassadors' and recognised to be little different from representatives ' 
of foreign states, would there be any need for a separate Office of State 
to conduct relations with the Dominions? 
The independence of India marked a watershed in the history of the 
Commonwealth. The 1.0. was absorbed into the C. R`0. and the Commonwealth 
was tentatively set to embark upon a new era with an expanded membership, 
and ultimately a different basis for the association. It would 
nevertheless be wrong to say that the independence of India was the 
reason for altering the name of the office, the status of High Commissioners, 
106. U. K. memorandum, October 1948, MG26, J 4, Vol. 234, File 2346, 
pp. C159859-C159860. 107. F. O. Circular No. 82, llth July 1947, F0371/65590, W6234/4898/68. 
108. Minutes by J. R. A. Bottomley (Private Secretary, C. R. O. ), 21st 
August 1947, joy, 21st August L 47 & Gwatkin, 22nd August 1947, ibid. 
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or the use of some nomenclature. , The old Dominions had become 
increasingly disenchanted with,. the term 'Dominion' and, while they 
did not press the U. K. for change in the same way as they did over 
the status of their representatives, it was a logical and probably 
inevitable one. The position of India, Burma and Ceylon no doubt 
added some urgency to the U. K. 's consideration-of these matters, and 
the U. K. was aware of the interpretation which the Dominions might 
place on its actions; but the title fitted the new relationship 
a f; yR 
developing between the U. K. and its senior Commonwealth partners. In 
this relationship the other members were conscious of their increased 
international status, of their relations with non-Commonwealth countries, 
and of fulfilling a more active role than before; but on their terms, 
not necessarily the U. K. 's. The distinctive Commonwealth relationship, 
characterised by the use of titles such as 'High Commissioner', was 
about to be challenged to a far greater degree by India's independence 
and the discussions over its future association with the Commonwealth. 
1. 
{0 
4. 
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Chapter Nin' 
Indian Independence and the Expansion of the Commonwealth 
In 1935 the U. K. Parliament. had passed the Government of India Act, 
designed to establish an all-Indian Federation with a central government 
which would be in charge of all matters except defence and external 
affairs. The Congress Party won ee'r'' 
but was reluctant to assume responsibilities in the national Government. 
Fierce divisions were appearing between the Congress Party and the Muslim 
League. Lacking a responsible central government, the Viceroy declared 
war in September 1939 without consulting the Indian leaders, which 
caused a protest from the Congress Party, many of whose leaders were 
imprisoned during the war. 'Talks between the U. K. and Indian leaders 
in March 1940 ended in failure, as did the Cripps mission of 1942. 
Indian self-government, possibly in the form of Dominion status, was the 
ultimate intention of the U. K. Government, but the timing of the British 
withdrawal remained uncertain, especially after the failure of the 
Simla conference of June 1945.1 
In the Speech from the Throne which opened the new Parliament on 
15th August 1945, the government promised to 
do their utmost to promote, in conjunction with the 
, leaders of Indian opinion, the early realization of 
full self-government in India. 2 
Attlee's government, and the Prime Minister in particular, determined to 
reach a solution to the Indian problem. Attlee had served on the Simon 
w 
Commission of 1928 and the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee of 1933, 
and possessed a good knowledge of Indian affairs. He selected as 
Secretary of State for India Lord Pethick Lawrence who had many friends 
1. For further details on India's progression towards independence see: 
Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: -The Transfer of 
Power 1942-1947, (H. M. S. O., London, 1970-8? ), ed. P. N. S. Mansergh. 
For more general accounts which related to the Commonwealth aspect, see 
P. N. S. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London, 1969), pp. 295-299; 
J. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI: His Life and Reign (London, 1965), 
pp. 692-704; P. Gordon-Walker, The Commonwealth London, 1962), 
pp. 47-49 & 132-133. 
2. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 15th August 1945, Vol. 413, Col. 57. 
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in'India und was therefore suited,, in Attlee's view, "to inaugurate a 
new policy". 
3 Attlee authorised elections to be held at the end of 1945 
and-in March 1946-sent a team of Ministers for further discussions. 
(The team consisted of Lord Pethick Lawrence, -Sir Stafford Cripps, 
President of the Board of Trade, and A. --V. Alexander, First Lord of the 
Admiralty. )-' The Prime Minister announced that the purpose of the' 
mission was to'establish a constitution-making body and a representative 
Viceroy's executive Council', but that it was for Indians'to decide the, 
form of'the constitution" and to choose whether or not, they wished'to' 
stay in the British Commonwealth. 
4 
The Cabinet Mission rejected'partition, 
but failed to heal the breach between the two groups, Hindu and Musliw; 
although' both signed the proposals for an Interim Government, ' Nehru and 
Jinnah had reservations 'and the first'attempts to form such 'a body-failed. 
In-July, elections were held for 'a constituent Assembly and in August, 
Attlee authorised the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, to form an Interim Government, 
which he succeeded in doing. 
Relations between the Congress Party and the Muslim League worsened, 
and after the failure of the ' London" talks of December 1946, between the 
U. K. and the two leaders, Nehrü and Jinnah, 'and the lack'of progress, made 
by the Constituent Assembly, also meeting in December, some fresh 
impetus was needed. 'Wavell" suggested to Attlee that 'the' U: K. should 
set a 'definite date ` for -withdrawal, `and begin a , phased departure'. 
However, Attlee was'not"happy'about Wavell's plan, and told the'King 
so. The King `noted in his diary- that 'Attlee had. said it' `"" ``d 
savours too "much of a military retreat"& (Wavell) 'does not-' '"' ", 
realize it is a political problem & not a military one. Wavell 
has done very-good work up to now but Attlee doubts whether 
he has the finesse to negotiate the next steps wh9n we must keep 
the 2 Indian parties friendly to us all the time. 
3. C. R. Attlee, As It Happened (London, 1954), p. 181. See also Pethick- 
Lawrence's statement to India press representatives, August 1945, 
Mansergh, India: Transfer of power, op. cit., Vol: VI; 'No. 10. 
4. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 15th March 1946, Vol. 420, Col. 1421. 
5. The King's Diary, 17th December 1946. Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, 
King George VI: His Life and Reign, pp. 709-710. 
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Attlee still hoped the Hindus and Muslims would establish'some kind 
OZ CMcXýf: E'..: 2 b-ut he t', -. &t b Gate i: bv tobe set for 
the U. K. 's withdrawal or no solution woüld, be found and the U. K. would 
be responsible for', the failure. He also decided to appoint a new 
Viceroy,:. Lord Mountabatten, whom he described as a man of "imagination, 
sympathy and tremendous drive" and who might be the man to "pull it 
of f". 
61, 'In. February 1947Attlee announced that the British would leave 
India and transfer power' to Indian hands no later than'June 1948. ' In 
March 1947 Mountbatten arrived in India and within'two months it had 
been decided that two self-governing Dominions should'be'established. 
June 1948 as the date of withdrawal was recognised'as being too late, 
and in July 1947 the U. K. Government introduced the, Indianlndependence 
Bill to Parl'iament. ý - This became law, without a division, '' on July-18th 
and-on 15th August '1947, exactly two years after the Speech from the 
Throne;. power was transferred to the new Governments of Indiaand- 
Pakistan: 
7 
A week'before India's independence, officials of'the'C. R. O., F. O. " 
and the soon to be extinct 1.0. met to discuss-what information should 
be sent to the two new members of the Commonwealth: It was agreed that 
there should be no diminution in the amasnt or quality of the information 
sent to, the four older members. Security arrangements in Karachi and; ='- 
Delhi were inadequate, -which made leakages quite likely; and an: I. O. 
official said that the "known communistic bias" of the prospectiveýIndian 
High Commissioner to London, Mr. Krishna Menon, made it "probable that, 
anything of importance will find its way into Russian hands". - It--- 
was decided that the U. K. should not inform either country of the 
6. Attlee, op. cit., pp. 183-4. 
7. See Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 711-714; Attlee, op. cit., pp. 184-185. 
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of the negotiations to revise the Anglo-Russian Treaty, about which 
the old Dominions had received some information. " The problem did 
not lie in the lack of security. Would India remain within the 
Commonwealth for long, and if not, should it -receive highly secret 
information, the safety of which was certainly in jeopardy in the 
short term and possibly in the long term if it left the association? 
As a guide to their policy, officials noted Attlee's statements that 
the new Dominions would be treated as full and equal members of the 
Commonwealth, and agreed that the U. K. should do all it could to try 
and persuade India 'to' stay in the association. Could the desire to 
treat them as equal members and demonstrate the value of membership 
in terms of shared information beýreconciled with the concern for the 
security of U. K. intelligence? 
8 
At a meeting at the end of August, 
it was agreed that whatever system was devised to send information, 
it should avoid "any appearance of discrimination, particularly in 
any formal respect". 
9 
The C. R. O. prepared a memorandum at the end of August on the existing 
machinery of collaboration to provide a basis for discussions. 
10 This 
was transmitted to the F. O. at the beginning of September and was 
accredited with supplying "a very useful summary of the present position 
and present mechanism". 1i Meanwhile, Mr. Ashton Gwatkin (Assistant 
Under Secretary at the F. O. ) had requested a paper from the D. I. D. outlining 
the categories of information which could safely be transitted to India 
and Pakistan, the key criterion being "whether or not we should wish 
the Soviet Government 
to know about it". 
12 An internal F. O. committee 
met to consider issues concerning the U. S. S. R. and discussed the question 
S. Report of a meeting of officials, 7th'August 1947, F0371/65574, W6057/7/68. 9. Report by J oy August F037 3rd September 1947, of meeting of officials at the end of I , 10. Memoranda 1/65575, W6316/7/68. 
cmoran 
um drafted by Twist (C. R. O. ) "Principles and Practices of cati 
Governmenson and consultation with the other British Commonwealth t F0371/655 in relations to Foreigh Affairs", 28th August 1947, 
11. Minute by Jö 
W6317/1101/68. 
12. Minute by Gwäýkin, 12theAugust 
91947, bF0371/65574, 
W3142/7/68. 
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of what information should be transmitted and it decided that the F. O. 
should "begin with less rather than more" information and await events. 
In a further minute Gwatkin suggested that until a firm decision had 
been made, F. O. telegrams and F. O. Print would not be circulated to 
the new Dominions as freely as to the old. Sir Orme Sargent wanted 
iý '" 
a document indicating the sort of information which it would be dangerous 
to send. 
13 
Mr. Joy, of the D. I, D. 'submitted a draft, 
14 
and on 1st 
September-1947 Gwatkin circulated a minute to other F. O. departments 
o utlining the kinds of information, which it, was thought appropriate`to 
send to India and Pakistan; the-U. K. 's long term policy towards the""` 
U. S. S. R., information received from friendly contacts in Eastern Europe 
any material classified 'Top Secret',, the U. K. 's long term defence policy 
and any information about the future, ýof the colonial empire. Papers 
on all other- subjects, which would normally, be; sent to the 'senior' 
Dominions, should also go to India and Pakistan. These included all 
issues on the U. N, O.. agenda. and Middle and Far, Eastern- subjects, (although'""' 
it was noted that, care would; have to be taken to ensure that they should 
not. discredit French policy towards Tndo-China). ->: Two'other subjects''"'`', 
considered suitable were, U. K.. policy towards countries. outside%the ", ' 
Soviet bloc,. and bi-lateral, or`multi-lateral'treaty negotiations, in; 
which the,. U. K. was: involved. Gwatkin pointed out that in every instance 
it would be as much-a question of drafting as of selection of material, - 
which would govern the,: supply-ofiinformation. " Telegrams should, be' drafted 
not only with. the., views and needs': of, India alld Pakistan 
mind, but also in the knowledge that any one of them may be read in, Moscow. 15 ;, _. 'J 
-Other . -F. O.: departments each'had, their own area of'reäponsibilityýwhich 
13. Minutes by Gwatkin, 15th August 1947, and Sargent, 16th August 1947, ibid. 
14. Minute by Joy, 3rd September 1947¬ and draft memorandum, 20th August 1947, F0371/65574,46316/7/68. 
t.. 15. Minute by, Gwatkin, 1st September, 1947, ibid. 
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was reflected' in their replies, but asked that caution should be 
exercised in relation to the new Dominions. The North American department 
was anxious for the U. K. not to jeopardise its flow of information from 
the U. S. A. If it were not made clear to the Americans that the U. K. 
did not intend to transmit information listed under Gwatkin's forbidden 
categories 
the Americans will be nervous lest secret information 
of this type which they give us leaks to the Russians, 
via India and Pakistan, and they will become less 
forthcoming. 
It also thought that details about standardisation of arms, and the close 
co-operation between the U. K. -and the U. S. on, military and intelligence 
matters, should be withheld. _ .,. Mr. D. J.. Cheke, of the Japanese and 
Far 
Eastern Department, agreed with-giving factual information on Far 
Eastern-. issues, with a qualification:, 
beyond that, in the field of policy, there is not strictly 
speaking, very much we should wish to tell them in the 
knowledge that it might, be read in Moscow. 
He noted that the joint representation, of the U. K., Australia, New Zealand 
and India as the Allied Council in,, Tokyo already gave. India considerable 
information on Far Eastern issues, which he thought should be, continued, 
in some instances by discriminating againstPakistan. 
, 
He concurred 
with the American department's view that the U. K. 's, close co-operation 
with the U. S. A. should not be prejudiced. 
16 
The Northern Department 
was doubtful about sending any information on the treaty revisions with 
the U. S. S. R. or Scandinavian defence measures, and it did not want any 
intelligence from its friendly East European contacts, passed on, in 
case these sources were compromised. (Mikolajczyk and Cyrankiewicz of 
Poland were mentioned as examples). Finally, it wanted to omit details 
of the U. K. 's tactics to counter the U. S. S. R. 's political manoeuvres. 
Summing up the department's attitude, Mr. R. ý M. A. Hankey wrote 
16. Minutes'by p. S. Stephens (N. American Dept. ), 3rd September 1947, and 
D. J. Cheke (Jap. & Pacific Dept. ), 18th September. 1947, ibid. (For 
details of the representation on theA11ied Council in Tokyo, see Chapter 7. ) 
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I should hope that each question or paper would be judged 
individually on its merits. It would, I think, be dangerous , 
to draw up a list of forbidden subjects and say that anything 
outside the list was harmless. 
The Eastern Department agreed with Hankey's conclusion. In its particular 
sphere of action it advised that Middle Eastern questions be handled, with 
care, as many concerned the U. K. 's long-term defence policy, and it also 
warned that other areas, such as oil policy, should be treated 
circumspectly. It asked for the information it received from Persian 
sources to be withheld, as the Persians had a very low opinion of Indians 
17 
and would stop passing on information if they knew it was being forwarded. 
While the F. O. had been discussing the content of telegrams which,, 
could be sent to the new Commonwealth members, it was also holding talks 
with the C. R. O. to decide on a system. At a meeting on 1st September 
+S , 
it was suggested that material common to all six Dominions should, be 
sent in the form of circular 'D' telegrams to all Dominion Governments, 
but that all other material should be sent to the British High Commissioners 
in the Dominion capitals. The High Commissioners in the older Dominions 
would pass this information on to the Dominion governments, while those 
stationed in India and Pakistan would exercise great caution in doing 
so, but would have the material for their own information. 
18 The C. R. O. 
was not satisfied with this arrangement. Shannon held further talks with 
Joy, and explained that the C. R. O. had always attached-great importance 
to maintaining the direct governmental links with the Dominions. Eire 
and South'Africa had both tried, and were still trying, to deflect 
communications through the High Commissioners, but this had been resisted. 
He added that the Office expected Australia and New Zealand to object if 
a substantial proportion of information were diverted away from the inter- 
governmental channel. In a minute reporting this conversation, Joy 
noted that if the High Commissioners were used, fewer papers would need 
re-drafting; it would be 
17. Minutes by Hankey (Head of Northern Dept. ), 10th September 1947 and P. 
Garren (Eastern Dept. ) 17th September 1947, ibid. 
18. See Paper by the D. I. D. prepared for a'joint meeting with the C. R. O. 
18th September 1947, F0371/65574, W6365t7/68. 
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great deal, simpler-for us if High Commissioners 
, are. used more approximately to II. M. Representatives in foreign" 
'countries. We have, always maintained this view strongly 
in the case of India. and Pakistan where we would like 
vl'-ý U. K. High Commissioners to be in the position . of. 
Fathers,, l9,, 
Confessor to the Governments, to which they are accredited. 
Joy added that an additional benefit of the original proposal was that 
India and Pakistan would not, formally be treated any differently from 
the other Dominions, although in-practice they would. In, the case of 
the Dominion High Commissioners in London, Joy said those representing 
the older Dominions could be given copies not as of right, but as-of 
grace, but that in practically, all cases the High Commissioners of 
t5 
India and Pakistan would not. . -The F. O. was not to get its way, although 
its attitude to the use of High Commissioners reflected a, persistent 
attempt to increase its authority over. them in the field of foreign 
affairs. 
20 The C. R. O. put forward an alternative system which also 
circumvented the problem of theoretical discrimination against India 
and Pakistan. The circular 'D' telegrams would be sent to all six 
Governments and these would be supplemented by individual un-numbered 
telegrams to Dominion governments, usually just those of the four 
older members, which would only bear the name of the recipient. 
21 
Confirmation of the poor security in India and Pakistan came even 
17 
while the two Offices were continuing their discussions. The U. K. High 
Commissioners in Delhi and Karachi had been asked for their comments 
on the situation and about the U. K. proposals. The High Commissioner 
to India, Mr. T. H. Shone, replied on 12th September, having consulted 
his colleague in Pakistan, Sir L. Grafftey-Smith: He reported that 
security arrangements "for the custody and disposal of material may be 
assumed to be non-existent". He suggested that any information sent 
19. Minute by Joy, 5th September 1947, ibid. 
20. See pp. 449-457. 
21. 
,. 
Paper prepared by the D. I. D. for a meeting with the C. R. O., 18th 
September 1947, F0371/65574, W6365/7/68. 
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would be, liable quickly to end up either in the hands of a political 
group hostile to both the Indian and U. K. Governments, or in a foreign 
mission. - Shone said that in the case of India he had no, proof of - 
foreign agents working, but, - 
,. in view, of the lax security arrangements and the presence 
of large numbers of ill-paid clerks and office servants 
who have access to even secret documents, it will be no 
difficult task for foreign missions, should they wish to 
do so, to suborn individuals in the Ministry, of Foreign 
Affairs. 
He advised his Government not to increase the amount of information 
transmitted from pre-independence levels. He argued that India had 
received very little information before and would be unlikely to ask 
for more unless the U. K. raised the subject. Moveover, Shone felt that 
harm rather than good would be done by discharging at 
the two new Dominions a mass of (confidential) material 
conflicting in many cases with their own instincts and 
attitudes. Indeed this might well work provocatively, 
by stiffening existing resistance, rather than educationally, 
by, stimulating co-operation. 22 
This posed a problem for-the U. K. One of the justifications accepted 
by the committee of officials for sending more information on as wide 
a. range of subjects as possible was to attempt to interest India and 
Pakistan in world affairs, generally "as seen through our-eyes". 
23 On 
the one hand the U. K. wanted to inform and consult India and Pakistan 
as much as the, security, permitted, in order to persuade them to stay 
in the Commonwealth and to 'inculcate' a British intepretation of 
international affairs, while on the o ther hand its. High Commissioner 
was warning that this could provoke the opposite reaction. 
Shone's reply. was, discussed by both Offices. The F. O. extended its 
list of unsuitable, subjects to. include material "the tone, of which is in 
conflict with the-'basic instincts arM attitude" of India and Pakistan" 
in response to Shone's analysis. The C. R. O. later decided to abandon, 
its, plan,. to send circular 'D' telegrams supplemented by individually 
22. Shone to. C, R. O., 12th September 1947, F0371/65574, W8614/7/68. 
23. Report by Joy of a meeting between officials, 13th August 1947, 
F0371/65574, W6057/7/68. 
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addressed ones, tbecause of difficulties" stemming from the^fact that 
other'topics, apart from foreigntaffairs, were included' in°'the 'D' 
series. "' Eventually it was decided that two new series'"would be started, 
after Ceylon was made independent in December 1947, the 'H' and 'Q' 
series, but thedistinction' between the' volume and quality of 'information 
sent to the new and old members remained. 
24 
The U. K. 's Weekly Political Intelligence* Summary", which-hadbeen` 
sent to Dominion Governments and shoyT to Dominion High Commissioners, 
was one'source of information which the C. R. O. did not want the new 
members to see. Because°it-would be difficult to stop circulation to'- 
the old'Dominions, it asked the'F. O. if the-Summary could be phased out. 
25 
This was an attempt to reduce the'. formal 'discrimination, in`the treatment 
of the new and old Dominions, -but`'once the principle-had been, accepted 
that the new members could not receive as much information, and that 
the older ones should" not receive substantially less-; the U. K. left", "` 
itself open tosuch, a- charge. ' The F. O. was `concerned' that 'the'*existence 
of'two series would become known and lead to protests;; it preferred 
the-option of individual telegrams. -t" It was'also'worried that the 'white' 
Dominions would'not be aware of what"material India, 'Pakistan and Ceylon 
were receiving. - Joy was convinced'that, Addison'would-not agree to'the 
older members being informed of the U. K. 's plans for"restricting''' 
information, but he advised'that"the''F. O. should make" the` distinction 
clear when` the new series started` soi "no 'white" Commonwealth representative 
is in any doubt what he can; or'cannot, discuss wj, th his "brown'` Colleagues* , 
26 
If Addison was reluctant to tell the ý senior' Dominions of'the U. K. s 
cautionary attitude towards the new members, ' his' successor, 'Rt:, Hon. P. 
Noel-Baker, who took office in, October 1947, was. less. so. In his diary. 
King recorded his surprise that the Indian and Pakistani High commissioners 
were present at a meeting on 24th November 1947, at which Bevin. briefed 
24. F. O. paper for meeting with the C. R. O. on 18th September 1947, F0371/65574, 
W6365/7/68. 25. Minute by Joy, 3rd September 1947, F0371/65574, W6316/7/68. 26. Minute by Joy, 27th December 1947, F0371/65574, W8614/7/68. 
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Commonwealth representatives on the international situation. This 
was after Noel-Baker's private-explanation to him that there were some 
things Bevin could not communicate to India because of the lack of 
security. 
27 
The procedure for inter-governmental communication had been 
established but, there remained other aspects of-Commonwealth collaboration 
which also had to be considered. Contact between U. K. departments and 
Dominion staff in'London had been growing closer. The main link was 
provided by the meetings between the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs and the Dominion High Commissioners, which were usually attended 
by a F. O. representative. At the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting it had 
been agreed that these meetings should continue, with, the Prime Minister 
attending periodically to give a resume of U. K. policy. The proposal 
for the U. K. Prime Minister to attend meetings was never properly 
implemented. Churchill attended two meetings, one in June and another 
in December, but thereafter the practice lapsed. 
28 
From 1945 onwards 
meetings between the Dominions Secretary and the High Commissioners 
became much less frequent and regular. In 1946 there are-records-of 
only seven meetings. There may have been more which were not recorded, 
but certainly their frequency lessened. 
29. 
In February 1947 Addison 
proposed that the meetings should be placed on a more"firm fortnightly 
basis. - Reporting this, the Canadian High Commissioner thought this 
offer stemmed from Australian criticism'of lack of consultation during 
the Deputy ForeigniMinisters''Meeting. Beasley !, warmly welcomed"'the 
idea; -but Robertson said'he preferred ad hoc meetings when required and 
insisted that, it was important to preserve their "private and informal" 
27. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, p. 110. (King speculated whether Bevin' 
was deliberately trying to leak information to the U. S. S. R.; namely 
the determination of the U. K. and the U. S. A. to stand up to Russia; ' 
but'he doubts the likelihood of-this. ). 
28. Garner recalls Churchill's lack rf attendance, Garner, op. cit., p. 266. 
29. Records of High Commissioners' Meetings, See D0121/15 & 16. 
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character, and not to build them up into "an additional form of 
Commonwealth consultation". lie said Addison had appreciated this 
point, but the offer had been made and accepted. 
30 
King was told 
of the proposal and felt "very strongly" that it was a matter to be 
treated with great caution. Canada should not get itself in a position 
where we begin to assume responsibility for shaping 
'-imperial policy' and having 'a Cabinet of High 
Commissioners'. 
He did not see why Canada should submit to Australia; all it wanted was 
to be "informed, and not to get tied up". 
31 
L. B. Pearson, Under-Secretary of State at External Affairs, asked 
Robertson for the attitudes of the other two Dominions and asked if the 
question could be reviewed. He told King that while he disliked the 
idea it would be difficult to stand out against the other three, but 
that he suspected it would die a natural death in the course of time. 
32 
Robertson shared Pearson's prediction, because of Addison's commitments 
and those of the other High Commissioners. These predictions were 
correct; during the remaining months of 1947 meetings with the High 
Commissioners were convened only once, or occasionally twice, a month 
and this pattern continued for the next two years. Robertson told 
Ottawa that-'since'his representations to Sir-Eric Machtig, Addison would 
not refer to the new arrangement as "a significant cog in"Commonwealth 
33 
machinery", but he feared that Evatt would. The Canadian attitude 
did not seem to have changed significantly since King's objection to 
Massey's attendance at High Commissioners' meetings in 1936 and his 
statements in__1939 that such meetings as. the Canadian High Commissioner 
30. Robertson to Pearson, 26th February 1947, MH26, J. is Vol. 429, File: 
Robertson Feb. -April 1947, pp. 389828-389829. 
31. Memorandum-for Pearson by J. A., Gibson (External' Affairs) 27th February 
1947; 1 MG26, J 4, Vol. 237, File 2352, p. C160326. 
32. Minute for King by Gibson, 28th February 1947, ibid. `-, p. C160327, '-and -- 
Pearson minute to King, 1st March 1947, MG26, J4, Vol. 281, File F2981, 
Imperial Relations, p. C193120. 
33. Robertson to Pearson, 8th March 1947, MG26, J I, Vol. 429, File: 
Robertson Feb. -April 1947, p. 389881. 
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did attend did not constitute consultation between the two countries. 
34 
Undoubtedly the Canadian Government placed a different intepretation 
on these meetings from that of the U. K. or Australia. The latter 
was consistently eager to gain the most in the way of information and 
consultation by this means. The U. K. included the meetings with the 
High Commissioners in its list of methods employed to inform and consult 
with the Dominions. In a C. R. O. memorandum on the subject in August 
1947, the purpose of the meetings was described as providing an 
opportunity to give the Dominions background information which it 
would be difficult to include in circular telegrams, "and to exchange 
views informally with United Kingdom Ministers and Officials". The 
meetings were not regarded as a substitute for direct communications 
with Dominion Governments. 
35 
These different opinions about the purposes of the meetings between 
the High Commissioners and the Secretary of State did not become a major 
bone of contention as their frequency diminished and their character 
changed. In August a C. R. O. official was informing the F. O. that 
it should not be too concerned about the Indian and Pakistani High 
Commissioners' receiving confidential information at these meetings as 
The discussion there of important matters involving 
-Ministerial decisions was bound, in C. R. O. 's view,:, - 
to cease. 36 
A week later Gwatkin noted that the two new High Commissioners 
would be invited to the meetings, but that these would be "less confidential 
and probably less frequent". 
37 Recounting his ecperience at the C. R. O., 
Garner writes that from 1947 onwards meetings with the High Commissioners 
34. . 
V. Massey, What's Past is Prologue,, (Toronto, 1963), p. 238 and U. K. 
High Commissioner in Canada to r, 0., 21st March 1939, D035/576, F706/110. 
35. C. R. O. Memorandum, "Principles and Practices of Communication and 
Consultation with other British'Commonwealth Governments in relation 
to Foreign Affairs", 28th August 1947, F0371/65574, -W6317/1101/68. - 
36. Report of meeting of officials, 7th August 1947, F0371/65574, W6057/7/68. 
37. Minute by Gwatkin, 15th August 1947, F0371/65574, W6142/7/68. 
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outlook and in the main could be trusted with confidential information. 
(The exception during the war had been Jordan, the New Zealand High 
Commissioner, who was thought to be sympathetic to and indiscreet 
with the Russian Ambassador. )42 At the end of the war the Dominions 
had begun to show greater diversity in their interests in international 
affairs, reflecting their different geographical positions and priorities. 
The entry of India, Pakistan and later Ceylon, increased the divergencies 
and introduced an Asian outlook. This, together with the introduction 
of abrasive personalities, and the doubts about security, seemed to 
sound the death knell for the meetings as a major part of Commonwealth 
machinery. Canada's refusal to consider them as a part of the 
consultation process was likely to cause difficulties, and perhaps the 
increase in the number of members would have devalued the benefit of 
the meetings anyway. 
The F. O. had been trying to encourage the staffs of the old Dominions 
to visit the F. O. to discuss issues and look at additional information. 
It was less keen to show the same encouragement to Indian and Pakistani 
officials. One official thought that these two High Commissioners 
should not be shown any F. O. telegrams, but by the end of December 
43 
the D. I. D. had decided it wanted to invite the staff of the new Dominions 
to visit the Department. Joy noted that for "formal purposes" it was 
desirable for the contact to be established (previously there had only 
been a little contact with the S. E. Asia Department) although he said 
his department could not be "so forthcoming" as it was with the other 
Dominions. He envisaged them acting as an "introductory and distributing 
centre for the other (F. O. ) Departments". 
44 
The other measure taken 
by the F. O. to preserve security was to inform its representatives abroad 
to be rather more cautious in discussions with Indian and Pakistani 
42. See chapter 2, p. 49. 
43. Minute by Halford'(Private Secretary to the' 'Permanent Under-Secretary), 
. 
12th December, 1947, ibid. 
44. Minute by Joy, 26th December 1947, E0371/65574, W8614/7/68. 
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colleagues than with the others. Since 1943-44'it had been 
encouraging its Foreign Service öfficers to consult with Dominion 
colleagues and provide them with as *much additional information as 
ý 45 
the policy-. possible. It circulated ä note 
These arrangements I for collaboration with India and Pakistan turned 
on the future of two countries within the Commonwealth. Would co-operation, 
as Shone"ha`d warned, be hindered if the U. K. told them too much about 
its'policy-, aspects bf which clashed with their own "instincts and 
attitudes"? ' If the two countries did decide to stay in the Commonwealth, 
the U. K. would encounter difficulties in terms of its'obligations to 
consult with all members unless they were admitted on a different 
basis from11 the other members', as 'associate members' in a'two-tiered 
association. 
ýý -r4-w. 
By 1946'/7 the F. O. wished `to- do more' than' improve ''its contacts 
with Commonwealth officials; ' it also wished to assume a' greater and 
more direct responsibility for liaison with Commonwealth coTuntries' 
about foreign affairs. Earlier, in the discussions 'on Commonwealth 
collaboration in 1943/4 some officials had suggested greater F: O. 
involvement, 'some thýe*amälgamation of the F. 0: and D. O., but these notions 
had been allowed to lie dormant. India's independence''provided the 
F. O. 'with an opportunity to increase its participation in the U. K. 's 
discussion' of foreign affairs with the other members of the Commonwealth. 
In-October 1946 the first U. K. nigh Commissipner`arrived'in Delhi. 
(Mr. Alec Syinon,. an I. O. official, had established the' Commission the' 'k 
previous summer., ) `At this`time'the Interim Government had been established 
but the Viceroy remained the head of the Government and responsibility 
for policy towards India still lay in the hands of the Secretary of State, 
for India. The U. K. -'was trying to treat the. Indian Government as a quasi- 
45. Circular to Foreign Service Representatives, 15th August 1947, F0371 65574 
W6042/7/68, and Minute by Joy, 26th December 1947, F0371/65574, W8614/68. 
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independent body, in an attempt to accelerate a solution to the political 
problem. Mr. T. H. Shone, formerly H. M. Ambassador in Beirut, 
was the first British High Commissioner selected from the Foreign Service. 
Pethick-Lawrence told Bevin that othe appointment of a F. O. man was 
"quite accidental" and that he would have preferred a man from among 
the other High Commissioners had a suitable candidate been available. 
46 
The Indian Government insisted that the High Commissioner should be 
regarded as the agent of the U. K. Government as a whole, and not=just 
the 1.0. (This together with the fact that the I. O. had never been 
an overseas service, no doubt explains why an 1.0. man was not chosen. 
) 
However Pethick-Lawrence did not think the High Commissioner should be 
placed under the control of the D. O. Such a "pretence" he argued, 
would be "clearly, and on occasion embarrassingly, exposed". Sir 
Stafford Cripps suggested that the Cabinet Offices should provisionally 
act as the channel of communication and although Addison disliked the 
idea, his officials persuaded him to accept it in order to avoid, 
prejudicing the responsibility to the D. O. of the other High Commissioners 
in the Dominions. 
47 
This was approved by Attlee and a committee'lof 
officials attached to the Cabinet-Offices were established to act as 
the channel of communication with the High Commissioner. 
Although the F. O. was pleased to have one of its own representatives 
appointed, 4t disliked the arrangement which it thought unsuitable=for 
the handling of information, and consultation with Shone, on foreign 
affairs.. The draft letter to the High Commissioner outlininghis 
responsibilities did not mention foreign affairs, but the F. O. argued that 
with the establishment of an Interim Government, it would be difficult 
for the Viceroy to "exercise that control of India's foreign relations" 
46. Pethwick-Lawrence to Bevin, 5th September 1946, F0371/54717, W992/560/68. 
47. See Garner, op. cit., p. 306, and minutes by Stephenson, 24th November 
1945,1st December 1946 & 1st August 1946, D035/1112, C257/1/26. 
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which was essential,.. It thought the High Commissioner would be, 
the person, to discuss foreign affairs with the Indian Government. 
48 
Sargent, now Permanent Under-Secretary at the. F. O., was under the 
impression that in matters of foreign policy the, Foreign Secretary 
would have, direct communication with the High Commissioner, but he 
wanted the, directive to state this explicitly. He also proposed 
that the F. O. ensure that the vice-chairman of the officials committee 
should always, be an: F. O. official, not one from the I. 0. -; this would 
secure. effective chairmanship, ` with the Chairman, SivE. Bridges, likely. 
to- be absent most -most meetings. 
49 
The Foreign Secretary wrote to Attlee requesting that he should 
instruct, and receive reports from, the High Commissioner directly. 
He added, 
The position of the United Kingdom High , Commissioner, in India will not in all respects be analogous with that of 
our High Commissioners in the other self-governing 
Dominions. As part of the Asiatic continent India is 
contiguous with other countries such as Persia, Afhganistan, 
Tibet and Nepal, and is bound to have a special relationship 
with China. In all these countries the United Kingdom 
has interests more or less important, and while we do not 
know what the future status of India will be, it"is essential, 
that we should try to persuade her to walk in step with 
United Kingdom policy in these countries. 50 
Pethick Lawrence opposed Bevin's proposal. He told the. Foreign Secretary 
that the main channel of information between India and the U. K. would 
remain that of the India Office to the Government of India. - If the , 
Interim Government needed any special guidance on=foreign affairs, 
the Viceroy would be approached : first; butt if it. ýwere, 
"expedient" to---!, 
use the High Commissioner,, communication would beýthrough the committee 
created for that purpose. He saw no reason forý, the F. O. 'to have direct 
48. Minute by Dening, 26th August 1946, F0371/54717, W9991/560/68. 
49. Minute by Sargent, 26th August 1946, ibid. (The F. O. seemed to have 
achieved this, see minutes of meetings of India & Burma Committee, 
1st October 1946, ibid. and 22nd November 1946, F0371/54719, 
W11185/560/68. ) 
50. Bevin to Attlee, (copy to Pethick Lawrence) 31st August 1946, 
F0371/54717, W9991/561, /68. 
448 
communication with the high Conunissioner and asked Nevin to abandon 
his Achcºnc. 
51 
Mr. Dening, of the D. I. D., noted that the 1.0. who are no doubt 
supported by the Dominions Office" were trying to treat India as an 
ordinary Dominion, despite the F. O. 's argument about the geographical 
differences. The Office also thought that Indians required different 
treatment from the other Dominions, "which, after all, spring from 
our own race". 
52 Sargent's comment on the situation was that he 
typed the Foreign Secretary would continue to press for direct communication 
because 
An important question of principle is involved which 
if not secured at the outset may go by default - to 
the great detriment of the F. O. in future years. 53 
The F. O. continued to try and secure its objective, despite Attlee's 
support for the constitutional authority of the Secretary of State 
for India and the Viceroy. 
54 Bevin explained that he thought the 
relationship between the two governments in the field of foreign affairs 
had been "radically altered" by the establishment of an Interim 
Government. He stressed the importance of "the inter-play between 
the interests of the United Kingdom and India and of the neighbouring 
states" and said it was essential for the High Commissioner to have all 
information available to him from the F. O. and for the F. O. to be fully 
informed of the day to day attitudes and actions of the Indian government. 
This must be done by direct communication between the F. O. and the High 
Commissioner if they were to avoid delays and misunderstandings. 
ss From 
Sargent's minute it does appear that if the F. O. was not trying usurp the 
authority of the 1.0., it was certainly attempting to anticipate the 
51. Pethick Lawrence to Bevin, 5th September 1946, -F0371/54717, 
W9992/560/68. (Shone had been seconded from the Foreign Service, 
with his emoluments being borne by the Treasury vote. ) 
52. Minute by Dening, 6th September 1946, F0371/54717, W9991/560/68. 
53. Minute by Sargent, 6th September 1946, ibid. 
54. Attlee to Bevin, 9th September 1946, F0371/54717, W9993/560/68. 
55. Bevin to Attlee, 16th September 1946, ibid. 
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D. O. ' eventual responsibility for relations with India, and encroach 
upon its authority. 
Attlee, Bevin and Pethick Lawrence met on 26th September 1946 to 
discuss the situation; and Bevin agreed to using the Cabinet office 
committee as his channel of information. It was also established 
that he would consult with the 1.0. if he wanted to send instructions 
directing the High Commissioner to take some positive action, and that 
he would copy all informatory telegrams to the 1.0.56 The method of 
communication had been settled; but the question of using the Viceroy 
or the High Commissioner as the person primarily responsible for 
presenting the U. K. 's 'foreign policy to the Indian Government had not 
been. The F. O. maintained that while the Viceroy was responsible to 
the Secretary of State, who in turn was responsible to Parliament, 
for the conduct of India's foreign relations, he could not be 
responsible for U. K. foreign policy. The task of persuading the Indian 
Government to support the U. K. 's foreign policy should rightly be 
the High Commissioner's because the Viceroy, as the head of the Interim 
Government, was on the side of India, not the U. K. 
57 
This interpretation 
was challenged by Sr. E. Bridges in a letter to the F. O. which reiterated 
the I. O. 's point of view. Normal communication on foreign affairs would 
pass between the 1.0. and the Indian Government with copies going to 
both High Commissioners, which was comparable to the direct correspondence 
between the D. O. and Dominion Governments. When the U. K. wanted to 
persuade the Indian Government of a certain policj, "it would at the 
outset normally be more appropriate for the Viceroy to come into action", 
although sometimes it could be expedient to use the High Commissioner. 
From the London end, Bridges suggested that for the most part the F. O. 
would determine the substance of communications on foreign affairs to 
56. 
_, Note, by, Bridges of-a conversation between Ministers, 27th-'September 1946, "FO371/54717, W9995/560/68. 57. See, Minute by Dening, Ist October 1946, ibid, and Minutes of"India 
and Burma Committee, 1st November 1946, F0371/54717, W11110/560/68. 
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the Indian Government, but that it would be primarily for the Secretary 
of State for India to "judge the tone and channel of the communication". 
58 
The F. O; decided that providing it could dictate the substance of 
representations to the Indian Government and the High Commissioner, 
it did not object to Bridges' proposal. However, it did reiterate to 
the 1.0. that it would probably be necessary to use the High Commissioner 
to make representations to the Indian Government., 
59 
The F. O. 's request for direct communication with the U. K. high 
Commissioner to India has to be related to India's status and the 
position of the other Dominions. India was about to be given its 
independence, and while its future was uncertain it was likely to 
remain in the Commonwealth for a time. When it became independent, and 
if it did stay in the association, responsibility for relations with 
India would be'transferred to the D. O. (The 1.0. would effectively be 
amalgamated-with the-D. O. ). The F. O. had no direct communication 
with any other U. K. HighýCommissioneror with the other Commonwealth 
Governments. Any information to them was sent via, and after being 
approved by, the D. O. In short, the F. O. was pressing for a significant 
change in the conduct of the U. K. 's relations with its Commonwealth 
associates. Sir Orme Sargent's eagerness to secure the F. O. 's 
responsibility for the U. K. 's relations with India in the field of 
foreign affairs was an effort to establish a new principle. His 
concern that it would go by default if not gained at the outset, was, 
an appreciation. that once the D. O. assumed respon. eibility for India's 
relations, the method employed-would be the same as for the other 
Commonwealth countries and the chances of the F. O. 's securing direct 
communications thereafter were slim. India's geographical position was 
very significant, possibly more so than the other Dominions. It was 
58. Bridges to Dixon, 21st October 1946, F0371/54617, W10825/560/68. 
59. Minute by Mayall, 25th October 1946, and letter, J. P. E. C. Henniker- 
Major (Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary) to Bridges, 
29th October 1946, ibid. 
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situated in a vital area for the U. K. and its foreign policy would affect 
crucially theU. K. 's own policy in the Cülf and South East Asia. The 
F. O. also seemed to suggest that because India did not contain a 
predominantly 'white' , 'British' population it was-the correct Office 
to handle relations with' India. 
An F. O. official had assumed that the D. O. was supporting the I. 0'. 's 
right to retain control of the U. K. 's relations with India, and it would 
be surprising if that`had not been the case; for' the D. O. was utterly 
opposed to any alteration in the basis of the U. K. 's 'relations with the 
Commonwealth. It had always believed that relations between member 
states were different in mind from the U. K. 'S relations with foreign 
states, and that the former needed to, be considered as a whole and 
be supervised by aI special Ministry with s'epar'ate-`Cab inet representation. 
To allow the F. O. the authority to conduct the U. K. 's relations with'-". 
India in the field of foreign affairs would undermine this principle 
and possibly lead to that Office's taking over responsibility for all 
the other members. ' Taken to its logical conclusion, this 'would have 
neant that all the functional Ministries in Whitehall would assume 
responsibility for Dominion relations within their own spheres of action. 
The position of the F. O. and the Dominions in relation to foreign 
affairs was raised again by the F. O. two years later in 1948. The 1.0. 
and with it responsibility for Indian affairs, had in the meanwhile been 
absorbed'into the newly named C. R. O. In March 1948 Sargent expressed 
his concern that Bevin was unable to deal direct., y with the Dominions 
and suggestedt-that it was. time, to question the future of the C. R. O. in 
its exist in g'form. Had it outlived its purpose? lie stated that 
originally it, had had administrative functions but that these had mostly 
gone now that the Dominions were independent, a curious statement as 
the Dominions 
were independent when the D. O. was set up. Sargent 
emphasised the inportanceof the Dominions' international role and said 
that the C. R. O., channels of communication between Prime Ministers, 
were "woefully inadequate & cumbrous". Instead, relations within 
the Commonwealth, on foreign affairs should be handed over to the F. O., 
which he suspected would mean that the C. R. O. would be so depleted that 
, 
it would hardly warrant the status of an important department of state. 
Whatever course was chosen, Sargent was confident that the Dominions 
would be pleased and he also thought it would make it easier to retain 
India and Pakistan within the Commonwealth. 
60 
Bevin decided to speak 
to Attlee about this. While he did not repeat all Sargent's suggestions, 
he, said that he should have the authority to deal directly with the 
Dominions' High Commissioners, adding that this could lead to an 
improvement in the calibre of men appointed and commenting that only 
N., Robertson (Massey's_replacement) was of first class ambassador calibre. 
Bevin told Attlee that-he did not, mind the Commonwealth Secretary 
or a senior C. R. O. official being present at such meetings and in May 
1948 the; Prime-Minister, and Noel-Baker agreed to Bevin's seeing the 
High Commissioners. 61 
_ ý, 
In March, Sargent.. had talks with Machtig about, the future of the C. R. O. 
in which the latter defended his Office's position. . 
But Sargent was 
determined to try and. secure a change and after the meeting he listed 
the minimum requirements of the F. O. These were direct dealings with 
the Dominion High Commissioners, (which was granted the following month); 
with the*U. K. High Commissioners in the Dominions; and with the Dominion 
Foreign Ministers. 
62 
The C. L. D. had also considered the question of 
amalgamation and one official suggested that the whole C. R. O. would be 
n 
60. Minute by Sargent, 9th March 1948, F0371/70202A, W3053/3024/68. 
61. Minute by F. K. 'Roberts (Private Secretary to Bevin) 12th March 1948, 
F0371/70202A, W3067/3024/68;, Noel Baker to Bevin, lst May 1948, 
F0271/70202A, W3331/3024/68. 
62. Minute by Sargent on conversation with Machtig, 24th March 1948, 
F0371/70202A, W3067/3024/68. 
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somewhat indigestible for. the F. O. to swallow but that 44 
there should be no insuperable difficulties in the way 
of. removing the Commonwealth aspect of foreign affairs 
fron the purview of the C. R. 0 and adding them to the 
responsibilities of the F. O. 
ý'3e. 
" _: '" 
The superintending Under-Secretary of the C. L. D., Sir Noel Charles, 
agreed, with., hisýofficial,, adding that the F. O. couldrborruw, or "take-over" 
a C. R. O.., otficial, such as Shannon (then Head of the Foreign Affairs 
Department of the. -C. R. O. ). 
64 
After agreement had; -been reached with 
the C. R. O. for Bevin to have direct-access to the High Commissioners 
Charles proposed the idea of amalgamating the Foreign Affairs-Department 
of the C. R. O. with the F. 0.65 Despite the obvious lack of enthusiasm 
in the C. R. O., the F. O. did not give up its efforts to increase its 
responsibility over, Commonwealth foreign relations and, in December 
1948. Sargent wrote officially to the. newly"appointed (althou gh, not yet 
incumbent) P. U. S. at the C. R. O., Sir, Percivale Liesching. - After 
congratulating him on his appointment, Sargent went,. immediately to the 
heart of the matter and told him that the increased' activity of the-- 
Dominions, in world affairs, had led Bevin to feel, that 
in the interests-of efficiency,. and co-ordination he ought--= 
to communicate on foreign affairs with the Ministers of 
External Affairs in. the, Dominions, either directly or - r= cr 
more normally through the United Kingdom High Commissioners. 
This,, would require a division to be made between inter- 
Dominion questions and foreign affairs and this he feels 
could be-don e96without overlapping or friction, in the two 
departments. 
In a memorandum Sargent set out four specific requirements: first, 
for responsibility for the conduct of relations with Commonwealth countries 
in all matters pertaining to foreign affairs to be vested in the Foreign 
Secretary; second, that in consequence there should be direct contact 
between the Foreign Secretary and the Dominion Governments; third, the 
C. R. O. department dealing with foreign affairs should be integrated with 
63. Minute and note by Mr. Furlonge, 17th March 1948, ibid. 
64. Minute by Charles, 22nd March 1948, ibid. 
65. Minute by Charles, 13th May 1948, F0371/70202A, W3331/3024/68. 
66. Sargent. to Liesching, 6th December 1948, D0121/22. 
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the appropriate department of the F. O.; fourth, to assist the Foreign 
Secretary a senior C. R. O. official should be established in the r. 0. 
with the rankiof Assistant Under-Secretary to supervise the department(s) 
0 17) 
dealing with the, Commonwealth 
Liesching clearly felt these tactics unfair. lie told Sir Norman 
Brook, the'new`Secretary to the Cabinet, how hard it. was to be asked so 
ßubstantial a question, which affected the whole C. R. O., -before he had 
even taken up his post. He hoped Brook would support him in stalling 
since, he'needed three or four months in the job before he could possibly 
give an, answer. 
67 (Liesching had served in the Board of Trade and, the 
Ministry'of Food since 1942. ) 
"' This was the first time the F. O. had directly challenged the right 
of-the C. R. O. to conduct- the U. K. 's relations with the Dominions, but 
the minuting'within the F. O. and Sargent's letter show quite clearly 
that it, was definitely proposing some form of amalgamation which would 
automatically reduce the-position of the C. R. O. The discussions over 
the High Commissioner' to India in 1946 had been a warning of the F. O. 's 
intentions and previously, in 1943-44, the possibility of the amalgamation 
of the two offices had been discussed, within the F. O. and with Foreign 
Service representatives. On this occasion a number of F. O. officials 
had favoured the idea, including the Head of the D. I. D. at the time, 
Mr. Greenway, and the Minister of State, Mr. Law. It wasinot officially 
raised then although an F. O. memorandum including the proposal was 
circulated to the D. O. and produced a strong reaction. The F. O. justified 
its'proposals chiefly by reference to the increased international' importance 
of the Dominions; ' the independence of India which had created two new 
states-in Asia, an area of such importance to the U. K., added force to 
their efforts. Moreover, the Indian Government were keen for the F. O. 
to play a greater role in Commonwealth affairs. Nehru told King in 
67. Liesching to Brook, 11th December 1948, ibid. 
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October 1948 that there would be an advantage if the F. O. sent its 
telegrams direct to the Doniniolls' High Commissioners for forwarding 
to their governments, instead of via the C. R. O. The next day India's 
Minister for External Affairs, Sir Girja Bajpai, spoke to King on the 
same subject, telling him that he wanted the Commonwealth High 
Commissioners to deal directly with the F. O. on the same basis as did 
foreign representatives. A few days earlier Bajpai had told a F. O. 
official that he wanted direct contact with the F. O. and disliked the 
the C. R. 0.68 Support for the F. O. 's proposal had also come from the 
U. K. High Commissioner to Australia, Mr. E. Williams, who was not a 
C. R. O. official. He had told the F. O. that it would be easier to 
keep Australia informed of events if the F. O. dealt directly with the 
Dominions. 
69 
It also seems that Sargent was a key figure in pushing 
the issue so far. In 1943-44 Cadogan, then P. U. S., had not been so 
enthusiastic about any proposals for amalgamation, although it is 
possible that he might have taken a different attitude by 1948-49. 
The C. R. O. wanted to retain its authority to supervise Commonwealth 
relations, to amend F. O. telegrams if it thought necessary and especially 
to uphold the principle that Commonwealth relations were fundamentally 
different from any others. In notes prepared by Sir G. Laithwaite, 
Deputy Under-Secretary in the C. R. O., in February 1949 for discussions 
with the F. O., it was pointed out that while there were shortcomings. 
in the collaboration procedures the difficulty was of a more fundamental 
n 
kind, stemming from arrangements for the handlingpf foreign, affairs, but 
related to the "reality of the Commonwealth relationship". Laithewaite 
added that the Commonwealth 
68. Mackenzie King Record Vol. IV pp. 405-406; Minute by R. Hadow, 9th 
October 1948, F0371/70202A, W7113/3024/68. 
69. Despatch from Williams, May 1948, F0371/70202A, W3330/3024/68. 
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ý- will still continue to need special handling by an 
experienced agency, which can take account of reactions 
in all fields of work with the knowledge of the general i0, 
political position in the particular Commonwealth country. 
The issue eventually went to Attlee. He ruled that the C. R. O. should 
retain its responsibility for the U. K. 's relations with the rest of 
the Commonwealth. 
71 
At the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 
measures were taken to improve liaison with the Dominions on foreign 
affairs, chiefly by the despatch of extra categories of telegrams to 
the Dominions, but also embracing plans for increased contact between 
C. R. O. and F. O. officials. 
72 
Canada however favoured an independent C. R. O. Mackenzie King 
told Bajpai that he did not want too much authority to be vested in 
the High Commissioners, for they might form "some sort of government 
unto themselves" and develop a secretariat in London. A Canadian 
official recalls that although Canada felt it an issue for the U. K. 
to decide, it also found many advantages in retaining the C. R. O. There 
at least the Dominions were the prime concern, which they would never 
have been for the F. O. (This point some Commonwealth officials repeated 
with some regret after the two offices were eventually combined. ) 
Canada also felt that the F. O. lacked knowledge of, and any real interest 
in the Commonwealth; that had to come from service in those countries, 
an experience which very few of the F. O. staff had enjoyed. With 
73 
Attlee's-decision the issue rested, for a time. Most positive efforts 
were made-to ensure harmonious collaboration between the two offices 
and in 1950 Liesching wrote to Bevin to say that%the 1948 memorandum 
by Sargent seemed to have been inspired by a feeling that co-operation 
70. C. R. O. notes 'for discussions with F. O. by Sir G. Laithwaite, 2nd 
February 1949, D0121/22'. (Laithwaite, after serving in the Cabinet 
Offices moved to the 1.0. in 1946 and then to the C. R. O. when it 
combined with the latter. He was Deputy Under-Secretary of the 
'Indian Division 'B' at the C. R. O. ) 
71. Garner, op. cit., pp. 301-302. 
72. See Notes on recent action to increase and expedite information 
supp lied to Dominions, 1949, D0121/22. 73. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. IV, pp. 405-406; Professor J. W. Holmes in 
conversation with the author. He noted that the F. O. 's contact with 
Dominion officials was increasing in this period, with the frequent 
international meetings. ) 
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between the two offices was not good, n situation which muat be 
rectified. 
74 
Garner recoi 
India's membership of 
progression. Until 1949 
stay in the Commonwealth. 
-ds that relations did improve in the 1950x. 
75 
the Commonwealth followed no, inevitable 
no-one knew whether, India would decide to, 
Some within the U. K. felt uncertain if its 
membership would serve the best interests of the association. In 
addition, the admission of India was not purely the, responsibility, 
of the U. K., but also that of all the other members; and if the basis 
of the Commonwealth relationship had to be adjusted to-accommodate 
India, it had to be a unanimous decision. To some extent. the rather 
hostile attitude of many Congress members, including Nehru, towards 
the British, and their intention, to establish a , republic, 
led the 
U. K. to assume that India would want to leave the Canmonwenlth. Attlee 
had stated that India was at liberty to do so. But, the Chiefs of 
Staff showed the greatest keenness, to retain India, and at a Defence 
Committee meeting of October 1946 Lord Montgomery emphasised that. the 
strategic advantages "were beyond question". 
76 
In November 1946 Sir David. Monteath, Permanent Under-Secretary. at 
the 1.0., wrote to his opposite numbers at the F. O., D. O. and C. O. about 
India's membership of the Commonwealth, or its association with the U. K. 
by means of a Treaty. Monteath told the others that, the 1.0. thought it 
unlikely that India will wish to remain within the. 
Commonwealth at any rate as at present constituted, ' 
and we are also doubtful whether it wouldbe in the, 
general interests of the Commonwealth to induce India 
to stay in the Commonwealth if this were possible. 
w 
74. Liesching to Bevin, n. d. (1950), D0121/22. 
75. Garner, ' op. cit.,, p. 302. 
76. Minutes of Meeting of Defence Committee, 2nd October 1946, D0(66) 
26th mneeting. P. N. S. M-lnsergh ed., India: The Transfer of Power, 
op. cit., Vol. VIII, No. 398. 
77. Monteath to Machtig, 8th November-1946, D035/1251, C257/1/55. 
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lie enclosed a memorandum containing the views of the 1.0. and some 
correspondence with the Chiefs of Staff (C. O. S; ') The memorandum 
doubted if-India would "interpret the obligations of membership'in 
the same spirit as the four major Dominiýns", and thought' the` Congress 
leaders possessed an "emotional complex" about the British. It was 
thought likely that India would leave the issue` of membership in 
abeyance until after the constitution had'been framed, while at'the 
same time creating a republican constitution"'in'donsi'stent'with the" 
existing framework of the Commonwealth. '` Nehru's statements had shown 
it clear that he-wished India to be non-aligned and neutral in world 
affairs. 
The chief advantage to be gained from India's remaining in the 
association was thought to be military. Monteath enclosed a memorandum 
by the C. O. S. which reiterated the importance of India's membership 
for the future strategy and security of the'Commonweälth. -" It said 
the alternative was for the U. K., deprived`of its main"administrative 
and strategic bases in the Indian ocean, to reorientate its strategy; 
its"sea communicatiöns'to' the Far East would'have to' follow"the, Cape 
route under the*protection of naval"and air forces based on Africa, 
Singapore and'-Western Australia, ' or, subject to American goodwill, 
follow the Panama route. 
78 
The 1.0. memorandum stated that it was 
impressed with the arguments''of the C. O. S. but thought' that defence 
requirements could' be achieved 'by means of 'a', treaty. ', ''' At 'least the 
mutual obligations of each party'would'then-be'defined at'in time-of war 
the U. K. would have rights "whi'ch could not, be called"into'question by 
anyone". Whether such rights woulcYbe'upheld'by'India, outside'the 
Commonwealth, was another question, ' but one which the'I. 0. seemed to 
ignore. But it did `recognise I that the 'disadvantage `of `a, 'treaty ,, 
78. Letter, C. O. S. to India Office, 4th October 1946, attaching annex 
"Future Treaty with India - Military Considerations"; Monteath to 
Major Hollis, Secretary to the C. O. S., 31st October 1946; Memorandum 
, enclosed 
in letter, Monteath to Machtig, 8th November 1946, "India 
and the British Commonwealth" n. d., D035/1251s'C257/1/55. `- 
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vf "N . may., 
relationship lay in the difficulty of prescribing, for an unforeseen 
future and acknowledged that, the C. O. S. had said it would be, impossible 
to get an independent state to agree to detailed arrangements for 
defence assistance. 
The 1.0. 's memorandum admitted, that other advantages, in the realms 
of foreign policy co-operation and trade would accrue from India's 
continued membership, and that the U. K. 's commercial', assets in India 
could be endangered if it were. outside. the-Commonwealth. In-: more .,: o 
general terms it noted that 
The prestige and power of the Commonwealth in world,. 
affairs would be greatly wakened if India went out 
of the Commonwealth. Moreover,, owing to her dominant 
position her example' is likely to determine the conduct 
of other parts of the Empire now on. the road to 
-Dominion status, particularly Burma, and possibly Ceylon 
and Malaya. 79 
Despite these advantages, the 1.0. still thought India's membership 
would not be beneficial, or necessarily the, best way to derive the most 
from the U. K. 's relationship with India. It did not. want to admit a 
new member, especially one, dominating South East Asia, which was not 
sufficiently "imbued with the spirit and ideals" which constituted the 
basis of the Commonwealth policy internationally. It considered it 
inconceivable that India could become a similar partner to the other 
four, which had common racial origins to the U. K. and "sentiments, 
symbolised by the common allegiance to the Crown", and were also 
"christian and particularly,, protestant civilisations" with democratic 
institutions and English legal systems. The non-British,, elements in 
Canada and South Africa had proved difficult enough to absorb and retain 
in the, Commonwealth, and India. possessed none of the characteristcs , 
mentioned above. It further noted that it would be disadvantageous 
to have a member who could not be relied upon to act, in time of need .. 
according to the unwritten obligations of the association. 
79.1.0. memorandum "India and the British commonwealth" n. d., ibid. 
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The 1.0. listed the lack of security in India as another problem 
and, arguing against one of its own earlier points, thought that trading 
benefits would possibly be the same whether India were a member of the 
Commonwealth or not. ," India had already made it - clear that, it would 
not remain within the system of imperial preferences whatever happened. 
As for the U. K. 's prestige, the memorandum suggested that the nominal 
retention of India, carrying-no advantages in practical collaboration, 
would"not. improve the U. K. 's position, but that- its prestige would beý ". 
high - if it unreservedly recognised India's independence, and collaborated 
with it- outside the Commonwealth. The most important consideration 
was thought-to be the recognition and definition-, of,, rights and- 
- obligations of both countries in a treaty, either as part of, India's 
membership, or, outside the association. , Inducements would have to 
be offered to=India to remain. On balance the office was sceptical 
of the-benefits. to be secured-by India's membership, and, hoped the 
military requirements might be achieved by treaty alone. 
80 
,- tIn reply, rSir Eric Machtag, said- the'D. O. 'sý general view was that 
, the -Commonwealth's interest would be served if. India remained within 
the association.. Its departure 
would certainly be regarded byýthe general public in this country and the Dominion and the world at large as a_weakening of the Commonwealth, and-as a critcism of the Commonwealth system. Moreover, the inference 
-might well be drawn that India's failure to remain 
within the Commonwealth was due to some theory that equality of status-and real independence was not compatible with the Commonwealth system - with consequent r reactions in the existing Commonwealth countries. 81 
The D. O. also doubted the', advantages of a rigid-treaty system, the value 
of which would in the last resort depend wholly on goodwill. If India 
accepted the Conuaonwealth 
with goodwill, co-operation, would probably 
be more forthcoming 
than under a treaty. The D. O. had no doubt that 
80. . Monteath to Machtig, 8th November 1946, ibid. 81. Machtig to Monteath, 22nd November 1946, ibid. 
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the other four Dominions would welcome India, and said its inclusion 
would support the Commonwealth ideal. " Admittedly, there would be 
problems; Machtig referred to the dispute between India=And South ` 
Africa at the U. N. O. as one such difficulty, =but said that'there was 
no reason why- these, should'not lessen in, time, provided India accepted 
the. principle; of co-operation. He told Monteath that Indian 
representatives at. international gatherings had welcomed the, benefite' -. 
of Commonwealth-co-operation. - The D. O. considered a written Commonwealth 
agreement ,a possibility, despite the unfortunate precedent of, Eire; " 
but wanted some,, form of, genuine 'acceptance of the Crown. , .-°- 'I 
A similar-letter was addressed, to: Sir Orme Sargent, who was 
specifically asked-if, the F. O.,. considered India to be a benefit or a 
liability, to the Commonwealth. Overruling, the view°of; one of his 
officials, 
82- he said that "it'would undoubtedly be a great. *advantage" 
for'India to remain in the Commonwealth and agreed with'Machtig that 
its-departure would be universally}intepretcd as`a blow to British 
prestige and authority and as a "diminution in the political, -military 
and economic strength of the Commonwealth as ,a whole": On. the subject 
of, a new type of-treaty relationship, Sargentsaid if India opted*for - 
membership,, "military and political relations with her: (India) become-` 
very much simpler". -Thefdifficulty would arise if it made°itss 
membership. conditional on British agreement to a new type of Commonwealth 
association, other than one based on the-Crown. This would also be 
interpreted by foreign opinion-as a blow to the ugity of the association. 
Sargent anticipated that India would elect to leave the Commonwealth, 
not because it was in its interests, but because 
unreasoning nationalism and xenophobia may well require her 
to sacrifice her economic. and even her national security for^, - 
what she will consider the necessary assertion of her new found 
independence. 
L. 
V 
82. Minute by A. L. Mayall, (D. I. D. ), 18th November 1946, F0371/54719, 
W11185/560/68. 
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I 
In view of this antagonism, he thought it would be very unwise for the 
U. K. to arouse suspicions and court a rebuff by even suggesting any 
long-term political or military agreement. To be refused would further 
weaken the U. K. 's authority in Asia. Sargent also warned that if 
India were partitioned, Pakistan was likely to enlist U. K. aid by 
offering military facilities; "but would it be worth our while ... 
to commit ourselves to-what would be in effect the defence of one Indian 
State against another? " Turning to the C. O. S. 's description of what 
the U. K, needed from India in terms of strategic bases, manpower and 
industrial capacity, he noted their admission that a written agreement 
which would meet these requirements could not be secured. 
83 
The third Office to be consulted was the C. O. Its P. U. S., Sir 
George Gater, tended to share the I. O. 's own view and advised that in 
the interests of the Colonial Empire it would be better if India 
did not remain in the Commonwealth. (-)He opposed any strong persuasion 
because. the basis of the Commonwealth was "a willing partnership 
founded on unwritten understandings" and he thought a reluctant member 
would prove a liability. Cater pointed out that the U. K. consulted 
the Dominions on its colonial policy and usually secured their agreement. 
If India became a member, the C. O. would be obliged to treat it in the 
same way; but its approach to colonial problems was fundamentally 
different. 
The results might well be delay and deadlock on many 
important colonial questions, hnd the only way out of 
the deadlock would be to" proceed deliberately contrary 
to the strong views of the Government of India, with - 
consequent strain on Commonwealth relations and on the 
unwritten basis on which the-Commonwealth operates. 
Cater also thought that it would be'easier to handle the question of 
Indian minorities in Empire territories if India were a foreign state.., 
Ile anticipated that India would continue to champion the rights of such 
83. Sargent to Monteath, 7th December 1946, ibid. 
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communities 'and clash with the U. K, over this, as in the South 
African dispute, which would have an embarrassing" effect, 
If 4a new type of Commonwealth relationship ' was' to be introduced', ` 
the C. O. emphasised that`the`U. K. should not''appear tö think that 'ý 
only 'white''countries should have full membership. ''' The''decision 
should be based on the' degree of interest and the form` of association 
möst' suit'able' to the individual -case. "" ý If India formed 'a treaty 
äs-sociation, rather than a Dominion relationship, that 'must not be 
considered a'precedent for all 'non-white"territories. ' With these 
qualifications, the C. O. thought' a treat y`relati'onship an admissible 
84 
alternative' goal for the"' constitutional development of the colonies. 
After. receiving' the replies from the' three departments. the 1.0. 
revised its paper and sent it to-the three departments, 'requesting 
discussiöns'among `officials before 'it was submitted to 'the Cabinet. --' 
The introduction to the 'new paper"stated' that there were certain 
disadvantages' involved 'in 'India's membership. ' 
though I do not suggest that the-Se necessarily outweigh 
other considerations. 
% 
It was assumed that India would not be keen to stay in the association. 
The U. K. had therefore to consider whether to attempt persuasion, 
and be willing so to modify the relationship that a republican state 
could be included. Four advantages were identified: a better 
safeguarding of the U. K. 's defence. requirements; the chance for close 
contact to engender co-operation; the absence of a precedent for 
colonies'to"follow; no loss 'of'the'U. K. 's"prestigeor weakening of 
the internal bond of the relationship. However, rather more disadvantages 
were given. - The absence of racial,, cultural. and"institutional ties.:,. -, 
was stressed, as was the likelihood of-internal-tensions between members, 
especially India and South Africa, which. could. destroy the harmony 
of the association. On: the subject of defence; co-operation,. the 
84. Cater to Monteath, 6th December 1946, ibid. 
464 
memorandum: atated that India would probably prove "unreliable" and 
"elusive" and act like Ireland; a treaty relationship would be more 
clear and benefical. ° Finally-if India-rejected association with the 
Crown and was allowed-to remain 
inside the Commonwealth,,, this could" 
weaken the position of the others and lead others to follow its 
example. -If sufficient co-operation were not forthcoming, India 
w ould be a. liabilityin the Commonwealth. 'The paper recommended 
that India should not, stay in the association unless it accepted the 
obligations-of membership; and. if admitted as, a republic, India 
should be asked, to signýa Treaty'. of Friendship and Alliance-binding 
it to co-operate with the rest oUthe. association; 
85 
This revised memorandum-did not really reflect the views of"the 
D. O., or the-F. O. "A month later, officials from these Offices, plus" 
the Burma-Office: and the"C. O. S. met at the I. 0. - Machtig, reiterated 
the D. O. 's dislike for the Eire precedent-of a treaty relationship, 
but did not exclude the possibility, provided that India recognised 
an, appropriate position for the King and'the other Dominions agreed. 
"16.. . 
Sargent had apparently changed his mind; -, and although still maintaining 
that India would choose not to be in the Commonwealth, he suggested 
that it would=be too unreliable if it did. . 'The U. K. would have', ' 
a moral obligation to go to its defence, but India would have none"to'''" 
assist the-U. K. This position was'satisfactory in the case of`the 
four Dominions because,; they had the same outlook as the U. K. ' 
but he could not believe that pit- would be a satisfactory 'form 
of relationship with the Indians who were totally different in 
outlook and fanatically nationalist. In the long run he 86 
thought a Treaty relationship with India would be necessary. 
85. Monteath to Machtig, Sargent and Gater, enclosing memorandum "Future 
Relations of India and the British Commonwealth", Mansergh, India; 
Transfer of Power, op. cit., Vol. IX, No. 338. 
86. Record of meeting at 1.0., 11th March 1947, Mansergh, India: Transfer 
of Power, op. cit., Vol. IX, No. 522. (According to a-memorandum by 
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For the C. O., Sir Thomas Lloyd reiterated India's opposition to the 
U. K. 's colonial policy and the danger that a hybrid status within 
the Commonwealth would be a precedent for others. 
The one person to object sternly to the terms of the memorandum, 
was Ismay, for the C. O. S. lie said there were too many imponderables 
to reach any firm conclusion, but thought that 
every effort should be made to keep India in the Commonwealth 
and that the main objective should be to get friendly 
relations with India in the subsequent period. 
He did-not agree that a treaty relationship would be more reliable; whatever 
rights a country had, in war they were valueless without a will to 
co-operate. He also thought it mistaken to place a paper before 
Ministers in which the objections to membership were presented "as 
equal to, if not outweighing the advantages". 
87 
It was agreed that 
the memorandum was inappropriate as it stood for submission to the 
Cabinet, and that a paper should be prepared which would delineate 
the relations the, U. K. desired with India whether or not it stayed in 
the Commonwealth - thus shifting the emphasis from the question of 
whether the U. K. wanted India in the Commonwealth, to the practical 
details of future U. K. -Indian relations. 
While the consistent attitude of the C. O. S., Ismay's interjections 
at the meeting,: and the reservations of the D. O., seemed to have prevented 
the 1.0. from advising the Cabinet that Indian membership of the 
Commonwealth was of doubtful benefit, the attitude of that Office 
remains surprising. After its history of servile to the, Indian Empire, 
the I. O.: might have been expected to welcome India's entry into the 
Commonwealth as the crowning glory for many years of effort. Nor does 
it seem that the Secretary of State for India was backtracking on India's 
independence. Attlee had appointed Pethick-Lawrence partly because 
of-his sympathy for Indian aspirations and while the Dominions Secretary 
and the Minister of Defence had their hesitations about aspects of policy, 
87. Record of meeting at I. 0., 11th March*1947, op. cit. 
466 
such as the U. K. 's declaration of a definite date for withdrawal, 
Pethick-Lawrence did not. 
88 
The memorandum discussed with the-", 
other offices was a draft for the Cabinet, and thus had presumably 
been accepted'by the'Secretaryý'of State for India. ' The explanation 
for this attitude `is- not -readily 'forthcoming. `- ,- `zo t' 
-" It is possible that having supervised Indian affairs for so long, 
the I: 0. felt that there was a distinctiveness about India and Indians 
which meant it could`notýbe transplanted easily into an association the 
membership of which had little in common with"India. For`many''officials 
the, idea of Dominion status and Commonwealth-membership'might well 
have'been their ambition for'Indiaý'but they might also have been' 
acute-enough to realise that the result might not be satisfactory for 
either party - that the depth of anti-Bri. tish'feeling was, so strong 
and the cultural and religious difference so great', ' that`'it-would be 
a disastrous marriage. Thus, their inclination to want'`India within 
the Commonwealth was-overlaid by their-fear that it could lead'to tragic 
results. 'The'I. O. "s judgment on the benefit of a defence'treaty for 
securing the U. K. 's strategic-requirements must, be questioned, -but -ý" 
its warnings about the danger of tensions-within the relationship, * 
of other colonies following the exampleiofIndia's association with' 
the Crown, and the risk of weakening the Dominions'-bond with the 
association, were partially justified by-later events. ` 
The view of the C. O; S. about the risks involved in leaving the 
U. K. 's'defence requirements to treaty negotiations after'India; became 
independent is important. ý Like ithe_D. O. ý, it appreciated that*not 
only would India as'an independent state'be, unwilling-to enter into , 
detailed commitments, but that the value of any arrangement was"` 
extremely uncertain in a; crisis. The U. K. '. knew of Nehru's intention 
88. See Cabinet Meeting of 18th February 1947, CM(47)23. Mansergh, 
India: Transfer of Power, op. cit., Vol. IX, No. 421. 
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that India should be non-aligned in world affairs. However, this 
did not alter the need for the U. K. to"secure defence arrangements 
with India and, if anything, increased the need to retain India in 
the Commonwealth. Then more detailed defence arrangements could at 
least be discussed internally and there'was always the chance that the 
close contact membership would bring would enable the U. K. to, alter, 
its attitude. 
To decide on India's independence was a British responsibility; 
its membership -of'the Commonwealth concerned the whole association, 
a"point' which the-D. O. had stressed to the 1.0. 'as early as 1939., _ 
89 
The'U¬K. had kept the Dominions informed of the U. K. 's policy towards 
India, although Attlee's announcement: in March 1946 that India could 
choose whether or not tojoin the Copý, nonwealth, anticipated detailed' 
discussions"with the other members, as membership, would be difficult,. 
90 
to deny beforehand. -' - Indian independence had been talked about for 
some time as had' its full memership of the Commonwealth, although no 
precise dates had then been tabled. No Dominion had indicated. - 
opposition to this, and confirmation came at thell946'Meeting of Prime 
Ministers. 91 Before the statement announcing the date of the U. K.. 's 
withdrawal from India'- was' made, the Dominions Secretary had underlined,. 
the need, for the Dominions to be' informed and 'allow their comments,.: 
to be made-. 
92 As the' Indians", determination to form a republic became 
more obvious, the attitude of the'Dominions was crucial., 
The Dominions had not always been willing tom allow India access 
to Commonwealth discussions be fore'independence; and it was debatable 
whether in"fact it was a'member of 'the, Commonwealth 'or not before 1947. 
Its status's`ince 1919`had'be'en anomälous., On the-one hand it had been 
89. Machtig to Stewart. (P. U. S. at I'. 0., 1937), 17th November 1937, D035/539, C74/30. 
90. Mansergh, India; Transfer of Power, op. cit., Vol. VI, No. 533. 91. Machtig to Monteath, 22nd November 1946, D025/12151, C257/1/55. 92. See Mansergh, India: Transfer of Power, op. cit., Vol. IX, Nos. 235, '245,262 & 390, 
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a. full member of the League of Nations and was a founding member of 
the United Nations Organisation; on the other,, -it was still under 
British rule, with'no independent foreign policy. In 1943 the Secretary 
of State for India had tried to secure an invitation for India to the, 
1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, but Attlee, then Secretary of State 
for, Dominion Affairs, had objected, declaring it to be a Prime Ministers' 
Meeting and pointing out that India had no one to represent it. 
93 
King also objected strongly, insisting-that a "sharp distinction" 
should be maintained between the character of the meeting and a regular 
imperial conference. 
94 After the war the slightly uneasy relationship 
between India and the Dominions continued. An Indian delegation 
attended the preliminary discussions about the U. N. O. in London and the 
San Francisco Conference, but it-seems that its representatives rarely 
attended meetings of Commonwealth delegates, although there was close 
and fruitful co-operation with the U. K. delegation. 
95 
, During the 
meetings of Dominion representatives at the time of; the September Council 
of Foreign Ministers the Dominions objected to the presence of an Indian 
representative at their meetings. Evatt declared India to have no 
international status and no control over its external affairs, and said 
it should not be treated in the same way as them; "meetings with Dominion 
representatives should not be diluted in this manner". The next day 
when they were debating the association of countries=with the framing 
of the Itälian Treaty, Evatt suggested that the U. K. "'s idea of India's 
inclusion was complicating the issue for the U. S. 4_. 
96 
If the Dominions were rather jealous of their positions as 'Dominions', 
they still welcomed India's independence. On"hearing Attlee's announcement 
on 15th March 1946 that the U. K. would grant independence to India, 
93. Chapter 5, pp. 252-253. 
94. King to D. O., 2nd February 1944, D035/1203, WC60/4. 
95. Cockram to Stephenson, 10th June 1945, and Cockram's note of meeting- 
of 18th June 1946, and rest of file, D035/1884, WR208/216. 
96. Minutes of meeting with Dominions representatives, 12th September 1945 
and 13th September 1945, D035/2017, WR334/17. 
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King"wroie` in his diary "that' is' the''right course". '" (Ile thought 
anything c18'c would have rc'aültcd' iii' the''ovnrtlirow of Brl tinh rule'. ) 
In May 1946when'he was in London, he disagreed with Churchill's 
criticisms of th'e°Indian policy and his` pessimistic forecasts, telling 
Churchill-that self-government woüld'work'out for''India. 
97 
BY 
February'1947, King vias-less'optimistic, the news about India's civil 
strife making hiia "sad at heart", and contemplating'thät India would 
leave the Commonwealth completely'; 'possibly aligning" it self with, 
other Asian countries in opposition to'ttie West, ' lle' was possibly 
cheered by a letter from Lord Addison in March, which wasfäirly` 
hopeful about the future and informed King' that the Indians had asked 
Auchinleck'tö stay''on as Commonder in Chief and seemed to want-the 
U. K: 's help. Addison wrote, "I'think''thät'the liberalism that kept 
South"Africa with us may yet 'succeed. " 
98 
There was some difference of opinion between the'Canathan Department 
öef External Affairs and King on whether Canada should comment on the 
position of India'and`'the question of its joining the Commonwealth. 
Lester Pearson, Under-Secretary in the Department, realised that'any 
comment could be-seen as intervening in a matter of 
' U. K. 'concern, but 
he wänted`to make'sure that Canada did not appear to give the 
U. K. " 
the sole right to'invit`-other states to join the Commonwealth. ''üer 
thought'two principles'ought to be established; that no new state 
could be'admitted without the"'consent'öf the ether'members; ý` and that 
a new member` should be`fully independent. 
99 Kitg'rejected'Pedrson's 
draft establishing these points, and told him that it would constitute 
an unnecessary and possibly dangerous interference in a matter which 
"was of no special concern" to Canada. He added that the 'drift' endorsed 
a "doctrine of participation'in imperial affair`s which`he had opposed i0 
97., Mackenzie-King Record, Vol. III, pp. 188 & 241. 
98. Mackenzie King Record, Vol. IV, p. 34; Addison to King, ist March 1947, 
MG26, J 1, Vol. 420, pp. 380752-380755. 
99. Memorandum by Pearson for King, 30th May 1947, MG26, J 4, Vol. 281, 
File: 2925, pp. 193262-193267. 
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all his life" and that it could be exploited in London for undesirable 
purposes. King also took his Minister for External Affairs, St. `Laurent, 
to task for responding to another U. K. telegram on an aid programme 
to India. 
100 
Thus King was still protecting Canada from the 
machinations of U. K. Ministers, and perhaps the explanation for ' 
King's extreme caution with regard to India stems from'the. fact that 
he was near the end of a distinguished career devotedrto Canadian unity. 
King did not oppose India's independence-or its,, membership of the 
Commonwealth. The new British High Commissioner to Canada, Sir 
Alexander Clutterbuck, reported that after King returned from, the 
wedding of Princess Elizabeth, in August, 1947, he"had been very 
"cagey" about his talks in London because he did not want to be 
101 
embroiled in the issue of India and Pakistan. 
King'did break his self-imposed silence in connection with the 
Indian`Independence Bill. He told Clutterbuck that he disagreed'with 
the use of the term, 'independence', seemingly because it was inappropriate 
for a country which was to remain for the time being within the 
Commonwealth. Quite why King made such'an objection is uncertain, 
considering he had been fighting for years to establish Canada's 
right to an independent foreign policy. ' Clutterbuck consulted Addison 
and told King that although the U. K. had received similar`representations 
from Smuts, it could not alter the title of the Bill as the Indians 
had already seen it, and so to'do so would arouse their suspicions, 
especially as the phrase "independence whether within or without` 
w 
the Commonwealth" had been-used freely in discussions. 
102 
The Australian Government also welcomed India's independence. It 
had a relatively progressive policy towards colonial questions and 
approved of the U. K. 's policy. - One historian considers Evatt's attitude 
100. Pearson to Robertson, 2nd June 1947, (no ref, 'ibid ?? ); Mackenzie 
King Record, Vol.. IV, pp. '42-43. 101. Clutterbuck to D. O.; 8th October 1947, D0121/70. 
102. Clutterbuck to King, 7th July 1947, MG26, J. 1, Vol. 422, 
PP. 382827-382828. 
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to have been similar to Attlee's; that because independence was 
inevitable ;. it,: ought to be granted, not postponed. ; Ile also records 
Evatt's willingness to assist India and Pakistan and the appreciation 
of both countries for this offer~which,, led to the request-for"Australia 
to act-as urbiterlin the Kashndr dispute, 
103, 
When Attlee announced 
the appointment of Mountbatten as Viceroy in February 1947, -Evatt 
told the U. K. High Commissioner, Mr. E. Williams, that he, hoped there -., I 
would be no severance of-association between the. Commonwealth and 
India,, and of Australia's intention to maintain close realtions with 
India. 
104 
. Some Australians had their doubts about India's membership. 
R. G. Casey, Australian diplomat, Minister of State in the Middle East 
and-later to become Australian Minister of External'Affairs and Governor- 
General, "recorded that although he thought self-interest would'dictate 
a close British-Indian link, 'Dominion status' was an"artificial+, 
conception for people of a non-British race, which'needed the British 
tribal-instinctSto make it work. 
105 
, This -was not-a dissimilar attitude 
from the, I. O. 's. The New Zealand Government had'a comparable attitude 
to Australia's on colonial policy andaoffered no criticism of U. K. ' 
'policy. -'Both countries were-to play important roles in 1949 when-- 
India's precise association with the Commonwealth was being decided. 
Smuts' attitude to what he-considered the disintegration'of the 
British Empire-(i. e. the independence of 'India, Burma 'and Ceylon) was 
, uncertain', He welcomed the independence of India, but mourned the 
losses. 
106, 
In 1942 Smuts had urged Churchill to take a-positive attitude 
towards India's political aspirations. lie said that 'Dominion status' 
would have to 'follow the war , and , if the U. K. -promised it'then, it would 
be good , for India's war'effort and for relations afterwards) 
07 
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1945, 
- 
however, South Africa's relations with Inndia became tense. 
The Indian Government was protesting at South Africa's treatment of 
its. Indian minority and raised the issue at the U. N. , 
In a letter 
to a friend in March . 
1946, Smuts regretted that fact that the issue was 
to be ventilated there, and predicted that it would put South Africa 
at odds with world opinion and make his country appear more reactionary 
than it was. In a letter of October 1946 Smuts explained South Africa's wish 
to create a European civilisation in Africa and commented 
India is threatening this noble experiment with her vast 
millions who have; frustrated themselves and-now threaten 
to frustrate us ... they are invading, infiltrating, 
penetrating in all sorts of devious ways to reverse the 
role which we have thought our destiny. 108 
Smuts was clearly annoyed at India's policy towards his country. In 
February 1947 he expressed his opposition to U. K. policy. Attlee had 
informed the Dominions of his intention to set a definite date for the 
transfer of power to India. lie thought the effect would be to hand 
over power to Congress and betray the Muslim League; rather than quit, 
the U. K. ought to start negotiations afresh, consulting with the 
Dominions and possibly the U. S. Attlee replied and after apologising 
that the Dominions had been given short notice of his intended statement, 
told Smuts that the U. K. was s{etting a date because it was convinced 
the two parties would otherwise never co-operate to reach a sjolution. 
109 
Smuts was not wholly anti-Indian in the Co-=onwealth context. By 
May 1947 he was anticipating considerable support among "reasonable" 
Indian leaders for Commonwealth membership and offered no protesting 
NO 
110 
comment. The next month he made efforts to normalise relations 
r t, 3 
with India, which had withdrawn its high Commissioner and imposed 
sanctions against South Africa. He told Nehru that he had not taken 
108. Smuts to M. C. Gillet, 3rd March 1946 and 27th October 1946, Smuts 
Papers Vol. VII,, Nos. 701 & 730. 
109. Smuts to Attlee, 16th. February 1947, Attlee to Smuts, 19th February , 
1947, 
Mansergh, India: Transfer to Power, op. cit., Vol. IX, Nos. 409 & 428. 
110. Smuts to D. Moore, 18th May 1947, Smuts Papers Vol. VII, No. 748. 
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action at the IL N. against India's hostile behaviour because he 
wanted to have friendly relations with India and look upon it as a 
"fellow member of the British Commonwealth". He continued 
In'the same spirit the Union had favoured the rise of 
India to her full status of freedom and sovereignty in 
the most recent constitutional developments, and I have 
publicly welcomed this splendid achievement of Indian 
and British statesmanship, and wholeheartedly given it 
such blessing on behalf of Sout Africa as I can. 
111 
Nevertheless, Smuts was prejudiced against the non-European. Writing 
to a friend shortly afterwards, he admitted to being "mildly sceptical" 
of the "political capacity" of the Oriental, and thought that popular 
self-government was "mostly beyond them", citing the mess the Indian 
and Pakistani leaders had made of their countries. By 1949 Smuts was 
extremely pessimistic at the'thought of India's entry on a different 
basis and warned against weak toleration of India which would drain 
the Commonwealth of all substance and significance. 
112 
In August 1947 India became independent; in November 1947 Burma 
received its independence; and in December 1947 the Ceylon independence 
Act was passed. After the June 1948 elections, the new Burmese Government 
announced that it would adopt a republican constitution and not join 
113 
the Commonwealth, assuming that India would behave likewise. By 
contrast Ceylon was moving towards Dominion status and membership of 
the Commonwealth. Its Independence Act was supplemented by agreements 
with the U. K. on defence and external affairs, under which Ceylon undertook 
to adopt and follow the resolutions of past imperial conferences and 
114 
observe the principles and practices of consultation. The key 
to the future remained with India. The U. K. was convinced that its 
decision would be crucial to the action of oth(r colonies gaining 
111. Smuts to Nehru, 16th June 1947, Smuts Papers Vol. VII, No. 755. 
112. Smuts to D. Moore, 23rd September 1947, Smuts Papers Vol. VII, No. 764; 
W. K. Hancock, Smuts Vol. II, The Sanguine Years, 1919-1950 (C. U. 'P. 1968) 
113. 'P. N. S. Manscrgh, The Commonwealth Experience (London, 1969), p. 331. 
114. P. N. S. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth 
Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. II, pp. 749-751. 
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independence, and to the general future of the association. 
In October '1948 the three Minn Prime Mlitlsters joined those of 
the four, older'members and the U. K. at a meeting in London. It was 
not called to discuss the membership of India and Pakistan, which was 
not treated at any'of the formal meetings. Issues of defence, economic 
development and international security were debated, designed to give 
these'three Prime Ministers a better idea of how the Commonwealth. 
functioned. -115 However, the question of membership was inevitably 
broached in, yprivate talks, as'King's diary illustrates. King had 
been worried that'both India and Eire would be forced to leave the 
Commonwealth because of the stress placed on allegiance to the Crown, 
and was anxious to avert the situation "in spite of the Tories who will 
put'all their emphasis on the Crown and symbols" and who would allow 
countries'to leave. ' He thought reality more important than appearance, 
and that in the existing international situation it was vital to 
keep-the Commonwealth together. 
116 
mustrbe kept to the fore". 
"The larger vision is one that' 
He continued in this vein, in London, 
telling Sir A. Lascelles, the King's secretary, and Addison, of the 
danger of raising the question of the Crown's position in relation 
to the°Commonwealth. He said the emphasis should be placed on the 
community of nations-possessing certain ideals, rather than the "symbolism 
of the''Crown". He spoke in similar terms to Nehru. 
117 
In response 
to a comment from St. Laurent that there should be something to make 
the Commonwealth aunit, King rejected the importance of symbols-and 
said'in reality there was no such thing as a Commonwealth "as. an'entity - 
with policies of its own". It was a community of free nations'held 
together'by similar*ideas. 
118 
He noted down a possible basis for the 
115. F. Williams, A 
116.. Mackenzie King 
meeting and st, 
(Eire had just 
Relations Act, 
117. Mackenzie King 
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announced its intention to repeal the 1936 External 
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Record, Vol. IVY pp. 403-404. 
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Commonwealth, to Include any country which at the time, in the past, 
or in the future, gave allegiance to the Crown. lie also thought 
"Commonwealth of Free Nations" would be a more suitable title. 
119 
r The U. K. 's thinking about India had progressed. A memorandum 
of October 1948 on tree general principles of the Commonwealth stated 
that room should be found for independent peoples who could not formally 
accept the full constitutional ties of the Statute of Westminster, 
although nothing should be done to impair the constitutional relationship 
of other members. It continued: "nor is it desirable that the independent 
peoples of the Commonwealth should be formally divided into two classes" 
according to their constitutional position. "There can be scope for 
variety in the relations between the different parts of the Commonwealth". 
As to how far a country could 'deviate' from the relationship, all 
members were asked to recognise the King's role, which would not prevent 
a state from adopting a republican constitution, providing the President 
accepted that he would act as the King's representative in external 
relations. A country offering less than this would be regarded as 
a foreign state, but could choose to be associated with the Commonwealth; 
and this special relationship would 
he acknowledged without implying any 
constitutional link, or any formal union with the association. It 
was thought inexpedient to define precisely what would be meant by 
such an association; the link would emerge in time. 
120 
Although the recognition of the King in external relations was 
similar to the position adopted by Eire in 1936 (ýhich it had just 
decided to renounce) this scheme did contain two new elements. First, 
that a country could possess a 'republican' constitution, if modified 
with regard to foreign affairs. Second, while rejecting a two-tiered 
Commonwealth, a new informal undefined 'associate' relationship was 
119. Personal and Private Memorandum by King, 10th October 1948, MG26, J 4, 
Vol. 237, File 2352, p. 160472. 
120. Draft Statement of General Principle for discussion at October, Hieeting 
of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. CAB134/118, App. to CR(48)5. 
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thought possible, as a solution to the position of India, Eire and 
possibly others. This would not involve actual membership of the 
Commonwealth, and so would not create a two-tier system, but the hope 
was that there would be a close association which would amount to a 
de facto membership. However, this solution had some of the disadvantages 
of two-tiered membership without the benefit of retaining India within 
the association. Although this formula did not provide the basis for 
India's membership, the paper shows a willingness to explore solutions, 
even if the first was rather contrived. The intent is clear from the 
first paragraph - 
Commonwealth policy should be directed towards maintaining 
the existing membership" of the Commonwealth, even though 
some Commonwealth countries (i. e. Eire, India, Pakistan 
and possibly South Africa) may be unable to accept the precise' 
form of constitutional relationship which is preferred by the 
other members. 121 
(It' is not clear to'whom'this memorandum was circulated. It was marked 
Top Secret, but King'was certainly given a copy as it appears in the 
Canadian archives. ) 
The crux for the Commonwealth came'in 1949 with the imminent 
adoption'of India's constitution. By this time it had, become"clear 
that India and Pakistan wanted to remain in the Commonwealth if a suitable 
basis could be found. 122 Between December 1948 and February 1949 the' 
U. K. Committee on Commonwealth Relations, set-up in 1947'(which was a 
Ministerial Committee supported by'a committee-'of officials), considered 
the future structure of the Commonwealth. The-Committee--of officials 
produced a memorandum which suggested-two methods of retaining India, 
within the association. ' "The first was 'to' define the relationship as w ., 
one'cönsisting, of states "which'owe, `or have owed, allegiance to: the Crown", 
e4ual'and freely"associated with each other, `"some by their allegiance. ' 
to'-the'. Crown, and all'by their -acceptance-`of -the principle of consultation 
121. Ibid.; see Garner, op. cit., p. 318. 122. Nehru in conversation with King, October 1948, Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit. 
P. 720. 
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on all matters of common concern" and by the rights of common citizenship. 
The second was that a formal statement redefining the relationship 
might not be necessary (and would certainly attract attention and 
controversy). Instead India could confirm and renew its membership 
when it adopted its republican constitution, the others declaring 
that "India, on becoming an independent republic, is and continues to 
be a member of the Commonwealth". It was acknowledged that this 
second option did not alter the fact that the relationship had been 
altered. The paper suggested that if such a change were permissible 
it was important to avoid the inference that "there was some practical 
or constitutional difference between the republican and the other members", 
for this would lead to a two-tier system not desired by the U. K. or 
{ 
India. The memorandum made it clear that if the change was adopted it 
would be possible, and necessary, to preserve the position of the 
original members, although allegiance to the Crown would no longer be 
"Y L° 
"a feature of the Commonwealth relationship or the essential test for 
Commonwealth membership". The principal problem of this solution was 
the danger of accelerating the tendency towards republicanism and 
possibly weakening the Crown in those countries where the connection 
remained unimpaired. 
123 
These discussions in 1947/8 showed a remarkable change in the U. K. 's 
attitude, especially the D. O. 's. Before the war common allegiance 
to the Craw n had been regarded as the central aspect of the Commonwealth. 
In the 1930s the D. O. had thought neutrality incompatible with 
membership, mainly because it considered common allegiance to mean the 
indivisibility of the Crown. When South Africa and Ireland made references 
to plans for remaining neutral in a war, the D. O. decided not to face 
the issue directly. It accepted that Ireland would be neutral, at least 
123. Memorandum by Committee of officials, 4th February 1949, CR(49)2. See 
also "The Commonwealth Relationship", 23rd February 1949, CR(49)5, 
CAN134/119. 
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to begin with, but refused to declare that this was inconsistent with 
membership and let it lie dormant for the duration of the war. In 
South, Africa's-case, it essentially adopted a, 'wait and see' policy, 
124 
while trying to influence it towards participation. , However, it 
is clear that the D. O., regarded the Commonwealth's-, common link with 
the Crown as the essence of the relationship. As Harding, (P. U. S. 
in the 1930s) minuted, -the Crown was "something much more than the 
symbol of the co-operation of these units. 11125 The D. O. 's capacity 
for flexibility had been shown by the acceptance of the 1935 External 
Relations, Act for Ireland, which limited the King's sovereignty, but 
the attitude of the D. O. before the war indicates that it would then 
have been unthinkable to have any country within the Commonwealth which 
did not possess a common constitutional link with, the Crown. 
By 1948 the U. K. was moving away from too strict an insistence 
on this relationship, while trying to retain an historical tradition, 
perhaps as a substitute for the link, but also in order to differentiate 
the-Commonwealth from any other, group of foreign states. The proposals 
were also remarkably similar to King's own thoughts in October. 1948, 
and may have owed something to him. In February 1949. Attlee called a 
meeting of-Commonwealth Prime Ministers. to discuss the situation, 
and also decided to send emissaries " the Dominions, to hold prior 
discussions with the leaders. Sir Norman Brook, Secretary. to. the 
Cabinet, Was sent to Canada, Mr. P. Gordon-Walker, Under-Secretary, of 
State at the"C. R. O., went to India, Pakistan and Ceylon, Lord Listowel 
went to Australia and New Zealand and Sir Percivale Liesching, P. U. S., 
at the C. R. O., to South Africa. -In his letter to St., Laurent (now 
Prime Minister of Canada), on 25th February explaining the position, 
Attlee said that the issue was whether the basis of the-Commonwealth-could 
be modified to accommodate members with no allegiance to the Crown, 
124. See chapter 1. , 1. 125. Minute by, Harding, 30th March 1937, D035/530, C6/10. (Harding's 
italics. ) 
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which'he""admitted raised the'widest issues, 
126 
`Meanwhile he was 
urging his own Cabinet to accept members' without monarchical 
allegiance. '" He told his'colleagues that the political advantages of 
keeping India in the'ässöciation were so great that they justified' 
adapting the basis of the relationship. He carried his Cabinet with 
him and, form'the 3rd March 1949 the U. K., at least, accepted the 
principle that common allegiance to the Crown was no longer the essential 
feature of the association. 
127, 
India's precise attitude was not known, 
but'Sir A. ' ste, now U. K. High Commissioner in India, sent an appreciation 
of-Nehrü's probablpi position. He thought that the Indian'Prime 
Minister might relent, -''and 'accept a connection with the Crown, if 
he was convinced'that the other-members would refusetmembership otherwise; 
whereas'-if Nehru had an inkling'that India's membership would be 
acceptable on other terms, heiwould press his, objections very strongly. 
128 
The C. R. O. valued, this*appreciation and advised the Prime Minister to 
appraise the other Prime Ministers of it'and warn them not to withdraw 
from their insistence on ,a link with the King until Nehru's proposals 
had been considered+jointly'by them all. "It thought"Mr. Chifley might 
easily be won over- by' Wehru if not warned 
129 
The-1949 Prime Ministers' meeting lasted less than a week and '' 
managed to reach a"satisfactory concludion. The formula adopted'to 
define the Commonwealth relationship seems to'have been first suggested 
by Mr. P: 'Gordon-Walker. 
130 
Realising that it would be, very difficult 
for India to recognise the King'as having any jur, tsdiction over Indian 
affairs, he thought `India might recognise the King's position'in 
relation to the whole'Commonwealth, whichýwouldinot impair'India's 
126. Attlee to St. Laurent, 25th February 1949, MG26-, J4, Vol. 274, File 
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republican status. This idea for recognition of the King as 'llead 
of the Commonwealth' was put to Attlee after Cordon-Walker had returned 
from his mission to Asia-in the spring of 1949. The speed with 
which the meeting reached an agreement was probably due to the extensive 
talks which had been taking place in the Dominion capitals, and to 
Attlee's-introduction from the first meeting of the idea of the King 
as 'Head of'the Commonwealth'. 
Lester-Pearson, who attended in place of St. Laurent, wrote detailed 
notes-on the-meetings and his private conversations. He recorded 
that both Attlee and Sir N. Brook were determined to allow a republican 
India to remain a member, although the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, 
Mr. P. Noel-Baker, was worried about the effect on the political 
development of Pakistan and Ceylon. Pearson met Mr. Malan, the new 
South African Nationalist Prime Minister, whom he expected to create 
problems because of the difficult relations between India and South 
Africa. He was rather surprised to find Malan friendly towards the 
131 
Commonwealth and to India, which, he said, "removed one big hurdle". 
The U. K. had also been apprehensive about South Africa and had not 
always included that Government in its discussions about India. 
132 
Within Commonwealth ranks a division which arose tended to lie between 
Australia and New Zealand on the one side, and the three Asian Dominions 
on the other, with Canada and the U. K. holding the middle ground. The 
antipodean, Dominions strongly emphasised the desire of most members to 
keep their link with the Crown and tried to play dpwn the Indian 
development as a single exception. This was disliked by the Asians, 
especially Pakistan and Ceylon, which wanted to keep the way open 
for altering their constitutional basis in the future. At one point, 
Pearson recorded that Fraser became "more and more British" in his 
131. Pearson's 'Notes on Visit to London, April 19th-30th 1949'. (Private 
Papers of J. W. Holmes. ) (For more details on the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, see J. Eat( ts, In Defence of Canada: Peacemakin 
and Deterrence (Toronto, 1972', pp. 226-257. 
132. Memorandum by Turnbull for Noel-Baker, 7th February 1949, D0121/72. 
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emphasis on the, Crown. ... st 
The term 'llead of the Commonwealth' was acceptable to all in 
principle, with some disagreement over the phrasing. Malan thought 
that the original phrase 'symbol of our association and Head of the 
Commonwealth' could be interpreted as a move towards a centralised 
association', and Pearson agreed Instead, the words 'and as such 
Head'of the Commonwealth' were eventually accepted. The minutes record 
that the expression had no constitutional significance. Eventually 
ä balance between`the'views of all the Ministers was found and"the 
final'communiqueissued at the'end of the meeting noted that India 
had informed the other members of its intention to form a republic 
while`affirming`tier'desire'to remain within the Commonwealth 
and her acceptance of the King as the symbol of the 
free association of its independent member nations 
and as such the Head of the Commonwealth. 
The Governments of the, other countries of the 
Commonwealth, the basis of whose membership of the 
Commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and 
'recognise India's' continuing membership ' in accordance 
with the, terms of the declaration. 
Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand,, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
hereby declare that they remain untied as free and 
equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely, 
co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and 
progress. 133 
On the 27th April, having reached agreement, the eight Ministers waited, 
on the King to inform him of their,. discussions. _George 
VI congratulated 
them on their promptitude, wisdom and tolerance.,. He described the 
solution as a striking example of the, elasticity of the Commonwealth 
system and gave his blessing to the new basis for the Commonwealth 
relationship 
134 
133. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches, op. cit., Vol. II,, p. 846. 134. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 729-730. 
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Summing up the 'conference, 'Pearson thought this a momentous 
occasion. 
We have avoided 'a break in the Commonwealth which might 
have been the beginning of fts end, and we certainly 
have' established a new basis which may be the beginning1 
of something very important and far reaching. 135 
That it was a new beginning was irrefutable. The basis of countries' 
association with the Commonwealth had been changed substantially and 
this step had immediately ensured the entry of three Asian Dominions, 
with the prospect of motte Asian and African countries to follow. The 
Commonwealth had changed from being a closely-knit, 'white', British 
one, based on the consequences of Britain's emigration policy,, to a 
genuinely multi-racial, international one, based on Britain's imperial 
expansion. The one member to be lost to the association was Eire. 
It repealed its External Relations Act in November 1948, 'a few months 
before before the constitutional basis of the. Commonwealth was revised. 
However, it never re-joined the association, despite continuing close 
ties with the U. K. in some areas of policy, especially citizenship. 
The proximity of the twos"events may mislead. The U. K. did not miss 
by 
,a 
few months a chance of preventing Eire from leaving, for it 
had ceased to be an active member of the Commonwealth in 1939 or before. 
The governments and personalities involved in the final negotiations 
of India's membership of the Commonwealth had a bearing on the outcome. 
Those absent included smuts, the stalwart of South Africa's Dominion 
existence whose political career had ended, and King, who had retired. 
Churchill and Menzies were in Opposition. King's absence, was not an 
important factor since Canadian policy was the same, and he had done 
135. Pearson', " "Notes-on'Visit-to London-, ''April 19th 1949 - April 30th 1949", 
o . cit. (During the meeting, on. 22nd April, Pearson met Sir A. Lascelles to inform him of the progress they were making. Lascelles 
thought the formula 'Head of the Commonwealth'-was good and that, the King would be pleased. "He said they, had been looking into the 
question of inclusion of a Republic in an association of monarchies 
and found that it had been done in the Holy. Roman Empire in connection 
with the Republics of Danzig and Lubeck. " Pearson was relieved to hear that the Palace was not likely to object to the compromise being 
worked out. ) 
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much to promote India's membership 
before 1949 (although Pearson 
and St. Laurent were more positive in their approach). The position 
in the other countries is perhaps significant. The Labour parties 
of the U. K., Australia and New 
Zealand 
ensured the Commonwealth's 
continuation in this changed form. This might not have occurred had 
they not been in office. Churchill had been a fierce opponent of 
Attlee's Indian policy and it is probable that had Labour not won the 
1945 election India would not have been in the position of negotiating 
its membership in 1949. '" He accepted the conclusions of the 1949 
meeting with grace and in a helpful speech applauded the-fact that 
"neither the majesty of the Crown nor the personal'dignity of the King 
had been impaired", 136 but had opposed' India's original independence. 
Smuts was not constructive in his public statement, and in letters 
137 
to Churchill he anticipated the reaction in South Africa would be to 
push the Nationalists further on the path to republicanism "as a stepping 
stone to full secession". `tie said the U. K. had acted with full knowledge 
of the consequences, ' but he feared that the Commonwealth could "go 
the way of the Holy Roman'Empire and become nothing but a name, and lose 
all meaning and reality ". 
138' Menzies also spoke against the new 
arrangement, insisting that the Crown's position was the lynch-pin of the 
association and should not have been altered. 
139 
This defence of the 
Crown received little appreciation from George VI, who told Pearson that 
while he had been pleased by Churchill's- speech, ""tie`had little patience. 
with Menzies" and ias "sad" that Smuts had taken the same attitude. 
140 
The attitudes of three deposed Prime Ministers, however prescient they 
may have been, suggest that the new basis for the Commonwealth could not 
have been achieved if they had still been in office., 
136. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 731. 137. Pearson Notes on the 1949 London meeting, op. cit. 138. Smuts to Churchill, 21st May 1949 and 23rd May 1949, Smuts Papers Vol. VII, Nos. 847 & 849. 139. J. Tennant, Evatt, Politics and Justice (London/Sydney, 1970), pp. 192-3. 140. Pearson Notes on 1949 London meeting, op. cit. 
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Conclusion 
It was suggested in a D. O. memorandum'of May 1947 that membership 
of, the Commonwealth 
implies an>obligation to consider one another's interests, 
tomake every effort to ensure that pursuit of individual 
needs and interests is adjusted wherever practicable to 
consideration of the needs and interests of other members 
of the Commonwealth, and to give mutual support where 
practical in all essential matters. 1 
This rather imprecise outline of Commonwealth duties differs little from 
statements made about the association at the 1930 Imperial Conference,, -, 
and by the late 1940s the principles of Commonwealth collaboration had 
changed very little from those of a decade or more earlier. What 
had altered was the position of the members within the international 
community, and while a study of the Commonwealth in the 1940s, does not 
reveal revolutionary changes in the principles of collaboration, it ,.. 
does demonstrate how the U. K. had adapted to new demands, from its,. 
fellow members in the field of foreign affairs, and how its own 
perceptions of the Commonwealth had undergone a transformation. 
There was a consistency in the attitudes of each Dominion throughout 
the period under consideration, despite deviations of their policy. 
Canada was always opposed to the pursuit of a Commonwealth, policy 
merely for the sake of unanimity. It stood by the principle that 
each countryt"s policy had to be decided by its own Government and., Parliament, 
and thought that to attempt to tie members by decisions made at, 
Commonwealth 
meetings would jeopardise the association. The balance., 
between the desire for independent action and continued association 
would be tipped in the direction of the former and lead to the break- 
down of the Commonwealth. Yet the Canadian government firmly believed 
that on major 
. issues'the: Commonweälthwould almost always agree on policy, 
1. D. 0 
Minnt Memorandum "The Structure of the Commonwealth" enclosed in a from Addison to Attlee, 19th May 1947, D0121/10C, No. 73. 
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because their association rested on their likemindedness and community 
of interests. 
2 Between 1944 and 1945 the Canadians co-operated 
closely with U. K. and Commonwealth colleagues and played a leading 
role internationally. It seemed that King's fear of committing 
Canada to any international action had been laid to rest and Canadian 
officials flourished in their new freedom. However, in his last year 
or two of office King became more hesitant about such an active Canadian 
foreign policy and more unpredictable in his decisions. Louis St. 
Laurent, Canada's new External Affairs Minister who was destined to 
take over the leadership from King, believed in a firm positive foreign 
policy, but was at times restrained by King. 
3 
Mr. A. Heeney of the 
External Affairs Department recalls that by the autumn of 1945, after 
he'had left the Paris Peace Conference, King was growing greatly 
fatigued4 and this perhaps explains his increasing unpredictability. 
Once King had retired and St. Laurent assumed the Premiership. Canada 
embarked on a more positive foreign policy, but its attitude towards 
common Commonwealth policies remained unchanged. It wanted to retain 
a flexible association which did not force members to adopt joint 
policies. r, 
The South African government under the leadership of Smuts maintained 
a consistent approach to inter-Commonwealth collaboration and one largely 
determined by the internal divisions within the country. While Smuts 
had his own hopes for the future of the association, particularly 
closer co-operation with Western Europe, and waswin close touch with 
Churchill and other U. K. Ministers, the South African government played 
a diminishing role within the Commonwealth in the 1940s. As the 
strength of the Nationalist Party grei, and the divisions within the 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
,.,, 
Mackenzie King Record Vol. IV, pp. 386-87. 
D. C. Thomson, 'Louis St. Laurent: Canadian', (Toronto, 1967), 
pp. 216-240. 
B. D. Heeney ed., The Things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian 
Public Servant, (Toronto, 1972), P. 90. 
Thomson, op. cit., ch. 10 & C. Stacey, '-Through the Second World War' 
in M. Careless & R. C. Brown The Canadians 1867-1967, Vol. 1, (1969), 
pp. 304-5. 
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country sharpened, Smuts' Government had'to pn y'more attention to' " 
internal policy. '' Moreover its principal' involvement-'at the United'' 
Nations arose from the status of Indians, within South`Africa and the 
dispute with the new Indian"Government. ''When'the Nationalists'won 
the 1948'election the balance Smuts had: tried to retain-'between 
association with, the British Commonwealth and a'degree'of independence 
seemed doomed. Although the new ' Prime' Minister, Dr. Malan, reaffirmed 
South Africa's allegiance to the Commonwealth at the 1949 Meeting, and 
South Africa'stayed in"the association for a further twenty years, the 
politicall'balance had swung' permanently in favour of the Nationalist 
Afrakaaners, which resulted in'more muted'support for the Commonwealth; 
and'South'Africa's racial policies' alienated it from other`members, 
especially-the'new Asian'and Africaci'coüntries. 
The Australian government's policy contained the most"variations` 
during the'1940s; -, but at the end of the decade it, possessed`many' 
similarities with that' of Menzies' government. ' The Curtin government, 
with'Evatt as Minister of External-Affairs, had initiated a more', 
positive, agressive and independent policy during the second half of 
the war and made an attemp't'to forge closer relations with'the U. S. A.?, 
It is extremely doubtful that the Australian government-seriously 'intended 
to replace its close alignment with'the U. K by a similar relationship 
with the U. S. A. Certainly by 1945/6, its traditional-allegiance with 
the' U. K. and the Commonwealth had been reaffirmed but not at- the 
sacrifice of an independent foreign`policy. - Menzies' attcmpts to 
'secure a greater say in the direction of the°war, and Curtin's and 
Evatt's'actions from 1944, whether it U. N.; meetings or during discussions' 
on, U. K. policy, were designed to protect; Australian"interests,, not to bow 
submissively to the"U. K. Under Evatt's. direction the Australian 
. department'of. External Affairs, expanded, as did the'scopeýof Australian 
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foreign policy. The repeated suggestions by the Australian government 
for closer collaboration in Commonwealth policy, and a greater degree 
of unity in the various policies pursued, did not indicate, any desire to 
lose its independence, but rather a desire to have a greater say in 
aspects of Commonwealth policy, especially those concerning the Pacific 
and South East Asian regions. Unlike Canada, Australia felt that its 
interests, were best protected by a greater, rather than lesser, 
involvement in U. K. policy. 
New Zealand maintained an equanimity in its relations towards the 
U. K. which none of the other Dominions quite achieved. - 
It had begun 
the decade content to allow the U. K. to play the dominant role in 
Commonwealth foreign policy and although the scope of its own foreign 
policy increased substantially, New Zealand did not suffer the doubts 
or irritation about its, relations with the U. K. which sometimes plagued 
the other members. This is not to suggest that New Zealand always 
submitted to the U. K. 's, direction. During the war, especially in 
connection with the Pacific theatre of war, Fraser was not slow to, 
indicate his disagreement with the U. K. and, in the discussions concerning 
the establishment of the U. N. the New Zealand government was firm, even 
stubborn, in its views on the Great Power, veto and the right of all 
nations to havera voice in world affairs. 
The early post-war period was unusual inasmuch as the European 
states were badly weakened by their war experiences and, in. contrast 
to subsequent_decades, most of the African and As4an states were still 
under colonial rule. Thus the status of the Dominions within a 
relatively small U. N. increased. They were for the first time. significant 
international actors, not of the first rank, -but nonetheless possessing 
the will, and position to make some impact, especially in collaboration 
with other smaller powers. Their increased interest in foreign affairs 
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inevitably resulted in a concentration on their own regions. 
Another development of some import was the increased representation 
of the Dominions abroad. Apart from protecting their interests and 
establishing a level of representation in keeping with their status, 
this meant that the Dominions no longer relied so markedly on the 
U. K. for information on foreign affairs. Inevitably any material 
passed on by the U. K., however 'factual in content, reflected its general 
view of the world and its particular attitude to the policies of 
foreign governments. Indeed in connection with the supply of information 
to the newly independent India, the F. O. was conscious of the importance of 
educating India in the British perspective upon world affairs. With 
their own representatives posted abroad, the Dominion governments were 
more able to formulate genuinely independent policies according to 
the information received from their own representatives, and had the 
opportunity to shape policies with a more distinctive national flavour. 
This process would take time to develop and not necessarily detract 
from the close community of interests and interpretation within the 
Commonwealth. Another development in Commonwealth representation 
led to a full complement of representatives in all Commonwealth capitals, 
which completed the circle of collaboration and meant that all members 
were fully aware of each other's policies, and did not have to rely 
on the U. K. for discovering the attitudes of their partners, which 
had sometimes occurred in the past. 
If the Dominions were more important international actors, and 
wanted to demonstrate their independence, why did they not only stay 
within the association, but continue to try and strengthen it and improve 
collaboration between the members? Despite their unusually strong 
Position in the 1940s and early 1950s, the Dominions all recognised 
that alone they would be relatively ineffective. They were strong 
enough in comparison with other small states to survive alone, providing 
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no major power were, positively aggressive towards them, and in that,. 
respect secession from the Commonwealth was not wholly tunrealistic. 
However it was quite clear to all of them that within the association.. 
they. would have a great influence over events, not least because 
their close,, collaboration with the U. K,, meant that they were almost 
always better informed., than any other state of comparable size. 
Nor did. any Dominion want to exchange its closerelationship with thee 
U. K., for, client status under another major, power, especially the U. S. A., 
which was,. the. obvious example tor, either the Antipodean, Dominions or 
Canada. The,,, latter, had spent many years trying tor; balance its 
relations between its. powerful, neighbour and , 
its. traditional ally and 
intended to keep that balance., Australia and New, Zealand had experienced 
close association with the U. S. A,, during. the war. and decided that. their 
interests would, be.. protected better by continued association with, the; 
U. K.. Moreover. the Dominions disliked the polarity-of the post-war 
world. and wanted to do all they could to protect the rights of middle 
and minor states and,, create a, genuine international, community of nations. 
Association with the Commonwealth was, felt to be a. way-in which such 
polarity could be reduced. Fundamentally,. the, Dominions realised, that 
on their own,. they were not , strong enough, 
despite, the.. advances they 
had made,, to stand alone; if co-operation could be_achieved without 
undue loss of freedom, this suited their interests. There was however, 
a clear indication that the degree of collaboration they were willing-to 
share with. the U. K. would not be offered without,. ssome changes, and the 
post-war, period saw a shift in the centre, of, gravity of the Commonwealth. 
The U. K. remained the most powerful and influential member, but the 
exclusive right to stage meetings and initiate policy was lost. 
Commonwealth Ministers held meetings in other capitals and collaboration 
between the Dominions and non-members became a recognised and acceptable 
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event, Thus the U. S. took over prime responsibility for the defence 
of Auvtrnlja and New Zealand Canada, the 11. K. and the U. S. were the 
main instigators of the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty; and the 
South East Asia Treaty OrganSisatron 'contained some Commonwealth members 
and other non-members. The association was not so exclusive as it 
had been pre-war and combined more easily with the rest of the 
international community. 
Many aspects of the Dominions' attitudes had remained consistent. 
There remained' a clear division, between the degree of collaboration 
desired by Canada and that by Australia, with New Zealand coming 
somewhere between the two and South Africa comparing somewhat with 
Canada, 'especially after the Nationalist Government' gained power. 
Given these attitudes 'it is not surprising that complaints -continued 
about the modes of the U. K. 's collaboration and that disagreements 
continued on new proposals. With no clear consensus it was difficult 
to create a system which 'satisfied everyone. However, 'the U. K. had 
attempted to fulfil the increased Dominion demands. 
By the late 1940s the machinery for Commonwealth collaboration 
extended through the whole range of ministerial and official positions. 
The meetings between the Prime Ministers occurred more frequently and 
in a more businesslike atmosphere. More contacts were established 
between 
other specialist Ministries. The one omission to the system 
was meetings between Ministers responsible for foreign affairs. Foreign 
policy had always been discussed by the leaders, sometimes accompanied 
by colleague or officials specialising in external affairs, at the 
Prime Ministers' meetings. One reason for this was the tendency of 
Dominion 
leaders to assume the portfolio for foreign policy in 
addition 
to their other duties. King did so until September 1946 when 
St. Laurent became External Affairs Minister and even then King kept a 
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firm rein on Canadian foreign policy. Smuts and Fraser also acted 
as their own foreign ministers; though under Curtin, and later Chifley, 
Evatt, assumed responsibility for Australian foreign policy. 
Churchill's dominance over all aspects of policy during the war had 
tended to perpetuate the practice of confining foreign affairs to 
Prime Ministers'- meetings. - Cranborne had intended suggesting this 
at the 1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, and while he might have mentioned 
n 
record his proposals for defence collaboration. 
, 
At, the 1948 meeting 
the idea to Dominion representatives, the Minutes of the Meeting only 
of Commonwealth leaders there were moves to change this situation. 
A, proposal. for annual or twice yearly meetings of Ministers responsible 
for foreign policy was put forwatd. 
6 
Australia was keenly in favour? 
but Canada and India both had doubts. The Canadian government told 
the U. K. that while it was not opposed to the principle of such 
meetings, it did not want the association to fix definite times for 
them, 
,. 
asthat could give the impression that the Commonwealth was 
being organised 
in order, that some one of them might speak for the others. Sucha situation would be as unacceptable as it would be 
unworkable. 
It concluded by repeating a long held view that it saw 
only danger ahead in any effort either to formalise 
or to change substantially procedures which are already 
working satisfactorily. 
The Indian Government held a similar attitude, and told the U. K. that 
while it welcomed improvements to Commonwealth collaboration, it could 
not accept any formalisation of the machinery. 
9 
The C. R. o. proposed that meetings should be held annually, -"or 
6.1948 Prime Ministers' Meetings, CAB133/88. 7. Minutes 
of meeting between the Lord Chancellor, Noel-Baker, Evatt, Fraser and Pearson, 15th December 1948, D0121/72. 8. Memorandum 
of the Canadian Government, November 1948, D0121/72. See also 
D012]/ meeting between Noel-Baker and Pearson, 8th November 1948, 18ý 9. Indian Government to C. R. O., 27th November 1948 (extract) D0121/72. 
I 
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more frequently if occasion requires". 
l° 
This produced the response 
fron the South'Äfrican government that meetings between Prime 
Minis t' ers'or Foreign Ministers should only take place when neces::. iry 
or''desirable"and that"no fixed time should be`set. 
11 There' was a 
meeting of External Affairs Ministers with the U. K. Foreign Secretary 
in Colombo in 1950, when they discussed recognition of Communist China 
and'aspects of international economic aid. But this event unssnot 
repeated and discussions at the political level continued to be'' 
condýuc'ted'at Prime Ministers' Meetings. 
12 , This was possibly'düe to 
the strength of`past practice and the importance of the subject, 
rather than to objections about set intervals between meetin'gs. ° TheS 
unique organisation of Commonwealth relations within the British's 
government and the closeness of all aspects ofCommonwealth collaboration 
also had a bearing upon this arrangement. Attlee's decision in 1948 
to uphold the responsibility of the C. R. O. for collaboration'with' 
the Dominions in all spheres of policy and not to give the F. O. the 
principal role in foreign policy collaboration, reaffirmed the special 
nature of Commonwealth relations and the need for the U. K. 'to treat the 
partners as particularly intimate associates whose relations with 
the U. K. had to be nurtured and considered in a broad perspective. 
This'did not in itself prevent Meetings of Foreign Ministers; but 
the continuation of direct Prime Ministerial contact combined with 
the special position the U. K. accorded to its Commonwealth partners by 
keeping a separate Ministry'to oversee its relations with them, 
perpetuated the practice of dealing with most issues at the highest 
level and within the general scope of'the association. Thuswhile 
the F. O. and the Foreign Secretary would always play a substantial 
role in collaboration on foreign affairs, it would be achieved in 
10. Minute by C. G. L. Syers, 5th January 1949, ibid. 
11. South African Government to C. R. O. 27th January 1949, ibid. 
12. Garner, op. cit., p. 298. 
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conjunction with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth ReLti'ons ' 
and the Prime Minister, by replacing them. 
While the position of the Dominions was changing, the U. K. was 
also reassessing its own relative decline in power and influence. 
If the"Dominions (and possibly some of the smaller European countries), 
would endorse the'main principles'of U. K'. foreign policy, then 
might not the U. K. be able to match the two greatest powers? This 
did-not necessarily mean formal agreement on common policies. But 
it did'mean that on major issues when the U. K. wanted to negotiate 
on'equal terms with the other two, it would have to be in a position 
to say with-confidence'that it hid the backingof`its partners. Could 
this be achieved at a'time when the Dominions were keen to'demonstrate 
their newly increased independence in world affairs? 
The machinery existed for effective collaboration' at every level, 
a system expanded to accommodate new developments and new requirements. 
Variations in the members' use of those procedures continued. Each 
member decided whether information sent was to`be'regarded as an 
invitation to respond with comment or criticism or support. Much 
also rested on the U. K. 's willingness'tö give'the fullest information 
to its partners at the earliest moment. Despite''the U. K. 's wish for' 
support from the Dominions, there'was a certain reluctance to be 
wholly open, especially on matters of U. K. ''foreign policy. The', 
negotiations of the Russian'and French treaties in 1946 provided an 
illustration of,; this 'and a critical point in the'., 1J: K. 's handling of 
Commonwealth relations. The U. K:, 'and especially the F. O., was" 
not keen to have its own foreign policy, modified'by its-partners-and 
sometimes did''not want "to reveal 'all its aspects Moreover, could'' 
Dominion Governments be told full details of proposed policy'before 
that policy had been approved by the U. K. Cabinet? These questions 
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were raised by the two treaties in 1946 and demonstrated reservations 
on the part of the U. K. While the D. O. wrirned that AuntrAlinn 
reactions could prejudice further collaboration with Australia, "the 
F. O. stuck-firmly to the principle, that the U. K. had to be free to 
decide its own 'policy in its relations with other states, and that 
it, could not give full details of prospective policy. 
The U. K. 's policy on this issue accorded more nearly with Canada's 
than with the Australians'. , 
It is perhaps not surprising. that hav. ng 
pursued an unimpeded independent policy for so many years that the U. K. 
was even more reluctant than some of its partners to sacrifice that. - 
right, unless compelled by a more powerful state. So by the late 
1940s despite. its keenness to promote positive Dominion support for 
its policies, the-U. K. had also clarified the, extent to which it was.., 
willing to co-operate with. its partners and its reluctance to be 
dictated to by them. The new Labour Government in the U. K. did not 
make any dramatic change-to the U. K. 's relations with. the rest of 
the Commonwealth. -Apart from Attlee's policy towards India, which 
was an important departure that would not have been pursued by a 
government under Churchill, there was no significant change in attitude. 
1, The interpretation, of Commonwealth relations which had triumphed., 
by the end of the 1940s was in essence the Canadian one: close contact 
which was not exclusive and permitted co-operation with°non-members; 
flexibility, which-, meant that-some or all members could co-operate 
in a scheme and a functional, practical approach which, resulted in 
collaboration when necessary, but not for the sake, of., demonstrating, 
unity. _ Such-a loose-knit community seemed to have a greater chance 
of success than a more formal association. The. future of Commonwealth 
collaboration would ultimately rest on the., will of, each to make, it 
succeed. However--, one increasingly important aspect of the machinery 
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was the contact between officials in all Commönwealth'capiials'tind 
abroad. Informal contact between officials who knew' and trusted 
each other could provide a way of making sure that embers of the 
Commonwealth knew of possible policies under consideration. In" 
such unofficial exchanges, a Dominion official might indicate any' 
aspect about which his government felt strongly, which could then be 
taken into consideration during the formulation of policy. This is 
not to suggest that U. K. or Dominion officials deliberately'or 
improperly organised leakages of information; but in'the growing 
sphere of official contacts, whether in London, or Moscow or Canberra, 
the opportunity existed and seems increasingly t0 häve'been exploited, 
r .. 
for official and unofficial exchanges of information which, on occasions, 
could do more to aid consensus than formal meetings between Ministers. 
The Dominions had been of value to the U. K. in the 1930s. '` They 
formed part of the British Empire and part of the aura°of British 
power. Their willingness to fight in a future war was regarded as 
important for the military and economic contributions they could make, 
and because it would be proof of the solidarity of purpose within the 
association. In peace-time the Dominions made few initiatives in 
, 
the field of foreign affairs and showed a reluctance to commit themselves. 
The U. K. was not unduly disturbed, providing it felt confident of 
ultimate support. For the U. K. the Commonwealth existed, functioned 
reasonably well, and constituted an asset rather than a hindrance. 
Many of the discussions about the association were concerned with 
its constitutional purity and the practical applications of the Statute 
of Westminster, but many assumptions about the purpose and value of 
the Commonwealth were unspoken or even unconscious. 
After the Second World War the Commonwealth functioned in an 
increasingly hostile and divided world, in which the U. K. no longer 
had so powerful a voice. The Dominions, including the new Asian 
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members, appreciated that co-operative action with the U. K. and 
the other members would strengthen their positions and their capacity 
to wield some influence. The U. K. meanwhile was taking stock of 
its decline internationally, recognised that henceforth the Dominions 
were going to be active and valuable international actors, and wished 
to make the Commonwealth a more positive partnership in order to 
preserve its-own position. The U. K. 's determination to keep India 
within the Commonwealth, because it felt that the power of the 
Commonwealth would be strengthened, and, its, willingness to change the 
basis of the association to accommodate a republican state, indicate 
the U. K. 's new pragmatism. It viewed the Commonwealth in a more 
realistic way, emphasising the practical advantages which could be 
derived because it needed them badly. Some believed that by ending 
the monarchical link the association would be weakened; the centripetal 
forces would prevail and the Commonwealth disintegrate. The fact 
that despite this risk, India was considered so vital to, the association 
reflected the extent to which the U. K. regarded the Commonwealth as 
essential to its post-war position. TheIpositi, on of the Crown itself, 
the one aspect of Commonwealth relations hitherto considered sancrosanct, 
was partially-dismantled as the U. K. -took a realistic look at the value 
of the Commonwealth to itself. 
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Appendix I 
List of Principal Characters 
ADDISON, Dr. Christopher, 1st Vi ount 1945: Minister of Health, 
1919-21; ' Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
1929-31; Dominions Secretary, 1945-47; Commonwealth 
Relations Secretary, 1947; Paymaster General, 1948-49; 
Lord Privy Seal, 1947-51. 
ATTLEE, Clement R., 1st Earl: Leader of the Opposition, 1935-40,1951-55; 
Lord Privy Seal, 1940-42; Dominions Secretary, 1942-43; 
Lord President of the Council, 1943-45; Deputy Prime 
Minister, 1942-45; Prime Minister, 1945-51. 
BATTERBEE, Sir Harold: Senior Assistant Secretary, D. O., 1925; Assistant 
Under-Secretary, D. O., 1930-38; High Commissioner to 
New Zealand, 1939-45. 
BEASLEY, John A.: (Australian) Minister of Supply and Defence, 1941-45; 
Minister of Defence, 1945-46; Resident Minister, U. K., 
1946; High Commissioner to U. K., 1946-49. 
BEVIN, Ernest: Minister of Labour and National Service, 1940-45; Foreign 
Secretary, 1945-51. 
BRIDGES, Sir Edward E. (later Lord Bridges): Entered Treasury 1919, 
Principal Assistant Secretary, 1937-38; Secretary of 
the Cabinet and Permanent Secretary to the offices of 
the Cabinet and to the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
1938-46. 
BRUCE, Stanley M. (later Lord Bruce of Melbourne): Australian Prime 
Minister and External Affairs Minister, 1923-29; various 
Ministerial posts; High Commissioner to U. K., 1933-45. 
BUTLER, Sir Nevile M.: Entered F. O. 1920; Private Secretary to Prime 
Minister, 1930-35; served in Teheran, Berne and 
Washington; Head of F. O. North American Dept., 1941-44; 
Assistant Secretary of State, superintending North 
and South American Depts., 1944-47; Ambassador to the 
Netherlands, 1952-54. 
CADOGAN, Sir Alexander G. M.: Entered Diplomatic Service 1908, served 
various posts abroad, Ambassador to Peking, 1935-36; 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State,. Z. 0., 1936-37; 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, F. O., 1938-46; 
Permanent representative to the U. N. O., 1946-50. 
CAMPBELL, John Dee: Entered F. O. 1920, served at various posts abroad, 
transferred to Dominions Intelligence Dept,, F. O., 
1942-44; posted abroad to Brazil and Panama ending career 
as Minister and Consul-General to Iceland, 1950-53. 
CAMPBELL, Sir Gerald: Consular service, 1907-38; High Commissioner to 
Canada, 1938-41; Minister at Washington Embassy, 1941, 
1942-45; Director of British Information Services, New 
York, 1941-42. 
ii 
CAVENDISH-BENTINCK, Victor F. W.: Entered F. O. 1918, served various 
posts abroad, transferred to Egyptian Dept. F. O., 
1937-39; Head of Dominions Intelligence Dept., 
1940-43; Head of Services Liaison Dept., 1943-45; 
Ambassador to Poland, 1945-47. 
. 
CEAMBERLAIN, Neville: Various Ministerial offices, 1922-29; Chancellor 
of Exchequer, 1931-37; Prime Minister, 1937-40; Lord 
President of the Council, 1940. 
CLARK, William A. W.: Temporary Principal D. O., 1941; Principal, D. O., 
1943; Private Secretary to Dominions Secretary, 1945. 
CLUTTERBUCK, Sir P. Alexander: Principal in D. O., 1929; Deputy High 
Commissioner to South Africa, 1939-40; Assistant 
Secretary D. O., 1940; Assistant Under-Secretary D. O., 
1942-46; High Commissioner to Canada, 1946-52; High 
Commissioner to India, 1952-55; Ambassador to Ireland, 
1955-59; Permanent Under-Secretary C. R. O., 1959-61. 
COCKRAM, Ben: Principal D. O., 1934-39; Political Secretary to High 
Commission South Africa, 1939-44; Counsellor at 
. 
Washington Embassy, 1944-49; Assistant Secretary, 
C. R. O., 1949-51; Deputy High Commissioner to Australia, 
1952-54; Director of Information C. R. O. 1954-57; 
Director of Information Services, C. R. O., 1957-62. 
-CRANBORNE, Viscount (later Marquess of Salisbury): Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary, F. O., 1935-38; Dominions Secretary, 1940-42, 
1943-45; Colonial Secretary, 1942; Lord Privy Seal, 
1942-43; Leader of the House of Lords, 1942-45,1951-57; 
Lord President of the Council, 1951-57. 
CROSS, Sir Ronald: Parliamentary Secretary Board of Trade, 1936-39; 
Minister of Economic Warfare, 1939-40; Minister of 
Shipping, 1940-41; High Commissioner to Australia, 
1941-46; Chairman of Public Accounts Committee, 1950-51; 
Governor of Tasmania, 1951-58.1 
CURTIN, John: (Australian) Leader of the Opposition, 1935-41; Prime 
Minister, 1941-45. 
DENING, Sir M. Esler: Entered F. O. 1938, Far Eastern Dept., 1938-42; 
Chief Political Adviser to Supreme Commander S. E. Asia, 
1943-46; Assistant Under-Secretary, F. O., 1946-50; 
Special Mission to Asia, 1950-51; Ambassador to Japan, 
1951-57; Head of Delegation to &ntarctic Treaty 
Conference, 1959. 
DIXON, Sir Charles: Assistant Secretary at D. O., 1925-30; Assistant 
Under-Secretary, D. O., 1940-48; retired, but retained 
as Constitutional Adviser to C. R. O., 1948-68. 
DUFF, Sir Patrick: Private Secretary to successive Prime Ministers, 
1923-33; Permanent Secretary, Minister of Works and Public 
Buildings, 1933-41; Deputy High Commissioner to Canada, 
1941-44; High Commissioner in New Zealand, 1945-49; 
Church Commissioner for England, 1949-54. 
iii 
EDEN, R. Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon: Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
F. O., 1931-33; Lord Privy Seal, 1934-35;. Minister 
without Portfolio, 1935; Foreign Secretary, 1935-38; 
Dominions Secretary, 1939-40; Secretary for Wnr, 
1940; Foreign Secretary, 1940-45,1951-55; Leader 
of the House of Commons, 1942-45; Prime Minister, 
1955-57. 
EMRYS-EVANS, Paul V.: Parliamentary Private Secretary to Dominions 
Secretary, 1940-41; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of. 
State, D. O., 1942-43. 
EVATT, Dr. Herbert V.: Australian Justice of High Court, 1930-40; 
External Affairs Minister and Attorney General, 1941-49; 
Deputy Prime Minister, 1946-49. 
FINCH, John P. G.: -Consular Service, 1923-44; served temporarily in 
F. O., 1944; appointed to F. O., Head of the Commonwealth 
Liaison Department, 1947-52. 
FLOUD, Sir Francis L. C.: Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, 1920-27; Chairman Board of Customs and 
Excise, 1927-30; Permanent Secretary, Minister of 
Labour, 1930-34; 'Nigh Commissioner to Canada, 1935-38; 
various-other public offices. 
FRASER, Peter: New Zealand Minister for Education, Health, Marine, 
1935-40; Minister in'charge of Police, 1935-49; Prime 
Minister, 1940-49. 
GARNER, J. J. S., Sir Saville, later Lord: Entered D. O., ' 1930, rank 
of Principal, 1940; Private Secretary to successive 
Dominions Secretaries, 1941-43; Senior Secretary at 
High Commission to Canada, 1943-45; Deputy High Commissioner 
to Canada, 1946-48; Assistant Under-Secretary, D. O., 
1948-51; Deputy High'Commissioner to India, 1951-53;. 
High Commissioner to Canada, 1956-61; Permanent Under- 
Secretary, D. O., 1962-68. 
GREENWAY, John D.: Entered F. O. 1920, various foreign postings, 1920-42; 
transferred to F. O. as Counsellor, 1942; Acting Head 
of D. I. D., 1943-44; Acting Head of Economic and . 
Reconstruction Department, 1944 (with H. M. G. Jebb);,., 
Minister to Rio de Janiero, 1944; Minister to Panama, 
1946-50; Minister and Consul-General to Iceland, 
1950-53. 
GORDON WALKER, 9dx Patrick: Parliamentary Private Secretary to H. 
Morrison, 1946; Under-Secretary of. State, C. R. 0.,, 1947-50; 
Commonwealth Relations Secretary, 1950-51; Foreign 
Secretary, 1964-65; Education Secretary, 1967-68. 
HALIFAX, Viscount, later 1st Earl: Viceroy of India, 1926-31; Lord 
Privy Seal, 1935-37; Lord President, 1937-38; Foreign 
Secretary, 1938-40; Ambassador to U. S. A., 1941-46. 
HANKEY, Sir Maurice, later Lord: Secretary to the Cabinet and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, 1916-38; Minister without 
Portfolio in the War Cabinet, 1939-40; Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, 1940-41; Paymaster-General, 
1941-42. 
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ILANKINSON, Sir Walter C.: Entered D. O. 1925; Acting, representative 
to Australia, 1931-32,1935-36; Principal Private 
Secretary to successive Dominions Secretaries, 1937-39; 
Assistant Under-Secretary, D. O., 1940; Deputy High 
Commissioner to Australia, 1943-47; High Commissioner 
to Ceylon, 1948-51; Ambassador, to Ireland, 1951-55. 
IHARLECH, Lord (formerly W. Ormsby-Gore): Postmaster General, 1931; 
1st Commissioner of Works, 1931-36; Colonial Secretary, 
1936-38; North East Region Commissioner for Civil 
Defence, 1939-40; High Commissioner,. to South Africa, 
1941-44. 
HARDING, Sir Edward J.:, Assistant Under-Secretary, D. O., 1925-30; 
Permanent Under-Secretary, D. O., 1930-40; High 
Commissioner to South Africa, 1940-41. 
HOLMES, Stephen: Principal, D. O., 1928; Senior Secretary, lIigh,,, 
Commission in Canada, 1936-39; D. O. representative, 
Washington, 1943-44; Deputy High Commissioner, to 
Canada, 1944-46; Under-Secretary at Board of Trade, 
1946; Second Secretary at Board of Trade, 1947-51; 
Deputy Under-Secretary, C. R. O., 1951-52; High 
Commissioner-to Australia, 1952-56. 
INSKIP, Sir Thomas, later Lord Caldecote: Minister for Co-ordination.. 
of. Defence, 1937-39; Dominions Secretary, 1939 Jan. -Sept.; 
Lord Chancellor, 1939 - May 1940; Leader of the House 
of Lords, May - Oct. 1940; Dominions Secretary, May - Oct. 
1940; Lord Chief Justice, 1940-46. 
ISMAY, General Sir H. L., later Lord: Deputy, Secretary to Committee.,,,. 
of Imperial Defence, 1936-38; Secretary-to Committee, 
of Imperial Defence, `-1938; Chief of Staff to Minister 
of Defence, 1940-46; Deputy Secretary to dar Cabinet, 
1940-45; Chief of Staff to Viceroy, 1947; Commonwealth 
Relations, Secretary, 1951-52; Secretary General to 
N. A. T. O., 1952-57. 
JAMES, J. Morrisv i.: a 
Entered, D. O. 1939; Private Secretary, to Permanent 
Under-Secretary, 1940; Assistant Secretary at High 
_ Commission to South Africa, 1946-47; Head of Defence 
Dept., C. R. O., 1949-51; Head of Estab. Dept., C. R. O., 
1951-52; Deputy High Commissioner to Pakistan, 1955-56;, 
Adviser to Prime Minister, Jan. -Feb. 1958; Deputy 
High Commissioner India, 1958-61;., High Commissioner 
to Pakistan, 1961-1966; Deputy, Under-Secretary at C. O., 
1966-68; Permanent Under Secretary at C. O., Mar. - Oct. 
1968; High Commissioner to India,, 1968-71; High 
Commissioner to Australia, 1971-73. 
JEBB, Cladwyn, later 1st Baron Cladwyn: Private Secretary to Permanent 
Under-Secretaries of State, 1937-40; Ministry of 
Economic Warfare with temporary rank of Assistant Under- 
Secretary, Aug. 1940; Acting Counsellor, F. O., 1941; 
Head of Economic and Reconstruction Dept., F. O., 1942-44; 
Head of Reconstruction Dept., F. O., 1945; Assistant, - - 
Secretary-General, 1946; Deputy Under-Secretary, P. O., 
1949-50; Permanent representative. at U. N. O., 1950-54;.,, 
Ambassador to France, 1954-60. 
V 
JOY, Michael, G. L.: Entered F. O., 1947, Commonwealth Liaison Department, 
1947-48; Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary,. 
1948-50; served at various posts abroad, 1950-64; 
seconded to the Cabinet Offices 1964-66; returned to 
F. O., 1966-68. 
KING, W. L. Mackenzie: Canadian. Minister of Labour, 1909-11; Leader 
of Canadian Liberal : 'arty, 1919-141; 1'r the Minister, 
1921-26,1926-30,1935-48; External Affairs t-linister, 
1921-30,1935-46. 
LAW, Richard K., later Lord Coleraine: Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, 1940-41; Parliamentary Under-Secretary at F. O., 
1941-43; Minister of State, F. O., 1943-45; Minister 
of Education, 1945. 
LIESCHING, Sir Percivale: Staff of High Commission to Canada, 1928-32; 
Political Secretary, High Commission to South Africa, 
1933-35; official Secretary High Commission to Australia, 
1936-38; Assistant Under-Secretary, D. O., 1939-42; 
seconded to Board of Trade, 1942-46; Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Food, 1946-48; Permanent Under Secretary, 
C. R. O., 1949-55; High Commissioner to South Africa, 
1955-58. 
MACDONAILD, Malcolm J.: Dominions Secretary, 1935-38; 1938-39; Colonial 
Secretary, 1938-40; Minister of Health, 1940-41; High 
Commissioner to Canada, 1941-46; various posts abroad, 
including High Commissioner to India, Governor-General 
and Commissioner General to S. E. Asia, and many posts 
in Africa. 
MACHHTIG, Sir Eric G.: Assistant Under-Secretary, D. O., 1936-39; Deputy 
Under-Secretary, D. O., 1939; Permanent Under-Secretary, 
D. O., 1940-49. 
MASSEY, Vincent: Canadian Minister to Washington, 1926-30; High 
Commissioner to U. K., 1935-46; Governor-General Canada, 
1952-59. 
NASH, Sir Walter: Secretary to New Zealand Labour Party, 1922-32; 
Minister of Finance, 1935-49; Prime Minister, 1957-60. 
NEWTON, Sir Basil C.: served in Peking, 1925-29; Berlin, 1930-37; 
Prague, 1937-39; Ambassador to Iraq, 1939-41; Assistant 
Under-Secretary supervising Dominions Intelligence 
Department, F. O., 1943-46; with position of Liaison 
Officer to Dominion High Commissioner. 
PAGE, Sir Earle C. G.: Leader of Australian Country Party, 1919-39; 
Minister of Commerce and Deputy Prime Minister, 1934-39; 
Prime Minister, 1939; Special representative to U. K., 
1940-41; Accredited representative to U. K. War Cabinet, 
1941. 
PEARSON, Lester B.: Entered Canadian External Affairs Dept., 1928; 
Counsellor to High Commission in London, 1935-40; 
External Affairs, Ottawa, 1940-42; Minister in Washington, 
1942-45; Ambassador in Washington, 1945-46; Under- 
Secretary of State, (1xternal Affairs, 1946-48; Minister for External Affairs, 1948-57; Prime Minister, 1963-68. 
vi 
PRICE, C. R.: Assistant Secretary, D. O., 1940-48. 
ROBERTSON, Norman A: Entered Canadian External Affairs Dept., 1930; 
Under Secretary of State, 1941-46; High Commissioner in 
London, 1946-49,1952-57; Secretary to the Cabinet, 
1949-52; Ambassador to the U. S. A., 1957-58; Under- 
Secretary of State, External Affairs, 1958-64. 
SARGENT, Sir Orme G.: Entered F. O., 1906; Assistant Under-Secretary 
of State, 1938-39; Deputy Under-Secretary, 1939-46; 
Permanent Under-Secretary, 1946-49. 
SHANNON, G. E. Boyd: Entered D. O., 1930; official Secretary in High 
Commission to New Zealand, 1939-41; Assistant Secretary 
and Head of Foreign Affairs Department, D. O., 1945-48. 
Deputy High Commissioner to Canada, 1948-50; Deputy 
High Commissioner to Calcutta, 1952-56; Assistant 
Under-Secretary, C. R. O., 1956-68. 
SMUTS, Field Marshal J. C.: Member of U. K. Imperial War Cabinet, 1917-18; 
South African Prime Minister, 1919-24,1939-48. 
STEPHENSON, Sir John: Under-Secretary, D. O., 1940-48. 
St. LAURENT, Louis: Canadian Minister of Justice, 1941-1946; External 
affairs Secretary, 1946-48; Prime Minister, 1948-57. 
WHISKARD, Sir Geoffrey: Home Office, 1911-22; Colonial Office, 1922-25; 
joined D. O., 1925, Assistant Under-Secretary, 1931-36; 
High Commissioner to Australia, 1936-41; Permanent 
Under-Secretary Ministry of Works, 1942-46. 
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Appendix II 
United Kingdom Ministers 
Prime Minister « 
May 1937 - May 1940 
May 1940 - July 1945 
July 1945 - October 1951 
Neville Chamberlain 
Winston S. Churchill 
Clement R. Attlee 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
December 1935 - February 1938 R. Anthony Eden 
February 1938 - December 1940 Viscount Halifax 
December 1940 - July 1945 R. Anthony Eden 
July 1945 - March 1951 Ernest Bevin 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
November 1935 - May 1938 Malcolm MacDonald 
May 1938 - October 1938 
October 1938 - January 1939 
January 1939 - September 1939 
September 1939 - May 1940 
May 1940 - October 1940 
October 1940 - February 1942 
February 1942 - September 1943 
September 1943 - August 1945 
August 1945 - July 1947 
Lord Stanley 
Malcolm MacDonald 
Sir Thomas Inskip 
R. Anthony Eden 
Lord Caldecote 
Viscount Cranborne 
Clement R. Attlee 
Viscount Cranborne 
Viscount Addison 
w 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
July 1947 - October 1947 Viscount Addison 
October 1947 - February 1950 Philip J. Noel-Baker 
Canada 
1921-1926,1926-1930 
1930-1935 
1935-1948 
1948-1957 
South Africa 
1924-1939 
1939-1948 
1948-1954 
Australia 
1932-1939 
1939-1941 
1941, Aug. -Oct. 
1941-1945 
1945-1949 
New Zealand 
1935-1940 
1940-1949,; 
India 
1947-1964. 
Pakistan 
1947-1951 
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ARpendix III 
Dominion Prime Ministers 
«4 
W. L'. M. King 
R. B. Bennett 
W. L. M. King 
L. St. Laurent 
J. B. M. Hertzog 
J. C. Smuts 
D. ' F. Malan 
J. A. 'Lyons 
R. G., Menzies 
A. Fadden 
J. Curtin 
J. B. Chifley 
M. J. Savage 
P. 
-Fraser., 
J .. Nehru 
L. A. Khan 
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Appendix IV 
United Kingdom Nigh Commissioners in the Dominions 
Canada 
r 1935-1938 Sir Francis L. C. Floud 
1938-1941 Sir Gerald Campbell 
1941-1946 Malcolm MacDonald 
1946-1952 Sir Alexander Clutterbuck 
1936-1941 Sir Geoffrey Whiskard 
1941-1946 Sir Ronald Cross 
1946-1952 Edward J. Williams 
South Africa 
1935-1940 Sir William Clark 
1940-1941 Sir Edward Harding 
1941-1944 Lord Harlech 
1944-1951 Sir Evelyn Baring 
New Zealand 
1939-1945 Sir Harol4, Batterbee 
1945-1949 Sir Patrick Duff 
India 
1946-1949', Terence H. Shone 
Pakistan w 
1947-1951 Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith 
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Appendix V 
Dominion Governor4-General 
Canada " 
1935-1940 Lord Tweedsmuir of Elsfield 
1940-1946 Major General the Earl of Athlone 
1946-1952 Field Marshal, Viscount Alexander of Tunis 
Australia 
1936-1944 Brig. -General Lord Gowrie 
1944-1945 Major-General Sir Winston J. Dugan (Acting) 
1945-1947 II. R. H. the Duke of Gloucester 
1947-1952 W. J. Mckell 
South Africa 
1937-1943 Sir Patrick Duncan 
1943-1946 N. J. de Wet (Officer Administering the Government) 
1946-1951 Major G. Brank van Zyl. 
New Zealand 
1935-1941 Viscount Galway 
1941-1946 Lord Newall, Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
1946-1952 Lieut. -General Sir Bernard Freyberg 
India 
1947-1948 The Earl Mountbatten of Burma 
Pakistan 
1947 M. A. Jinnah 
1947_1951 
Khaja Nazimuddin 
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Appendix VI 
Dominion High Commissioners in the United Kingdom 
Canada 
1935-1946 Vincent Massey 
1946-1949 Norman A. Robertson 
r) 
Australia 
1933-1945 Stanley M. Bruce 
1946-1949 John A. Beasley 
South Africa 
1929-1939 
1939-1942 
1942-1944 
1944-1948 
New Zealand 
1936-1951 
India 
1947-1952 
Pakistan 
1947-1952 
C. T. to Water 
S. 'F. Waterson 
Colonel Deneys Reitz 
C. Heaton Nicolls 
.rd 
William J. Jordan 
'T ' 
- F 
V. K. `Krishna Menon 
Habib I. Rahimtoola 
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